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Abstract 
 
How does the international community understand and apply the right of 
self-determination?  Who holds this right: individuals, peoples, nations, states, 
ethnicities, minorities, majorities?  What limits are there to the exercise of this 
right and which claims are ‘valid’ and which are not?  This thesis addresses these 
issues as it seeks, above all, to answer the question of when, why and in what 
ways the international community’s understanding of and normative responses 
to self-determination have evolved.  
To do so, Part I explores critically the theories and history of 
nationalism, human rights, sovereignty and self-determination to explain the 
challenges of ‘emerging nationalism’ (defined herein as nationalism within 
established multi-national states aimed at altering the constitutional and/or social 
standing of the nation vis-à-vis the larger political entity).  This part identifies 
the genesis of the interconnected ideas of identity, human rights, and 
sovereignty and begins to trace the evolution of the norm of self-determination 
over time as it has been conceived and employed by international society.  It 
suggests new approaches to these concepts based within the liberal democratic 
tradition, which are, arguably, more philosophically coherent than other 
explanations for self-determination.   
Part II assesses international normative responses to state fragmentation 
and national liberation prior to the end of the Cold War to determine how 
much they have resembled the interpretation of national self-determination 
suggested in Part I, contending that the conceptual evolution of self-
determination can only be interpreted accurately by understanding the parallel 
evolution and development of international society.   
Part III examines the evolution of self-determination and emerging 
nationalism in the post-Cold War era, asking whether the norms generated by 
the present-day society of states are consistent with the theoretical and 
historical observations made earlier.  The recent case of Kosovo is examined in 
detail as it best suggests the present trajectory of international norms and 
responses to emerging nationalism. 
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Introduction 
 
At the Palace of Versailles in early 1919 as the great powers that were left 
standing at the end of the war began to reconstruct the shattered and bankrupt 
dynamics of international relations and domestic authority, Woodrow Wilson 
interjected the concept of self-determination into the debate.  He confidently 
believed that self-determination would be one of the guiding precepts of the 
new era of democracy that he hoped would emerge from the otherwise pointless 
devastation wrought by the war.  For Wilson, the war had been ‘to make the 
world safe for democracy’1 and he considered, correctly, that self-determination 
was central to the workings of democracy and that it would have to play a part in 
any just and lasting peace. 
The story of how such hopes were systematically thwarted through 
design, ignorance, apathy and carelessness at Versailles is well known.  The 
unequal and uneven use of the principle caused disappointment and frustration 
to Wilson and others who subsequently felt that Versailles failed to make self-
determination a coherent and accepted norm in international activity.2  The 
practical complexities associated with the application of the concept proved 
extremely challenging, as Wilson himself later admitted.  ‘When I gave 
utterance to those words, I said them without the knowledge that nationalities 
existed, which are coming to us day after day…You do not know and cannot 
appreciate the anxieties that I have experienced as the result of many millions of 
people having their hopes raised by what I have said.’3  Robert Lansing, Wilson’s 
Secretary of State, was even more critical of the notion of self-determination 
fearing the uncertain consequences of its use.  He stated that while the idea was 
highly relevant, it was ‘loaded with dynamite’.4   
Many of the challenges Wilson and the others faced at Versailles are 
intrinsic to the concept, as self-determination necessarily involves the emotions, 
values and the collective will of people and tests the limits and legitimacy of 
political authority.  When self-determination is combined with the potent force 
of nationalism, especially when seeking to redefine power relations within or 
eliminate existing states (as was the case in 1919) the challenges of how to 
                                                        
1 Woodrow Wilson, ‘Speech to Congress for a Declaration of War Against Germany’, 2 April 
1917 [http://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/todays-doc/index.html?dod-date=402]. 
2 However, Buchheit contends that the application of self-determination along ‘national’ lines in 
the period immediately following the First World War, with all its failures, solved about 50% of 
Europe’s ‘minority problems’ in one move.  See Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-
determination (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978), 120. 
3 Wilson in Buchheit, Secession, 115. 
4 Robert Lansing in Alfred Cobban, The Nation-state and National Self-determination (London: 
Collins, 1969), 62. 
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respond coherently and consistently from a normative standpoint become 
extremely great.  
As with all ideas and forces that affect international activity, self-
determination is broadly dependent on and shaped by two factors: the context 
of international affairs in which the concept operates and its relative importance 
vis-à-vis other ideas and forces.  These two factors determine how self-
determination is defined and understood, how it is applied and whether it is part 
of the norms that govern the interactions of the various actors that control 
world politics at a given time.  However, as self-determination interacts on so 
many levels with other vital concepts like identity, authority and legitimacy, its 
significance to international affairs is especially contentious, not only as to what 
it means and who has a legitimate right to exercise it but also about what limits 
may be justly applied on its exercise.  Additionally, because it often involves a 
direct challenge to the existing international as well as the internal order, it 
raises further questions about who judges the validity of claims, how it ranks in 
relation to other competing norms and considerations that policy makers and 
other actors weigh up as they try to shape and direct events.  As such, self-
determination is a singularly slippery concept, open to multiple understandings 
and different applications.   
Lansing appreciated the difficulties contained within the concept and 
openly postulated about them, yet despite the accuracy of his verdict, self-
determination proved irrepressible, as did the concomitant challenges it 
presented.  During the Second World War, self-determination emerged as a key 
principle in the stated war aims of both the Allied Powers and, surprisingly, the 
Axis countries as well, and at the end of the war, self-determination became an 
established, explicitly expressed norm of international society in the Charter of 
the United Nations.  Self-determination was at the very heart of decolonisation 
in the post-World War II period, an operative principle of numerous 
international treaties and covenants in the late-twentieth century and remains a 
peremptory norm of international relations in the post-Cold War era, where it 
has proved extremely pertinent.  In fact, even before Wilson expressed his 
desire to construct politics and the new international system around self-
determination, the concept had been part of the intellectual and political milieu 
of (at least) Europe and the Atlantic community.  The use of the concept by 
states acting alone or in concert with others stretches back to the seventeenth 
century, when the present-day structure of relations between states first 
coalesced, and self-determination’s intellectual roots run deeper still.  
Yet, if anything, the perennial challenges that self-determination 
presents to the international community have intensified since 1919 rather than 
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receded.  The persistent, fundamental questions abound: is self-determination a 
right or a principle in international relations?  Who holds the right: individuals, 
nations, peoples, states, ethnicities, minorities, majorities, etc.?  What limits can 
be placed on its exercise, what claims are valid and, importantly, which are not?  
What is the relationship of self-determination to democracy and to state 
sovereignty?  Moreover, these normative queries collide together when policy 
responses are formed, raising further concerns such as whether force should be 
used to support or deny a movement that bases its actions on a right of self-
determination and whether the concept can be employed legitimately to 
fragment a sovereign state or to change its internal dynamics.  
This study explores these questions and the theory and the history of 
self-determination from the standpoint of the international society of states to 
answer the overarching question of when, why and in what ways the 
international community’s understanding of and responses to self-determination 
have evolved.  To do so, it examines self-determination’s status as a norm of 
international activity by tracing the concept’s theoretical roots and the history 
of international responses to claims based on it and by analysing self-
determination’s evolution as a norm over time through an examination of a few 
critical events and cases that defined and continue to shape its trajectory.   
In taking this approach, this study consciously looks for linkages between 
the practice of states and the international community and the ideas and norms 
on which they base their responses to situations involving self-determination.  It 
also seeks to show not only how these ideas have been debated and understood 
at various historical moments with differing strategic and political 
circumstances, but to discern the intellectual roots of the idea of self-
determination and then to see in what ways these ideas are employed by the 
society of states, gauging to what extent practice meets theory.  In so doing, it 
attempts to get at the aforementioned slipperiness that surrounds self-
determination, asserting that at least part of this slipperiness stems from a 
divergence between the international community’s norms and responses and the 
intellectual foundations of the concept.   
The fracture between the theory and the application of self-
determination has proved very significant over time, especially since the mid-
twentieth century when self-determination became an accepted norm of 
international politics.  Like most other ideas and values on which international 
society rests, self-determination has specific intellectual origins that imbued the 
concept with very particular attributes, logical parameters and implications, and 
while the concept has been and remains open for debate and interpretation, 
international norms that ignore or run contrary to these ‘roots’ are more likely to 
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result in inconsistent or incoherent responses to actual or threatened state 
fragmentation.  
Much of the current scholarship on self-determination does not approach 
the subject with these sensitivities in mind and is either too divorced from these 
philosophical matters or gives only cursory attention to them.  Few accounts 
since Alfred Cobban’s and Rupert Emerson’s treatments of self-determination 
have attempted to link directly the responses of the international community to 
both the history and the theoretical underpinnings of the concept.5  These 
works offer insights into not only what happened during various movements for 
national liberation and state fragmentation, but they also pay careful attention 
to the motives and rationale of those who sought to challenge the existing order 
as well as those who opposed them, and also of the international community as 
it responded to these challenges.  Their sensitivity to the dialogical exchanges of 
the parties involved in these episodes and the ideas on which such movements 
were defended and opposed throws much light on the meaning of self-
determination and its evolution as a norm of action in international politics.  
Through such a lens, Cobban and Emerson offer a fuller and more satisfactory 
survey of self-determination, nationalism and state fragmentation than most 
other contemporary examinations.  
Nonetheless, while these studies are excellent, they are dated, focusing 
on the challenges of nationalism and self-determination that were germane at 
their time of writing, and neither scholar could take account of the massive 
expansion of scholarship on nationalism, identity and the ethics of human 
groups over the past thirty years.  Additionally, these works also predate the 
intense debate about the role and importance of ideas in the formation of norms 
ushered in by social constructivist theories, and as indicated below, this is a very 
relevant development, since the interpretation and understanding of ideas has a 
great impact on the application of self-determination and its evolution as a 
norm.  Of course, these shortcomings are also evident in more recent 
examinations of self-determination, the bulk of which have focused on specific 
cases or on the legal or strategic aspects related to the concept.  While many of 
these studies are extremely valuable (and are scrutinised when relevant in this 
investigation), a more penetrating and satisfying inquiry of the normative status 
of self-determination must take this broader view advocated above. 
It is a major contention of this study that ideas are fundamentally 
significant to the formation and evolution of norms, self-determination 
included, and that when the practice of the international community and                                                         
5 Cobban, The Nation-State and Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1960). 
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individual states adheres more closely to the ideas and understandings that 
constitute such norms, the stronger and more potent such norms become.  
While it is possible to question the reach and influence of international norms, 
their existence and utility are beyond serious reproach.  In a world where 
international interactions are increasingly governed by agreed norms and 
accepted patterns of behaviour, shared understanding, appreciation and 
enforcement of such norms will occur far more frequently when the theories on 
which such rules are founded are likewise understood and appreciated.  On the 
other hand, when the practice of the international community and of individual 
states is inconsistent with these norms or, at the extreme, runs contrary to them, 
the meaning, integrity and utility of these norms are all lessened and the force 
these norms have in guiding and shaping international relations could degrade 
further, perhaps to the point of irrelevancy.   
Yet, norms do not exist timelessly.  Far from it, they evolve over time, 
and this evolution is subject to the interactions, debates, policies and responses 
to events taken by states, international organisations and other non-state actors.  
Moreover, there is no predetermined direction in which these norms will evolve, 
regardless of the ideas on which they are based or the subjects they seek to 
define and circumscribe.  In other words, this evolution is not a teleological 
process.  While norms may shift and change for innumerable reasons, and while 
there might be a direction in which norms ought to evolve (which this study 
suggests is the case with self-determination), there is no certainty as to the 
direction or momentum of such changes.  There is often a potent clash and 
mixing of ideas at work in the creation and shaping of the norms that lie at the 
heart of international society and, at the same time, individual norms frequently 
collide and compete with other norms.  Thus norms not only evolve but have to 
be understood contextually, and it is this context that in turn helps to shape and 
define the international system, the legitimate actors within it and the rules and 
procedures these actors employ.   
As one of these norms, self-determination is subject to this kind of 
evolution, and this examination does not attempt to gauge just what the concept 
means or how it has been applied in a static fashion but instead tries to explore 
self-determination’s dynamic evolution over time through an analysis of selected 
normative responses of the international community.  Doing so outlines more 
clearly the concept’s trajectory and its shifting role in international activity.  
However, examining self-determination’s evolution through the lens of the 
international community’s normative responses raises questions about the 
assumptions and methodology involved in this process.   
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Drawing in part on social constructivist theories of international 
relations, this inquiry considers ideas as not only meaningful but constitutive, 
especially on the normative plane.  Social constructivist interpretations of 
international relations usefully and accurately direct attention to the links 
between institutions, their structures and procedures and to the ideas and norms 
that compose and guide them.6  As mentioned previously, norms are, by 
definition, ideas and understandings that constitute, guide and limit the practice 
of states and other actors within the international community, something akin 
to what Christian Reus-Smit calls ‘constitutional structures’.7  As J. Samuel 
Barkin and Bruce Cronin have noted, these normative structures, whether 
formalized or ad hoc, have an impact that is equal to if not greater than strategic 
and legal considerations.8  These structures provide the foundation for, give 
substance to and continually inform the workings of the international 
community.  
Moreover, as Alexander Wendt indicates, the sovereign states and other 
constituents who comprise the international system are not bystanders in this 
process: their interactions over time create and modify the very structure and 
nature of this system of which they are a part.  When Wendt suggests that 
‘anarchy is what states make of it’, in reference to the assertion of an ‘anarchical 
society’ of states, he highlights the contingent nature of the structures and 
norms created by states and others and the fact that these are not givens and 
that they are not set in stone.  For Wendt, even the sovereign state, the basic 
building block of the current international system, is ‘an ongoing 
accomplishment of practice, not a once-and-for-all creation of norms that 
somehow exist apart from practice.’9   
Reus-Smit and Cronin build on this in their respective treatments of the 
nature of the state and of international society by emphasizing the role that 
identity and culture play in the practice of groups in international affairs.10  Both 
authors rightly posit that rather than a perpetual clashing of ‘interests’, the 
international society of states creates meaningful institutions through 
ontological and intersubjective understandings of ideas and their social and                                                         
6 Relevant examples include Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, 46: 2 (1992) and Wendt, Social Theory 
of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Friedrich Kratochwil, 
Rules, Norms and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); J. Samuel Barkin, 
International Organizations: Theories and Institutions (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); J. 
Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, ‘The State and Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of 
Sovereignty in International Relations’, International Organization 48:1 (1994).  
7 Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1999), 30-33. 
8 Barkin and Cronin, ‘The State and Nation’.  
9 Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’, 413. 
10 Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose and Bruce Cronin, Community Under Anarchy: Transnational 
Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
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political interactions.  As Reus-Smit puts it,  ‘[s]ocieties of states are 
communities of mutual recognition; they are bound together by intersubjective 
meanings that define what constitutes a legitimate state and what counts as 
appropriate state conduct.’11  Bruce Cronin goes further, stating that: 
 
the sovereign state develops its identity as a state through its 
associations within the nation-state system, and its unique 
consciousness is formed by differentiation from other states… In 
contemporary international society the creation and re-creation of 
conceptual boundaries continues to play a vital role in the 
development and transformation of identities and interests.12 
 
Thus, at the core of the international community lies an interlinked dynamic 
exchange of ideas and identities that are mutually understood and cooperatively 
shaped, and these in turn shape, define and constrain the interests and actions of 
states and create structures that provide meaning and direction to international 
activity.   
Because these contextually dependent shared understandings are of such 
great import to the foundation of international society, language and dialogue, 
the mechanisms by which these understandings are communicated, are essential 
components in the iteration of the structure of this community.  How states 
express themselves, both in terms of what they say and the medium selected for 
communication, how they justify their actions and how and when they debate 
the rightness of others’ actions and ideas creates a dialogical space and a shared 
idiom for interactions.  Over time this dialogue shapes and changes norms and 
institutions.  As Barkin asserts, international institutions ‘encourage dialogue 
and communication among states as a first response to disagreements, and they 
foster rules-based, rather than power-based, dispute settlement in a variety of 
functional realms’.  He adds that, as international institutionalization increases 
over time, there is a more general change to ‘the basic expectations of states and 
foreign policy makers about how international relations work’.13  Accordingly, a 
primary methodology of this study is interpreting the dialogue that surrounds 
and pervades the debate about self-determination with these sensitivities in 
mind while also incorporating an analysis the historical, theoretical and strategic 
context in which that debate occurs.   
However, despite proceeding from these understandings, this 
examination departs from a few of the premises behind some social 
constructivist and communicative theories of international society, as the ideas                                                         
11 Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose, 156. 
12 Cronin, Community Under Anarchy, 26 and 28. 
13 Barkin, International Organizations, 133. 
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and identities on which norms form are rarely either open-ended or capable of 
entirely subjective interpretation.  Ideas often have a discreet and contextually 
specific heritage that shapes and defines them, rendering them far less open to 
interpretation than some constructivist arguments imply.  At a minimum, many 
concepts (like identities) have well-defined intellectual, historical and cultural 
foundations from which deployment and interpretation should be based, and 
this is especially the case with self-determination.  As Friedrich Kratochwil 
asserts, ideas that form the basis of collective action need to resonate on some 
level with those discussing them and that through the process of this discourse, 
these ideas become collectively shared and often morph into norms that govern 
collective behaviour.14  While discourse is a quintessential element of 
constructing norms, finding shared purpose and understanding requires the 
creation of norms that are based on coherently and mutually understood 
rationales, and this is more likely to occur when the philosophical roots of these 
ideas are apparent and the logic underlying them is appreciated and accepted by 
those debating them.  Just because institutions and norms are understood 
intersubjectively and constructed in a social dynamic, this does not imply that 
the ideas and values on which they are constructed can be construed in any way 
that is desired.   
Ideas and values often have an intellectual foundation that serves to 
delimit the extremities of debate and the construction of norms and institutions 
built around them.  While there may be considerable philosophical elasticity to 
these concepts, particularly over time as the context in which these ideas are 
debated shifts, the context in which they developed is usually more fixed and of 
great importance.  Moreover, when attention turns to the ideas and concepts on 
which the fabric of the international system is constructed, such as is the case 
with self-determination, actions that fly in the face of these ideas or ignore their 
historical context may lead to incoherent norms or unsound institutions.  
Conversely, closer adherence to and better understanding of the intellectual 
foundations of the ideas and values on which norms are based might lead to more 
stable and more effective institutional arrangements that will better serve those 
who created and continue to shape such norms and structures.  
For example, much of the current controversy over the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) centres on the application (or misapplication) of liberal 
economic theory and the norms and practices related to free trade.  Many 
contend that the WTO’s actions, far from assisting the growth of less                                                         
14 Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions.  See also Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative 
Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), particularly 
Chapter I. 
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economically developed countries or even advancing free trade more generally, 
are aimed instead at strengthening the economic advantages of the dominant 
countries within the organisation.15  Whether or not this is true is not the 
concern of this study, but what is relevant in this analogy is that the normative 
principles on which the WTO’s actions are meant to rest, free trade, extend 
from a philosophical position that trade advances all economies most effectively 
when it has few (or at least fewer) constraints imposed by states and governing 
structures, which is a product of the European rationalist tradition, refined and 
articulated first in the eighteenth century.  Like self-determination, the idea of 
free trade arose within a particular historical context and contains logical 
implications that can guide state actions and that also suggest conditions when 
states or institutions can impose limits on the exercise of the concept, often for 
perfectly sound domestic reasons.  Yet, when institutions like the WTO adopt 
or permit safeguards, exceptions, subsidies and exclusions that seem to run 
contrary to the core concepts of free trade, the charges of institutional hypocrisy 
seem well founded, increase the likelihood of controversy and threaten the very 
stability the institution was created to ensure.16  While not taking a view on any 
of these charges, it is important to note that the provenance of the idea, the 
current debate over the concept’s meaning and its application by the WTO 
amidst the specific conditions of the present moment are all relevant to the 
workings and evolution of the norm of free trade.  To ignore any part of this 
puzzle is to miss the whole significance of what is at work.  
It is for this reason that this study examines not only the intellectual 
roots of the concept of self-determination and its application by the 
international community, but also the context of the international system in 
which self-determination’s meaning, use and limits are contested.  Over its 
nearly 400-year evolution from principle to right to norm, self-determination 
has been used and discussed within very different international structures and 
contextual forces.  Nationalism, liberalism, democracy, fascism and communism 
are some of the ideological forces that at times have been at work in this 
dynamic, while states, ethnicities, multi-lateral concerts and more formal 
intergovernmental organisations have formed the stage on which this interplay 
has and continues to occur.  The trajectory of self-determination’s evolution has 
been shaped consistently by both institutional and theoretical alterations and 
this continues to be the case, and, as later parts of this study suggest, shifts in 
the context and structure of international relations have often ushered in the                                                         
15 See for example the points raised by Dani Rodrik, ‘Trading in Illusions’, Foreign Policy 
March/April (2001). 
16 A battery of these criticisms is pithily and potently summarized in ‘The WTO under Fire’, The 
Economist (18 September 2003). 
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greatest developments in self-determination’s evolution as a norm.  Thus, the 
challenges of self-determination, nationalism and state fragmentation exist on 
the theoretical and the practical level and sometimes simultaneously on both 
levels, as they did in 1919.  
To assess the full depths of the challenges the lie beneath the evolution 
of the international community’s normative responses to self-determination and 
the potential and actual fragmentation of states, Part I traces the philosophical 
origins of self-determination and seeks to discern the role that identity, 
particularly national identity, plays in the concept; Part II surveys selected 
international responses over time, noting the interrelations between the 
structure and context of international society and the reactions to self-
determination and nationalism prior to the end of the Cold War; and Part III 
surveys the changes to international society ushered in with the end of the Cold 
War, reviews some of the initial alterations to the concept and then examines 
the case of Kosovo in detail, as that example highlights the current normative 
position of self-determination and reflects whether the international reactions 
are consistent with the ideological basis on which self-determination rests.  
Like those who witnessed the events and participated in the negotiations 
at Versailles, and like countless others prior and subsequent to 1919, the post-
Cold War generation faces the challenges presented by a concept that is 
desirable, perhaps, even inescapable, and yet is also seemingly impossible to 
contain.  As democracy has flourished since the end of the Cold War, the 
salience and the relative significance of self-determination, as well as the potency 
and frequency of nationalist movements, have increased markedly, pushing the 
accompanying challenges to the fore, both on the normative and the practical 
level.  As Michael Walzer has written, ‘the tribes have returned’17, and they are 
demanding the right to determine their own political future, often outside of the 
confines of their current state.  The massive strategic, political and socio-
economic changes since the end of the Cold War have increased the likelihood 
of nationalism and identity-based political action, which draw strength from 
self-determination, and, as a result, the need for coherent norms and consistent 
responses at the international level is greater than ever.  As one scholar posits, 
‘[t]here is a danger that the continued absence of a collective and consistent 
response to self-determination will destroy the flimsy consensus on state 
sovereignty and self-determination without replacing it with an alternative.’18  
                                                        
17 Michael Walzer, ‘The New Tribalism’, Dissent (1992), 164. 
18 Kemal Shehadi, Ethnic Self-determination and the Break-up of States Adelphi Paper 283 (London: 
Brassey’s, 1993), 51. 
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This study contends that by tracing the foundations of self-determination 
to the liberal democratic philosophical tradition and by highlighting the 
concept’s interconnections with the theory and international norms of human 
rights, more coherent and more theoretically sound norms are discernable.  This 
approach also suggests practicable limits to the actions of ‘emerging 
nationalism’, which seeks to alter or abolish established political and social 
arrangements within states.  While the evolution of the international 
community’s normative responses to such movements over time have not 
entirely reflected this interpretation of self-determination, there are indications, 
particularly in the post-Cold War era, that a normative framework such as this is 
beginning to take shape.   
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Part I – Theory 
Chapter 1 
 
Identity, emerging nationalism and self-determination 
 
Self-determination has a long theoretical lineage and a lengthy history as 
an operative political principle and, more recently, as a peremptory norm of 
international society.  In order to come to grips with the perennial challenges 
self-determination presents, its meaning, its limits and its moral standing must 
be assessed at the theoretical level first before surveying how the idea has been 
interpreted and applied by the international community.   
The theory of self-determination begins properly with questions about 
the subject of the concept, the ‘self’ that is to be determined, and yet very few 
studies of self-determination, particularly those concerned with self-
determination in international politics and its relation to state fragmentation, 
pause to consider this.  Too many scholars opt for a cursory definition of the 
term or associate it automatically with nationalism by referring to it as national 
self-determination while others (particularly legal scholars) examine the current 
formulation, ‘the right of self-determination of peoples’, offering a brief 
treatment of the term peoples, and then focus on the practical limitations that 
ought to be placed on the application of the concept.1  While some of these 
examinations are extremely effective within their own parameters, they fail to 
explain sufficiently either how self-determination is connected to identity of the 
people who exercise it or how self-determination relates to other norms of the 
international system, such as state sovereignty, political obligation and non-
interference, and they do not consider the moral weight of the concept.   
As a result, self-determination has rarely received the holistic analysis and 
debate it needs, either from the community of states, which shapes and acts 
based on these norms, or from the academic community.  As noted, some 
studies avoid such questions and focus on the tangible consequences and results 
when the concept is applied.  While practical considerations about the 
application of the concept are highly relevant, they cannot take the place of 
justified and articulated explanations of why self-determination should be                                                         
1 For example, see Joshua Castellino, International Law and Self-determination (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2000); Antonio Casessie, Self-determination of Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995); Alexis Heraclides, Self-determination of Minorities in International Politics 
(London: I.B. Taurus, 1990); Thomas D. Musgrave, Self-determination of National Minorities 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Kemal Shehadi, Ethnic Self-determination and the Break-
up of States Adelphi Paper 283 (London: Brassey’s, 1993); Max Kapelman, ‘Secession and the Right 
of Self-determination: An Urgent Need to Harmonize Principle with Pragmatism’, The 
Washington Quarterly 16:3 (1993). 
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considered as a basic right in international relations nor do they provide 
coherent and sensible standards by which the international community should 
judge the legitimacy of the holders and the claims based on this right. 
However, even when the theoretical foundations of self-determination 
are considered, its relation to nationality, ethnicity and other identity based 
groups is frequently passed over, especially the question of why nations, as 
opposed to any other group(s), merit such a privileged position.  To understand 
the nature of national self-determination and the ‘self-determination of peoples’, 
to consider the status of self-determination as a peremptory norm of 
international behaviour and law and to confirm it as a fundamental, democratic 
right, it must be shown first that such a right exists, what its proper subjects and 
objects are and what its position is vis-à-vis other international rights and norms.  
This chapter takes up the issue of the ‘self’ in self-determination as well as the 
concept of emerging nationalism, and considers what ‘determination’ entails for 
such groups and the individuals who compose them.  To accomplish this, the 
historical roots of self-determination are traced to the origin of liberal 
democratic theory.  The chapter then considers how the ideas of self-
determination, nationalism and human rights appear to work against one 
another, before concluding with a suggested means of reconciliation. 
 
(i) Self-determination and the liberal democratic political tradition  
 
Coming to grips with the idea of self-determination is a challenge in and 
of itself, quite apart from those it presents when the concept is applied and leads 
to tangible actions (and its application and interpretation by states, it should be 
remembered, is part of how it is defined on the international level).  In essence, 
self-determination is a principal component of freedom, based on the 
proposition that being free involves the ability to determine certain 
relationships and actions without reference to others, who themselves may be 
acting similarly to determine their relations and actions.  Leaving aside just for 
the moment the object of ‘determination’ and the constraints that exist on the 
employment of the concept, it should be clear that, at its core, self-
determination is intimately connected with autonomy and is relevant for the 
freedom of individuals and collectives, as both individuals and groups will seek 
to determine their actions and relations.  Thus, both individuals and groups are 
correct subjects of the concept on a theoretical level.  However, unlike autonomy, 
which normally refers to freedom of action in the private sphere, self-
determination is normally concerned only with public freedom, specifically 
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freedom in political and social acts that relate to authority in some manner.  It is 
from here that the true power of the concept stems, as it defines and shapes not 
only the actions of people to their political systems but also serves as a basis of 
legitimizing the authority of groups, including states.  Such a formulation also 
begins to reveal how self-determination has its genesis within the liberal 
democratic tradition, given the central concern with freedom of human 
groupings and the individuals within them in their political and social relations. 
However, it is also at this point that conceptual difficulties arise, for it is 
not yet clear what groups are able to act on the principle or whether or how self-
determination for groups fits together with self-determination for individuals.  
Additionally, it is not clear which human groupings can make legitimate use of 
to the concept.  For example, could any combination of individuals, however 
random, seek to determine their future by drastically rearranging their status 
before the state, or justly resort to violence to oppose the actions of a 
government or, at the extreme, separate from the state in an act of secession or 
conduct a revolution?  If not any group, then which groups?  From the opposite 
side of the coin, further questions arise: could a state claim to be the 
embodiment of ‘the people’ and use the concept to protect those within its 
borders from aggression or the actions by other states, or could a state claim 
with any justice to be acting on the principle as it restricts the actions of those 
whom the state feels are a threat to its ‘national destiny’?  However, these 
serious questions are more solvable when the object or aim of self-determination 
is considered in conjunction with its subjects, which is best accomplished by 
tracing the philosophical origins of the concept, which lie at the heart of the 
liberal democratic tradition of thought.  
Although the exact origins of the modern concept of self-determination 
are not fixed, the most clearly discernible genesis of the idea (at least in Europe) 
is the intellectual and political milieu of sixteenth and seventeenth century 
Protestantism.  The Protestant movements (for it would be wrong to employ the 
singular) emphasised many different theological positions developed from widely 
varying biblical hermeneutics; however, all Protestant thought emphasised the 
primacy of the Bible and the direct interaction of the faithful with the word of 
God.  The importance of this over and above the centralised dogma of the 
Church of Rome was a hallmark of the various strains of Protestant thought, and 
the importance given to developing an individual connection and relationship 
with the Almighty marked an important and deeply significant alteration which 
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itself had far reaching implications, both theological and political.2  In particular, 
the arguments advanced by the Protestants to defend their resistance to 
religious and also to secular authorities helped develop the idea that such 
resistance could be based on the will of a community of like-minded individuals.  
Although the concept of a unique community with its own political and social 
will had existed for many centuries,3 during the Reformation, such claims 
evolved into a near-sacred agreement that bonded all members together and to 
which all members of the community were an equal part.  Although the 
particular religious nature of such agreements was highly significant at the time, 
the religious imperatives later diminished and a secularised version of political 
legitimacy emerged.  This proved significant for the theory of self-determination 
because, over time, it strengthened the belief that a particular community, 
defined by the individuals who constituted it, each having equal membership in that 
community, determined their own secular political authority.  Furthermore, it was 
during this period and soon after that these ideas were infused with the language 
of rights.   
From the outset, the protest against Rome took on a political edge.  
Luther was adamant that the true church of Christ was a congregatio fidelium, a 
congregation of the faithful, all of whom were in equal standing with each other 
in relation to the majesty of God.  In saying this, Luther argued both explicitly 
and implicitly that the connection between God and the faithful was beyond the 
direction of the Church, and was, instead, in the hands of the individual, who 
was, after all, the subject of the relationship.4  Thus, for Luther, salvation was a 
matter that directly concerned each equal individual.  Moreover, the state of 
one’s soul was not governed by the actions of the overarching authority of the 
Church or by unthinkingly observing the Church’s dogma but by the actions and 
choices individuals themselves made to strengthen their direct and unimpeded 
faith in God.5  By promoting the importance of faith and devaluing the authority                                                         
2 For the implications of Protestant thought on politics and specifically on concepts of individual 
liberty, see Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Vol. 2 - The Reformation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Michael Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965); G.P. Gooch, English Democratic Ideas in the 
Seventeenth Century (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959); A.S.P. Woodhouse, ed., Puritanism 
and Liberty (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1938). 
3 See for example, Anthony D. Smith, Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003). 
4 These themes are mentioned throughout Luther’s work, but for more specific reference, see 
‘Freedom of a Christian’ (1520), ‘Commentary on Galatians’ (1531), and, in particular, ‘The Pagan 
Servitude of the Church’ (1520) and his open letter, ‘An Appeal to the Ruling Class of the 
German Nation’ (1520), all of which are contained in John Dillenberger, ed. Martin Luther: 
Selections from His Writings (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1961). 
5 Freedom for Luther was liberating the soul from the prison of trying (and failing) to achieve 
salvation through anything other than faith.  The free choice in this process was the spiritual 
decision to hope for salvation by direct intercession with God though prayer and study of the 
Bible.  
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of the Church, Luther’s attack robbed the Roman Church of much of its power, 
both spiritual and secular, and instead diffused it amongst the community of the 
faithful.  Luther’s emphasis on individual interaction of the faithful with the 
Holy Spirit, his belief in the ‘priesthood of all believers’, that nothing should 
separate an individual and the community of the faithful from the word of God 
can all be seen as a force to weaken authority and emphasise the importance of 
autonomy. 
The political implications of this were many sided.  The clear rejection of 
the authority of the Roman Church paved the way for the establishment of 
state-sponsored, self-determining Reformed churches, as was the pattern in 
Denmark, Sweden, England and many German principalities.  It is necessary to 
point out that in putting forward these ideas, Luther intended to weaken the 
spiritual authority of the Church and not authority in general. 6  Nonetheless, it 
was only a short step from arguing for an egalitarian and spiritually autonomous 
community of believers to the emergence of claims for a politically egalitarian 
and self-directing community, a step taken by thousands of German peasants in 
their actions and writings in 1525.   
Although the peasants’ dispute with their landlords had deep-running 
roots, ‘The Twelve Articles’ promulgated by the peasants drew directly on 
Lutheran theology and readily applied his teachings in support of their 
campaign.7  In addition to calling for the right to choose their own priests and 
the removal of the Church’s obligatory system of tithing which they viewed as a 
tax (both of which were targeted in Luther’s writings and sermons), the peasant 
leaders employed Luther’s ideas of Christian equality and liberty in novel ways.  
In the passages related to serfdom, the authors of the ‘Twelve Articles’ attack 
their overlords, stating that the ‘right’ to hold people as chattel ‘is pitiable, 
seeing that Christ has redeemed and bought us all with the precious shedding of 
His blood, the lowly as well as the great, excepting no one.  Therefore it agrees 
with Scripture that we be free, and will to be so.’ 
This example shows how Luther’s message was expanded and subtly 
transformed from a campaign for theological liberty into, first, a justification of 
individual autonomy and, then, a defence for the self-determining acts of a 
community.  Although very ideologically distant from the modern concept of 
self-determination, Luther’s writings are a very early, powerful example of the 
essential characteristics of the idea and mark an important first step in its                                                         
6 Skinner, Foundations, Part I, Chapter 3 generally supports this interpretation, despite making 
important reservations while doing so. cf. Roland Bainton, The Reformation of the Sixteenth Century 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1952). 
7 ‘The Twelve Articles of the Upper Swabian Peasants’ (1525), in Michael G. Baylor, ed. The 
Radical Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 231-238. 
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evolution.  Above all, Luther’s writings provide an implicit link between 
autonomy for the individual and self-direction for collectivities.  Luther saw not 
only a direct link between God and each person as the foundation for a salvation 
but he envisaged the community of faithful as the joining together of people 
who were equal in their standing to each other before God and united by their 
faith in the Him.  
However, Luther himself was not explicit about this connection and was 
reluctant to apply his ideas in such a way.  He rejected, with vehemence and 
considerable detail, the Peasants’ Revolt of 1525 and, like most of the Protestant 
reformers, was hotly opposed to the actions of the Anabaptists.  For Luther, at 
least in the 1520s and 1530s, it seemed that liberty was entirely spiritual, both for 
the community and the individual Christian.  Yet, Luther himself made 
something of a volte-face when the defence of his own church became an 
unavoidable necessity.  The initial Lutheran response to physical confrontation 
was to adhere to the absolute Pauline and Augustinian tradition of passive 
resistance and prayer for deliverance.  Any active resistance was seen as contrary 
to the will of God.  However, when faced with the prospect of armed 
opposition, and, soon after, the real possibility of forceful elimination of the 
faith, Luther and his followers sought to justify the assertive defence of their 
community against the threatening religious and secular authorities, something 
which would have a vast impact on the ideas of self-determination and 
autonomy.  
However, it is within the tradition of Calvinism that Protestant religious 
and political arguments for autonomy developed most towards the modern 
concept of self-determination.  As Walzer, Bainton and a number of others 
indicate, the political radicalism that emerged from Calvinist theology is 
correctly seen as the basis for the modern concept of the secular state.8  Calvin 
and his growing number of followers at first approached the matter of defending 
their church as the embattled Lutherans did – by relying on the works of 
Catholic conciliarists and private-law theories to defend their communities.9 
Calvinist theories of resistance were developed significantly in the years 
following the growing hostility and violence towards the Huguenots in the 1570s 
and 1580s.  In a bid to woo disenchanted Catholics to the cause of resistance as 
resentment of the power of the House of Valois increased throughout France, 
the Huguenots first advanced a more overtly political theory of resistance in the                                                         
8 Walzer, Revolution, particularly Chapters 1, 2 and 5; Bainton, The Reformation; Skinner, 
Foundations; R.H. Murray, The Political Consequences of the Reformation (New York: Russell and 
Russell, 1960) and John Neville Figgis, Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius, 1414-1625 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956). 
9 Skinner, Foundations, 206-221. 
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period just before the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in 1572.10  One of the 
most important of these writings was François Hotman’s Francogallia (1573) 
which openly maintained that the people, as embodied in the Three Estates, 
were the source of authority and that their representatives had the authority to 
confirm the king and, as such, also had the authority to resist the actions of a 
monarch when his actions betray the reason for which the king was placed in 
power.11  This introduced an argument for popular sovereignty into the 
Huguenot campaign but within an historicist methodology so as to present a 
more universal and more broadly based attack against unbridled monarchical 
power.12  This theme was reiterated by Theodore Beza, Philippe du Plessis-
Mornay and the anonymous authors of The Awakener, Political Discourses and The 
Politician, who broadened the idea to suggest that the sole basis for political 
authority was the people who can be seen even as the electors of the king.13   
According to these later Huguenot accounts, the formation of political 
society was the result of a contract between the whole of the collective body and 
the leader, formed by the will of the community that was to be governed by the 
agreement.14  In addition to strengthening the resurgence of popular 
sovereignty, these writings clarified the idea that a people could be identified by 
their distinct beliefs and that political arrangements should enforce and protect 
the particular characteristics of the people.  The mechanism through which this 
took place was the covenant, and this connection is made explicitly in Mornay’s 
Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos (1579).  This work, above all others written during the 
period, points to the explicitly liberal democratic nature of political self-
determination.  It is liberal in that it is concerned primarily with the situation of 
the individual person and their rights, and democratic in that it relates to 
individuals who are equal constituents of the group, each endowing the body 
with legitimacy.  As Gooch observes, it ‘is the first work in modern history that 
constructs a political philosophy on the basis of certain inalienable rights of 
man.’15  Combined with the Protestant teachings on Christian liberty, the 
significance of the community of saints, and the development of a vibrant, rights-
based protection of these interests, the continental Calvinists’ writings greatly 
advanced the development of the idea of self-determination.  Whether they 
intended to or not, these authors went far towards linking the liberty of a                                                         
10Julian H. Franklin, ed. Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century (New York: 
Pegasus, 1969), 11-46. 
11 François Hotman, Francogallia, particularly Chapter VI, and Chapter XXV, which was an 
appendix to the 1586 edition, in Franklin, Constitutionalism, 53-96.  
12 Skinner, Foundations, 314. 
13 Theodore Beza, The Rights of Magistrates, and Philippe du Plessis-Morney, Vindiciae Contra 
Tyrannos, both in Franklin, Constitutionalism.  See also Skinner, Foundations, 315-318. 
14 Beza, Rights, 103-105 and 108-129; and, in particular, Mornay, Vindiciae. 
15 Gooch, English Democratic Ideas, 14. 
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community of belonging to the ideology of natural law, rights and the democratic 
legitimacy of political and social order.   
However, the real radicalism of the Calvinist tradition came from the 
ardent English Protestants who, after dutiful obedience to a very powerful, 
moderately Protestant sovereign in the figure of Queen Elizabeth and a less 
august but still palatable King James, found themselves confronting a suspected 
Catholic and authoritarian monarch in Charles I.  As a result, English religious 
and political theory turned increasingly radical, following many of the lines 
developed by the Huguenots and other continental theorists yet with several 
departures from this that are highly significant for the concept of self-
determination and human rights. 
English radicals such as the Quakers and the Levellers, although very 
much on the margins of political thought at the time, proved to have an 
exceptionally long-lasting influence.  Across the broad spectrum a religious 
thought in England in the mid and late-seventeenth century, there was a 
widespread and ever-increasing acceptance that the central Protestant idea of 
the ‘priesthood of all believers’ implied that each and every member of the godly 
community, as an individual, had a right to influence the actions of their 
government and that the actions of the government should be directed towards 
their well-being.  Furthermore, to ensure that this would stay the case, such a 
government would remain firmly under the control of the people through their 
chosen representatives.  Specifically, the writings of the Levellers provide 
evidence of this birth of democracy and popular sovereignty, fused with a 
philosophical commitment to the idea of individual rights.16 
In the three successive versions of the ‘Agreement of the People’, all 
published between 1647 and 1649, the Levellers advanced a reasoned, essentially 
secular version of limited representative government, based on popular 
sovereignty with, crucially, a list of protected rights of individuals.17  The idea of 
a community bound together and acting for their own advancement comes 
though in passages such as, ‘We do now hold ourselves bound in mutual duty to 
each other, to take the best care we can for the future, to avoid both the danger 
of returning into a slavish condition, and the chargeable remedy of another war.’  
They stress the ‘Common Rights and liberties’ of individual that must be 
preserved and, going so far as to list them in a bill of rights at the end of each                                                         
16 Theordore Calvin Pease, The Leveller Movement (Washington, D.C.: American Historical 
Association, 1916); H.N. Brailsford, The Levellers and the English Revolution, Christopher Hill, ed. 
(Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961) and Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside 
Down: Radical Thought during the English Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1972). 
17 All three versions of the ‘Agreement’ are available in Don M. Wolfe, ed. Leveller Manifestoes of 
the Puritan Revolution (New York: Humanities Press, 1967). 
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Agreement and by noting that ‘the power of this, and all future Representatives 
of this Nation [i.e. Parliament], is inferiour only to theirs who chuse them.’   
Although such ideas were radical in the seventeenth century, elements of 
them persisted and were refined through the filter of ‘rationalist’ methodology, 
in particular with the employment of the rationalist’s tool, the ‘state of nature’.  
In the Prolegomena to De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, Hugo Grotius traces the 
development of rights to individuals by considering the state of nature and the 
laws of nature as understood through rationalist inquiry.18  Grotius makes clear 
that the creation of political authority has its basis in the natural instincts of 
humans, and that the end to which mutual cooperation is directed is the greater 
good of all individuals who, in turn, chiefly seek to protect their right of survival.  
The formal creation of authority in shape of the laws is to be guided by human 
reason for the interests of all.  Grotius expressly denies that sovereignty is always 
and absolutely popularly held; however, Grotius does admit that the prosperity 
of the people is the ‘primary consideration’ of most states.19  Thus, Grotius 
presents us with an occluded message, walking a fine line between positing a 
theoretical view in favour of popular sovereignty and individual rights and a 
pragmatic acceptance that government need not followed this pattern in all 
cases. 
In a similar vein, Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan uses rationalist principles 
to explain the origin of society, sovereignty and the existence of natural rights 
belonging to all individuals.  Although Hobbes eschews the lengthy historical 
citations that thicken Grotius’ work, he, like Grotius, concludes that individuals 
are innately autonomous in a state of nature, that they possess certain rights, 
namely the right to self-preservation, that these rights are discernible through 
reason and that groups of individuals are the basis of society.20  Hobbes 
perceives sovereignty as popularly created, but he, like Grotius, does not endorse 
a right of resistance or espouse a concept of limited government.  However, 
despite this, the writings of both Hobbes and Grotius did much to shape and 
develop natural law arguments for autonomy and self-determination for 
individuals. 
Also by applying the rationalist mechanism of the state of nature, John 
Locke traced the origin of government to the consent of the governed, 
developed a justification of individual rights and, crucially, explored the rights of 
resistance and limited government that a community could retain even after                                                         
18 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, Liber Tres (1625), Francis Kelsey, trans. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1925), ‘Prolegomena’, Sections 11, 12 and 40 in particular. 
19 Grotius, De Jure, Book I, Chapter III, Section VIII. 
20 Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan (New York: Collier Books, 1962), especially Chapters 13-17, 18 
and 21. 
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creating a sovereign authority.21  Although his justifications for resistance and 
for limited government went beyond and were more novel than those developed 
by his intellectual predecessors, it has been contended with some justice that 
‘John Locke merely said in 1690 what the Levellers had said in 1646’.22  
Nonetheless, Locke’s ideas of consent, whether tacit or expressed, highlighted 
the democratic edifice of communal action and greatly shaped the liberal 
democratic theory of government. 
It is in James Harrington’s Oceana that a highly developed political theory 
incorporating popular sovereignty and a direct link between the people’s will and 
the government’s institutions first emerges.  For Harrington, the involvement of 
all individuals within the community filled the same function as blood 
circulating through a healthy body, and although the guidance of the body 
politic would be limited to a few, the many got to participate in the expression 
of the political will at the ballot box.23  Harrington’s work is worth highlighting 
for the analogy with the human body points toward the type of emotional 
essence of nationality (discussed in detail below), as well as for his promotion of 
individual rights, popular sovereignty and self-determination of the group. 
However, it is not until the eighteenth century that the modern concept 
of self-determination and national self-determination emerge clearly, most 
notably with the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  Rousseau’s works are 
profoundly important to the evolution of self-determination, not only because of 
his absorbing and impassioned discussion of autonomy, but also because he 
develops a theory of order based around volition.  Put simply, for Rousseau, one 
cannot will without making a choice and imposing order, but the order that is 
best is an order of one’s own choosing and, thus, does not restrict one’s liberty, 
provided the willed action was in fact free in the first instance.24  As a result, 
autonomy is not at all anarchy; it is self-government or, as F.M. Barnard prefers, 
‘self-direction’, in its truest sense. 25  Yet here, it seems, is a problem and one 
that is not addressed forcefully enough by Barnard.  If this liberty is to be valued, 
even in the state of nature, why is it to be rejected by joining together in a 
society, the very thing that Rousseau so loathes?26  The answer is that society is 
for Rousseau either a force of suppression and destruction or emancipation                                                         
21 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1960), in particular Book II (The Second Treatise), Chapters 2, 7-9 and 19. 
22 Theodore Calvin Pease, The Leveller Movement (Washington, D.C.: American Historical 
Association, 1916), 364. 
23 James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana J.G.A. Pocock, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1992); Gooch, English Democratic Ideas, 245-247. 
24 Jean Jacques Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’ and ‘The Social Contract’, in 
The Social Contract and the Discourses (London: Everyman Library, 1973), 90ff and 190-192. 
25 F.M. Barnard, Self-direction and Political Legitimacy: Rousseau and Herder (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1988), 32. 
26 Jean Jacques Rousseau, ‘The Social Contract’. 
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depending entirely on how it is composed and, vitally, how the wills of all those 
who make a particular community are joined and for what purpose they are bound 
together.  For Rousseau, human fulfilment, indeed, human perfectibility, requires a 
specific type of willed action.  This is not the willed action of the free, savage 
man, to do whatever crosses his mind; it is autonomy that is mindful of one’s 
self-interest27 yet equally and simultaneously aware of the community of which the 
individual is a part.  As Rousseau explains, this requires the formation of a social 
contract whereby the individual’s will both creates and conforms to the ‘general’ 
will.  To do so, each individual: 
gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all; and, this 
being so, no one has any interest in making them burdensome to 
others.  …Finally, each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to 
nobody; and as there is no associate over which he does not acquire 
the same right as he yields over himself.28 
 
In this manner, the individual retains true freedom, yet also gains an increased 
and higher sense of self through the intimate association with those with whom 
the individual contracts, a process that Barnard aptly call ‘the extension of 
selfhood’.29  This new ‘selfhood’ is both formed by and rises above the 
commonality of the members to the social contract.  As Rousseau puts it, ‘At 
once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of 
association creates a corporate and collective body. …and receiving from this act 
its unity, its common identity, its life, and its will.’30   
Rousseau’s account of autonomy and the self-determining community is 
novel because of the centrality of autonomy in fulfilling human existence.  
Without this fundamental liberty, life is pitiable to the point of being 
meaningless.  By arguing that the self can only be fully, morally realised within 
and conforming to a society of which that self is but one part, Rousseau forged 
together the well-being of the individual and the society by making self-
determination for the individual dependent on that of the community, and vice-
versa.  Thus, self-determination is delineated and given philosophical 
underpinning, with the result being a robust defence of its worth as a normative 
principle.   
When taken as a whole, the development of these concepts from the 
late-sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries produced a solid philosophical base 
for the legitimacy of self-determination, redefining it as the securing of basic                                                         
27 This should be understood as the quality of l’amour de soi-même, self-love, that Rousseau 
describes in detail.  ‘Love of self is a natural feeling which leads every animal to look to its own 
preservation, and which, in man is guided by reason and modified by compassion, creates 
humanity and virtue.’ Rousseau, ‘Inequality’, 76. 
28 Rousseau, ‘The Social Contract’, 191. 
29 Barnard, Self-direction, 34. 
30 Rousseau, ‘The Social Contract’, 192. 
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individual rights as well as those of a community.  As such, self-determination 
becomes a right (as opposed to merely a ‘principle’), exercised collectively by 
groups for the fulfilment of its individual members.   
These writings are also crucial because they emerged at genesis of the 
modern (European) state system.  The confluence of liberal democratic political 
philosophy and the rise of the modern states meant that the ideas of popular 
sovereignty, of a right of autonomy for unique communities based on the 
collective will of the populace, became a recognized and discernible element of 
the legitimacy of a political and social community.  However, despite adding 
clarity, these philosophical roots leave three significant questions unanswered: 
what groups could be recognized as legitimately self-directing; whose rights 
trump whose – those of the group or those of individuals; and what limits can be 
placed on the exercise of the right of self-determination?   
 
(ii) Primary Identity Forming Groups and ‘emerging nationalism’ 
 
Taking on the first of these interrelated questions is a challenge as there 
is any number of groups that could plausibly claim to be the legitimate subjects 
of the right of self-determination: peoples, ethnic groups, minorities (numerical 
or otherwise), nations, states, etc.  The openness of the concept is, no doubt, 
one of its attractive features to groups that seek to base their claims upon it as 
they attempt to determine their future.  However, provided the liberal 
democratic basis of the right is kept in mind, the list is narrower than at first 
glance, for within a liberal democratic approach, only groups that serve to fulfil 
and enhance substantially their members’ lives can hold the right and exercise it 
legitimately.   
In theory, any group of likeminded individuals, bound together for any 
reason, including choice, could claim the right of self-determination, arguing 
that a transformation of social and political arrangements, either domestic or 
international, was necessary to fulfil its aspirations and improve meaningfully its 
members’ lives.  However, within the Protestant accounts of autonomy, the self-
determining community is one brought together by God for spiritual ends that 
were of the highest and most defining importance to the life of each individual in 
the group.  In a similar but secular vein, the ‘rationalist’ liberal theorists, such as 
the Levellers, Locke and Rousseau, see the self-determining group as one that 
shapes and reflects the identity of the members at a fundamental level and 
engages the individual members in a constant and direct manner in countless 
ways.  For all liberal democratic theorists, both secular and religious in tradition, 
the communities they conceive as legitimately holding a right of self-
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determination are both profound and constitutive for the members, who in turn 
shape and define the collectives. 
The profundity of these connections mean that communities legitimately 
holding a right of self-determination are fundamental to the identity of the 
individuals and to the shared identity of the whole in what is an essentially 
symbiotic relationship.  Such identity relations are of such moment that, while 
in ideal circumstances these communities are not exclusive of other identity 
forming relations, in non-ideal, practical situations, it is rare that an individual 
will belong to two or more such groups.  This study refers to such groups as 
Primary Identity Forming Groups (PIFGs), signifying both the role that 
membership plays in the formation of the individual constituent’s identity and 
to highlight the primacy of such relations on both the theoretical and tangible 
level.   
While in theory PIFGs could be composed through choice, in reality 
most are linked to more entrenched and inescapable human identity groupings 
such as ethnicity, religion, language and, perhaps most importantly, nationality.  
While the academic debate about the meaning and substance of such human 
groupings, particularly ethnicity and nationalism, is as intense as it is vast, much 
of this is actually not as relevant to self-determination as it might at first seem, 
provided, again, that a liberal democratic understanding of the term is employed.  
What is essential in this proper understanding of self-determination is not any 
particular quality of the group, but the meaning and significance of the association, 
the degree to which it resonates for members of a collective and to which it 
motivates them towards public action domestically, internationally or both. 
Since the eighteenth century (if not before), nations and nationality have, 
arguably, been the most salient and relevant PIFG, particularly as agents of 
political and social change, despite the indeterminacy of the definition of the 
concept.  As noted before, there is a vigorous debate about the origin, meaning 
and ethical significance of the term ‘nation’, but there is a broad consensus that 
a minimal definition of a nation is a community of people who share an identity, 
a history, a geographic space with which they identify and, perhaps most 
importantly, shared political and/or social aspirations or affinities that are 
valued.  However, the intensity of each of these characteristics and the depth of 
commitment can and does vary tremendously, thereby stimulating the debate 
about the concept’s relevance.  
The two poles of debate are the modernist/social constructivist position, 
which holds that nations are nothing more than élite constructed, even 
fictitious, entities; and the primordialist/perennialist position, which contends 
that nations are givens, emerge in many human societies and that they have a 
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timeless quality that links a current nation with a real population going back into 
the mists of time.31  One of the most convincing approaches in this debate is the 
‘ethno-symbolist’ approach, which highlights the significance of ethnicity, 
perhaps the most powerful PIFG, as the basis of the nation and nationalist 
activity.32  More recently, ‘liberal theorists of the nation’ or ‘liberal nationalists’ 
have revived the interpretation of the nation that focuses on its democratic 
elements of choice in creating communities and equality of membership within 
the collective.33  
Taken together, these potent accounts highlight the ethical worth 
attached to nationality through the basis of choice and/or identity and their 
combined meaning to individual members.  While a strictly ‘liberal’ account of 
the nation may fail to account for the mass resonance required to motivate, 
sustain and propel a sense of nationality and nationalist activity, the link to 
PIFGs amply provides this.  When self-determination is traced to some source 
other than the liberal democratic perspective, it does not suggest or limit what 
groups are legitimately self-determining; however, when its origin is correctly 
understood, self-determination is legitimately held by groups that are 
meaningful and fulfilling for the individual members, resonating with and 
stimulating them to actions aimed at advancing the group as a whole towards a 
larger, shared vision.  While nationality in its liberal configuration is perhaps the 
most salient iteration of this in modern times, it is precisely the fundamental, 
defining and all-encompassing characteristics of PIFGs that make the mass 
resonance and appeal for group action on this basis so powerful.   
J.S. Mill, probably the greatest theorist of liberal democracy, contends in 
Considerations on Representative Government that it is difficult if not impossible to 
conceive of a self-determining group that does not share a nationality, which 
Mill understood as a group having both a common identity and common beliefs 
                                                        
31 For accounts closer to the first pole, see Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, 
Myth, Reality 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 1992); Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities 2nd edn. (London: Verso, 1991); John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State 
(Manchester University Press, 1985); and for those closer to the latter view, see John Armstrong, 
Nations before Nationalism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); Anthony 
D. Smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Anthony D. Smith, ‘State making 
and nation-building’ in John Hall, ed., States in History (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Clifford Geertz, 
Old Societies and New States (New York: Free Press, 1963); Pierre van den Berge, The Ethnic 
Phenomenon (New York: Elisevier, 1979).  While these works do not exemplify perfectly either 
pole, they do explore the debate and take positions on the opposite side of the fence from the 
other.  
32 The work of Anthony D. Smith is the best example of this.  See Smith, Ethnic Origins and 
Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge, 1998). 
33 The two most effective works in this category are Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) and David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995).  
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and values.34  Mill did not limit his definition of nationality to only PIFGs or to 
those groups bound together by choice; rather, he fused the two categories 
together to show that nationality’s democratic quality and mass resonance are 
tied together with identity, custom and political fulfilment.35  As a result, Mill 
seems to suggest that nationalities not only provide fulfilment for the individuals 
who compose them but also reflect a high degree of political maturity stemming 
from the identity-based nature of nationality, and that, accordingly, they should 
form the basis of representative and independent governments.  
Building on Mill’s conclusions and other elements of the liberal 
democratic tradition outlined above, it is possible to create a bridge between the 
right of self-determination, PIFGs and nationalism.  Nationalism may be 
defined in this context as the directed and willed, emotional promotion, even 
exaltation, of nationality in the hope increasing the social and political standing 
of the nation and its members.  As noted before, Mill suggests that the fullest, 
but not necessarily the ‘natural’ or inevitable, expression of nationalism is the 
attainment of political independence for the group, thereby presenting the 
biggest challenge of identity politics and self-determination: do PIFGs and, in 
particular, nationalities have a right of self-determination that legitimately 
permits them to alter fundamentally the political arrangements within a state or, 
at the extreme, to secede?   
‘Emerging nationalism’ refers herein to the phenomenon that provokes 
such questions, namely, movements by nationalities or other PIFGs that seek to 
alter or abolish the underlying political bonds of the state(s) of which they are a 
part.  Thus, emerging nationalism presents a substantial potential for disruption 
to both domestic and international order on both a philosophical and a practical 
level.  The ubiquity and multiplicity of PIFGs and the intensity generated by 
nationalism are ideal ingredients for instability even when not fused together as 
they can be in the concept of self-determination.  While connecting identity, 
nationality and self-determination properly defines the list of legitimate holders 
of the right of self-determination, it not only leaves unanswered the question of 
how PIFG rights relate to individual member’s rights, but it seems to increase 
dramatically the need to control the exercise of the right.  In fact, tackling the 
first of these points actually paves the way to a workable normative framework 
for the exercise of the right of self-determination that addresses the serious 
concerns raised by emerging nationalism. 
                                                         
34 J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1882), 
Chapter XVI, 310-311. 
35 In fact, Mill does not preclude and often seems to encourage the ‘blending’ or ‘absorption’ of 
one nationality by another, confirming the element of choice in nationality.  
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(iii) Human rights, group rights and self-determination 
 
The relation of the rights of groups to those held by individuals is a 
matter of tremendous import for the exercise of self-determination but also 
because it gives shape and meaning to the idea of human rights, which in the 
past thirty years have increasingly been a key issue of international politics.  In 
fact, the power of ‘human rights regimes’ and the ‘rights discourse’ today is such 
that, at least insofar as international norms are concerned, it is taken for granted 
that individuals have rights and that the basis of their rights is the simple fact of 
their existence.  However, while the links between individual rights and group 
rights are perhaps apparent, they have tended either to develop along different 
trajectories or to have been somewhat divorced in theory and application.  For 
example, in most international instruments concerning rights, either individual 
human rights or the rights of groups are promoted, but rarely is a connection 
explicitly drawn between them.36  Even within the academic discussions of 
rights, a division between the two is often maintained or the linkage is 
insufficiently explored.37   
This division is problematic for self-determination, but it is artificial on a 
theoretical level.  On the one hand, self-determination clearly involves 
collectives, but, as demonstrated above, it is linked to fulfilling the individuals 
who compose the group.  Moreover, it must be recalled that human rights and 
self-determination flow from the same liberal democratic tradition and 
acknowledging and emphasising this common intellectual foundation clarifies 
and resolves the issue. 
To expose and explore these connections fully, the first analytical task is 
to address the creation of groups and the relation of groups to the individuals 
within them.38  In common with many of the authors discussed above, it can be 
taken for granted that human beings are, through a mixture of choice and 
necessity, social animals and form groups for survival and to increase their 
mutual happiness.  The creation of groups is, thus, a fundamental human 
occupation, and, in the realm of liberal political theory at least, it is done so on 
the basis of free choice.  Thus, liberal theory in the ideal begins with the 
individual prior to any contractual agreements or casual associations, free to 
make decisions and chose whether to enter into or withdraw from collectivities.                                                          
36 Chapter 4, below, examines these instruments in some detail. 
37 See for example the articles in Will Kymlicka, ed. The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995) and Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995).  
38 What follows is a theoretical discussion that, at several points, assumes ideal conditions within 
a liberal democratic framework, and distortions from real circumstances are a given but will be 
assessed later. 
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Liberal theory also holds that whatever rights are attributed to the individual 
they are based solely on the primordial, ineffable and singular nature of human 
existence.  In other words, individuals do not owe their rights to any pre-existing 
social, economic or political arrangements; all individuals share some basic rights 
equally simply because they are human beings.  Whatever further rights may flow 
from particular social and political agreements are qualitatively different from 
these basic human rights if they cannot trace their existence to this defining 
postulate.   
In these idealised conditions, groups also have rights, but all groups, even 
PIFGs and families are the result of the will and actions of individuals.  
Furthermore, they are capable of withering over time and owe their continued 
existence to determined actions and desires of their members.  Thus, in theory, 
group rights are based on the voluntary membership of the individuals who make 
up the collective and are thus, by definition, derivative.  For example, the right 
to form and run a social or sporting club is not evidently intrinsic.  Rather, the 
legitimacy of such an association stems from the choices and directed actions of 
the individual members.  Such associations would not exist without the 
voluntary membership and active participation of their constituents, and they 
would come to an end should the members actively desire their termination or, 
through apathy, permit a group’s demise.  The difficulty with this is that, in 
theory, all human associations would have the same rights and ethical 
importance. 
However, there are some groups for which the choices and actions of 
members have much less impact on the existence and character of the group, 
most notably PIFGs.  Normally, PIFG membership is not voluntary but is, 
instead, thrust upon individuals and is virtually if not totally inescapable.  As 
discussed earlier, PIFGs shape and mould individuals’ development and personal 
identity greatly (often whether the shaping is desired or not), and because of the 
somewhat organic quality of most PIFGs, the rights associated with them are 
different to those of other corporate bodies.  To return to the example of the 
social or sporting club, although membership can be incredibly important to a 
given individual's identity, these collectives do not have the permanence or the 
deeply pervasive qualities that typify PIFGs such as language or ethnicity.  
Because of the virtually inescapable nature of PIFGs, their prominent 
role in the life of all individuals and because of their persistence in history, such 
groups are now widely considered to have rights intrinsically and not explicitly 
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by virtue of the democratic participation of their individual members.39  Despite 
the theoretical right for individuals to quit PIFGs, others may not permit them 
to be characterised in any other way.  For example, it would carry little weight 
for a person to argue that they want to be seen as an individual and not be 
associated with their ethnicity when they are denied entrance to a cinema 
because the person selling the ticket discriminates on this basis.  Yet, granting 
intrinsic rights to even the narrow list of PIFGs has important consequences as 
Nathan Glazer has pointed out.40  Such policies tend to strengthen the view that 
these identities are permanent and are incapable of change at any point in the 
future, and this view begs the serious question of whether a self-determining 
community might act against the interests or even the rights of its members in 
pursuit of a ‘higher’, group objective. 
However, augments in favour of intrinsic group rights fail on two counts.  
Firstly, they do not consider that all collectives are, at least in theory if not in 
practice, susceptible to alteration or elimination, even though doing so may take 
many years, cause much hardship and ultimately prove undesirable to the group’s 
members.  Secondly, no group, not even PIFGs, can legitimately violate the 
fundamental human rights of its members.  Groups may legitimately pressure 
and limit the freedom of their populations, but only insofar as the constituents 
accept it.  It is a rational contradiction of popular sovereignty and individual 
self-determination that any group can legitimately act habitually and 
intentionally in a manner that is contrary to the ultimate best interests of the 
people from whom the groups derives its sanction.  To permit violations of 
human rights on such grounds would run contrary to the liberal democratic 
foundations of self-determination, even if a PIFG were to justify its actions on 
‘democratic grounds’ as expressed by the numerical majority its members, 
despite any positive benefits the group acquires.  
To clarify the relative importance of PIFG rights vis-à-vis the rights of 
individuals, it should be added that there is nothing inherently permanent about 
PIFGs.  Any given nationality, ethnic group, culture or religion, can dissolve over 
la longue durée as a result of the choices and decision of the constituent 
individuals.  And yet, jettisoning ethnicity, religion, home and nation may be 
particularly hard, even impossible, within the lifetime of one individual.  When 
examined at this level, it is easy to conclude that the single member of a group 
may be losing much by not participating in groups actions or by leaving the 
collective altogether (if possible) and that they may come to regret such                                                         
39 See for example the language of the UN Declaration of Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, A/Res./47/135 (18 December 1992) and the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/Res./61/295 (17 September 2007). 
40 Nathan Glazer, ‘Individual Rights against Group Rights’ in Kymlicka, ed. Minority Cultures. 
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decisions, but liberal individualism ultimately demands that doing so is the right 
of every individual, even if only possible on a theoretical level.   
Individuals retain this right because each individual is, by definition, the 
same as all others in terms of the nature of their existence.  While it is true that 
an individual can evolve and develop over time, their nature as an individual 
remains unchanged, and it is this unchanging quality of life from which human 
rights derive their legitimacy.  Unlike the individuals who compose it, a group, 
whether a PIFG or not, is open to a degree of change.  A group’s nature, unlike 
an individual’s, is capable of evolution, expansion or contraction, and groups are 
subject to disappearance.  Although particular individuals do not possess a 
group’s lengthy temporal span, individual will and action are the life-blood of all 
collective organisations.  Put another way, individuals create and sustain groups 
and groups may sustain individuals, but groups do not create individuals.  While 
it is difficult to imagine a ‘group-less’ human existence, it is possible.  A 
‘member-less’ human group is, however, an absurdity. 
Therefore, there exists a hierarchy of rights that places fundamental human 
rights on the highest plane and groups rights below.  Such a hierarchy is 
necessary, for without it groups could violate the rights of individual members to 
suit the interests of the collective, a proposition that cannot be accepted as valid 
since the core feature of all groups is that they are made up of individuals.  
Groups are not and cannot be the lowest denominator in society; they are 
divisible and, more importantly, they are made up of single, unitary individuals, 
who can, in theory at least if not also in practice, dissolve the group. 
This is not to suggest that each and every individual must like or agree 
explicitly to all the decisions that the group reaches.  For example, imprisoning 
or taxing individuals might be resisted by the people concerned, but such actions 
are legitimate if they are the correct action for the group to take to ensure that 
the rights of all its members are to be enjoyed and the duties of each are 
balanced in some manner consistent with the principles of justice to which all 
members would generally adhere.41 
In this context, self-determination is a right possessed ultimately by 
individuals but exercised most commonly by a PIFG in order to protect its 
individual members from the actions of a person or a group acting to deprive its 
constituents of their fundamental human rights.  It is correctly located within a 
liberal democratic, human rights-oriented framework, functioning as a 
protective mechanism aiming above all other goals to enhance the fundamental                                                         
41 This is a ‘textbook’ claim within liberal democratic theory.  John Ralws, A Theory of Justice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), Locke, ‘Two Treatises’, and Rousseau, ‘The Social 
Contract’ all contain classic accounts of such tenets. 
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rights of all individuals who compose the group, and, as such, it cannot be 
employed legitimately to diminish human rights.  
While such an understanding of self-determination addresses the 
question of who legitimately holds the right of self-determination and while 
tracing out the hierarchy of rights implicit within this framework resolves the 
clash of human and group rights, the final question of what limits can be placed 
on the employment of self-determination remains.  As noted previously, the 
resolution of this last normative dilemma is contingent on the previous answers.  
With these answers in hand, sovereignty and political obligation will be 
considered along side self-determination and emerging nationalism to mark out 
the normative constraints that can be deployed to tackle the challenges of state 
fragmentation. 
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Chapter 2 
Sovereignty, state fragmentation and the limits 
of political obligation 
 
The relation between the concepts of sovereignty and self-determination 
is as complex as it is central to any normative understanding of self-
determination and to the limits that can be placed on its exercise.  Perhaps the 
greatest challenge extending from the right of self-determination is that it can 
be used both as an affirmation of the state and its sovereignty over a territory 
and a people as well as a justification for the fragmentation of an existing state.  
Chapter 1 explored the nature of self-determination and its connection to 
human rights and the rights of groups, concluding that its validity and 
significance as a norm was based on its ability to give meaning and fulfilment to 
the lives of those who make up the groups by affirming and strengthening their 
shared identity and aspirations.  If self-determination operates in this fashion 
within the confines of a sovereign state, which, in turn reflects or enhances the 
lives of its citizens, then self-determination serves as a norm both to shape and 
define the character and identity of the state and to legitimize the state’s actions 
towards its citizens, thereby reinforcing popular sovereignty and human rights.  
This is sometimes referred to as the ‘internal’ or ‘domestic’ aspect of self-
determination, which at first glance may seem relatively incontestable, but there 
are large and controversial issues when a state contains more than one Primary 
Identity Forming Group (PIFG), which is the case in all but a handful of states 
today, and it becomes even more challenging when the ‘external’ aspect of self-
determination is taken into account.  This aspect refers to the interactions and 
relations of a self-determining community, the state in which it is located and 
the international society of states pertaining to questions of international 
legitimacy and recognition and, ultimately, of state fragmentation and secession. 
Accordingly, the external aspect largely revolves around emerging 
nationalism and the international dimension of identity politics.  This 
precipitates further questions such as whether the self-determination of 
nationalities or other PIFGs dictates that the only legitimate state is one that 
reflects the will of the people over whom it exercises authority, to what extent 
nationalist demands from within a multi-national state must be internationally 
recognized and accommodated and, in extremis, whether it validates the dictum 
‘to every nation, its own state’, carrying with it a right of secession.  Even on the 
‘less controversial’ issues related to the internal aspect of self-determination 
there are potent questions, such as whether contemporary multi-national or 
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multi-ethnic states persist only through the repression of national consciousness 
by the state’s institutions?  Secession is the point at which the concepts of self-
determination, political obligation and the role of the international community 
intersect and, as a result, it indicates more clearly the normative confines of self-
determination and state sovereignty.  Examining each of these challenges in turn 
provides greater clarity about the limits that can be placed legitimately on the 
exercise of self-determination. 
 
(i) Sovereign statehood and self-determination 
 
There is an intimate connection between the concepts of sovereignty, the 
state and self-determination.  Although there is nothing groundbreaking in this 
assertion, it is worth restating because any attempt to separate the ideas and 
downplay or deny the connection would result in a misrepresentation of the 
concepts and their impact on international norms.  Any defence of self-
determination that fails to consider the concept of sovereign statehood and the 
society of states invites theoretical and pragmatic inconsistency and potential 
incoherence.  As later chapters suggest, this explains in part the troubled course 
of events involving self-determination after the First World War and in the 
post-Cold War era.   
The state is a political entity that is relatively easy to discern, especially 
considering its prominence today.  Yet, despite being the central focus of 
politics in the modern era, the sovereign state and its characteristics are the 
subject of controversy.  Part of the difficulty is that the modern state, like 
virtually all social and political constructs, developed in a particular set of 
historical circumstances, changed and developed over time and continues to 
alter with the constant process of evolution.  Most authors identify a number of 
common characteristics that are constitutive of statehood and although there is 
a great deal of consensus about what the state is and even about what 
sovereignty involves, there is a wide divergence on the relative importance of 
various aspects, which makes subsequent discussions about self-determination 
and ‘the state’, ‘sovereign authority’ and the ‘international system of states’ 
problematic. 
The 1933 Montevideo Convention defines a state as having a permanent 
population, a defined territory, a government and a recognized ability to enter 
into relations with other states.1  In addition, it should be added that states are 
today the main political actors on the world stage (and have been in Europe                                                         
1 ‘Convention on the Rights and Duties of States’ (Montevideo Convention), League of Nations 
Treaty Series, 165: 19 (1933). 
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since roughly the sixteenth century), that states recognize each other as having 
authority over their territory and populations, that states are legally equal and 
that they are only restrained legitimately through international law, over which 
states have some degree of control.  Although these assertions arouse little 
controversy, they prove too vague when analysing sovereignty and the impact of 
self-determination.  To get at the relation between statehood and sovereignty, 
the quality of independence needs to be explained. 
Many accounts of the statehood indicate the interrelated nature of 
sovereignty and independence.  Reynolds holds that sovereignty is the ‘formal 
authority to make binding laws and political decisions within recognized 
territorial limits without interference or control from other bodies and to act 
externally with a freedom that is limited only by voluntarily accepted restraints’.2  
Similarly, and in common with many other international lawyers, Jennings and 
Watts, in their Oppenheim's International Law, include sovereignty as one of the 
four constituent elements of the state, holding that ‘[s]overeignty in the strict 
and narrowest sense of the term implies…independence all around, within and 
without the borders of the country.’3  Having the ability to exercise this 
authority over a given territorial unit and being free from the interference or 
control of another state or states when exercising authority is an important, if 
not the defining, characteristic of the state.  
However these views all leave the matter in a nebulous condition because 
they fail to describe exactly how sovereignty and independence fit together.  
None describe how the ability to govern within a state’s borders is gauged or 
understood, or how this relates to a state’s international standing and legitimacy.  
It is clear that the international community frequently applies a varying standard 
when judging the capacity of states to be sovereign within their own borders for 
the purpose of recognition.4  Furthermore, many authors understand the term 
sovereignty differently.  As Hurst Hannum notes, ‘[a]t least part of the difficulty 
in defining sovereignty lies in the fact that sovereignty traces its historical roots 
to sovereigns, in whose hands “absolute” spiritual and temporal power rested’, 
and as Hannum continues, this is hardly the case today.5   
However, both James Crawford’s insightful legal study of statehood and 
Alan James’s astute observations from the perspective of international relations                                                         
2 Quoted in Alan James, Sovereign Statehood (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 20. 
3 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, eds., Oppenheim's International Law 9th. edn. (London: 
Longman, 1992), 32. 
4 See James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1979), Chapter 2, Section 3.  
5 Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting 
Rights 2nd edn. (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 14-16 and, more 
generally, Chapter 2.   
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provide some much-needed clarity.6  James contends that sovereignty is best 
understood as that capacity which entitles a state to enter international society 
and play an active role on this stage.  Sovereignty therefore becomes a function 
of power, one that creates states and ensures their position and standing in 
relation to other states.  By taking the case of the Solomon Islands and tracing 
why they were once not a state and then were, James identifies the capacity to 
act without constraint from the British government that transformed the 
Solomon Islands into a sovereign and independent state.  This freedom is 
fundamentally legal in character rather than the product of brute force, and, 
accordingly, independence is first and foremost constitutional in nature.  Thus a 
sovereign state is one that has a constitutional capacity to enter the society of 
other states on the terms of equality, that is, an equality of standing, not of 
power.  
In a similar vein, Crawford states that independence is ‘the central 
criterion of statehood’.7  Using the Island of Palmas Arbitration (1928) and the 
Austro-German Customs Case (1931) as precedents, Crawford concludes that 
independence is the ability of a state’s institutions of government to exercise 
exclusive control over its internal affairs.  The recognition of this quality by 
other states is not a statement of approval or disapproval of the government or 
people, merely an acknowledgement of legal standing.  By this explanation, the 
society of states is the collection of political entities that mutually recognize the 
right to independence over matters deemed to be internal and base their equal 
legal standing on this premise.   
Sovereign statehood reflects both an external and an internal dimension 
of sovereignty that is very similar to the internal and external aspects of self-
determination.  As Robert Jackson explains it, sovereignty includes both ‘an 
internal aspect which a government of a populated territory is supreme within 
its jurisdiction, and an external aspect in which that same government is legally 
separated from all other governments of the same sort and is recognized as such.  
Thus in international relations, sovereignty is a mark of political independence 
of the state.’8 
It is more than coincidental that the conceptual explication of sovereign 
statehood and self-determination sound similar, as the two concepts originated 
at roughly the same historical moment and, more importantly, they are 
analogous and are interconnected.  Sovereign statehood and the corresponding                                                         
6 James, Statehood, Chapters 1 and 2 in particular; Alan James, ‘The practice of sovereign 
statehood in contemporary society,’ Political Studies 47 (1999), 457-473; and Crawford, Creation, 
Chapter 2.  
7 Crawford, Creation, 48. 
8 Robert Jackson, 'Introduction: Sovereignty at the Millennium', Political Studies 47 (1999), 425. 
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concept of non-intervention have much in common with the self-determination 
and its democratic imperative.  Briefly tracing the roots of the sovereign state 
usefully illustrates this point.   
The international system of states coalesced in Western Europe during 
the early modern era (at the same time as self-determination first emerged) and 
the system was based on the ideas contained in the peace of Westphalia.  The 
Westphalian formula of cuius regio eius religio (first stated in the Treaty of 
Augsburg of 1555) established independent and sovereign states as the model for 
international interaction and gave to that system many of its defining principles, 
including non-interference and territorial integrity.  Westphalia was a 
settlement that, as Daniel Philpott has suggested, altered the ‘constitution of 
sovereignty’ for the key political actors concerned.9  As Jackson explains, this 
transformed Europe from a society in which authority was, at least nominally, in 
the hands several princes acting on behalf of the greater and unified respublica 
Christiana, to an international society based on separate, independent and 
equally sovereign entities, into whose domestic affairs other states would not 
interfere.10  This alteration was hardly democratic or liberal, but it did have 
everything to do with self-determination, for the peace of Westphalia imbued 
the sovereign state with certain rights that were predicated on the idea that each 
state could determine its own religious, social and political direction legally and 
constitutionally independent from the others.  Over time, this idea became 
central to the relation of states.  In effect, each state was free to determine its 
own path in the absence of any over-arching, sovereign authority.  As Osiander 
points out, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, European monarchs were 
‘essentially...self determining actors, none of which was entitled to dictate to 
others’11, a process that could not have taken place without the conceptual shift 
brought about during this time.  
One central assumption created at Westphalia was that the 
distinctiveness of states’ internal arrangements is the foundation of their 
independence and is the basis for non-interference.  It is clear that, at the time 
of Westphalia (and for many years afterwards), the distinctiveness on which 
sovereign independence and non-interference was based was the preferences of a 
handful of monarchs or state élites.  The determining ‘self’ in this case was the 
monarch.  However, by adding the democratic underpinning of self-
determination and nationality to this changes the locus of this distinctiveness.                                                          
9 Daniel Philpott, ‘Ideas and the Evolution of Sovereignty’, in Sohail H. Hashami, ed., State 
Sovereignty (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 28-34. 
10 Robert Jackson, ‘Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Historical and Conceptual 
Landscape’, Political Studies 47 (1999), 435-439. 
11 Quoted in Jackson, ‘Sovereignty’, 439. 
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With self-determination, the popular will and sentiment of the state’s citizenry, its 
nationality, defines the state and supports the claim to sovereign statehood, and 
it does so in a manner entirely compatible with the Westphalian settlement.  
While historical evidence of this is discussed at some length in Part II of this 
study, it is relatively uncontroversial to assert that, as the position of individual 
sovereigns diminished as democracy grew, their role as the definers of the state’s 
uniqueness was usurped by the populace at large who were also wresting political 
power from them.  By the beginning of the twentieth century in Europe and 
increasingly elsewhere, the phrase ‘sovereign state’ implied that the citizenry 
were a vital and defining part of the whole, rather than the hapless body of 
people living within the territorial confines of the state who were insignificant in 
relation to the person who was sovereign.   
In this sense, self-determination can be seen as something quite different 
from what it is often presented as being.12  Here it is not a claim for political 
separation; rather it is an expression of popular consent, or at least popular 
acquiescence, of the sovereignty of the state.  This popular endorsement of the 
state’s internal sovereignty confirms the state’s position as a member of the 
society of states externally, thereby creating a link between the internal and 
external aspects of sovereignty and self-determination.  This passive expression 
of self-determination is not as obvious as emerging nations are, which should be 
seen as active expressions of national self-determination, but it is no less 
significant.  As the basis of a state’s sovereignty over internal affairs and the 
state’s external personality, self-determination takes on a new and more 
significant position than perhaps it is accorded when viewed as nothing more 
than a remedy to injustice.  
Although this clarification is valuable, further issues related to it are not 
yet explained.  If the link between self-determination and sovereignty is meant 
to be a precondition for international legitimacy, are states that cannot show 
evidence of popular sovereignty by definition illegitimate?  If the answer to this 
is yes, then, by extension, is not any state containing emerging nationalism also 
illegitimate?  If the answer to this is also yes, then national self-determination 
would seem to contain a robust and legitimate right to secession.  The following 
section considers how popular sovereignty, political obligation and self-
determination affect the question of state legitimacy and the constitutional 
arrangements within states, while section (iii) considers the question of 
secession.                                                         
12 A similar point is made by Rodolfo Stavenhagen, ‘Self-determination: Right or Demon?’, in 
Donald Clark and Robert Williamson, eds., Self-determination: International Perspectives (London: 
Routledge, 1996). 
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(ii) The internal aspect of sovereignty and humane governance 
 
Since self-determination can be both passive and active and is, in its 
passive manifestation, akin to popular sovereignty, it is vital to delve deeper into 
the specifics of sovereignty’s internal dimension.  To do this, it is useful to look 
at the formation of political society in the liberal democratic tradition again.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, political societies are created through a 
mixture of choice and necessity to fulfil both the basic needs and the desired 
ends of various human communities.  The fundamental reason for the existence 
of political and social groups, especially PIFGs, is to serve the most significant 
interests of the group’s members.  Although necessity often plays a greater part 
than choice in these groups, liberal democratic theory stresses the importance of 
individual volition in this process and traces the genesis of the group and 
individual rights to this. 
Stressing the role of individual choice in group formation helped 
elucidate the hierarchy of rights outlined in Chapter 1, but when considering the 
other side of the coin, that is to say the limits of such rights, the emphasis on 
volition proves somewhat difficult to systematise.  The basic problem is that if 
individual or group choice creates a larger polity and/or endows it with 
legitimacy, there seems to be no restriction to another choice bringing it to an 
end at any point in the future.  This is further complicated by the fact that, with 
the hierarchy of rights, the wishes and desires of each and every individual in a 
particular group must be perceived as meaningful, making it difficult to clarify 
when an association should change or end.  For example, is a nationality acting 
in a ‘popularly sovereign’ fashion when serious dissent exists within its ranks?  
How small or how large must the percentage of dissent be before an act of self-
determination (passive or active) ceases to be legitimate? 
These challenging questions point to the indeterminacy created by the 
so-called ‘consent theories’ of sovereignty.13  The theories that fall under this 
broad heading take many shapes but share the common trait of being based 
ultimately on the democratic desires of the group (usually a nationality) taken as 
a whole.  Self-determination in this context demands that the constitutional 
arrangements, whatever their exact configuration, reflect the desires of the ‘the 
people’.  However, Ivor Jennings’s oft quoted point makes clear that this seems 
really easy on the surface, ‘let the people decide’, but, in fact, leaves out the                                                         
13 For developed examples of choice theories of obligation, see Henry Beran, The Consent Theory 
of Political Obligation (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Beran, ‘A Liberal Theory of Secession’, 
Political Studies 32 (1984), 23-35; Beran, ‘A Democratic Theory of Self-determination for a New 
World Order’, in Percy Lehning, ed., Theories of Secession (London: Routledge, 1998); and Daniel 
Philpott, ‘In Defence of Self-determination’, Ethics 105 (January 1995), 352-385.  
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answer to the question ‘who are the people?’14  One answer to this is that ‘the 
people’ should be taken as all persons in the state, but even if this were plausible 
for an overwhelmingly ethnically homogeneous ‘nation-state’ like Japan or 
Denmark, the vast majority of states are multi-national and/or have multiple 
PIFGs.  As a result, something better is needed to address the situation caused 
by emerging nationalism.   
A more productive approach is to blend the ideas of humane governance 
with the conclusions reached in Chapter 1 about the restriction of authority in 
groups.  Humane governance is increasingly used in academic and policy circles 
and is differentiated from other concepts of governance by the emphasis it 
places on human rights, peaceful human empowerment, and democratic, rights-
enhancing decision-making.15  The effect of this theory on self-determination, 
nationalism and sovereignty is to place human empowerment and human rights 
ahead of the arbitrary authority of a group or a state.  In a general sense, it is 
entirely in line with liberal democratic ideas and, more specifically, it fits in well 
with the hierarchy of rights.  As for the limits of self-determination, it was noted 
in Chapter 1 that a nation was meant to be the embodiment of the political will 
of its members but that unanimity was not required or expected for the actions 
to be legitimate, only that the actions and decisions could not be contrary to the 
well-being of the people in an overall or long-lasting sense.  Provided this is the 
case, a nationality or other PIFG could legitimately demand a rather high degree 
of conformity from its members. 
As Chapter 1 showed, the formation of social groups, especially PIFGs, 
involves consent and creates obligations and authority, and this process is even 
more apparent with states.  As individuals and groups form or legitimate a state 
through their consent, they do so for ends that are ultimately in their own 
interests.  Although states exist for many reasons, humane governance contends 
that their legitimacy rests on the state’s ability to provide an environment that 
serves its population’s needs and self-determined ‘goods’.  In so doing, the 
individuals and groups making up the state are obligated to the state and agree 
to respect the state’s authority. 
It should be noted that by accepting the state’s authority and the 
consequential obligations, the population accepts limitations on the absolute 
liberty they would, in theory, possess prior to the creation of such political                                                         
14 Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), 
56. 
15 For a lucid, useful introduction of the concept, see Richard Falk, On Humane Governance: 
Towards a New Global Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Daniele Archiburgi and David 
Held, Cosmopolitan Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994); David Held, Democracy and the 
Global Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), Part IV in particular. 
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collectives.16  The duties imposed by states and the state’s authority over 
peoples’ lives are the natural consequences of any well functioning association.  
In its proper sense, authority is the right of a state (or another socio-political 
body) to control the functioning of the state and, within limits, its citizens’ lives.17  
In this context, obligation can be defined as the limitations placed on individual 
freedom resulting from the authority the state exercises.  Both authority and 
obligation, indeed all the legitimate power of the state, arise from the transfer of 
freedom individuals make through their tacit or expressed consent for the state, 
a transfer made for the greater benefits achieved by the association.18  This is an 
important point, for without this, authority would be no more than the power to 
coerce.  However, to view authority in this manner would be a 
misrepresentation of the concept, which in terms of humane governance is never 
distanced from its instrumentalist role.  In this context, authority is coercive, 
but only insofar as the coercion is in the overall interests of the coerced.  
Authority, here, is much like Rousseau’s ‘General Will’ which separated the 
individual from their particular motivations to force them to act in their general 
interest (i.e. their true interest) at all times.19  The result of this is a balance 
between the obligations a state may legitimately place on its members and their 
retained liberty while subject to its legitimate authority.  
This balance is difficult to describe qualitatively with any exactitude, but 
it is surrounded by important guiding principles that give it a modicum of 
clarity.  Like relations within groups, at an absolute minimum, the authority of 
the state cannot legitimately override basic human rights.  Although an exact list 
of basic human rights is very hard to enumerate, it is relatively easy to argue that 
every legitimate state will respect at least the most basics rights such as, for 
example, life, conscience and freedom from torture, and, while these rights 
might be violated frequently in practice, it would be very difficult to argue that 
the states doing so exhibit a high degree of internal self-determination.  
Accordingly, states have a moral imperative to govern in a humane manner, so as 
to make their authority legitimate.  However, the theories of self-determination, 
humane governance and consent demand more than this from states; they also 
set down the idea of democratic responsiveness as a yardstick by which to judge 
the application of authority and the imposition of obligations.   
                                                        
16 This builds on the premises taken in most contractual theories of the state. (e.g. John Locke, 
Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); 
Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan (New York: Collier Books, 1962), et al.) 
17 cf. Beran, Consent, 5-15. 
18 For a classic elaboration of tacit consent, see Locke, Two Treatises. 
19 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and the Discourses (London: Everyman Library, 1973), 
190-192. 
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This is not to suggest that only liberal democratic states can be self-
determining.  Self-determination does have its philosophical roots in liberal 
democratic theory and assumes a democratic or at least demotic backing for the 
state’s authority, but neither it nor consent theory nor humane governance 
suggest that legitimate expressions of self-determination inevitably lead to 
liberal democratic institutions.  Numerous peoples have given their tacit, if not 
their expressed, consent to forms of government and to associations that are not 
particularly democratic or even terribly rights respecting.20  The point here is 
that for authority to be legitimate the state must reflect the interests of its 
population and it must maintain their approval or at least their willing 
compliance.  In short, the state’s population must exhibit a degree of self-
determination, though this need not necessarily be national self-determination, 
for the creation or maintenance of a viable, singular national identity is not a 
necessary condition for a state’s authority to be legitimately exercised (though 
most states seek to foster the development of a national consciousness in order 
to help legitimize their actions and existence).  
This balance allows a state to exercise its authority while preserving the 
interests of individuals and groups within its borders, and it permits the creation 
of laws that are ultimately deemed to be in the interest of the public good even 
if they are not specifically attractive to a particular individual or groups.  
Examples of this could include limitation on travel or conscription.  Many 
individuals may themselves in the position of seeing no tangible benefit of such 
an obligation, but this is simply the trade off for the greater good of the whole 
society.  In many cases, individuals may never actually receive any reciprocal 
benefit from such obligations in any overt or material sense of the term.  For 
example, taxation of the wealthy may never yield any tangible benefit to them, 
nor may they ever have recourse to the public services their taxes support.  Thus 
on the grounds of reciprocity as tangible reward, some people may not consider 
their contribution to be sufficiently worthy to warrant their continued allegiance 
to the state.  Such an opinion, though plausible on the surface, does not bear up 
under scrutiny, as the basis of duties such as taxes to groups is not reciprocity in 
the sense of receiving immediately tangible benefit, but the intangible and, 
perhaps indefinable benefits of corporate society.  Moreover, these duties are 
valid even when they are not codified, when they are the result of custom and 
even when the state was created by a previous illiberal action, such as conquest.  
As with PIFGs, what determines the legitimacy of a state is the degree to which                                                         
20 For example, some Native American PIFGs have a great deal of power and authority that is 
based on the overwhelming, popular backing of their members yet observe a limited range of 
basic human rights and do not adhere to liberal democratic standards. 
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it is internally self-determining and acting in accordance with the principles of 
humane governance - in other words, the degree to which the state serves the 
interests of its population and provides opportunities for them to find meaning 
and fulfilment.  
Of course, it must be remembered that states provide not only identity 
but also security for the enjoyment of individual rights at both the domestic and 
international level.  They are (normally) the bodies that ensure social order, 
dispense justice and have the greatest responsibility to individual development 
by controlling or influencing education, housing, economic regulation, welfare 
and cultural policy.  A degree of faith that they are in fact acting in the best 
interests of the members must, therefore, be extended to such collective bodies.  
The wholesale rejection of state authority and obligations would be folly in the 
extreme and an ultimately self-defeating proposition, as this would not be either 
possible in a practical sense or in the population’s true, best interests as political 
association is intended to provide the individual with certain ‘goods’.  This does 
not deny the right of opposition or even the ultimate right to reform or abolish a 
state’s institutions.  Indeed, to deny the right of such ultimate remedies would 
undermine the liberal democratic basis of society. 
The internal aspect of self-determination, then, is an ongoing and 
somewhat inscrutable balancing act between respecting the authority of the 
state and, at the same time, legitimising that authority through consent, which 
itself could be either expressed or tacit.  Furthermore, the exercise of self-
determination at this level could be either active or passive since it applies to 
associations of which the present-day population most likely did not themselves 
create but only inherited.  In these circumstances, it would be illogical to expect 
every individual or group to exercise their right of self-determination through 
some form of expressed allegiance.  Members of such collectives accept the 
authority of groups and states until such time as they see fit to use their right of 
self-determination in an active manner to oppose the sovereignty of the state.   
The maintenance of state authority through a passive expression of self-
determination by the individuals and groups in a state is most obviously 
accomplished by constructing and preserving institutions that not only fulfil the 
necessary conditions of basic human rights and minimally responsive 
government but also those that aim to develop genuine and meaningful relations 
between the state and the governed.  Self-determination is meant to enhance 
popular sovereignty, and any scheme that would be inconsistent with such a 
principle would seem to run foul of this basic intent.  Consequently, states have 
an obligation to developing inclusive politics, and it is for this reason that states 
seeking legitimacy (or at least its appearance) frequently embark on ‘nation-
  48 
building’.  In both theory and practice, the creation or the nurturing of an 
inclusive nationality by a state is a useful and important activity not only for 
states that aim towards the standards of humane governance but also for those 
hoping to minimize resistance from the population.  As Chapter 1 showed, 
identity, particularly nationality, is deeply meaningful for most individuals, and 
the benefit of this for the individual citizen of a national- or nation-state is a 
direct identification with personality of the state and its internal institutions.  
Of course, it is not necessary and indeed may not even be possible for states to 
foster or promote a shared identity or nationality, but without the presence of 
the constitutional mechanisms to ensure that all their citizens’ interests and 
identities are meaningfully and significantly reflected in and supported by the 
state, its authority could be called into question.  The duty of providing 
democratic representation and meaningful respect for human rights for all 
nationalities and PIFGs within a multi-national state is very great, and begs the 
question of the length to which a state must go to ensure this and at what point 
an underrepresented or repressed group can legitimately assert its right of self-
determination in an active manner to address this imbalance. 
 
(iii) Secession 
 
Secession brings the theoretical and practical difficulties surrounding self-
determination and emerging nationalism to a head.  Although, the active 
assertion of the right of self-determination does not necessarily imply the 
fragmentation of a state with multiple PIFGs into new, separate entities, the 
insecurity and the fear of instability ensure that any active application of the 
principle is a cause for concern internally if not internationally as well. There 
seems an impenetrable array of both practical and theoretical hindrances in the 
way of making a robust defence of self-determination that includes secession, 
and yet the liberal democratic imperatives that buttress self-determination make 
it difficult to argue against the possibility of legitimate political divorce if such 
actions were manifestly in the peoples’ best interest and enjoyed overwhelming 
popular support. 
The debate about whether a credible theory of secession exists has 
intensified in the post-the Cold War era as more and more states find 
themselves confronting emerging nationalism,21 but there are a few theoretical 
groupings or categories into which most positions can be placed: anti-
secessionist, remedial right only, choice, national, and well-being arguments.                                                          
21 The reasons for the proliferation of such theories and the historical and strategic conditions 
that have led to it are taken up in Chapter 5 below. 
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Each of these will be considered in turn, but it is interesting to note that in all of 
the groupings, regardless of whether a specific theory defends a right of 
secession or not, there is little question that a right of self-determination exists 
in its passive form.  The central issue across all the groups is not whether 
peoples’ interests matter, for that is taken for granted, but whether and how 
their interests can be served by independence.  
The essential point of the theories falling into the anti-secessionist 
category is that self-determination, regardless of the actions of a state towards it 
citizens, does not include a right of secession.  Because it places a blanket ban on 
the fragmentation of states, this category could lead to the simplest of 
international norms: states are to be supported against all emerging nations (or 
any groups) that aim at independence.  Some recent anti-secessionist 
commentaries have suggested that the right self-determination and a right of 
secession are two entirely different concepts and must be kept distinct.22  By this 
account, self-determination is a democratic right to participate in the political 
life of the state and a mechanism to protect basic human rights, yet the 
termination of the overall political association is both separate and illegitimate.  
This thinking is often traced to the overriding benefits and the legally binding 
nature of political membership in the state.  As Buchheit indicates, the legal 
dictum that applies is pacta sunt servanda, that, all things being equal, agreements 
are binding.23  By this line of thinking, the consent of the governed, whether 
tacit or expressed, is entirely binding even for succeeding generations.  It was to 
this line of thinking that Abraham Lincoln subscribed.  As he said in his first 
inaugural address in 1861, ‘I hold that the Union of these States is perpetual.  No 
State upon its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union.’24  Lincoln, in 
fact, was willing to concede a very great degree of autonomy to the southern 
states (e.g. enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act and refusing to act against slavery in 
existing slaveholding states prior to 1862), while declining even to contemplate 
secession.  
Of course, the difficulty with the anti-secessionist logic is that such 
blanket bans are blunt instruments and are open to many criticisms.  The most 
obvious difficulty is that many states have been created as a result of secession, 
often without having the legitimacy of the fragmentation called into question, 
usually because the secession was overwhelmingly popular within the newly                                                         
22 Max Kampelman, ‘Secession and the Right of Self-determination: An Urgent Need to 
Harmonize Principle with Pragmatism’, The Washington Quarterly 16:3 (1993), 5-12. 
23 Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-determination (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1978), 20. 
24 Abraham Lincoln, ‘First Inaugural Address’ (4 March 1861) [http://www.yale.edu/ 
lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/lincoln1.htm]. 
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created state and internationally.  For example, the international community 
endorsed most of the state creation following the First World War and during 
the era of decolonisation precisely because it enhanced popular sovereignty.25  
On the purely normative level, separating self-determination from secession is 
questionable in light of the principles of liberal democracy and consent theory.  
If popular sovereignty is to be valued as a safeguard of the rights and status of 
the people within a state, the right to alter or abolish that state cannot be 
denied, for without this reserved power, a state could inflict the most severe 
abuses on all or a portion of its population without the fear of a legitimate 
fragmenting taking place. 
It might seem possible to make an exception to the anti-secessionist 
category and to limit secession only to the case of decolonisation or to political 
‘divorce’ where all parties agree to the secession.26  However, both cases fail to 
satisfy the demands of self-determination as it is understood in the liberal 
democratic tradition.  If the enhancement and protection of rights and 
fulfilment for all citizens is the ultimate goal of self-determination and the 
sovereign state, it is hard to see how these exceptions necessarily achieve or 
work towards these ends.  As for decolonisation, the ‘exception’ fails to identify 
accurately the real problem behind decolonisation, namely, unpopular and 
unresponsive rule.  Colonialism can be condemned for many reasons, but arguing 
that it violates the right of self-determination for being ‘alien’ or ‘foreign’ rule 
misses the mark, as the real illegitimacy of colonial rule was its lack of popular 
support by those it ruled.  Such a situation could easily exist or be worse within a 
state that has no experience of colonialism, and, yet, in these non-colonial cases 
would fall under the ban.  Similarly, to grant an exception when the parties 
merely agree to separate might lead to a situation in which either or both of the 
new entities fail to enhance rights or actually to repress them.  Both of these 
scenarios clearly are at odds with a rights based theory of self-determination and 
sovereignty. 
It is for this reason that some scholars have focused on defending 
secession as a right used for remedial purposes only.27  In remedial right only 
theories, no right of secession exists except when the group in question acts ‘in                                                         
25 These cases are examined more depth in Part II.  Of course, it should be noted that whether 
the creation of states actually contributed to popular sovereignty is another matter.   
26 Michla Pomerance, Self-determination in Law and Practice (The Hauge: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); 
Malcolm Shaw, ‘The Western Sahara Case’ British Yearbook of International Law 49 (1978), 153. 
27 Although remedial theories have a long intellectual history, Allen Buchanan’s recent treatment 
of the subject is arguably the clearest and most potent statement of the position at present.  See 
Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Buchanan, ‘The International Institutional Dimension of 
Secession’ in Lehning, Theories of Secession; and Buchanan, ‘Democracy and Secession’ in Moore, 
National Self-determination.   
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response to serious and persisting grievances’ and as a ‘remedy of last resort to 
escape serious injustices’.28  Although these conditions are far from specific, they 
establish parameters by which a state’s legitimacy and its subsequent 
fragmentation can be judged internationally.  Since self-determination is 
grounded in human rights and liberal democratic theory, persistent violations of 
individual rights and the standards of humane governance would certainly call 
into question a government’s legitimacy and justify the fragmentation of the 
state provided that the aim of the secession was solely to redress serious 
injustices.  Accordingly, the legitimacy of state fragmentation would be 
determined by the persistence and severity of the evils suffered by those 
attempting to secede and the degree to which the new state they aim to create 
reflects a correction of those wrongs.  
The advantage of this theory is the equal emphasis it places on human 
rights and the necessity of those suffering the abuses to show sufficient cause for 
redress.  As for the first of these, the emphasis on human rights and democratic 
governance fits well with self-determination’s intellectual heritage.  If a state’s 
legitimacy is supposed to be based on its popular support, then the abuse of 
fundamental human rights ought to trigger an active assertion of a people’s right 
to self-determination as a corrective to this, up to and including a right of 
secession.  The emphasis placed on showing sufficient cause can be seen as a 
corrective to what one scholar has called ‘vanity secessions’, which are secessions 
based on motives that are ethically inferior to the serious and persistent abuse of 
fundamental human rights.29  In this way, remedial rights theories permit 
secession but do so only in a highly conservative manner, thereby providing a 
defence against the (well-founded) accusation that secession is disruptive to 
international stability and security.  By placing the burden of proof on the 
seceding party, remedial rights arguments ensure that the only legitimate cases 
of state fragmentation will be those where the protection and promotion of 
human rights and humane governance are the motivation.  In any normative 
framework of self-determination, the challenge is to develop theoretical 
parameters that permit self-determination yet maintain a credible and workable 
degree of political obligation.  Self-determination should never be responded to 
in a way that supports only one side of this important equation.  The remedial 
rights only argument has the double-edged benefit of protecting a specific body 
of people on a specific occasion and promoting the general principles behind a 
liberal democratic conception of self-determination while also ensuring a stable                                                         
28 Buchanan, ‘Democracy’, 25. 
29 Wayne Norman, ‘The Ethics Of Secession and the Regulation of Secessionist Politics’ in 
Moore, National Self-determination, 52-56. 
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framework for the application of these ideas through the setting of limits on the 
concept’s application.  
Although remedial right only theories provide some much-needed 
boundaries for the active application of self-determination, the emphasis on 
suffering as the criterion for the legitimisation of separation avoids the question 
of who can secede and what they can take with them in terms of land and 
resources.  This seems to reopen some the issues that seemed settled about the 
legitimate holders of the right of self-determination and then to try and develop 
a remedial right of secession.  For example, would religious congregations or 
even smaller groups, such as families, be legitimate holders of this right in this 
version and, if so, should other criteria such as the economic viability, the size or 
the degree of ethnic or national cohesion of a group be added to the list of 
requirements?  If the persistent, widespread and serious violation of basic human 
rights is what matters, why should the size of the territory in question or the 
ethnic composition matter?  What alternative do remedial rights theories hold 
for states, like former Yugoslavia, where the violation of rights was evident but 
the geographic mixing of PIFGs was such that viable secession seemed 
impossible in practical terms? 
If it were only a matter of adding further criteria, remedial rights theories 
might serve as a basis for a normative framework for addressing secession, but 
there are more issues that are not addressed at all.  One is that, regardless of how 
theoretically correct it is to justify secession as a remedy for serious and ongoing 
wrongs, it is far from easy in practice to judge accurately what constitutes ‘grave 
violations’, how much suffering is ‘enough’ to trigger a legitimate, active exercise 
of self-determination and who is competent to judge these criteria.  While it 
might be acceptable to say that the ‘court of world opinion’ is a good place to 
look for verdicts, this court can be manipulated by those who might be more 
able than others to parade their suffering effectively on the international stage.  
It must also be noted, the international community has to balance other, 
potentially conflicting norms and a host of practical and strategic factors at the 
same time.  Nonetheless, the indeterminacy surrounding this, while great, can be 
reduced, in theory at least though often not in practice, through diligent 
collection and reporting of human rights violations and humane governance 
initiatives that seek to judge and address the actual degree of democratic 
deficit.30 
However, a more fundamental problem with remedial theories is 
precisely the concentration on abuse.  While the gross abuse of human rights                                                         
30 The role of the media, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in collecting 
and reporting such information would be critical for success in this process. 
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and the persistent and systematic denial of humane governance would legitimize 
the active application of self-determination, there seems no good reason why a 
more expansive list of rights, or even democratic participation should be denied 
to a group that has not had the ‘privilege’ of persecution.  To limit secession to 
remedial use only would encourage ‘rouge states’ to abuse all or part of their 
population to all lengths short of that which might break the (undefined and 
perhaps indefinable) minimum threshold at which the right to self-
determination could be actively applied legitimately.  As a result, limiting the 
cases of legitimate secession to remedial circumstances only might restrict the 
passive, democratic aspect of self-determination within states and might 
eliminate the possibility of legitimate political divorce based solely on the 
expressed, self-determined wishes of emerging nations.31  Thus, the remedial 
right only position is too limited to be the sole basis for an encompassing 
international norm of self-determination. 
On the other extreme of the debate from the anti-secessionist position 
are the choice theories of secession.32  The arguments that fall under the heading 
of choice theories revolve around the central belief that there is an intrinsic 
value in democratically organised societies and in the exercise of political 
autonomy and that the expressed choice of a group to secede may be a 
democratically legitimate action, regardless of the group’s motivation.  Choice 
theories do not require evidence of prolonged or severe abuse by the state.  
According to choice theorists, the value of autonomy and the democratically 
expressed will of the people in favour of secession outweighs whatever value 
might be attached to the maintenance of the existing state.  As Philpott clarifies, 
‘[w]hat justifies self-determination is not the mere fact of the members’ choice, 
but their realization of democratic autonomy, their increased ability to steer 
their fate. Autonomy here is a realized good.’33  The circumstances giving rise to 
the secessionist movement are also of little significance, for, regardless of what 
specific participants themselves claim at the time, the real aim behind all 
secessions is the increase of autonomy.34  In this conception of self-
determination, the liberal democratic heritage is most openly visible and 
promoted.  The expression of political will, whether in the shape of plebiscites 
or mass action takes on a liberating and enriching function for all those involved                                                         
31 Cases like the ‘velvet divorce’ of Czech and Slovak Republics in 1992 come to mind as cases 
that would not be valid under a remedial right only theory. 
32 See for example Philpott, ‘In Defence’; Daniel Philpott, ‘Self-determination in Practice’, in 
Moore, National Self-determination, 79-102; Beran, ‘A Liberal Theory’; and Beran, ‘A Democratic 
Theory’.  Also see Ronald S. Beiner, ‘National Self-determination: Some Cautionary Remarks 
Concerning the Rhetoric of Rights’ in Moore, National Self-determination, 158-180, for a more 
limited endorsement of this concept. 
33 Philpott, ‘Self-determination’, 82. 
34 Philpott, ‘In Defence’, 375-376. 
  54 
since the act of secession seeks a ‘good’ towards which they themselves desire 
and work.  This approach to self-determination and secession also obviates the 
need to produce evidence of suffering that remedial right only theories 
necessitate.  If the clearly expressed will of the people to separate from a state is 
the legitimizing factor, then it seems superfluous to require any group to endure 
human rights abuse.  This has the tremendous added bonus of setting a higher 
standard of democratic accountability for states, which, again, reinforces popular 
sovereignty and respect for humane governance.   
However, the emphasis on the expressed will of the people as the 
legitimating principle creates almost as many problems as it solves.  One major 
difficulty is the failure to identify and limit the number and types of groups that 
can legitimately exercise the secessionist element of the right self-
determination.  Most choice theorists speak of a people with a common 
allegiance, a shared culture or an affective tie that binds them, which legitimizes 
their efforts to separate from their current state, but such formulations fail to 
show why these groups should have priority over any others if choice is the most 
important factor in their secession.  Many choice theorists suggest that only 
groups with a specific territory and with economic viability can legitimately opt 
for secession or they go silent on the issue,35 but such qualifications seem 
insubstantial.  By placing such weight on the importance of choice, it seems 
implausible to then limit the choice-making groups to only those in neat, 
territorially confined parts of the state from which they wish to split, taking 
enough (but not too much) of the former state’s resources to be economically 
viable once independent. 
Another problem with choice theories is the potential for abuse.  In 
addition to the threats of unlimited fragmentation and ‘vanity secessions’, 
Buchanan points out that plebiscitory theories of secession can actually prove to 
be anti-democratic, in that a minority group can hold a majority to ransom by 
endlessly threatening secession, and in so doing, monopolize the state’s 
attention and an unjust share of the state’s resources.36  In effect, this abuse of 
the right self-determination runs counter to the democratic logic behind popular 
sovereignty.  Although technically correct in calling this undemocratic, 
Buchanan fails to highlight the larger confusion surrounding the issue, for 
without knowing the boundaries of the demos in question it is impossible to 
determine whether an action is actually democratic.  Additionally, choice 
theories emphasize democratic, as opposed to liberal democratic, values.  Putting 
aside Buchanan’s concern that choice theories can be used by minorities to wrest                                                         
35 Philpott, ‘In Defence’, 369-371 and Beran, ‘A Democratic Theory’. 
36 Buchanan, ‘Democracy’, 21-24. 
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concessions from a majority, there is too much silence about the rights of 
individuals within newly created states in choice theories and no mention about 
the protection of dissenting minority groups that might be trapped within the 
new states.  All that can be inferred is that such individuals and groups would 
have the same right to leave or secede from the new state as the original group 
did from the previous state.37 
If choice theories are lacking because they do not clarify sufficiently what 
groups may secede, then nationalist theories of secession by contrast are far 
more restrictive.  As Part II outlines, nationalist theories were employed 
frequently in the twentieth century and contend that nations are culturally, 
historically and socially distinct collective entities and, as such, hold the right to 
secede. Many authors, not just those who perceive a specifically national right of 
secession, argue or assume that seceding groups must have a high degree of unity 
and permanence to be legitimate.38  Chapter 1 contended that, of all PIFGs, 
nationalities are the most developed in political terms, and, because many can 
draw on shared culture, history, ethnicity, homeland, etc. to maintain their 
unity, nations are the most likely groups to challenge the status quo within state, 
and, as such, the make the best (and perhaps only) case for being a ‘special 
category’ that can exercise a right to secede from a state.  
Looking at the matter in ideal theory helps to confirm this conclusion, 
for in idealised conditions, it could be maintained that any group or any 
individual could exercise the right of self-determination actively and ‘secede’ on 
virtually any grounds.  However, by adding the ‘national’ qualification, the 
employment of a right of secession is limited in a way that preserves the 
democratic basis of the right while adding more manageable conditions.  Firstly, 
beyond permanence and unity, nations are democratic (or at least demotic) 
embodiments of their members’ identity and desires, and, as such, they merit 
greater ethical significance than non-PIFG social and political groups and, 
because of their relative size and degree of political, social and economic unity 
and activity, they are more capable than any other PIFG group of meeting the 
requirements of sovereign statehood.  Nationalities also bring their own 
territorial dimension to the secession process.  Although the introduction of 
territory can be deeply problematic, virtually all nationalities have a ‘homeland’                                                         
37 Beran, ‘A Liberal Theory’ and ‘A Democratic Theory’ hints that this might be the case.  
38 See, for example, Beran, ‘A Liberal Theory’; Beran, ‘A Democratic Theory’; Simon Caney, 
‘National Self-determination and National Secession: Individualist and Communitarian 
Approaches’ in Lehning, Theories of Secession; Kai Nielson, ‘Liberal Nationalism and Secession’, in 
Moore, National Self-determination; David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), Chapter 4; Ralph Predmas, ‘Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective’, 
in Ralph Predmas, S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe and A. Anderson, eds. Secessionist Movements in 
Comparative Perspective (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990). 
  56 
and for most, this is not only a geographical space but carries with it a spiritual 
significance that binds people to it and normally evokes a high degree of loyalty 
and willingness to sacrifice to secure or obtain it.39  While having a distinct 
geographic space is essential for acquiring statehood, the emotional attachment 
to land can become so visceral that any practical application of self-
determination can be too focused on this one dimension, thereby thwarting a 
settlement and distracting the parties away from other crucial component of 
self-determination such as human rights. 
Unfortunately, nationalist theories of secession fail on several other 
counts.  Perhaps the most important is the way national theories treat any 
nation as having the same entitlement to secession.  Although it has been 
contended that part of a nation’s ethical worth is its democratic basis, it must be 
remembered that the term democratic is employed broadly and refers to the 
equality of membership and the crude articulation of public will that nations 
embody.  While some nations are fully democratic in terms of participation, 
institutions and the reflection of popular sovereignty, nations are frequently 
subject to elite manipulation and have only marginally liberal or, indeed, illiberal 
institutions and policies.40  In its simple form, the national theory of secession 
extends the right of secession somewhat blindly, equally to liberal and illiberal 
nations alike, but attempting to limit its application to ‘liberal’ nations is a tricky 
enterprise at best.  For one thing, exactly what makes a nation ‘liberal’ is not 
immediately certain and even if criteria can be teased out, it is still far from 
obvious why this should confer an automatic right to secede.41  
Of all the theoretical approaches to secession, perhaps the most vague at 
first glance is the ‘well-being’ defence of secession.42 It is somewhat helpful to 
begin by describing the affinities that well-being arguments have with remedial 
right theories.  At the simplest level, well-being arguments, like remedial right 
theories, seek to protect the physical security and basic rights of individuals and 
groups by legitimizing secession that is carried out for these reasons.  But, a 
concept of well-being also incorporates values that are beyond security and basic 
human rights, such as the welfare, interests and aspirations of the people within 
a society. The source of the ambiguity is the stress placed on well-being, which 
appears on the surface to be a deeply subjective matter. 
                                                        
39 For more on the territorial dimension of nations and nationality, see Smith, Ethnic Origins. 
40 This point is well made, in a wider context, by Erica Benner, ‘Is There a “Core” National 
Doctrine?’ Nations and Nationalism 7:2 (2001). 
41 For the difficulties in defining the idea of a ‘liberal’ nation, see Tamir, Liberal Nationalism. 
42 For example, see Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, ‘National Self-determination’, Journal of 
Philosophy, 87 (1990).  
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However, the uncertainty about this list of values, which itself is not 
exhaustive, is entirely compatible with the democratic nature of self-
determination, for it permits flexibility and greater applicability.  To clarify, by 
not specifying what well-being means in absolute sense, each group or society is 
left to determine what is essential for their well-being, what they consider to be 
the ‘goods’ for which their society exists.  In this sense, well-being is a concept 
that fits nicely with the democratic dictum of allowing people ‘to find their own 
good in their own way’.  Raz and Margalit speak of an ‘intrinsic argument’ in 
favour of self-government as a means to promoting the well-being of the body 
politic.  Building on this point, Simon Caney maintains that the right of self-
determination, including secession, can be justified by the benefits that 
autonomy and self-government deliver to the well-being of the people in 
question.43  At the core of well-being arguments is the assumption that states 
ought to be popularly sovereign and that states have a fundamental duty to serve 
their citizens interests, thereby extending the internal aspect of self-
determination to the external level. 
However, few authors delve into any detail about what well-being means 
and how it might translate into international norms to deal with secession crises.  
One thing that helps with this is the relatively seamless fusing of well-being 
arguments to national theories of secession. 44  Doing so gets around a huge 
number of the difficulties previously mentioned.  Firstly, it removes questions 
about which groups’ well-being should be considered.  This is not to suggest that 
PIGFs’ or other groups’ well-being is insignificant nor does it necessarily mean 
that only nationalities have a right to secede; it just indicates that nations, for 
the reasons outlined above, will be the only groups that normally have a right to 
secession, whereas other groups that lack the political, social and economic 
status and viability to achieve sovereign statehood will have a higher burden of 
proof to meet in order to secede legitimately.   
This also addresses the ‘other side of the coin’, that is, the duties of the 
sovereign state that has multiple nationalities or PIFGs within its borders.  In 
such cases, it is the responsibility of the majority or the dominant state-
sponsored nationality (if indeed there is one) to ensure that the well-being of 
minority nationalities and other PIFGs are sufficiently respected, lest they 
spawn and give legitimacy to emerging nationalism.  Although it may be that 
emerging nationalism within an existing state can best ensure the well-being of 
the members of that nationality, this alone may not be sufficient to legitimize                                                         
43 Caney, ‘National self-determination’ 163-175. 
44 Many authors do so without noticing or articulating the benefits.  See Margalit and Raz, 
‘National self-determination’; Caney, ‘National Self-determination’ 163-175; Miller, On 
Nationality, ch. 4. 
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secessionist campaigns.  Since well-being can (and should) be interpreted loosely, 
it is easy to maintain that when multi-national states protect physical security 
and basic human rights and make genuine attempts to secure the interests and 
aspirations of all the individuals and groups within their confines, the legitimacy 
of secession by emerging nationalities is highly questionable.  Because the results 
of secession are uncertain, emerging nations would have to show not only that 
their well-being would be discernibly and markedly improved by secession but 
that the state from which they are seceding has manifestly failed to ensure their 
well-being.   
From this it is clear that well-being arguments are not as open to abuse as 
choice theories nor as restrictive as remedial right only theories.  This 
introduces another dimension to the popular sovereignty/secession equation 
that is incredibly important (and notoriously overlooked) when the theoretical 
basis for international norms of secession is considered.  Consistent, 
theoretically coherent and rigorous international norms should not only lay 
down conditions that legitimize secessions but they should also provide 
incentives for existing states to accommodate national and other PIFG 
minorities within their borders.  International responses to movements for self-
determination should never support only one side of this important equation.  
As Viva Ona Bartkus notes in her detailed examination of groups’ decisions for 
secession, the reaction of states to the challenges and demands of potential 
secessionists is a key component in the course of action ultimately taken by 
groups threatening the state.45  Accordingly, states hoping to avoid 
fragmentation have an interest in seeking to support the well-being of such 
groups and the international community, in turn, should hold up norms that 
facilitate and encourage states to make such efforts.  As the well-being approach 
to secession places demands on both sides of the dispute, it goes some way 
toward providing a sound basis for international responses to emerging 
nationalism and to demands based on self-determination. 
However, this modified well-being argument needs further refinement.  
Its greatest deficiency, which it shares with the national theories, is the 
insufficient protection of individual rights within the larger scheme of self-
determination.  To correct this, the hierarchy of rights mentioned in Chapter 1 
should be applied.  Doing so insures that self-determination and secession are 
kept firmly within the liberal democratic tradition. 
The theory of self-determination and secession put forward here, then, 
places the well-being of the individuals within a nationality or other PIFGs in                                                         
45 Viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamics of Secession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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the uppermost position.  It assumes that nationalities are the type of group most 
likely to seek secession and normally make the best case for seceding; that, 
ultimately, individuals form and/or maintain national identities (even if 
inherited) because they are deeply valuable in some way to them; and that, since 
nations are made up of and exist for the benefit of the individuals who compose 
them, national rights are secondary to individual rights.  Additionally, because 
self-determination and secession must work only towards ends that increase the 
well-being of all individuals, emerging nations have the burden of showing that 
the any scheme that dramatically increases autonomy within or fragmentation of 
the existing state is aimed at these goals.  Some important limitations on the 
right of self-determination and secession follow on from this.   
One of these limitations strikes at two particularly troublesome aspects 
of post-secession states, namely the problem of post-secession minority enclaves 
and the protection of citizens’ rights in the new state.  The logic of secession 
holds that, following independence, the nationality that was formerly an 
oppressed or poorly served minority will be governed better now that they form 
the majority in the newly created sovereign state, but many theories of secession 
ignore or only weakly address the plight of the new minorities invariably created 
by the separation.  However, the incorporation of the hierarchy of rights and the 
emphasis on well-being and humane governance ensures that no campaign for 
self-determination should be legitimate that would result in a new state or a 
devolved federal region that permitted violations of human rights or restricted 
to only a portion of the citizenry the opportunities for meaningful participation 
in the public life of the new entity.   
Moreover, if a newly independent state were to contravene the hierarchy 
of rights on which this framework for self-determination is based and failed to 
look after the well-being of its minorities, it would be furnishing the minority in 
question with grounds for redress or even secession that would be identical to 
those the new state employed against the multi-national state from which it 
seceded previously.  Although this (theoretically) risks ‘infinite divisibility’ it is 
highly unlikely, because of the stringency of the conditions that have to be met 
before secession could be valid. 
It should be stressed that this approach to self-determination and 
emerging nationalism sees secession very much as a last resort.  Although the 
remedial right only argument was rejected as too limited, the theory of secession 
proposed here is still rather conservative.  Provided a multi-national state’s 
actions are not contrary to the principles of humane governance, the well-being 
of the individuals living there is probably best served by finding a solution within 
the state (e.g. autonomy, federalism, consociational government, etc.) rather 
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than through secession.  No PIFG could legitimately secede without paying due 
regard to the just obligations required by the association they are attempting to 
alter or abolish.  Such just obligations are the natural consequences of any well-
functioning state and form the other side of the sovereignty coin.  Accordingly, a 
state can expect a relatively high degree of compliance from the PIFGs living in 
its borders.  In effect, this formula gives both sovereign states and emerging 
nations targets and limits.  The target is to create and maintain institutions that 
respect the rights of all of the state’s citizens and govern in their interests, and 
the limit is to respect the authority of the state, a respect generated by the 
benefits provided by being part of the state. 
This formula for self-determination and secession does not concentrate 
on what limits or conditions can be place in front of a seceding group before the 
secession is acceptable.  Rather, it approaches the issue with the premise that 
session is a legitimate, if extreme, action provided the protection of human rights 
for all citizens of the new state is equal to or greater than the protections given to all 
citizens of the state from which the group seeks separation.  The use of the term 
‘citizens’ rather than ‘nationals’ or ‘peoples within the state’ is deliberate and is 
crucial to the success of the formula.  By using the term ‘citizens’, self-
determination hopefully becomes a more inclusive norm, treating the majority 
and minorities in the state equally.  The principle is directed to all individuals 
who are subject to the power of the state and those who would be under the 
sovereign authority of the new entity, thus emphasising the superiority of 
individual and human rights when confronting emerging nationalism.   
This argument also does not privilege national or ethnic claims based on 
historical evidence or even directly on the sufferings (real or imagined) of the 
seceding groups.  Instead it places the spotlight on the actions and policies of 
current and ‘potential’ states, thereby directing the scrutiny where it ought to be 
in a normative framework that seeks above all to ensure and promote humane 
and liberal democratic government.  Following this argument, the state 
attempting to thwart a secession cannot rely on vague appeals to sovereignty and 
non-interference or put forward convoluted legal opinion and precedent, yet, at 
the same time, the nationality or other group seeking independence cannot rely 
on ‘ancient claims’ or ‘evidence’ of past wrongs to justify the rightness of their 
cause to the court of world opinion whose hearing is selective and whose 
verdicts are fickle at best.  Instead a challenge is created.   
In the first instance, it is a challenge for the existing state to 
accommodate to the greatest possible extent its minorities through existing 
mechanisms of political reconciliation and inclusion, such as consociational 
government, constitutional reform or autonomy.  However, it also challenges the 
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seceding group to examine its programme in light of the requirement to 
accommodate not only its own members but also all minorities in the new state 
and to ensure that these groups will be well governed, secure and respected and 
fully part of the workings of the new state.  Failure to do so might legitimize 
secessionist actions against this new state and garner the support of the 
international community.  This requirement alone might have a most profound 
and sobering effect on emerging nationalist movements.46  
 
(iv) Implications for international norms 
 
The accuracy and utility of these theoretical observations related to self-
determination, sovereignty and secession must ultimately be judged by their 
ability to provide a sound and practicable normative framework for international 
responses to the challenges presented by emerging nationalism and identity 
politics.  On the normative level, the challenge is, as Buchheit notes, ‘to suggest 
acceptable guidelines for the operation of the principle of self-determination 
which, for obvious reasons, may not accede to the demands of every parochial 
sentiment but which must also avoid an uncritical affirmation of the supremacy 
of the “sovereign” state.’47  What Buchheit calls for is nothing less than a way of 
working through at least some of the challenges of self-determination and 
emerging nationalism that this study seeks to address, and while the 
interpretation and analysis of self-determination and its related concepts 
presented in Part I may not entirely meet such a rigorous test, it goes some way 
to providing the philosophical foundation for a normative framework from 
which coherent and effective international responses might be developed.  
Self-determination’s origin in the liberal democratic tradition of political 
thought and its connections with individual autonomy offer a powerful basis on 
which norms could be constructed by which PIFGs could assert their identity in 
the internal workings of the state of which they are a part, all the while 
enhancing the legitimacy of the state externally to the international community 
on the basis of popular sovereignty.  The challenges of self-determination 
increase markedly when PIFGs, most notably nationalities, seek to alter their 
relationship to the state of which they are a part, and these difficulties increase 
further still when emerging nationalism threatens the existence of the state, 
which by necessity involves the international society of states.   
                                                        
46 As Bartkus notes in The Dynamics of Secession, secessionist groups can be dissuaded by a 
significant increase in the ‘costs’ of secession, and such demands could be seen as a significant 
increase in such costs. 
47 Buchheit, Secession, 7. 
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While no one theory of secessionist self-determination is entirely 
successful in revealing coherent norms, self-determination’s grounding in liberal 
democratic theory, specifically its orientation towards the achievement and 
insurance of human rights points to a logical and coherent approach by which 
the international community could develop consistent and practicable norms to 
guide their responses to such situations.  What can be called the well-being 
argument for secession strikes at the core of this tradition, given its emphasis on 
achieving and maintaining human rights as well as providing not only a 
principled, last-resort mechanism for the fulfilment of national aspirations but 
also a means to limit the active application of self-determination in such a way 
that might ultimately permit independence as a form of redress of serious 
wrongs by a state.  At the same time, this method places the well-being of the 
individual and humane government at the centre of the debate and works to 
incentivise all parties to find solutions that ensure at least the maintenance if 
not the significant enhancement of the rights and the meaningful inclusion of all 
citizens within any given state.  
However, as was stressed at the outset of this study, an examination of 
the theory and philosophical lineage of self-determination, while critical, is 
insufficient to explain fully why or even how the international community 
responds to emerging nationalism and cannot on its own come to grips with the 
full extent the challenges that self-determination entails.  To get closer to this 
goal, as Buchheit articulated it above, it has be acknowledged first that theory 
can be very separate from practice and that even when they are conjoined, the 
context in which ideas are understood is of fundamental import to norms, both in 
terms of what actors are part of this creative and evolutionary process and what 
other strategic and normative factors are at work.  In other words, there is a 
dynamic connection between the ideas and the context in which they are active 
that constructs a normative framework and shapes its evolution.   
With the theoretical observations of Part I in mind, Part II of this study 
attempts to analyse selected interpretations and applications of self-
determination in an effort to trace the evolution of the concept up to the late-
twentieth century, just prior to the end of the Cold War.  The aim of Part II is 
to highlight the international community’s normative responses to self-
determination, emerging nationalism and state fragmentation by drawing careful 
attention to the intricate connections between ideas, structures and forces that 
were at work at key junctures during this lengthy time-span and to evaluate 
whether there has been any congruence between the theoretical framework 
outlined in Part I and the understanding of self-determination that states have 
collectively held and acted on over time.   
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As the following, selective narrative will reveal, the evolution of these 
normative responses has not been a teleological progression.  Since the first 
appearance of self-determination as an international political concept in 
seventeenth century Europe, the idea has been debated, interpreted and 
employed in various ways leading to different outcomes that have had a range of 
implications for the future.  Part I suggested the basis on which a coherent and 
practicable normative framework might develop, yet the nature, scale and scope 
of these responses have evolved over time for many reasons, but in each case, 
there is a link to the structure of the international system that is far more than 
coincidental.  Accordingly, a principal concern of the following chapters is to 
examine in what ways and how extensively changes in the structure of the 
international community and the forces affecting it have played in the 
understanding and use of self-determination. 
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Part II – History 
 
Chapter 3 
 
From ‘concept’ to ‘principle’ – The birth of nationalism, the 
construction of international society and the Paris Peace Conference  
 
As Part I illustrated, self-determination has a long and complex 
intellectual history, the theoretical roots of which (i.e. liberalism, democracy, 
nationality) stretch back at least to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries if not 
much earlier.  Most of the conceptual building blocks were extant in Europe by 
the end of the seventeenth century, and while an international normative 
framework for understanding and interpreting these ideas was not yet formed, 
the context in which such a system could be constructed was at hand.   
As this study contends, the challenge of creating consistent and coherent 
norms is not only a function of an exchange of ideas but also of the practice of 
states and the ways in which practice and theory are interlinked.  As states 
respond to events and to each other, they begin to construct shared 
understandings about their relations and, importantly, the mechanisms through 
which they conduct their interactions.  These structures of communication and 
interaction in turn facilitate the development of shared norms and consensus 
about their responses.   
By the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth 
centuries, the concept of self-determination was increasingly operating within 
the existing states of Europe at the time that nationalism rose to prominence as 
a driving force of politics and international activity.  It was also during this 
critical time period that the modern system of international relations coalesced 
and formalized, offering the first opportunities to construct norms in an 
organised and coherent fashion.  This process, the simultaneous advancement of 
the ideas of self-determination and nationalism on one hand and the 
construction and formalization of an international society of states, continued 
throughout the nineteenth century in an uneven but highly interconnected 
manner.  The increasingly formalized relations of mutually recognized and 
intersubjectively understood political entities propagated more structured 
interactions that enlarged and strengthened the dialogical space in which ideas, 
norms and actions could be debated and understood collectively. 
Part II attempts to outline the trajectory self-determination over time by 
looking at selected examples that reveal how the international community 
interpreted and applied the concept as it constructed normative responses to 
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emerging nationalism.  As the context and meaning of ‘international society’ 
changed so much during this time period, the interconnections between the 
formation of the society of states and the construction of norms related to self-
determination will merit particular attention.  This chapter concentrates on the 
earliest phase of this process, when the nascent international community, itself 
undergoing unprecedented institutionalization, first acknowledged the 
significance of the ‘political principle’ of self-determination as a normative issue.  
Throughout this time, which spans roughly from the end of the eighteenth to 
the middle of the twentieth centuries, there was a surge in the potency and 
attraction of nationalism, leading to number of political movements that 
threatened the nascent state system, presenting the fledgling community of 
states with a challenge that could not be ignored.  These early responses to 
emerging nationalism mark the starting point of the development of the norms 
of self-determination and highlight the correlation between the ideas and the 
actors who employ them, illustrating much about both. 
 
(i) Early reactions to self-determination and emerging nationalism 
 
The peace of Westphalia in 1648 internationalised the idea that states 
were independent and sovereign over their own internal affairs owing in large 
part to their internal distinctiveness.  Over the next century and a half, states of 
Europe accepted as a general principle that each of them was unique and had a 
separate, equivalent legal status to one another.  However, while conducted in an 
increasingly common dialogue that reflected and reinforced this legal equality, 
the interactions between these states were not institutionalized or particularly 
structured.  Also, many states in Europe underwent tremendous internal 
transformations during this period, leading to the creation and 
institutionalization of national or proto-national identities.  This process 
suggests an unspoken acceptance and increased popularity of the internal aspect 
of self-determination, though this expansion had more to do with pragmatism 
and efficiency than ideological commitment.  Most states (then as now) saw a 
utility in harnessing the power of limited popular consent and shared identity, as 
it could serve the ends of the state effectively. 
In some cases, such as in England and Switzerland, there is much 
evidence to suggest that states exhibited an expression of passive self-
determination, as representative institutions permitted a relatively high degree 
of correspondence between the state and those governed.  These nation-building 
exercises spread rapidly in the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.  It 
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would also be accurate to say that some of the struggles of this time could be 
characterised as emerging nationalism.  The Dutch revolt against the Spanish in 
the late fifteenth century, leading to the eventual recognition of the United 
Provinces of the Netherlands at Westphalia; the successful Swedish revolt led by 
Gustavus Vasa against the Danes in 1520; the rejection of Spanish rule in 
Catalonia and Portugal in 1640, leading to temporary autonomy for the Catalans 
and to independence for the Portuguese, all fit the model of emerging nations.1   
However, it would be inaccurate to say that these developments 
constitute entirely satisfactory examples of self-determination and emerging 
nationalism.  The main reason is that the degree to which these acts were 
accurate reflections of national will is rather uncertain.  There is little to separate 
these cases from the run-of-the-mill internal power struggles that took place 
within states and empires from time to time throughout ‘pre-national’ history.  
These pre-national conflicts often had more to do with the actions of 
dissatisfied local élites or anger over the distribution of patronage than with the 
manifest desire of a nationality to steer its own political fate.  And yet, the 
institutions set up in each of the cases mentioned above did (arguably) result in 
more popularly responsive forms of government, and, more importantly, in each 
case, there was a groundswell of popular support for the actions, illustrated most 
frequently by the willingness of large sections of the populace to take up arms 
and to die in the cause.2 
Aside from this point, it is also significant that the international reactions 
to these crises (the central concern of this study) were virtually non-existent or, 
when they did occur, were directed almost exclusively by commercial and/or 
strategic interests.  While such motives surround the international responses to 
self-determination today, the nature of the reactions and the context in which 
they take place are remarkably different in the present context of international 
affairs.  Firstly, the concept of international society or a community of 
independent but co-operating states was, at best, nascent during this time.  If 
such a community did exist it was almost exclusively limited to Western Europe, 
and even here the nature of diplomatic interaction was not integrated, 
significantly institutionalized or even consultative, and the aim was not to 
achieve or foster consensus.  Accordingly and secondly, there is little evidence of 
attempts to develop norms related to state fragmentation (or to any other type                                                         
1 These examples do not take into account earlier and more diverse struggles that could be 
interpreted as examples of emerging nationalism.  A credible case could be made that the 
(briefly) successful, rebellion of the Vietnamese against Chinese rule in the first century CE, led 
by the still venerated queen Trung Trac, was a case of an emerging nationalism, as was the Jewish 
resistance to Roman rule at about the same time.  
2 For example, the case of England is illustrative.  See G.P. Gooch, English Democratic Ideas in the 
Seventeenth Century (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959). 
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of international disruption for that matter).  There were of course established 
‘rules of the game’ for international relations well before the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, but it seems clear that these were vague and haphazardly 
structured and there were few if any deliberate attempts to create international 
normative practices, at least any related to self-determination.   
Nonetheless, in the late-eighteenth century, with the American and 
French Revolutions, the political theory associated with national self-
determination was employed directly and boldly in such a way that the states of 
Europe were forced for the first time to respond to the particular challenges 
posed by movements for self-determination.  However, it has to be noted that, 
while this connection with self-determination can and should be made, the 
vocabulary and the mentality of those who debated these ideas and reacted to 
these events were not explicitly tied to the concept, which at that time was not 
yet fully formulated or articulated as such.  Similarly, as noted before, the 
international context in which these events and ideas were at work was also 
lacking in any tight structure that might have allowed the formation of truly 
international normative responses.  At this time, the dialogical space needed for 
this was limited, and yet, these events prompted reactions and stimulated 
activity that can be seen as an early and significant guidepost in the development 
of norms related to self-determination and emerging nationalism.  
The separation of thirteen of Britain’s North American colonies in 1776 
has since proved to be a major turning point in the norms related to self-
determination, not only because of the way in which the Americans tried to 
justify their secession and the British and foreign reaction to this, but also 
because of the precedent it set for the future.  The understanding and 
interpretation of their own revolution has, over time, greatly shaped the 
approach Americans have taken with regard to emerging nationalism and has 
influenced, whether consciously or subconsciously, the American efforts to 
shape the international normative framework of national self-determination.   
As with most cases of emerging nationalism, there were numerous 
motives that led to the American colonists’ rebellion.  However, despite the 
specifics, the leaders of the American uprising saw the root cause as being a 
denial of democratic rights, and, for their part, successive British 
administrations resisted the American actions on the grounds that their right to 
govern for the whole of their territory and populations was beyond dispute.  The 
conflict was, thus, explicitly centred on the issue of self-government and political 
obligation and the eventual separation of the American colonies from the Crown 
had everything to do with competing national identities and self-determination.  
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When in 1764, following the defeat of the French and their allied Native 
Americans in North America, the British government increased its intervention 
in the affairs and finances of their American colonies.  In a series of 
parliamentary acts aimed, at least in part, to pay for colonial defences and for the 
recent war with France, the British government increased the taxation on its 
American colonies and ended what many Americans considered to be the long-
standing practice of allowing the colonies to govern themselves concerning most 
issues including taxation.  The termination of this period of ‘statutory neglect’ 
brought up many questions related to the limits and nature of government.  
Coming nearly within the living memory of the English Civil War, the 
happenings in America seemed to the colonists to threaten the very liberties 
that they felt had been so hard won and affirmed in the Glorious Revolution.  As 
James Otis of Massachusetts, a leading member of the ‘Sons of Liberty’, noted, 
the imposition of taxation on American without adequate (i.e. direct) 
representation was a violation of the freedom affirmed by parliament’s assertion 
of authority over the Crown in the previous century.3   
Parliament’s imposition of the Stamp Act in 1765, and the subsequent 
refusal even to consider the American petitions for its repeal or amendment 
seemed to many on both sides of the Atlantic to be a complete breech of the 
nature of the political arrangements between the Crown and the colonies.  Many 
American commentators saw this and the ensuing British actions as a direct 
contravention of the understood relation between the people and the governed.  
Interestingly, this understood relationship was, for the American leaders, not a 
matter of specified tenets but a mixture of (often erroneous) beliefs about the 
British constitution and the increasingly popular and well-circulated political 
theories of Hobbes, Harrington and Locke.  In particular, the idea of the social 
contract was ever more popular, and many American statesmen argued against 
the imposition of taxes not on the basis of historical or constitutional precedent 
but on the grounds that such actions were in violation of the reasons for which 
political society was founded in the first instance.  Many also saw the abrogation 
of democratic rights as going against God’s natural order or natural law.4   
In the proceedings of the First Continental Congress, even James 
Galloway, a Pennsylvania conservative who sought tirelessly to retain the link                                                         
3 James Otis’s speech, ‘Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved’ delivered at a town 
meeting in Boston in 1764, is quoted extensively in Page Smith, A New Age Now Begins (New 
York: Penguin, 1976), Vol. 1, Chapter 2. 
4 The opinions and sentiments of the American revolutionaries are captured in numerous works 
on the causes of the rebellion.  One of the best treatments is Smith’s A New Age.  Likewise, see 
Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis (New York: Collier Books, 1963) and 
Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 
1967).  
  69 
with Britain, acknowledged that the bond between the mother country and the 
colonies could be maintained only through a democratic uniting of political will 
in a British sanctioned, American legislature.  In the resolutions of that 
assembly, the delegates argued, first, that they were a singular people who ‘by the 
immutable laws of nature’ as well as by English legal precedent were holders of 
certain basic human rights, including life and liberty, and who, in order to 
protect these rights, could only be bound through their own consent.5  In the 
American ‘Declaration of Independence’ of 1776, Thomas Jefferson, the 
principal author, echoed themes that were also closely aligned to the theories of 
self-determination and popular sovereignty.  The ideas that government was 
consent-based and meant to serve the interests and rights of the governed form 
the cornerstone of the American appeal for independence.  In short, the end of 
government is the interests and rights of the nation and that ‘whenever any form 
of Government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the Right of the People 
to alter or abolish it and to institute new Government, laying its foundations on 
such principles, and organising its Powers in such form, as to them shall seem 
most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.’ 
By phrasing their secession in such terms, the Americans were, in the 
terminology of the previous chapter, actively asserting the principle of self-
determination and popular sovereignty.  Regardless of the specific language used 
to explain it, in so doing, the Founding Fathers of the American republic 
enhanced and promoted the concept as a viable and unavoidable political 
principle.  In Britain, Edmund Burke and Lord Chatham were tireless 
campaigners for the rights of the American colonies, who, although stopping 
short of advocating independence in 1776, saw a democratic legitimacy to the 
Americans’ appeals.  Burke, whose approach to America and governance in 
general was greatly shaped by his experience in Ireland, viewed the entire 
situation as a civil war and, in so doing, acknowledged the responsibility 
incumbent upon a state to govern in a manner that reflected the wishes and 
interest of its various peoples.  As Burke noted his speech regarding American 
taxation of 1774,  
 
if, intemperately, unwisely, fatally, you sophisticate and poison the 
very source of government, by urging subtle deductions, and 
consequences odious to those you govern, from the unlimited and 
illimitable nature of supreme sovereignty, you will teach them by 
                                                        
5 The resolutions can be found in full in Henry Steele Commager, ed. Documents of American 
History (New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1963). 
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these means to call that sovereignty itself into question…They will 
cast your sovereignty in your face.6 
 
Opinions similar to this were not uncommon in England.  Most pro-
American commentators agreed with Burke that, while outright independence 
was not justified, some accommodation had historical precedent and was 
necessary to ensure ‘good government’.7  In 1777, the Earl of Abingdon went 
even further and made an implicit link to the theoretical foundations of self-
determination and nationalism, arguing that, by their declaration and acts of 
independence, the Americans had ‘followed the teachings of John Locke and 
had accordingly established a new civil society over which Parliament had no 
jurisdiction’.8 
Although the reactions to the Americans’ struggle outside of the British 
Empire were governed far more by Realpolitik than by ideological persuasion, 
there were many who saw more in the American cause than an opportunity to 
exploit the distracted British.  Among these were the Physiocrats of France, who 
saw in the Americans something of the idealised, self-governing agrarian society 
they promoted.  Additionally and hardly surprisingly, various liberal political 
theorists such as Rousseau, Condorcet and Jean Paul Marat, were very 
supportive of the American cause and promoted ideas and policies that were 
philosophically compatible with the concept of self-determination.9  Also, the 
very large number of Europeans who voluntarily sailed for America to fight with 
Washington’s armies cannot be dismissed.  To be sure, many were seeking only 
military experience and/or fame, but the future political activities of the Marquis 
du Lafayette and Tadeusz Kosciuszko, both of whom fought for American 
independence, indicates that the commitment to popular sovereignty was very 
great amongst some foreign volunteers.10 
There is little question that nationalism played an essential and overt role 
in the events of the French Revolution.  Indeed, it is no exaggeration to suggest 
that the French Revolution ushered in nationalism in its truest sense, that is, the                                                         
6 Edmund Burke, ‘Speech on American Taxation’ (1774) in David Fidler and Jennifer Welsh, eds., 
Empire and Community: Edmund Burke’s Writings and Speeches on International Relations (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1999), 115. 
7 Chatham (William Pitt) and his followers were major proponents of what would be called today 
devolution.  In fact, David Hartley, a prominent MP who advocated conciliation, proposed a 
federal solution to the American problem, which was not unlike the ‘home rule’ stance eventually 
taken by successive British governments with regards to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
Ireland in the nineteenth century.  On this point, see Richard Van Alstyne, Empire and 
Independence: The International History of the American Revolution (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1965).  Lord Durham’s Report on the Affairs of British North America (1839) 
[http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/c.belanger/quebechistory/docs/durham/] is also confirmation of 
sorts that such a position became official British policy after the American Revolution.  
8 Van Alstyne, Empire, 130. 
9 Van Alstyne, Empire, 47-48 and 47n. 
10 The role Kosciuszko played in the Polish uprisings of 1794 is discussed later in this section. 
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mass mobilisation of a nationality’s popular political will for the advancement of 
the nation.  However, since emerging nationalism refers herein to movements by 
nationalities that are attempting to redefine the parameters of their group’s 
relationship with the authority inside of a multi-national state, the French 
Revolution does not appear to fit this type.   
A more accurate way of describing the French Revolution in the terms 
used in this thesis would be as an internal expression of nationalism and self-
determination that radically transformed the constitution of the state without 
causing its actual fragmentation.  Many of the key figures of the revolution saw 
the events around them in such terms. The ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and the Citizen’ (1789) stated that all individuals were equal before the law and 
were constituents of the nation, and, proceeding from that stance, all legitimate 
authority flowed directly from the nation.11  This application of liberal 
democratic principles marked a radical watershed in the history of nationalism 
and self-determination, and, although not strictly an example of emerging 
nationalism or of self-determination by name, its impact on the theory and 
practice of self-determination and the responses to it is of such moment that to 
ignore it entirely would be a mistake, particularly with regards to the reactions 
outside of France.   
The international reaction to the French Revolution is informative.  
Although the states of Europe were not responding to the fragmentation of a 
state, per se, they faced some of the same questions raised by emerging 
nationalism in the future.  Such questions included the thorny, perennial issues 
associated with self-determination: what government to support, whether 
intervention was warranted and what ideas should guide the responses and, as a 
consequence of that, what ideas were to be supported and which were to be 
opposed.  Following so closely on the heels of the American Revolution, the 
French case presented a problem for many in England who had supported the 
American cause, as well as in the United States, where the former rebels now 
had to determine whether to support revolutions elsewhere.  
Amongst the Americans, still technically in an alliance with the French 
government, support for the revolution was initially unrestrained and 
impassioned, with most Americans perceiving the struggles as an expansion of 
the ideas they had espoused in their war of independence.  Thomas Jefferson, 
who in 1789 was serving as the Washington administration’s minister to France, 
not only enthusiastically supported the resistance to the sitting government but 
also assisted and encouraged the revolutionaries in what he saw as ‘the most                                                         
11 Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/Avalon/rightsof.htm]. 
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sacred cause man was ever engaged in’.12  Jefferson, like so many other 
Americans, saw the revolution in exactly the same terms as the American 
secession: it was an affirmation of the rights of co-nationals to assert their 
authority to ensure the blessings of representative and responsive government.  
Jefferson’s philosophical commitment to the revolutionary cause is borne out by 
his assistance in drafting the ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens’ and 
his on-going consultation with the leaders of the early stages of the revolt.   
Given Britain’s later response to the French Revolution, it is worth 
recalling that the initial reaction in Britain to the events in France was not 
dissimilar to that in the United States.  For the growing number of British 
‘liberals’ and for many others as well, the feeling was that the revolution would 
bring about an end to unresponsive and unjust rule.  Even Pitt, who would 
prosecute vigorously the British armed opposition to the revolution in 1793, said 
with optimism in 1789 that ‘the present convulsions in France must sooner or 
later culminate in general harmony and regular order... And thus circumstanced, 
France will stand forth as one of the most brilliant powers of Europe.  She will 
enjoy just that kind of liberty which I venerate.’13  Echoing Jefferson’s 
exuberance, Charles James Fox considered the fall of the Bastille as ‘the greatest 
event that ever happened in the history of the world’, and pronounced the new 
French constitution as ‘the most stupendous and glorious edifice of liberty 
which has been created on the foundations of human integrity in any time our 
country’.14  In the early days of the revolution, one of the very few voices of 
opposition was Edmund Burke.  Given his stance on the rebellion in America, 
Burke's reaction surprised many, including Jefferson who noted in 1791 that ‘The 
Revolution in France does not astonish me so much as the Revolution in Mr. 
Burke.’15  Few others voiced outright opposition, preferring instead to welcome 
cautiously the changes, while inwardly speculating that it would all end in tears.16   
The significant turning point in international opinion regarding the 
French Revolution was the increasingly violent nature of events in France.  The 
execution of the king was almost universally seen as an act of mob hysteria and 
evidence that the few early prophets of doom such as Burke and, in the US,                                                         
12 Quoted in Samuel Eliot Morison, Henry Steele Commanger and William Leuchtenburg, The 
Growth of the American Republic 6th edn. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), Vol. 1, 300.  
For an informed and detailed analysis of Jefferson’s views on the French Revolution, see Merrill 
D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). 
13 Quoted in Asa Briggs, The Age of Improvement, 1783-1867 (London: Longman, 1979), 130.  For a 
concise yet powerful discussion of the reaction to the Revolution amongst British liberals, see 
Briggs, Improvement, 129-137. 
14 Both quoted in Briggs, Improvement, 130. 
15 Quoted in David Fidler and Jennifer Welsh, eds. Empire and Community: Edmund Burke's 
Writings and Speeches an International Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 33. 
16 Typical of those in this camp were Alexander Hamilton and John Adams whose subsequent 
views are discussed below. 
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Alexander Hamilton had been correct in their assessments.  While many 
liberals, such as Jefferson and Thomas Paine remained wholly supportive of the 
aims (if slightly more guarded as to the means) of the revolution, the core of 
influential foreign opinion became openly hostile.  Yet, within the numerous 
rejections of the revolution, there were more intricate arguments that highlight 
a growing attention to the normative issues raised by self-determination and 
how to interpret, shape and legitimate its application. 
Burke’s opinion, that the revolution was ‘the greatest evil’, was, literally, 
almost directly opposed to Jefferson’s, and, on the surface, it presents a difficult 
obstacle to interpreting his reaction (and others’) to popular sovereignty.  Upon 
closer examination, there seem to be two ways of explaining Burke’s negative 
reaction to the French Revolution that might also be valid for the others who 
initially welcomed it and then opposed it.  Firstly, it is possible to conclude that 
Burke, like the American opponents to the French Revolution, most notably 
Alexander Hamilton and John Adams, was deliberately inconsistent in his 
response to these events; that Burke and the others might have been in favour of 
particular movements while opposing others.  Because inconsistent reactions to 
self-determination and emerging nationalism remain such a dominant feature of 
international politics today, it is worth investigating this interpretation of 
Burke’s views afresh as applying Burke’s thoughts in this manner might prove 
illuminating for analysing contemporary challenges related to self-
determination.17   
Following this first possible interpretation, Burke’s reactions are 
explicable because of the practical considerations specific to the French case, 
the most important of which was the violence and chaos of the revolution.  For 
Burke, then, the potential for internal savagery and international conflagration 
were worries that overrode any potential benefits such an exercise of popular 
sovereignty and nationalism might bring.  That Burke was not joined in this 
opinion by many until after the violence escalated is of little consequence since 
Burke was utterly convinced that the revolution would be very bloody and 
chaotic.  In this interpretation, both Burke and those who subsequently opposed 
the revolution did so on pragmatic grounds as opposed to ideological ones, which 
endorses the view that judgements about the legitimacy of self-determination, 
then and now, must always come second to practical considerations18 or, more                                                         
17 It should be noted that Burke did not refer specifically to self-determination and that the 
following interpretations of Burke’s writings intentionally rework his thinking to fit hold them 
up to circumstances well outside of the context of his time of writing. 
18 For a recent statement that is perfectly in line with this approach, see Max Kampelman, 
‘Secession and the Right of Self-determination: An Urgent Need to Harmonize Principle with 
Pragmatism’ The Washington Quarterly, 16:3 (1993), 5-12. 
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likely, that Burke realised that theoretical considerations must be weighed 
simultaneously along with a host of practical concerns. 
Such a conclusion would not only influence the understanding of this 
period of nationalism but later historical and contemporary instances of 
emerging nations.  Accordingly, it is very important to ascertain the degree to 
which this explanation is accurate and satisfactory.  It should be noted first that 
there is ample evidence to support this interpretation of Burke’s thought.  Even 
a cursory examination of his writings shows that what Burke found most 
distressing about the French Revolution was its potential for internal chaos and 
international violence, specifically the violence that would be (and proved to be) 
injurious to the European balance of power, which Burke saw as a positive, 
stabilizing force.  The amount of time and the detail Burke devoted to these 
concerns, as opposed to the ideological considerations related to self-
determination, indicates that, for Burke, practical concerns of security and 
national interest took absolute precedence over the force of democratic ideas in 
the determination of policy.   
This interpretation seems even more applicable to those who initially 
supported the revolution and then rejected it following execution of the king 
and the growing violence.  Especially for them, the violence that flowed from 
these acts of self-determination trumped whatever good they delivered or 
promised to the people of France.  For most international observers, then, the 
response to self-determination in France was limited by the practical 
circumstances, rather than by kind of liberal democratically oriented normative 
framework suggested in Part I.  If correct, this interpretation would be 
significant not only for the analysis of subsequent cases of self-determination but 
could support the view that pragmatic considerations have been historically 
uppermost when the international community responds to emerging nations. 
However, there is another plausible interpretation of Burke’s response.  
By this rendering, Burke was not inconsistent in his interpretation of and 
commitment to the ideas related to self-determination but understood these 
principles in a consonant manner, resulting in his approval of the American 
Revolution and his condemnation of the French.  Far from denouncing the 
French Revolution simply for its violent potential, Burke can be interpreted as 
denouncing it because he saw no legitimate purpose to the violence of the 
revolution, arguing that any suffering would be liberty-denying rather than a 
necessary means to a genuinely democratic and liberty-enhancing outcome.  As 
he argued frequently, the revolution was likely to create a military dictatorship 
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rather than yield any practical benefit to the people of France.19  For Burke, the 
revolution sought to destroy the traditions and customs on which the French 
nationality (as he perceived it) had been built.  The revolution sought to destroy 
monarchy, nobility and the priesthood, on which the entire social and political 
fabric of the country rested.20  Moreover, since Burke felt that each country’s 
constitution was organic and specific to their particular national traditions, he 
feared that the misguided interpretation of popular sovereignty the revolution 
advocated would spread throughout Europe and cause a further corruption of 
the concept.  Thus, in this reading of Burke, the French Revolution is seen as a 
denial of internal self-determination rather than assertion of it, whereas, in 
America, the revolution could be cast as a legitimate attempt to reassert the 
liberties that the Americans held as British subjects.21 
This rendering of Burke’s thought is slightly harder to apply to those who 
at first supported and then opposed the revolution, but it is possible.  For 
example, Pitt’s decision for war against France in 1793 was not based on a 
rejection of the legitimacy of self-determination or even popular sovereignty per 
se but on the grounds that Britain’s vital interests and security were put seriously 
at risk by the external actions of the Committee for Public Safety and the 
Directory.22  Indeed, most British opposition to France was against the French 
government’s threatening foreign policies rather than its legitimacy before its 
own people or even the ideas of liberty it (nominally) espoused.  Likewise, in the 
United States a quarter of a century after the outbreak of the French 
Revolution, Thomas Jefferson conceded in letters to Lafayette and John Adams 
that the course the revolutionaries took in France led them to abuse and even 
destroy the principles of self-government and liberty, but he firmly asserted that 
the original intentions of the revolution were legitimate.23 
It is easy to see both of these elucidations as at least partially accurate, 
and the result seems to be a somewhat confusing picture.  However, this 
confusion should be accepted as it leads to the probably accurate conclusion 
that, as the ideas related to self-determination and nationalism first entered 
European politics on a large scale with the French Revolution, the reactions to it 
are difficult to analyse with accuracy.  Since the idea of self-determination was 
still in statu nascendi, its should not be surprising that these initial responses are                                                         
19 This is a frequent theme of Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France L.G.Mitchell, ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
20 Burke, Reflections and Burke, ‘Thoughts on French Affairs’ (1791) and, in particular, his 
‘Remarks on the Policy of the Allies’ (1793) in Fidler and Welsh, Empire, 236-253 and 264-286.  
21 It must be pointed out that Burke never advocated independence for the Americans, arguing 
instead for conciliation as the best application of the principles of popular sovereignty, though 
he accepted American independence ex post facto. 
22 For a discussion Pitt’s views and those of others, see Briggs, Improvement, 129-183. 
23 These letters (1816) are quoted at some length in Peterson, Jefferson, 935-936. 
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difficult to interpret, yet as the later sections of this study assert, subsequent 
international responses to self-determination often prove similarly difficult to 
understand.  As noted before, part of the reason for this is that self-
determination presents both theoretical and practical challenges, and 
international reactions to emerging nationalism and the fragmentation of states 
frequently involve the clashing of a range of ideas and strategic conditions that 
affect any normative response.  What is certain is that the American and French 
Revolutions introduced the principle of self-determination (if not by name) into 
the milieu of European politics.  As Alfred Cobban poignantly observed:  
 
By proclaiming the principle of popular sovereignty, the French 
revolutionaries fundamentally altered the prevailing conception of 
the state and opened a fresh chapter in the history of the nation 
state…The great achievement of revolutionary political thought, for 
good or evil, was the conception of government as a manifestation of 
the democratic will, and the identification of the state as the 
sovereign with the people.24 
 
The reaction of the Washington administration when it faced the thorny 
issue of whether or not to receive Edmund Charles Genet as the official 
Minister Plenipotentiary of France in 1793 reflected this.  Since the National 
Convention and not the king had appointed Genet, his formal acceptance by the 
American government would have amounted to recognition of the new 
government and, consequently, of the Revolution itself.  In a cabinet meeting in 
April, the issue was hotly debated, with Hamilton strongly opposed and 
Jefferson heavily in favour of Genet’s acceptance.  Jefferson pointed out that by 
refusing to receive Genet, the United States would officially: 
 
deny to other nations that principle whereon our government is 
founded, that every nation has a right to change [its constitution] of 
its own will; and externally to transact business with other nations 
through whatever organ it chooses, whether that be a King, 
Convention, Assembly, Committee, President, or whatever it be.  
The only thing essential is the will of the nation. 
 
Washington and a (narrow) majority of his cabinet could not fault Jefferson’s 
logic and duly received Genet, thereby enhancing the force of self-determination 
as a principle of international diplomacy.   
 
(ii) The nineteenth century: the creation of normative responses 
 
As momentous as these developments were, the greatest alteration to 
self-determination over the course of the following century did not relate                                                         
24 Alfred Cobban, The Nation-State and National Self-determination (London: Collins, 1969), 247-
248. 
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directly to the theory of the principle, its growing acceptance or even the 
increased frequency of emerging nationalist movements.  Instead, during the 
nineteenth century, the context of international relations began to shift 
significantly.  These alterations included the formation of a semi-permanent 
institutional arrangement that facilitated diplomatic interactions in Europe, the 
(limited) democratization of political processes, the expansion of the European 
system of states to other parts of the globe through trade, increased 
communication, diplomacy and empire.  This contextual change meant that as 
the minority nationalities and Primary Identity Forming Groups (PIFGs) across 
Europe sought to alter their political and social standing, the foreign actors 
involved were more numerous, more organised and more significant to the whole 
process, all of which were alterations that emerging nationalist movements 
increasingly made use.  Although there were many factors that account for this 
contextual shift, the two most significant were the increased cohesion of the 
international community of states and the expanding influence of ‘public 
opinion’ on the formulation of international policy.  
As for the first of these, during the nineteenth century, a coherent 
international society of states emerged in Europe, between whom the meaning 
and importance of self-determination and its applications and limitations could 
be weighed.  This process developed independently of self-determination’s 
growing appeal but altered dramatically how responses to international events 
(including emerging nationalism) were formulated.  Before the invention of the 
Congress system and the idea of a ‘Concert’ of Europe, there was simply no 
established international forum through which meaningful normative 
judgements could be made about movements for self-determination or about 
anything else for that matter.  Although the international institutions of the 
nineteenth century were only a shadow of those that arose after the First World 
War, they were revolutionary in their own right.  The opinions and reactions to 
the American and French Revolutions discussed in the previous section took 
place in a rather unstructured environment and the influence of a particular 
opinion was largely limited to the policy of the author’s government.  By the 
mid-nineteenth century, there was a clearly discernible diplomatic mechanism 
by which policy alternatives could be discussed and responses decided upon.  
This not only created the potential for concerted and agreed action that would 
be truly international, but it created a dialogical space in which the powers of 
the day could form normative approaches to the strategic and ideological hazards 
that (the increasingly frequent) emerging nationalist movements presented. 
Secondly, ‘public opinion’ had an increased impact on the formulation of 
international policy in nineteenth century Europe.  This change was itself two-
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fold: the meaning of ‘public opinion’ was shifting and the responsiveness of 
politicians to it was increasing.  At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the 
‘public’ whose opinions ‘mattered’ was limited to a very narrow melange of titled 
aristocrats, influential politicians, some wealthy landed gentry and merchants 
(and, depending on the country, the clergy) representing, in total, only a tiny 
proportion of the actual populace.  By the latter part of the century, as the 
electoral franchise increased dramatically in most European countries and as 
awareness of international events expanded with the growth of public education, 
literacy and, crucially, the mass media, politicians were more and more 
accountable to the opinions of an increasing number and a more socially diverse 
group of their constituents.   
The European politicians of the nineteenth century found themselves 
more constrained by the opinions of a more coherent, larger and more 
demanding electorate who simply would not be ignored with impunity.  While 
certainly not as democratically inclined or responsive as politicians in twentieth 
century states, those in authority faced new pressures to justify and explain their 
actions to a wider circle of people.  The growth of the mass media, aided by the 
invention of the telegraph, brought the international disruptions, dangers and 
conflicts that emerging nations entail into a far greater light and also placed the 
task of forming responses under far more scrutiny than had ever been the case.  
While somewhat limited in their impact at the time, these two important 
changes to the context of international affairs continue to be hugely important 
for facilitating democratic action and ideas and, by extension, self-determination 
and emerging nationalism. 
The illuminating case of the ‘January Insurrection’ in Poland in 1863-1864 
illustrates the degree to which these contextual alterations began to affect the 
trajectory of self-determination.  If ever there was a case that defines the 
concept of an emerging/submerged nationality, then Poland is it.  As Norman 
Davies remarks, ‘Poland, it is said, is a phoenix which repeatedly rises from the 
ashes of its own destruction’25, and the January Insurrection was only one 
episode in that nation’s long and tortured history of emergence following 
national suppression.  As such, the events reveal much about emerging 
nationalism and the position of self-determination in the context of nineteenth 
century international relations. 
It is useful to recall that Poland in the late-eighteenth century, while 
enjoying a brief period of independence, became the focus of a revolution in                                                         
25 Norman Davies, ‘The effects of the January Insurrection on East Central Europe’ in Bela 
Kiraly, ed. The Crucial Decade: East Central European Society and National Defense, 1859-1870 War and 
Society in East Central Europe Series (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1984), 37. 
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government that attracted the attention and support of many leading liberal 
democratic thinkers and politicians.  During the tumultuous reign of Stanislas 
Augustus Poniatowski (1764-1795), described as ‘undoubtedly the most 
enlightened and most universally educated Pole of his generation’,26 Poland 
underwent a remarkable national awakening that was heavily influenced by the 
ideas of the enlightenment and the American and French Revolutions, and this 
national revival was inspired by liberal thinkers, leading to significant political 
reform along liberal democratic lines.27  Stanislas sought out gifted scholars and 
writers for his court and initiated educational reforms with the aim of reviving 
Polish literature, history and traditions.   
He encouraged political theorists, many of whom were liberals and 
influenced by the works of Locke, the French Jacobins and the American 
revolutionaries, thereby stimulating political debate about the transformation of 
the Polish state and its institutions.  Many outside of Poland, most notably Jean 
Jacques Rousseau, took a great interest in the creation of the Polish constitution 
of 1791, which was designed to make the Polish diet, the Seym, more national and 
more representative of the whole Polish nation.  Although this constitution was 
stillborn, owing to the second partition of Poland by Prussia and Russia in 1793, 
the national awakening proved to be much more long-lasting, fuelling a series of 
rebellions that sought to revive Polish statehood and national identity in 1794 
and in 1830-1831. 
Thus, when the Poles rose again in January 1863, they could draw on a 
powerful national identity that now had the added tradition of national 
resistance to foreign (primarily Russian) subjugation.  In fact, the rising of 1863-
1864 was even more popular with the whole of the Polish nationality than the 
earlier insurrections, with a much higher proportion of rural and urban poor 
supporting the actions of their leaders.  Not only were the demonstrations in the 
cities that preceded the insurrection composed of ordinary Poles of virtually all 
walks of life, but those who fought in the Polish forces were entirely volunteers 
and were also more socially diverse than in 1830-1831.28  Moreover, the goals of 
the insurrection were more overtly democratic than in previous risings, with the 
leaders promising a liberal enfranchisement act and a new constitution with even 
broader representation than had previously been the case.                                                           
26 B. Dembinski, ‘The Age of Stanislas Augustus and the National Revival’, in W. Reddaway, et al 
eds., Cambridge History of Poland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1941), 116. 
27 For an overview, see Dembinski, ‘Stanislas Augustus’; Aleksander Gieysztor, et al. eds., History 
of Poland, 2nd edn. (Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers, 1979) and Norman Davies, God’s 
Playground: A History of Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). 
28 Eligiusz Kozlowski, ‘The Social Structure of the Insurrection Army, 1863-64’, in Kiraly, Crucial 
Decade, 108-118 and Ryszard Bender, ‘The Urban Population in the January Insurrection’ in 
Kiraly, Crucial Decade, 119-133. 
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As had been the case in the past in Poland, the insurgents of 1863-1864 
placed a great importance on the external façade of their rebellion; however, the 
shifting context of international affairs meant that foreign relations could play a 
greater and perhaps decisive role than in the previous risings, if, as the insurgents 
calculated, they could make full use of these changing circumstances.  The 
leaders of the insurrection in Poland, Polish émigrés abroad and supporters of 
Poland in foreign countries were fully cognisant of this, and how they 
represented their struggle to the international community of the day reveals as 
much if not more about international norms of self-determination at that time 
than they do about the character the Polish insurrection itself.   
When the insurrection began on 22 January 1863, sparked by the botched 
conscription into the Russian army of thousands of Poles who were considered 
‘revolutionary’, the Poles had a permanent and recognized base for diplomatic 
activity.  The Bureau of Polish Affairs, occupying much of the Hôtel Lambert in 
Paris, functioned very effectively as the Polish foreign office abroad, complete 
with fully staffed departments occupying different rooms.  From here, the Poles, 
under the direction of Prince Wladyslaw Czartoryski, who took orders from the 
various insurrection leaders, masterminded and controlled the external contact 
with the community of states in Europe.  The activities of the Bureau29 show 
that Czartoryski and his agents understood very well the prevailing attitudes of 
their audience and that their careful packaging and presentation of their cause 
to foreign governments and to the mass media was calculated to play on the 
sympathies and ideological commitments of the Great Powers.   
For some time, the Bureau had been lobbying the various powers of 
Europe to intervene on their behalf and to press Russia for concessions that 
would eventually lead to independence, and this continued to be the main aim of 
their policy during 1863-1864.  The central question facing Czartoryski and the 
Bureau was how best to pursue this goal, as there were a number of avenues 
open.  The Poles had a strong historical argument in their favour, as there was 
ample evidence of their long existence as a distinct PIFG, as a nationality and, 
though briefly, as a sovereign state, and the Great Powers at the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815, which included Russia, had jointly agreed that Polish nationality 
would be recognized constitutionally and respected by Russia following its 
                                                        
29 There are very few sources that are not in Polish that interpret the activities of the Bureau 
during the 1863-1864 revolt, and the most detailed analysis, by Jerzy Zdrada, ‘Foreign Policy 
During the January Insurrection’ in Kiraly, Crucial Decade, 148-168, must be treated cautiously as 
it is based on Polish sources and has no references or bibliography.  Where this source is referred 
to, all comments have been checked against other available primary and secondary sources for 
corroboration. 
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absorption of the Duchy of Warsaw, a promise that had not been kept.30  
Czartoryski could also argue that an independent Poland would provide a check 
on Russian power, thereby providing a buffer zone between Eastern and 
Western Europe.  In the end, the Bureau correctly gauged that foreign support 
could not be won by touting treaty commitments and strategic promises alone.   
There were two main themes in this crisis with which the international 
community resonated and on which the Poles played heavily: the Russians’ 
persistent and serious failure to respect Polish nationality by not promoting 
‘good government’ for the Poles and the intense suffering that the Polish people 
were enduring at the hands of their Russian overlords.31  The diplomatic contact 
between the other Great Powers and Russia and the frequent public statements 
by the Powers were the chief mechanisms by which the increasingly distinct 
society of states within Europe communicated and exchanged ideas about this 
matter (and others).  These indicate that both of these themes were repeatedly 
taken up as matters of concern and formed a significant part of the diplomatic 
intervention related to the Polish crisis.  The frequent iteration of these points 
during the crisis may even suggest the early development of a normative response 
to emerging nations in the mid-nineteenth century.  A closer examination of the 
language and the tone used in the diplomatic traffic and the popular press 
reveals much about this hypothesis. 
As for the first of these themes, many Powers held an historical 
commitment for the flourishing of Polish nationality.  The repression of Polish 
institutions, the Polish language and the restriction of the Roman Catholic 
Church angered many, particularly in France and Britain where the enjoyment of 
such beliefs and practices were considered basic human rights.  As mentioned 
before, Polish exiles had worked effectively for many years to build sympathy for 
their cause by highlighting these restrictions, but it would be fair to say that this 
sympathy had never led to the direct intervention the Poles desired.  However, 
Alexander II, the reforming Russian Emperor who had in 1861 freed the Russian 
serfs, was planning liberal reforms and genuine national development for Poland.  
The main changes for Poland included the establishment of a Commission of 
Public Worship, the reopening of ‘national’ institutions such as scientific 
academies, universities, art and literary societies, the return of the right of 
petition, a Council of State with Poles serving as members to discuss further                                                         
30 Similar guarantees were sought and obtained from Prussia and Austria, who also divided up 
Polish lands.  For more on this, see H. Montgomery Hyde, ‘The Congress of Vienna’, in 
Reddaway, et al., Cambridge History of Poland, 257-274. 
31 It should also be noted that there were significant strategic concerns that also resonated with 
the other European powers, some of which encouraged intervention and others making this less 
likely, so these more emotional appeals were of considerable import. 
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changes and the direct election of Polish town counsellors.32  In a nutshell, what 
Alexander offered the Poles was significant step towards full national autonomy 
within the Russian Empire.  For the Great Powers (and many Poles) 
independence, even if it could be won, was not considered necessary for securing 
Polish interests.  Of paramount importance was the right that Polish nationality 
should be respected and that the Poles were governed in a manner that the Poles 
accepted.  
The proposed reforms seemed to promise this, and the liberal democratic 
nature of the Emperor’s intentions was appreciated abroad.  As an article in The 
Times in 1861 put it:  
 
Alexander II has plainly learnt wisdom from the lessons which have 
been of late read to Royalty... His father, his father's ungrateful ally 
[the Austro-Hungarian Emperor], and some half-dozen of the minor 
sovereigns whom they protected have fallen under the most grievous 
calamities, and all for the same reason, - that they have ignored the 
national and individual rights which now form part of the political creed of 
Europe...  Alexander has made concessions which, though not as large 
as the advanced Liberals desire, …show that the world has made 
some progress since 1831, and even since 1849.  The Emperor has at 
least recognized the right of his Polish subjects to ask for reforms, 
even when those reforms involve the concession of something like 
nationality.33 
 
Alexander himself accepted the premise behind this statement, writing in 
1861 that he would spare no effort to ensure the welfare of his Polish subjects, 
while asserting the principle that, in return, he should expect their loyalty.34  A 
leading Polish émigré, Count Zamoyski, accepted the ideas underlying this but 
summed up the feelings of many Poles, reportedly saying that ‘[t]he country will 
accept the reforms with gratitude, but at the present moment these are but 
nominal.  The country now depends on their being carried into execution.’35  
However, the reforms did not lead to better government for the Poles, 
for, as the Poles feared, the promised reforms were never fully implemented, 
thereby strengthening their argument that the well-being of the Polish 
nationality within the Russian Empire was insecure at best.  Nonetheless, when 
the various European states began their diplomatic intervention in early 1863, 
official contact was directed principally at encouraging the Russians to push 
through the promised reforms and to govern more humanely rather than at 
                                                        
32 The reforms in Poland are discussed in detail in A.P. Coleman, ‘Poland under Alexander II: 
The Insurrection of 1863’, in Reddaway, et al., Cambridge History of Poland, 366-376. 
33 The Times (28 March 1861).  Emphases added.  
34 Alexander’s letter to Gorchakov (Russian Foreign Minister), n.d., printed in The Times (20 
March 1861). 
35 The Times (4 April 1861). 
  83 
supporting independence.36  Lord Russell, the British Foreign Secretary, 
admitted in parliamentary debates on 8 May 1863 that Russian policy was 
creating ‘a lasting sense of resentment, and an enduring belief that the Poles 
never can rely on the policy of the Russian government.’  However, he concluded 
that: 
 
I do not mean to be to say that the institutions which suit England 
are exactly those which would suit Poland, or any other country 
which could be named; but what I say is essential is that the persons 
who govern, whether they are named by the municipal councils or by 
the Emperor himself, or are chosen by the suffrages of the electors, 
should be persons who have the confidence of the nation - in the 
performance of whose promises the nation confides.37 
 
Thus, although there was considerable international pressure placed on the 
Russian Emperor to act, the international position was that autonomy, leading 
to better government, should be the aim of their intervention.  
However, the Poles also saw that one of the surest ways of increasing the 
momentum for intervention abroad would be to highlight the suffering of the 
Polish people and to ensure that the mass media, particularly in Britain and 
France, were well supplied with information about the Russian ‘atrocities’.38  In 
this task, the genuinely brutal treatment meted out by the Russians aided the 
émigrés’ efforts.  Already gripped by the situation in the region, the popular 
press, particularly in Britain and France, were full of stories of the mass 
executions without trial of suspected rebels, the sacking of villages by Russian 
troops, and the excessive force used by Russian troops and the police against 
even the smallest and most peaceful demonstrations.39  The ferocity and the 
nature of the attacks suffered by the Poles was (in part correctly) perceived as 
confirmation that Alexander II had no real intention of implementing his 
reforms, thereby increasing the view that independence was the only real chance 
the Poles had for securing their rights.  
                                                        
36 Zdrade, ‘Foreign policy’, 155-162; Lord Russell’s (British Foreign Secretary) letter to Lord 
Napier (British Ambassador to Russia), dated 2 March 1863, printed in The Times (6 April 1863); 
Extracts of the notes of Spain, Sweden and Italy to Russia and extracts of the replies, printed in 
The Times (7 May 1863); Drouyn de Lhuys’s (French Foreign Secretary) letter to the Duke of 
Montebello (French ambassador to Russia), n.d., printed in The Times (29 April 1863).  
37 Lord Russell, speaking in the House of Lords, 8 May 1863, reported in The Times (9 May 1863).  
Emphasis added. 
38 Zdrada, ‘Foreign policy’, 149-150.  There were also numerous meetings in Britain, France and in 
Sweden in support of the Poles before, during and after the rising at which Polish émigrés spoke 
of the abuse suffered.  Whether or not the supply of this information flowed directly from 
Czartoryski and his agents (and there is much to suggest that the Bureau was the source), there is 
clear evidence that British and French politicians were moved by the contacts they had with 
Bureau members.  
39 The examples are far too numerous to mention here, but reports in The Times (17 April 1863) 
are a typical example of the Russian actions and the way such events were reported in Western 
Europe. 
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In contrast to the potency of statements by the various powers regarding 
Polish national rights, constitutional arrangements and the strategic calculations, 
the public reaction to Polish suffering was potent, and the demands for action 
on these abuses fell on the doorsteps of policy makers.  There can be little doubt 
that what actions the states of Europe took against Russia were generated 
principally by the sense of public outrage over what would today be called 
human rights abuses inflicted on the Poles.  Policy makers were pushed into 
action by and frequently spoke of the anger and disgust felt within their 
respective countries, and the diplomatic notes sent to the Emperor usually 
referred specifically to this type abuse as being outside of the bounds of the 
proper behaviour of a sovereign.40  Although it is necessary to point out that the 
active ‘public’ that followed these events and pushed their politicians was far 
smaller than in the twentieth century, there is no mistaking the link between the 
popular press, the public anger and the actions of politicians on the diplomatic 
front, at least on the part of the British and French governments.   
Although the evidence of a moral clamour and the effect it had on 
encouraging a tougher stance over Poland is apparent, the diplomatic 
intervention of the powers for a change in Russian policy came to nought as the 
Russians, not unexpectedly, managed to quell the insurrection in 1864.  In the 
years following the uprising, the Russians did implement some limited reforms 
in Poland, but repression was the hallmark of the late-nineteenth century in 
Poland.   
Despite the failure of the diplomatic efforts to encourage better 
treatment of the Poles and to engender a settlement, it would be wrong to 
suggest that the international intervention had no impact at all.  During the 
early months of the insurrection, the pressure placed on the Emperor was 
sufficient to keep Polish national rights and Polish suffering at the top of the 
diplomatic agenda, making it difficult if not impossible for the Emperor to 
ignore completely such concerns.  This pressure certainly played a part in 
Alexander’s offer of amnesty and negotiation with the Poles (which was 
rejected).41  As a result, the Polish case highlights much about the status and the 
trajectory of self-determination at this time.  By comparing the actions of the 
Great Powers in Europe to the normative model suggested in Part I and to the 
reactions to self-determination discussed earlier in this chapter, a number of 
observations can be made.  
                                                        
40 For example, see The Times (29 April, 9 May and 11 July 1863); Coleman, ‘Poland under 
Alexander’, 378-384; Zdrada, ‘Foreign policy’, 159-164. 
41 Coleman, ‘Poland under Alexander’, 380-381. 
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The reactions to the Polish case, at a minimum, confirm that by the mid-
nineteenth century the principle of self-determination and the concern for 
human rights and humane governance had arrived on the international stage, 
albeit still not explicitly in those terms.  The tone and substance of the 
international reaction shows that the concepts of ‘nationality’, ‘national rights’ 
and ‘responsive government’ were part of the understood vocabulary of politics 
between the states involved in the matter.  Similarly, it is clear that concern for 
human rights and some of the ideas associated with humane governance were 
beginning to resonate across Europe.  In a manner that foreshadows greatly the 
cases of emerging nationalism and self-determination in the post-Cold War era, 
the influence of public outrage over media coverage of human rights abuse 
played a significant role in the international responses to the conflict.  Thus, 
self-determination was evolving away from its status as a thoroughly vague and 
‘dangerous’ political idea and into an increasingly accepted notion and, for those 
who claimed it, a right that nationalities possessed. 
Of course this conclusion needs many important qualifications.  It has to 
be remembered that ‘normative’ implies a uniform and widespread acceptance of 
the principles or rights discussed, and this was not the case with Poland.  
Although there was a relatively high degree of consensus in the international 
reactions, the principal actors had different levels of commitment to the ideas 
they upheld and some, notably Austria and Prussia, each with their own ‘Polish 
problem’, were never really moved to the extent that the Western European 
states were and certainly did not replicate the more liberal and democratic tone 
of their arguments.42  Even between the powers that condemned the Russian 
actions and attitudes, there were differences in the reasons for supporting the 
Poles.  Most states had a genuine concern for the condition of the Polish 
nationality, but most also had their attention focused on strategic concerns.   
This is hardly surprising considering the level of international interaction 
and organisation at this time and the aims and objectives of the European 
system.  The Concert of Europe’s guiding principles were the balance of power 
and the preservation of order, not the development of humane or even good 
governance, though this might have been a hoped for side-benefit.  There were 
no treaty commitments regarding the treatment of PIFGs and no mechanisms 
to monitor or insure the rights of either groups or individuals.  In short, there 
were few international norms that had anything to do with ‘domestic’ concerns, 
and there were no institutions or processes to enforce or encourage such norms 
                                                        
42 For more on the Austrian and Prussian reactions, see Zdrada, ‘Foreign policy’ and Gieysztor, et 
al. History of Poland. 
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had they existed in any meaningful sense.  Such normative developments simply 
did not appear until the twentieth century.   
Of course, this represents an important point about the construction of 
international society as well as its norms and rules.  While the international 
reactions to the Polish insurrection reflect a stage of increasing institutional 
development at the middle of the nineteenth century in Europe, it also 
highlights the reality that the creation and evolution of one norm cannot be 
understood in a vacuum, for while there is evidence that self-determination was 
gradually emerging as a concern of the international community, its meaning, 
importance and utility were extremely limited and very much affected by 
clashing with other norms, in this case, the norm of non-interference in 
domestic concerns and the primacy of preserving stability of relations between 
the Great Powers.  Perhaps not coincidentally, the next point of great 
significance in the evolution of the international community’s normative 
responses to emerging nationalism occurred as a result of the First World War, 
an event where the norms of non-interference and maintenance of the strategic 
status quo were thoroughly violated with devastating effects.  
 
(iii) The Paris Peace Conference and the interwar period 
 
Self-determination was transformed from a political concept operating 
implicitly and in the background of international affairs into one of the chief 
operating principles during and immediately after the First World War.  As was 
the case in the early and mid-nineteenth century, one of the key factors bringing 
this about was a change in the context of international affairs.  Once again, and 
not for the last time, the changing environment in which nationality, self-
determination and sovereignty operated and were discussed proved to be more 
significant than any change to the ideas that might have occurred in the course 
of their evolution.   
Putting aside all of its other, very considerable effects, the Great War, 
altered dramatically the amount, the breadth and the nature of international 
activity.  The war was in part caused by and fought between the alliances formed 
through diplomatic contacts, and the conflict necessitated dramatic growth of 
international coordination.  States went through four intense years of shared 
strife and struggle based on mutual cooperation on issues ranging from mundane 
matters like troop transport to vital concerns such as war aims.  As the number 
of combatants increased and as the conflict intensified, so did the amount of 
international contact and coordination, to the point that international 
integration on a wide range of major and minor issues seemed commonplace.  
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Moreover, the effects of fighting a war whose theatres of operations 
stretched well beyond the geographical and political limits of Europe accelerated 
the long process of integrating more states into the international system that 
originally began in Europe.  This process happened on the economic and cultural 
as well as on the strategic level, and brought the states and peoples of South 
America, Africa and Asia into the conflict either directly through their status as 
participants or indirectly through diplomatic and/or economic involvement.43  
The war also led to the emergence of many new international actors.  Most of 
these were new states, ultimately created as a result of the war, but there were 
also many non-governmental bodies formed during and after the war, which 
themselves opened up a whole new arena of international contact and activity.  
Above all, the Great War brought about a change in the nature of 
international affairs.  This change had three primary facets: a broadening of the 
content of international activity; the institutionalization of international 
processes; and popularization of democratic practices and ideas.44  Building on 
the already existing trend of wider and deeper social and economic co-operation, 
the First World War hastened and formed international links on a wide range of 
issues beyond the traditional scope of commerce and politics.  To take just one 
example, the influenza pandemic of 1919 increased the momentum for 
coordinated medical and health programmes both on the inter- and non-
governmental level, which culminated in the creation of the Health Bureau, 
which later became the World Health Organisation.45  The creation of the 
League of Nations, incorporating ‘non-political’ organs such as the ILO and the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, and the growth of non-governmental 
organisations during this time expanded the focus of the international 
community significantly, increasing international concern for many issues never 
before seen in such a light.   
Also, the establishment of (what were intended to be) permanent 
institutions to facilitate international activity was an extraordinary 
accomplishment.  Although the League ultimately proved to be short-lived and 
failed to have as inclusive a membership as its successor organisation, the United 
Nations, it was a truly novel creation.  Never before had so many states agreed 
to such enormous international undertakings, much less in such formal and                                                         
43 Within this, the role of the principal combatants’ colonial populations cannot be forgotten.  
In more than one case, the effects of the Great War on these peoples precipitated the events 
that would lead to their entry into the international system later in the twentieth century.  For 
details on the effect of the First World War on Europe’s colonies, see Rupert Emerson, From 
Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), especially Chapter 2. 
44 More correctly, this last point should read ‘the popularization of one interpretation of 
democratic practices and ideas’, namely the Wilsonian interpretation.  
45 On this point generally, see F.S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920-1946 
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1986), 163-191. 
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explicit terms, and never had so many hoped for such a project’s success.  Even 
the briefest comparison with the Congress system of the mid-nineteenth 
century highlights the gulf of commitment that separates the two projects.  It is 
only from this point that one can speak confidently of an environment in which 
the norms of international behaviour could be easily discerned and evaluated, for 
there now existed the dialogical space in which values, customs, laws and ideas 
could be exchanged and agreed upon.   
However, the change to the international system that had the greatest 
effect on the evolution of self-determination was the spread of democratic ideas 
and the forceful, explicit support for the concept during the Paris Peace 
Conference.  The victory by Britain, France, the United States and their allies; 
the internal disorder of the defeated powers and the victors’ complete 
domination of peacemaking arrangements meant that the conquering states had 
a unique opportunity to shape the terms of the peace and to construct the post-
war international arrangements as they saw fit.46  Thus, at the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919, the victorious powers were able to stamp their mould on the 
norms and institutions that came out of the settlement.  However, in so doing, 
the policy makers at Paris faced many difficult choices about the post-war 
system they were to construct, and, when facing these choices, the powers were 
influenced by a range of motives, inclinations and beliefs about how 
international relations operated and how they should in the future, and self-
determination was just one of the many competing ideas. 
The peacemakers had to choose between, what Arno Mayer has called, 
the ‘old’ and the ‘new diplomacy’.47  As Mayer explains, the old diplomacy was 
typified by undemocratic and unaccountable practices, such as secret 
negotiations, territorial aggrandisement, alliances, and the protection of spheres 
of influence; above all, it was the antithesis of the open, liberal and democratic 
practices on which the new diplomacy was to be based.  While there is no 
question that the old diplomacy persisted at Paris and after and is still present 
today, the new diplomacy was not only evident but powerful during the 
conference and is, arguably, the dominant modality of international relations 
today.  Yet, although its introduction brought democratic oriented practices to 
the fore at Paris, there were two rather differing interpretations of what 
‘democracy’ meant and, consequently, two different versions of how the new                                                         
46 The victorious powers were also aided by the absence of the Russians from this process owing 
to the turmoil resulting from the Bolshevik Revolution and the subsequent civil war.  Of course, 
this high degree of freedom, while offering the victors a blank canvas on which to work, also 
ultimately weakened the legitimacy of their efforts and reduced the potency of their claim to be 
advancing democracy. 
47 Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1959).   
  89 
diplomacy would actually function in practice from this time until the end of the 
Cold War: a socialist version, championed by V.I. Lenin, and a liberal 
democratic one, championed by Woodrow Wilson.48  In both versions, the 
principle or right of national self-determination was central to each champion’s 
understanding of democracy and the new diplomacy.   
However, neither man fully thought through the implications of his ideas 
or the logical consequences that self-determination implied.  As a result, the 
evolution of self-determination into a norm of international relations was, on the 
one hand, greatly enhanced by the development of this new diplomacy, yet, on 
the other, the ill-considered and contested meaning of self-determination during 
this period led to applications of the concept that were quite different from the 
framework outlined in Part I of this study.  While an incongruence from this 
framework could have been predicted solely as a result of the immensely 
complex and interrelated challenges created by the practical and normative 
upheaval of the war, the philosophical divergence between the socialist and the 
liberal democratic understandings of self-determination had important 
consequences when the international community responded to the large number 
of emerging nationalities following the First World War and even more so in 
the decades to follow. 
Both Lenin and Wilson saw self-determination and nationalism as 
fundamentally democratic principles.  However, as Part I of this thesis 
contended, self-determination has a two-sided nature.  One side is the liberating, 
freedom-enhancing belief that a nation’s will should form the basis of 
governmental legitimacy and justify actions seeking to ensure or achieve this.  
The other side limits the exercise of that right by emphasising the just 
obligations that a sovereign state may legitimately impose.  Both Lenin and 
Wilson looked at only the first side of the principle and ignored or insufficiently 
attended to the other.  However, Lenin had less of a problem than Wilson did in 
doing so.   
As Lenin posited in the years before the Bolshevik Revolution, Tsarist 
Russia was ‘a prison of nations’, and a socialist revolution based on nationalist 
and socialist principles was more likely to succeed than one based on socialism 
alone.  An awakening of class-consciousness was essential for his ultimate goal of 
a unified, communist society in which nationalism would play no part.  However, 
in societies, such as Russia, where a sufficient degree of class-consciousness had 
not yet developed, an appeal couched in the more accessible language of                                                         
48 This approach runs through Mayer’s work, but it is adopted by many others, notably Antonio 
Cassesse, Self-determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 14-23. 
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nationalism and minority secession might be a necessary first step in the process 
of liberation.  Lenin acknowledged that this might lead to the fragmentation of 
states, but the newly liberated national entities would be better suited to the 
evolution of class-consciousness, thereby ultimately stimulating the desire for 
unification into a single socialist society.  Thus, for Lenin, self-determination, 
including a right of secession, was not only an entailment of the concept but a 
facet that was to be openly trumpeted.49  
However, Lenin saw self-determination, above all, as a tool (an essential 
tool to be sure, but a tool nonetheless) of the larger socialist revolution.50  For 
Lenin, self-determination was like a wrench, used by a skilled mechanic to fix an 
engine.  A wrench would be essential to the overall process of getting the engine 
running properly and it would certainly be picked up and used from time to 
time.  However, the mechanic would place it back on the bench if another tool 
might be of more use or if the wrench proved counterproductive in bringing 
about the desired goal.  Just as the mechanic would find no logical contradiction 
in their intermittent use of a wrench, Lenin saw few contradictions or 
inconsistencies in his uneven application of self-determination.  Thus, for Lenin, 
when the idea of self-determination clashed with an action or event that was 
necessary for the world socialist revolution (such as the violent absorption of 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan between 1918 and 1922 against their will), he 
did not hesitate to put it aside and was able, with some success, to side-step any 
charge of logical inconsistency in the matter.  However, it is fair to contend that 
the ease with which the principle, or right as Lenin called it, could be discarded 
weakened the overall impact of the concept.51  
The matter was much more complex for Wilson: he perceived self-
determination as both the means and the end of democracy.52  Wilson had an 
almost religious devotion to democracy and liberal values and his views on 
nationality and self-determination reflected much of the liberal democratic 
reasoning outlined in Part I.  Wilson’s views on politics, nationalism and self-
determination (indeed all his beliefs) were based primarily on the Presbyterian 
tradition of freedom and equality amongst the elect of God and on the                                                         
49 For Lenin’s statements on self-determination, see A.A. Kristian, The Right to Self-determination 
and the Soviet Union (London: Boreas Publishing, 1952), 13-15. 
50 For a brief summary of Lenin’s views on self-determination, see Cassese, Self-determination, 14-
19 and Derek Heater, National Self-determination: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1994), 32-36. 
51 As Cassese, Self-determination, 18, highlights, Lenin essentially acknowledged this much when 
he conceded that the handing over of Poland, Byelorussia, etc. to Germany in the Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty without these peoples’ acceptance was a violation of their rights. 
52 Wilson’s life and political beliefs have been the subject of much study, and the most focused 
work on Wilson and self-determination is Heater, National Self-determination, but see also 
Cobban, Nation-State; Cassese, Self-determination, 19-23; and Harley Notter, The Origins of the 
Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937), 53-121 and 519-
645 in particular. 
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American democratic experience.53  Having been greatly influenced of these 
sources, Wilson, much like J.S. Mill understood the nation as a group of 
individuals bound together by their common values, ideas, history and culture, 
and believed, again like Mill, that the mature, democratic expression of national 
will should be political fulfilment as a free and independent state.54  Although 
Wilson, was rather vague about what a mature nation was, he indicated that 
nationality in general and self-government in particular demanded much of a 
people and that there was no automatic right to independence.55  As Heater 
relates, on the question of the Philippines, Wilson was in favour of granting 
independence but only after a suitable period of tutelage (by the Americans 
naturally), which he considered necessary for a people whose character and 
constitutional development was not ready for the task of self-government.56   
Nonetheless, Wilson believed that self-determination did permit the 
fragmentation of states.  As a fervent believer in America’s revolutionary 
heritage, he could hardly avoid this conviction.  In fact he proudly declared that 
‘[t]he glory of the of the United States is that when we were a little body of 
3,000,000 people strung along the Atlantic coast we threw off the power of a 
great empire because it was not a power chosen by or consented to by ourselves.  
We hold to that principle.’57  The American experience was for Wilson more 
than a case study to be admired; it was a shining example of democracy and 
national fulfilment for the world, and it was the mission of the United States to 
be a bastion, indeed, a champion of such rights for all peoples.  That this 
commitment entailed the possibility of secession and the break-up of existing 
states did not trouble Wilson in principle and can be seen as the logical 
extension of Wilson’s belief in a liberal and democratic theory of national self-
determination.   
In short, Wilson saw self-determination as a democratic expression of 
popular sovereignty, that governments must enjoy the approval (tacit of 
expressed) of those governed to be legitimate and that the creation of new                                                         
53 On the influence of Presbyterian theology on Wilson’s ideas see Robert M. Cruden, Ministers 
of Reform: The Progressives’ Achievement in American Civilization, 1889-1920 (Urbana, IL: University 
of Illinois Press, 1984), 3-38 and 225-273 and Notter, Origins, 3-52.  For the influence of American 
history on Wilson, see Notter, Origins, 53-121; Harold Nicholson, Peacemaking 1919 (London: 
Constable and Co., 1945), 28-31 and Heater, National Self-determination, 15-27. 
54 See Notter, Origins, 74-82. 
55 It is possible that he subscribed to Mill’s theory of ‘civilised nations’ that were capable of 
mature politics and ‘barbarian peoples’ that were not suited to it.  However, Wilson’s strong 
support of the League’s Mandates system, while paternalistic, indicates a belief in ‘progress’ 
towards national fulfilment.  
56 Heater, National Self-determination, 24-25.  It should be noted that, as President, Wilson 
supported legislation granting a substantial degree of autonomy to the Philippines with full 
independence to take place soon after the implementation of autonomy, the later of which 
actually became law in 1916 (the Jones Act). 
57 Quoted in Lee Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-determination (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1978), 116. 
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states, the redrawing of borders and alterations to the status of those governed 
should always reflect the will of the governed.  For Wilson, nationality was the 
embodiment of the democratic will of its members and this gave life and 
legitimacy to the state.  Accordingly, Wilson’s interpretation of self-
determination had to function within the ideas of liberal democracy and could 
not be a right that was important but ancillary to the higher purpose of another 
ideology, as was the case for Lenin.  It was not a tool for Wilson but an integral 
part of democracy as he understood the term.  As a result, Wilson could not 
easily champion the right of self-determination, apply it for one nationality and 
later say that it should not apply elsewhere to others without opening himself up 
to the charge of inconsistency, which is exactly what happened. 
Despite these underlying challenges, self-determination was centre stage 
during the construction of the new context of international relations after the 
First World War.  It is worth pointing out that, in addition to and in large 
measure separate from Wilson’s efforts to promote his interpretation the 
principle, self-determination was increasingly evident in the thinking of the 
victorious powers.  Even before the United States entered the war and had its 
greatest degree of influence over war aims and objectives, the British officially 
endorsed their own interpretation of the principle (not the right) of self-
determination for nationalities.  As the Memorandum on Territorial Settlement 
of 1916 states: 
 
His Majesty’s Government have announced that one of their chief 
objectives in the present war is to ensure that all the states of 
Europe, great and small, shall in the future be in a position to achieve 
their national development in freedom and security.  It is clear, 
moreover, that no peace can be satisfactory to this country unless it 
promises to be durable and an essential condition of such a peace is 
that it should give full scope to national aspirations as far as 
practicable.  The principle of nationality should therefore be one of 
the governing factors in the consideration of territorial arrangements 
after the war.58 
 
In 1918, David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister publicly stated his view 
that ‘government with the consent of the governed must be the basis of any 
territorial settlement in this war’.59  In this address, Lloyd George used the 
specific term ‘national self-determination’, unlike Wilson in his ‘Fourteen 
Points’ speech given later that year, and he committed the United Kingdom to 
the principle’s application in the Middle East and for German colonies in Africa 
and Asia (though, crucially, he did not make clear exactly how it would apply).60                                                          
58 Quoted in Cobban, Nation-State, 52. 
59 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London: Odhams, 1938), 1513. 
60 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 1512-1515. 
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The French too seemed committed to applying the principle to correct 
the suffering experienced by those under ‘foreign domination’, such as the 
Czechs and Slovaks and the Arabs.61  Even the left-wing parties within Germany 
accepted that self-determination would have to play a part in whatever 
settlement would come after the war.62  However, many politicians were less 
enthusiastic in their support of the principle than these official positions 
suggest, and few were prepared to make the seemingly obvious logical 
connection about the principle and its implications for their colonial 
possessions.  Moreover, many in Britain and France had promoted national self-
determination and encouraged certain emerging nations for strategic rather than 
ideological reasons.  As Cobban points out, ‘[t]he Western powers had not 
called the force of nationality into being; they had rather reluctantly recognized 
it when it appeared and used it, not to win the war but to hasten its last stages.  
In so doing, and in the propaganda they had poured forth, they had committed 
themselves to the principle of self-determination.’63  These varying 
commitments to and interpretations of self-determination and nationalism, 
while understandable, were to plague the peacemakers in 1919.  
The problems for Wilson and the other leaders only really began when 
their ideological commitments to self-determination clashed with the tangible 
challenges emerging nationalism presented and the other myriad strategic, 
economic and political problems associated with the peace.  Because the 
negotiations at Paris and the subsequent responses to emerging nationalism have 
been so well examined by other scholars, the analysis given here will aim, 
instead, to gauge the degree to which these international responses followed 
Wilson’s intentions and the theoretical suggestions made in Part I, and to assess 
the impact of this on the principle’s evolution as a norm of international activity. 
One of the most obvious consequences of the post-war treaties was the 
creation on several new states in the heart of Europe.  The Czech, Polish, 
Slovak, Finnish and Albanian nationalities, to name just a few, had long been 
submerged within larger states or empires for different lengths of time and 
under varying standards of treatment.  With the changing context of 
international relations ushered in by the First World War and the tremendous 
opportunity created by the war’s disruption of the existing strategic 
circumstances, the chances for ‘success’ had never looked so positive to these 
nationalists.  There seemed to be a real opportunity to achieve some, if not all, 
                                                        
61 Heater, National Self-determination, 29.   
62 Heater, National Self-determination, 44.  Mayer, Political Origins. 
63 Cobban, Nation-State, 52. 
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of their long hoped for goals, and these emerging nationalities now found an 
international community by whom their appeals might be warmly received. 
The representatives of the various emerging nationalities made frequent 
visits to the Allied powers with the hope of obtaining official support and to 
increase public sympathy for their causes.64  However, because the Allies openly 
endorsed certain nationalities as a war tactic to weaken Germany and the 
Ottoman Empire in particular, and because of the growing support for 
democratic institutions and self-determination, the emerging nationalities did 
not face the arduous struggle to win the hearts and minds of the Allied powers 
that the Poles had in the nineteenth century.  Even before the end of the war, 
these emerging nationalities created an impressive mechanism by which their 
claims could be promoted, one that reflected the ongoing changes to the 
structure and procedures of international relations.   
On 11 April 1918, the ‘Congress of Oppressed Nationalities’ met in Rome 
to discuss their common plight.  Representatives of the Czechs and the Slovaks 
(who were represented jointly), the Italians, the Poles, Romanians, the Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes (also represented collectively by the Yugoslav National 
Committee) were present.  The main achievement of the Congress was the 
drafting of a joint statement to the Allied War Council, pledging the 
nationalities present to struggle for the break-up the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
and for the creation of independent states.  Once the Paris Peace Conference 
opened, these groups had official representatives in place who routinely met 
with the leaders, ministers and civil servants of the ‘Supreme Council’ of the 
victorious powers.65  Through personal negotiations, careful publicity of their 
cause and a fair amount of pleading and badgering, many of these emerging 
nations were granted statehood in the resulting treaties.66 
Although these representatives used a specifically nationalist discourse in 
their diplomacy, many of the groups and the states that were subsequently 
created contained multiple PIFGs and were often multi-national.  There were 
many pockets of ‘stranded’ minority nationalities and other PIFGs within these 
new entities, and some groups were already conglomerations of multiple 
identities, yet presented themselves as a single nationality.67  The best examples                                                         
64 C.A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938), 
179-211; Heater, National Self-determination, 47-77. 
65 For the activities of these representatives, see Raymond Pearson, National Minorities in Eastern 
Europe, 1848-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1983), 117-189; Macartney, National States, 212-272; and 
Nicholson, Peacemaking. 
66 The new states created by the several peace treaties of 1919 were: Austria, Hungary, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom (Yugoslavia), Romania, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Finland, and Turkey.  This excludes entities that were made mandates or protected areas under 
the League, such as Danzig and the Saar region. 
67 Macartney, National States, 208-211. 
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of this were Czechoslovakia and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom (later called 
Yugoslavia).68  The Czech and Slovak nationalities were consciously and 
deliberately made (principally under Czech pressure) into a single 
‘Czechoslovakian’ nationalist campaign, one that claimed a territory in which 
the estimated majority of people were neither Czech nor Slovak (in fact the 
ethnic Germans outnumbered the Slovaks).  In the Serb-Croat-Slovene 
Kingdom (S-C-S), the new nationality was formed around the Serbian and the 
Croat ethnicities, of which over seventy-five per cent of the population of the 
new state were a part, but the number and scale of the S-C-S’s ethnic cleavages 
meant that the new state was potentially divisible on grounds similar to those on 
which they had appealed.  Regardless of these facts, these representatives 
presented themselves as national both at the Peace Conference and in their 
subsequent constitutions.69  
By doing so, these new multi-national states not only papered over 
numerous, deep divisions in their populations based on identity, their creation 
and sanction at the Conference helped to increase the validity of the national-
state as opposed to the nation-state.  Wilson never suggested that self-
determination could apply only to fully formed, ‘nationally pure’ groups, thus 
giving support to other, similar claims by multi-national groups.  However, not 
all of the emerging nationalist movements succeeded in obtaining sovereign 
statehood in 1919.  Many nationalities found that they were not only still 
submerged but were now within new and often potentially hostile states.  The 
Ruthenes, the Byelorussians, and the Montenegrins were now within states 
whose leaders had even less interest in accommodating their identity and their 
aspirations than did their former masters.  Also, the borders of the new states 
occasionally stranded peoples whose identities had been dominant in their 
former state but who now were national minorities, which was frequently the 
plight of the Germans and Hungarians in the new entities.  In most cases, this 
led to heightened tension, anxiety, and, in many cases, low intensity armed 
conflict.70  In such cases, however permeable or inclusive the national identity of 
these new states might have been in theory, there existed the real threat of 
human rights abuse and a violation of these peoples’ right to self-determination, 
the very principle that was invoked to create the new states. 
The peacemakers of 1919 were not unaware of such pitfalls within the 
principle of self-determination and developed an answer to the challenge that 
not only held out real promise for the threatened minority nations but                                                         
68 Pearson, Minorities, 147-189. 
69 See constitutional extracts and analysis in Macartney, National States, 209-210. 
70 Heater, National Self-determination, 60, indicates that there were fourteen such conflicts in 
mid-1919. 
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corresponded roughly to some of the limits to national self-determination 
outlined in Part I, namely, the minority protection treaties.71  These treaties, all 
of which were similar in wording and intention, were concluded between the 
victorious powers and the new states and were meant to serve as both a moral 
inducement to the new state to observe and protect the ethnic, religious and 
national minorities within their borders and to set up the League of Nations as a 
protector of these rights. 
These treaties granted equality of rights to all persons within the new 
states; the protection of national, ethnic (‘racial’ was the word used then), 
religious and linguistic customs; and they spell out the process by which the 
Council of the League could take action to redress grievances and violations of 
the protections.  The guiding idea behind all the treaties was, as Clémenceau, 
the French Prime Minister, put it, to ensure the ‘elementary rights which are, in 
fact, secured in every civilised state’.72  The League’s Council was empowered to 
‘take such action and give such direction as it may deem just and effective’ to 
ensure these rights.73  In addition to these specific guarantees, the peacemakers 
also encouraged and endorsed plans for autonomy, devolution and federal 
structures to accommodate emerging nationalism and to secure the rights of 
PIFGs.74  These far reaching ideas not only challenged the view that state 
frontiers were inviolable but they also point to a growing consensus that 
securing the rights of PIFGs and promoting the well-being of nationalities 
within existing states was integral to self-determination and was an essential part 
of ‘proper government’ by sovereign states.  This approach, implied throughout 
the treaties, suggested that the principle went beyond a stark choice between 
independent statehood on one hand or repression and assimilation on the other 
and moved the discussion towards the protection of rights and inclusive political 
and social arrangements within both existing and newly created states. 
Another similar attempt to address the challenges of self-determination 
and emerging nationalism was the use of plebiscites.75  As the foregoing has 
implied, a persistent difficulty with the application of self-determination in 1919 
was the broad dispersal of PIFGs across Europe and the rather constructed                                                         
71 The best account of these treaties, along with detailed excerpts from the various documents is 
L.P. Mair, The Protection of Minorities (London: Christophers, 1928). See also Macartney, National 
States, 212-294, and Thomas D. Musgrave, Self-determination and National Minorities (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 32-61. 
72 Clémenceau to the Polish leader, Paderewski, upon the signing of the agreement, quoted in 
Mair, Protection, 39. 
73 Quoted in Mair, Protection, 41. 
74 For example, in the 1918 Pittsburgh Agreement, the Czechs promised the Slovaks autonomy 
and a separate legislature within a federal Czechoslovakian state and similar promises were made 
in the minority treaty regarding the Ruthenes.  See Mair, Protection, 44-45 and Pearson, 
Minorities, 150-155. 
75 The classic work on plebiscites is Sarah Wamburgh, A Monograph on Plebiscites (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1920).  See also Heater, National Self-determination, 78-82. 
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nature of many of the nationalities that were emerging.  The hope was that an 
active expression of self-determination through monitored and controlled voting 
mechanisms would mirror the practice that democratic countries had used 
countless times to determine successive administrations in an orderly, timely 
and efficient fashion.  The difficulty with plebiscites and emerging nationalism, 
then and now, is that although the question put to the voters might be simple 
enough, unlike ordinary domestic elections, the electoral area and its population 
are often uncertain.  No fixed boundaries or eligible electorates existed for the 
post-war plebiscites and drawing boundaries assumed a far less confusing 
demographic situation than was the case.  With each alteration of a potential 
state’s boundaries, a new electorate was created, usually resulting in a new 
permutation of majority-minority relations.  Nonetheless, the plebiscites in 
certain areas (e.g. Schleswig, the Klagenfurt Basin) provided democratic 
legitimacy and some much-needed clarity to the fixing of borders that led to 
better and more responsive government.  
Thus, there were many ways in which the application of self-
determination at the Paris Peace Conference and in the interwar period were 
consistent with a liberal democratic, human rights orientated normative 
framework, and many of these led to a legitimate and peaceful (if not always 
permanent) settlement to many of the challenges arising from emerging 
nationalism.  However, some of the international responses and the application 
of self-determination during this period proved to be inconsistent with the 
framework and some of these inconsistencies led to disastrous consequences.   
One of the biggest criticisms of the promotion and application of the 
norm of self-determination in the post-war treaties and in the interwar period is 
that it created and increased as much tension as it reduced.  Yet, this criticism is 
misguided.  It is true that the context of the new diplomacy and the growing 
international commitment to self-determination, coupled with the widespread 
popular support for many emerging nations, emboldened nationalist movements 
in Europe and elsewhere.  It is also true that the Wilson and the other 
politicians soon felt frustrated and overwhelmed by the range and number of 
groups that sought international assistance for their movements for reform or 
secession, but, the failure to find practical limits for the application of the 
principle is not an inherent flaw of the concept; it owes more to Wilson’s one-
sided consideration of the concept’s theory and to the conflict that developed 
between the embryonic norm of self-determination and the other pressing 
concerns, both practical and theoretical, arising out of the settlements.   
As posited earlier, Wilson’s interpretation and championing of the 
principle, which was incredibly influential in the interwar period, only examined 
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seriously the side of self-determination associated with national and personal 
liberation and neglected the consideration of what logically defensible, 
normative limits might be placed on the idea.  Wilson and the other leaders of 
the interwar era gave scant attention to establishing norms that might apply 
generally to the type of challenges created by emerging nationalism, failing to 
realise that the ideological and emotional force of identity politics requires not 
only practical but also philosophical constraints.  While security, economic and 
political concerns, to name a few, were understandably and perhaps rightly 
uppermost in the minds of those who negotiated these settlements, the 
promises, statements and support shown for a norm of self-determination raised 
hopes to a level that, when reality did not reach expectations or even seem to 
align with the ideas advanced, the potential impact of the concept was reduced.  
In addition, the faith many held in the idea and in those who espoused it was 
likewise degraded, and opened up the leaders, Wilson especially, to charges of 
inconsistency and insincerity.  
For example, it is difficult to reconcile how Wilson was persuaded by the 
arguments based on self-determination in favour of statehood for Poland, yet 
offered no detailed explanation why the Ruthenes should not be supported 
towards the same end that squared with his democratic interpretation of the 
principle.  It could be contended that the nationalities that formed independent 
states were those that negotiated most effectively and persuasively rather than 
those who were being badly governed and perhaps ‘deserved’ to be independent.  
The lack of consistency led to more acute problems in the future when the 
budding norm of self-determination was not applied uniformly across the peace 
settlements, particularly with regard to Germany.  Unlike the Austro-Hungarian 
or Ottoman Empires that crumbled, the Germans within the atrophied German 
state found their co-nationals dispersed across territories where they were now 
the (often hated) minority.   
 The Saarland represented the most confusing application of self-
determination, as it was overwhelmingly German but held coalfields greatly 
desired by France as compensation for war losses.  Any just application of the 
right of self-determination would have left the Saar region in the hands of the 
German state, settling the question about the coal and reparations through some 
other means.  As it was, the principle was bastardised, and the Saarland was 
placed under League of Nations control and its material wealth sent to France 
and Belgium until a plebiscite was held in 1935 when it was returned to Germany.  
The highly selective application of the emerging norm of self-determination in 
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this situation weakened the idea’s credibility as tool for enhancing democracy 
and well-being internally and increasing stability internationally.76 
Still more damage was suffered when it became clear that the Allied 
powers had no intention of meeting the demands from emerging nations whose 
claims lapped on to their very shores.  As Harold Nicholson relates, the Greek 
delegation made demands for Cyprus based on the principle and noted that ‘it 
[Cyprus] is wholly Greek and under any interpretation of self-determination 
would opt for union with Greece’.  Nicholson, a member of the British 
delegation in Paris felt that Britain would be ‘left in a false moral position if we 
ask everyone else to surrender possessions in terms of self-determination and 
surrender nothing ourselves.  How can we keep Cyprus and express moral 
indignation at the Italians retaining Rhodes?’77  The reply Nicholson received 
from Sir Eyre Crowe, his superior at the Conference, reflects the opinion of 
many at the time: 
 
Nonsense, my dear Nicholson.  You are not being clearheaded.  You 
think that you are being logical and sincere.  You are not.  Would 
you apply self-determination to India, Egypt, Malta and Gibraltar?  If 
you are not prepared to go as far as this, then you have not right to 
claim that you are logical.  If you are prepared to go as far as this, 
then you had better return at once to London.78 
 
The reluctance of the Allied powers to follow the democratic imperatives of self-
determination extended to the division of German and the Ottoman colonial 
holdings, where the Allied countries enjoyed something of a ‘land grab’ following 
the war.  This was somewhat mollified by the creation of the League of Nations’ 
Mandates system, which fitted well with Wilson’s paternalistic view that 
nationalities had to ‘mature’ in order to merit independence.  Under this system, 
self-determination was not so much denied as delayed, as territories were to be 
‘taught’ liberal democratic practices and prepared for decolonisation.79  
However, the Mandates system varied widely and many ‘mandatory powers’, 
which were meant to facilitate the transfer of authority, used the opportunity 
simply to exploit the territories as colonies under the guise of self-
determination. 
In all of these cases, the lack of coherent and logically consistent 
normative limits to self-determination made the practical application of the                                                         
76 For an overview of how self-determination was applied in this limited and problematic fashion 
with respect to Germany, see Heater, National Self-determination, 121-148. 
77 Nicolson, Peacemaking, 200-201. 
78 Nicolson, Peacemaking, 201. It is worth noting that Nicolson immediately conceded this point 
to Crowe. 
79 On the mandates and the League, see Northedge, The League, 192-220 and Heater, National 
Self-determination, 177-205. 
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principle haphazard.  Unfortunately, this problem was further magnified in the 
late 1930s.  One of the major difficulties related to self-determination in the 
1930s was that, by this time for numerous unconnected reasons, the League was 
showing acute signs of rigor mortis.  The Covenant of the League included 
explicit references to self-determination only in the drafting stages, its final 
wording avoiding the term, but the protection of minorities was a firm 
commitment of the Council.  However, the paucity of decisive and rapid action 
by the League made enforcing the treaties a virtual impossibility.  It would be 
fair to say that the failure to enforce minority rights was not a denial of their 
worth as a mechanism to ensure self-determination and the observation of 
human rights, but it did make the exercise and protection of minority nations’ 
right to popular sovereignty limited.80 
By far, one of the most dramatic situations related to self-determination 
during the interwar period, which impacted its evolution greatly, was the Nazi’s 
use of the principle.  As mentioned before, a glaring double standard applied at 
the Paris Peace Conference was the denial of self-determination in Germany and 
for German peoples across Europe.  This, and the Allies’ endorsement of the 
principle of self-determination without any coherent normative limits, played 
into the Nazi’s tactics perfectly as Hitler repeatedly held up these 
inconsistencies as well as the arguments in favour of self-determination put 
forward by his opponents to further his own ends.  While the decision to uphold 
security and other more concrete concerns over self-determination is explicable 
and perhaps understandable in the context of the events, the impact of doing so 
was profound. 
Hitler was able to produce an argument that drew on force and the 
vocabulary of self-determination.  Although he did not always use the exact 
language set out in this study, he explicitly used the term national self-
determination and he constructed an argument that aped the theory of self-
determination outlined in this study.  With regards to the proposed Anschluss or 
union with Austria, which had been barred by the Treaty of Versailles, Hitler 
argued that it was a denial of a cherished democratic right, and his 
denouncement of alleged maltreatment of the Sudetan Germans in 
Czechoslovakia and the Germans of Poland sounded remarkably similar to the 
language used in this study, namely, a violation of their well-being and an 
impingement on their human rights, thereby justifying their emerging 
nationalism.  As the existing minority protection mechanisms had limited results 
at best, the Nazis promoted the cause of their emerging and stranded co-                                                        
80 Macartney, National States, 295-369  
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nationals.  Given the absence of a ready, normative response answer to the 
‘limits’ side of the self-determination conundrum, Hitler was able to 
(mis)interpret and selectively apply the ideological foundations of self-
determination to his advantage in a manner that greatly jeopardised the security 
of Europe and endangered rather than helped to protect human rights and 
democratic freedoms.  In doing so he also tarnished the idea of self-
determination in the eyes of many. 
Wilson’s aim of elevating the concept of self-determination and the 
practices of liberal democracy to the status of international norms met with 
varied success.  The principle, though increasingly accepted as one of the norms 
of international affairs was not seen by all as a right, nor was it global in the sense 
of being universal and applying equally to all, as a right must do.  Moreover, self-
determination was applied in the post-First World War treaties and settlements 
and in the interwar years in a haphazard manner.  Wilson’s interpretation of the 
concept and the norm that began to develop during this time were based on a 
democratic logic and heritage that resonated relatively well with the 
international context that arose from the devastation of the Great War, but 
there was no theoretically consistent or practically uniform means to limit its 
employment as its popularity spread.  When compared to the framework 
outlined in Part I, the evolving norm of self-determination and the international 
responses to emerging nationalism in the interwar years lacked clarity and failed 
to provide sufficient incentives for inclusive politics and humane governance.   
In short, the norm that began to take shape in the post-Versailles world did not 
have sufficient clarity as to the limits that could be placed on its exercise. 
However, it must also be remembered that the conditions following the 
First World War were exceptionally demanding and the challenges that 
emerging nationalism presented added greatly to an already truly complex 
context.  That Wilson and the other politicians of this generation were able to 
balance self-determination to any degree against the array of other political, 
economic and strategic motives and concerns that were operating during the 
peacemaking and after is an accomplishment of note.  Given the need many felt 
to subdue Germany and the real need to concentrate on rebuilding economies 
and societies after the war, and considering the institutional limitations that 
hindered the League in carrying out its lofty goals, it should not be surprising 
that self-determination was interpreted incoherently at times and that responses 
to emerging nationalism were often inconsistent with the liberal democratic 
framework outlined in Part I.   
It is also significant to note that although there was tremendous 
movement in the evolution of the norms related to self-determination during 
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the Paris Peace Conference, the inconsistencies and limitations in its application 
discussed above did not prevent the concept from spreading.  To the contrary, 
self-determination was widely viewed at the time and even during the 
disruptions of the later 1930s as the ‘imperative principle of action’ that Wilson 
thought it needed to be to foster the more liberal democratic system of 
international relations he desired.81  When the post-Versailles international 
system, which aimed at its most ambitious points to outlaw war as an instrument 
of policy, began to fall apart and a new wave of violence culminated in a second, 
truly, world war, the powers opposing the fascist and militarist states, committed 
themselves anew to the idea self-determination.  The nature and the effects of 
this commitment on the system they forged while fighting this war and 
solidified while making the new peace proved to have a deep impact on the 
trajectory of self-determination’s evolution. 
                                                        
81 Some of these attitudes are reviewed in Heater, National Self-determination, 95-120. 
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Chapter 4 
 
From ‘principle’ to ‘right’ - The UN system, the Cold War and the 
‘special case’ of decolonisation 
 
In the interwar years, self-determination was clearly discernable as a 
central if contested principle of international activity and was, in the opinion of 
many, a right.  Yet, it took the shock of another world war (this time an 
indisputably global conflagration) and a corresponding alteration to the 
international community and the context of international affairs to usher in an 
era in which the concept would be universally and explicitly recognized as a 
fundamental norm of international activity.  As self-determination was 
increasingly accepted and its prestige enhanced during this period, these changes 
took place at an uneven pace and only partially resulted in the much-needed 
clarity regarding self-determination’s meaning, application and, particularly, its 
limitations.  
The first section of this chapter seeks to explain how and why, despite 
considerable problems regarding its application during the interwar years, the 
concept of self-determination persisted and became one of the chief pillars of 
the international system that was constructed after the Second World War.  
The development of the United Nations Organisation (UN) was the most 
significant institutionalization of international relations to date and was a far 
greater change to the context of international affairs than the Concert of 
Europe, the Congress system or even the creation of the League of Nations.  For 
the first time, there would be a truly international body in which norms could be 
debated and take shape, transforming lofty ideas into practical policies.  In the 
events and discussions leading up to the creation of the UN, the concept of self-
determination figured prominently, but although its meaning and limits were 
discussed and elucidated far more than they had been in the past, they were still 
some way distant from the normative framework laid out in Part I. 
However, the founding of the UN system played only one part in the 
evolution of self-determination and its transformation into a normative right.  
During the first forty-five years of the UN’s existence, there were two historical 
developments that had a vast impact on the application and, thus, the evolution 
of self-determination: the Cold War and decolonisation.  The two remaining 
parts of this chapter assess the impact of these two protean phenomena on 
emerging nationalism and state fragmentation.   
The Cold War, which arose almost simultaneously with the formation of 
the UN and the decolonisation process, presented the most threatening 
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strategic circumstances in human history and had a pronounced impact on the 
workings of the international community, the interpretation of self-
determination and, consequently, the international responses to emerging 
nationalism.  The Cold War imposed dramatic limitations on the scope and 
application of the concept, yet, paradoxically, it was during the Cold War and in 
part because of it, that self-determination was invoked as a justification and 
served as the propelling force for the granting of independence to nearly two-
thirds of the world’s population.   
The decolonisation process, which formally involved the international 
community at almost every stage, intensely shaped and defined the norm of self-
determination in this period and set precedents that still affect the responses to 
emerging nationalism in the post-Cold War era.  The endorsement of self-
determination for the purposes of decolonisation was remarkably true to the 
intentions of the idea’s earlier proponents such as Wilson, but by invoking the 
right of self-determination, the decolonisers faced all the perennial problems 
associated with trying to create logically coherent and practical limits to its 
application.  The international community’s overt desire to present 
decolonisation as a ‘special case’ and thereby to create limits to the application 
of self-determination will be examined in the last section of this chapter.   
 
(i) The United Nations system and self-determination 
a) The Atlantic Charter and the war-time alliance 
 
The attempt to establish a new international system with a ‘new 
diplomacy’, based on liberal and democratic practices and principles at the end 
of the First World War appeared doomed when Nazi Germany, fascist Italy and 
the militaristic Japanese Empire together discarded even the pretence of acting 
according to such ideas and embarked on a spree of territorial aggrandisement.  
What little interest these powers showed in liberal democratic ideas was when 
they pilfered them for their own benefit.1  However, when the countries 
opposing the violent actions of Germany, Italy and Japan began to consider aims 
that went beyond their immediate strategic survival and contemplated a post-
war world, they immediately embraced many of the ideas that gained 
international recognition in the 1920s, including self-determination.   
                                                        
1 For an account of the Nazi controlled ‘plebiscite’ in Austria, and for Hitler’s use of self-
determination regarding the Sudeten Germans at the Berchtesgarden meeting in 1938, see 
William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), 322-
356 and 357-454.  In the Nazi Party’s first significant statement of policy in 1920, the Twenty-five 
Point Programme [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/document/nca_vol4/1708-ps.htm], ‘the 
right of national self-determination’ is claimed in Point 1, and the rest of the document is 
suffused with the connected ideas of popular sovereignty and national rights.   
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The earliest, explicit consideration of such aims arose from the secret 
meeting between the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill and President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt of the US at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland in August 
1941.  This meeting resulted in a joint declaration later known as the Atlantic 
Charter.  It had not only the immediate effect of formally expressing the aims of 
the United States and the British Empire in the current conflict but also placed 
into the public domain an expression of the ideals on which these two powers 
felt that a just and lasting post-war order ought to be based.  As such, it not only 
served to strengthen the cooperation and shared determination of the two 
countries, it set a normative moral framework for the post-war world to which 
the parties publicly committed themselves.2  
The Atlantic Charter is a brief document, outlining the two countries 
‘shared principles’3, but paragraphs two and three, relate directly to self-
determination, albeit without using the term specifically.  Point two, states 
simply that: ‘they [the US and the UK] desire to see no territorial changes that 
do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned’.  In the 
third paragraph, the Charter states that the two governments ‘respect the right 
of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live; and they 
wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have 
been forcibly deprived of them.’4  
These paragraphs together form a clear endorsement of the ‘self-
determination as democratic self-government’ theory and suggests a 
‘plebiscitary’ interpretation of the theory of self-determination or, as described 
in Part I, an active application of the principle to confer legitimacy on 
sovereignty.  By this, territorial adjustments (or non-adjustments) become 
legitimate only by the will of the people, articulated through some type of vote 
or other similar expression of opinion.  Also clearly behind the declaration is the 
idea that sovereignty lies ultimately with the people of a given political space and 
                                                        
2 It was enhancing the first of these intended effects that most concerned Churchill in August 
1941.  While the ideological vision for the future was indeed significant, the UK government was 
primarily interested in cementing the existing relationship with America and extending 
American commitment to the war effort.  The Atlantic Charter’s emphasis on ideological 
commitment and the absence of a US/UK military alliance explains the dominant British 
perception of the Charter as a ‘flop’ when its terms were revealed upon Churchill’s return to the 
UK.  On this point and the British aims for the Charter see David Reynolds, The Creation of the 
Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41 (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1981), 251-294; and David 
Reynolds, ‘The Atlantic “Flop”: British foreign policy and the Churchill-Roosevelt meeting of 
August 1941’, in David Brinkley and David Facey-Crowther, eds. The Atlantic Charter 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994) 129-150. 
3 ‘Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and Mr. Winston 
Churchill, representing His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom’ [The Atlantic 
Charter] (14 August 1941), in Appendix A. 
4 Emphasis added. 
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that their will should be the basis on which government rests, again fitting in 
neatly with liberal democratic understanding of self-determination.  
While this was not the first time that ideas associated directly with self-
determination appeared in an international declaration or document, the 
significance of its presence within the Atlantic Charter should not be 
underestimated.  The Charter, which was first drafted by Churchill and then 
modified by Roosevelt and then further amended by their respective foreign 
ministries, was specifically aimed at stating the principles on which a post-war 
order was to be created.  When Churchill, at Roosevelt’s suggestion, wrote the 
first draft, he had many objectives in mind.5  He clearly intended to make a bold 
policy statement and later took great pride that the statements and sentiments 
contained were of British derivation.6  However, he was consciously responding 
to the American President’s recent speech in which Roosevelt outlined ‘Four 
Freedoms’ on which any post-war order should be based, and Churchill took 
pains to use language that would seem at one with the President’s well-known 
commitment to liberal and democratic values.7   
As for Roosevelt himself, he was firmly committed to ‘Wilsonian’ 
principles, having been a major proponent of the League and the democratic 
ideas of self-determination and popular sovereignty, but Roosevelt coupled his 
idealism with a strong dose of pragmatism, believing that ideas without 
practicable and realistic limits would be pointless.8  In a letter to Roosevelt’s 
personal representative to Pope Pius XII, Roosevelt noted that self-
determination was ‘the most substantial contribution made by the Versailles 
Treaty’, particularly the practical application of the concept through the use of 
plebiscites.9   
Although not a treaty and thus not a binding international agreement, 
the Atlantic Charter had a great impact almost immediately.  It soon became 
the basis for stated war aims of virtually all the allied combatants as it was co-
opted in a series of international meetings and declarations during 1941 and 1942, 
the most important of which was the Declaration by the United Nations (the 
                                                        
5 See n2 above. 
6 Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance, Vol. III of The Second World War (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1950), 434.  
7 Roosevelt’s ‘four essential human freedoms’ were the ‘freedoms of speech and expression, 
freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear’.  On these, see Frank Donovan, 
Mr. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1966) and Thomas Hoopes 
and Douglas Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the UN (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1997). 
8 See Hoopes and Brinkley, FDR. 
9 Quoted in Ruth Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 
1940-1945 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1958), 43. 
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first time this term was used) on 1 January 1942.10 Thus, even prior to the 
international conferences for the establishment of the United Nations 
Organization at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, there was an endorsement 
of the right of national self-determination.  It is for this reason alone that the 
Atlantic Charter stands out as a major development in the history of the 
concept. 
The bold positioning of self-determination in the Atlantic Charter did 
not prove an isolated iteration.  The adoption in toto of the Atlantic Charter 
within the United Nations Declaration in 1942 ensured that the ideas 
surrounding self-determination would remain in the vocabulary of the 
combatants, but as the post-First World War difficulties with the principle bore 
witness, the idea could have been set aside by appeals to Realpolitik or lost in the 
mix of more immediate and tangible concerns.  As it was, self-determination, 
particularly the passive application and the internal aspect of the principle, 
remained a central idea in almost all of the discussions dealing with the proposed 
post-war order, featuring prominently in each of the summits between heads of 
state and foreign ministers throughout the war.  To be sure, it jockeyed with 
other concerns and norms and on many occasions the principle was intentionally 
ignored out of deference to strategic imperatives.  For example self-
determination was deliberately placed under the table at Dumbarton Oaks (for 
reasons that will be made clear later), but it quickly resurfaced to play a hugely 
significant role at the conference for creating the UN in San Francisco in May 
and June of 1945, with explicit use in the Charter itself and in numerous 
subsequent UN declarations and resolutions.  Throughout the war, even when 
not publically espoused, the concept was a persistent part of the discussion 
between states.   
This raises two important questions.  The first is why did it persist, 
indeed why did it figure so prominently, in the construction of the UN system 
when other considerations and imperatives could have so easily submerged it?  
The answer to this first question is relatively straightforward: the principle had 
become adopted as an expressed or implied norm of virtually every power in the 
United Nations and was wholeheartedly championed by two of the most 
powerful states, the US and the USSR.  Although, as mentioned in Chapter 3, 
the Americans and the Soviets interpreted and sought to apply self-
determination in markedly different terms, they both exerted just enough                                                         
10 The Atlantic Charter was endorsed in full by virtually all of the allied governments in their 
public statements in the months following the publication of the Charter.  For individual 
countries’ statements and the Declaration by the United Nations of 1 January 1942, see Louise 
Holborn, ed. War and Peace Aims of the United Nations, September 1939 – December 31, 1942 (Boston: 
World Peace Foundation, 1943) 
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influence at critical moments to keep the concept central to the discussions 
about the post-war order.  In addition to their efforts, a number of smaller 
and/or less powerful states made impassioned arguments in favour of self-
determination, creating momentum in favour of solidifying the concept as a 
norm in international politics.  Rarely did all these less powerful states champion 
self-determination at the same time or for the same reasons, but equally, rarely 
was it allowed to drift far from the minds of those who designed post-war 
international society and its norms.  
The other question raised by the prominent position of self-
determination in the post-World War II order is whether the framing and 
articulation of the concept was made in such a way that it might result in a more 
philosophically coherent and practically applicable norm than previous 
iterations.  Answering this requires and longer and a less conclusive treatment 
than the first question did; however, in brief, self-determination’s employment 
in the Charter and later declarations, and in the negotiations for crafting of 
these agreements was far more illuminating and more encompassing than that of 
the Versailles era.  As a result, these deliberations were far more mindful of 
practical applicability of such norms than the vague if fulsome support that self-
determination was given in early 1919.  Yet, crucial theoretical difficulties 
remained and a lack of clarity persisted as the normative interpretation of self-
determination evolved during this period.  A close look at the relevant text from 
the documents and the travaux préperatoire of some of the deliberations helps to 
discern more detailed and satisfactory answers to these two important questions. 
 
b) The UN Charter 
 
At the conference held in San Francisco to create the United Nations 
Organization in the summer of 1945, there was a general feeling amongst the 
delegates that some explicit reference to self-determination should be made in 
the Charter.  In the pre-Conference submissions, the Soviet Union had made a 
specific request to the other three sponsoring powers (i.e. Britain, China and the 
United States) and France to modify the Dumbarton Oaks proposals so as to 
place self-determination in the Charter as a guiding principle of the 
organisation.  The Soviet Foreign Secretary, Molotov, had spoken frequently and 
publicly about this and made it clear to the other sponsoring powers that the 
inclusion of self-determination was a matter of great concern to his country.11  A 
number of other lesser powers, including Mexico, had also mentioned the need 
                                                        
11 Russell, United Nations Charter, 811. 
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to include the right of self-determination in the Charter.12  Accordingly, the four 
sponsoring governments tabled an amendment to include self-determination in 
Chapter I of the UN Charter, the section in which the purposes and principles 
of the UN would be stated.  
In the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Chapters I and II defined the 
purposes and principles of the organisation, respectively, with Chapter I, 
paragraph 2 stating that one of the purposes would be: ‘To develop friendly 
relations among nations and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen 
universal peace.’  The proposed amendment changed the text to read: ‘To 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace’.13  A similarly worded amendment to the chapter 
dealing with the proposed Economic and Social Council referring to self-
determination was also tabled by the sponsoring powers.14   
Committee I of Commission I was tasked with the wording of Chapter I 
of the Charter and the delegates worked to provide substance and meaning to 
this newly introduced clause, which proved to be a very important step in the 
concept’s evolution into a norm of the international community.15  For the first 
time, a focused, detailed discussion between representatives of the international 
society of states began on the meaning, limits and role of self-determination, 
aimed at forging a mutual understanding of these points.  In the initial country 
specific position papers on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the generally 
enthusiastic reception that the amendment got is noteworthy, but what is even 
more interesting is the connection immediately made by so many delegates 
between self-determination and human rights.16  The submission of the 
Panamanian government highlighted the intertwined nature of human rights and 
self-determination and called for the creation of a ‘declaration of human rights’ 
that would enshrine self-determination and self-government as  ‘essential human 
rights’.17                                                           
12 United Nations (UN), Documents on the United Nations Conference on International Organization 
(New York: United Nations Information Organization, 1945), Vol. 3, 146-148; see also M. Glen 
Johnson, ‘A magna carta for Mankind: Writing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, in 
M. Glen Johnson and Janusz Symonides, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A History of 
Its Creation and Implementation, 1948-1998 (Paris: UNESCO, 1998), 28-30. 
13 Changes noted in italics. 
14 The new text, later adopted (without any significant debate) as Article 55, reads: ‘With a view 
to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and 
friendly relations among nations based on the respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, the United Nations…’(italics identify the addition). 
15 UN, Documents, Vol. 6, 296. 
16 UN, Documents, Vol. 6, Doc. I/I/215. 
17 UN, Documents, Vol. 6.  Many governments advocated the adoption of a declaration of human 
rights as part of the Charter, but for a host of reasons, the crafting of a declaration was effected 
until 1948.  The inclusion of self-determination and other associated concepts within this 
document is discussed below.  
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In the sixth meeting of the Committee on 15 May 1945, for perhaps the 
first time, representatives of the international society of states discussed the 
applicability and limits implicit within the concept, something that was not 
broached during the Paris Peace Conference or at any previous time for that 
matter by a group of states.  The abiding feeling that emerged from this meeting 
was that self-determination should be understood and promoted as self-
government and that at the heart of the idea was the promotion of the will of 
the governed.  As the minutes of this discussion noted: 
 
Concerning the principle of self-determination, it was strongly 
emphasized on the one side that this principle corresponded closely 
to the will and desires of peoples everywhere and should be clearly 
enunciated in the Chapter…18 
 
The report also charged the new Assembly to be ‘unstinting and painstaking’ in 
creating a declaration of human rights.  The only real dissention to this was the 
renewed appeals of some states to have such rights confirmed and strengthened 
by making the declaration an integral part of the purposes and principles 
chapter.19  As the rapportuer of the subcommittee handling this issue, Farid 
Zeineddine of Syria, later wrote in his official report to the Conference, there 
were few problems with the language or the ideas used:  
 
The Committee understands that the principle of equal rights of 
peoples and that of self-determination are two complementary parts 
of one standard of conduct; that the respect of that principle is a 
basis for the measures to strengthen universal peace; that an essential 
element of the principle in question is a free and genuine expression 
of the will of the people, which avoids cases of the alleged expression 
of the popular will, such as those used for their own ends by Germany 
and Italy in later years.20 
 
This somewhat confusing text does at least clarify the answer to the question of 
why self-determination persisted.  Despite its language, this report as well as the 
related deliberation and submissions all convey the widely felt view that the 
Nazis and their allies had held a valuable principle hostage during the war, and 
that the new international organisation needed to embrace and define it so that 
future abuses could be prevented.  The hope was that the ‘genuine expression of 
popular will’ would be seen as the basis of legitimacy, which, in turn, merited a 
‘respect’ for peoples, something that most delegates felt had been grossly 
violated during the war. 
                                                        
18 UN, Documents, Vol. 6, 296. 
19 UN, Documents, Vol. 6, 296. 
20 UN, Documents, Vol. 6, 396.  
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In this light, the phrase ‘two complimentary parts of one standard of 
conduct’ holds up self-determination of peoples as a force to strengthen world 
order and world peace and not to threaten it.  Moreover, seen within the 
context of other crucial passages of Chapter I of the Charter, it is the universal 
right of self-determination that creates and enforces the sovereign equality of 
states and peoples, a respect for which would be the basis not only for ‘friendly 
relations’ but also for the ‘political independence’ and ‘territorial integrity’ of 
states, as protected in Article 2, paragraphs 4 and 7.  By supporting and defining 
self-determination in this manner, the delegates threw more light on this elusive 
and contested principle than had ever taken place and, at the same time, fixed it 
as part of the context of the new international order they were forging.  The 
connection thus made between self-determination, governmental legitimacy and 
international respect for political independence went far towards shaping the 
clearer and more coherent understanding of self-determination that was outlined 
in Part I.  The reference to self-determination as a right was also a huge step in 
its evolution as a normative concept of the international system.  
However, despite the increased clarity of this connection, the language 
selected was too vague in and of itself to clear up all the controversy surrounding 
the concept, particularly the difficulty concerning the question of who are the 
legitimate holders of the right.  More than one delegate warned of the dangers 
of an open-ended endorsement of the idea, and the representative of Belgium 
made a formal submission to the Committee aimed at narrowing the meaning of 
the term.21  The particular objection concerned the use of the word ‘peoples’ as 
opposed to ‘nation’ or ‘state’, all of which, the Belgian memorandum noted, had 
been used in the Charter might give rise to appeals by nationalities within states 
which, in turn, could spawn intervention from foreign states in support of these 
claims.  After discussing the proposals of the Belgian government, the 
Committee, by a two-thirds majority, rejected the proposed modifications and 
affirmed that ‘what is intended by paragraph 2 is to proclaim the equal rights of 
peoples as such, consequently their right to self-determination.  Equality of 
rights, therefore, extends in the Charter to states, nations and peoples.’22   
Meant to serve as a clarification, this ambiguous point seems to be a 
clarion call to any group hoping to use self-determination to bolster its cause.  
Moreover, the blanket nature of the phrasing introduced more obscurity about 
the legitimate holders of the right instead of the much-needed theoretical and 
practical precision.  In fact, by enhancing the status of the concept to such a 
high plane while at the same time increasing the confusion surrounding its                                                         
21 UN, Documents, Vol. 6, 300. 
22 UN, Documents, Vol. 6, 704. 
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meaning built difficulties into the normative framework under which the idea 
still operates.  
The inclusion of such a potentially expansive interpretation is all the 
more puzzling given that the Committee had already attempted to set out stern 
limits on the application of self-determination.  In the aforementioned 
discussions on 15 May when the Committee pushed strongly to have self-
determination enunciated in the Charter, they added the caveat that ‘the 
principle conformed to the purposes of the Charter only insofar as it implied the 
right of self-government of peoples and not the right of secession.’23   
Leaving aside for the moment the logical, historical and ethical problems 
associated with an outright ban on secession that were considered in Chapter 2, 
the Committee’s recommended text was taken up by the Coordination 
Committee, which was charged with confirming the final wording of the 
Charter.  In this Committee’s somewhat confused exchanges, it was at least clear 
that inclusion of self-determination was desired, but its exact meaning, the 
legitimate holders of the right and its limits remained elusive.  The Committee’s 
deliberations and the public statements of many powers including the United 
States and the Soviet Union reveal that the ban on secession was only half-
heartedly endorsed.  As will be discussed in the section on decolonisation below, 
at the same time that self-determination was written into Articles 1(2) and 55 of 
the Charter on the understanding that states should remain intact, the delegates 
were negotiating another amendment to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, a 
chapter on non-self-governing territories and, in so doing, many sought to 
extended self-determination to ‘peoples’ who sought secession from ‘alien rule’.24 
Thus, despite the fact that the Charter set self-determination as a 
normative principle and despite the limited success in contextualising the 
concept within a larger system of international priorities and concerns, self-
determination remained both a contested and a popular notion, at once 
promoted and not fully understood.  Nonetheless, as Aureliu Cristescu, the UN 
Special Rapporteur charged with examining the history of self-determination 
within the UN system, wrote in 1981, its incorporation into the UN Charter 
marked ‘not only the legal recognition of the principle…but also the point of 
departure of a new process – the increasing dynamic development of the 
principle and its legal content, its implementation and its application to the 
most varied situations of international life.’25 
                                                        
23 UN, Documents, Vol. 6, 296. 
24 UN, Documents, Vol. 10, 428ff. 
25 Aureliu Cristescu, The Right to Self-determination: Historical and Current Development on the Basis of 
United Nations Instruments E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev. 1 (New York: United Nations, 1981), 18. 
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During the creation of the Charter, many countries and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) pleaded for and laboured to promote 
human rights.  These efforts culminated in demands for the drafting and 
inclusion of an ‘international bill of human rights’ within the Charter.26  While 
widespread agreement in principle was achieved, the time needed to craft an 
effective and workable bill of rights within the Charter was not available.  
However, over the next twenty years, as the three documents that eventually 
made up the International Bill of Rights - the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) in 1948, and the International Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1966 
- were hammered out, the international community made significant 
enhancements to the scope and meaning of self-determination as a norm, 
transforming it from a ‘vital principle’ to a ‘sacred right’ of the international 
system.  Moreover, placing self-determination firmly within the context of 
human rights was also a significant and long-reaching decision, as it rooted self-
determination within a system of beliefs that was becoming increasingly 
universal and unassailable.  This process also helped in the long run to provide 
greater clarity over the limits and the holders of the right that had eluded the 
drafters of the Charter. 
Despite this ambiguity over self-determination, the wording of the 
Charter had reflected well the growing centrality of human rights in the thinking 
of the victors of the Second World War.  There were seven explicit references 
to human rights in the Charter and the pressure to incorporate a comprehensive 
bill of rights within the Charter was considerable and nearly sufficient to force 
the issue before the delegates at that time.27  However, the matter was passed on 
to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which in its first meeting in 
1946 created a smaller committee (the Nuclear Committee) and mandated that 
they consider the creation of ‘an international bill of rights, …international 
declarations or conventions on civil liberties, …the protection of minorities 
…[and] any other matter concerning human rights not covered…’28.   
This charge was problematic in that it left open the door as to both 
content and to procedure.  The central question revolved around whether a 
more general declaration would be created separately from a more detailed, 
binding covenant.  In the nearly two years that the Nuclear Committee took to                                                         
26 For more on the pressures placed on the UN to adopt a bill of fundamental human rights, see 
Johnson, ‘A magna carta’, 19-32.   
27 Johnson, ‘A magna carta’, 30-32. 
28 ECOSOC directions to the Nuclear Committee (1946) quoted in Johannes Morsink, The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 13. 
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draft the Universal Declaration, a division appeared between the mass of smaller 
states who, on the whole, advocated the ‘binding covenant’ approach and the 
larger states, most notably the US and the USSR, who backed the ‘declaration’ 
method.  A compromise of sorts played out over nearly three decades in which, 
in succession, the Universal Declaration and the two International Covenants, 
were drafted and ratified.  Self-determination, nationality, identity and 
sovereignty were all discussed throughout the drafting and figure greatly in each 
of these documents.  For the first time, states worked together in a structured 
international context to face the theoretical and practical questions of how to 
reconcile a group right (self-determination) within a theoretical framework of 
individual rights operating as a norm for a system of sovereign states.  Taking 
this step was fraught with difficulties and challenges, especially given that most 
states involved were not aware they were taking this step and many who were 
aware were resistant!  As with the creation of the Charter, the debates, drafts 
and final documents are all significant signposts in the evolution of the norm of 
self-determination.   
 
c) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
The first of these steps was the creation of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) between 1946 and 1948, and while the term ‘self-
determination’ was never directly used in this document, a major and long-
lasting step in the interpretation of the concept took place.  It was the first 
occasion that nationality, popular sovereignty and democratic government were 
explicitly linked with human rights, and human rights and firmly fixed as the 
basis for the workings of the international community.  Doing so, even while 
avoiding the explicit use of the phrase ‘self-determination’, went far to moving 
the international community’s normative framework closer to that advocated in 
Part I and, thereby reducing some of the theoretical inconsistencies that had 
existed in the past.   
In the text of the UDHR, the clearest references to nationality and to 
other Primary Identity Forming Groups (PIFGs) come in Articles 2 and 15.29  
Article 15 declares that ‘Everyone has the right to a nationality’ and that no one 
may be deprived of their nationality arbitrarily.  On the surface, this article is an 
endorsement of nationality as a protected category, suggesting that a multi-
national state has a duty to protect individuals who collectively constitute a 
national group.  To an extent, this is an accurate interpretation, but a closer 
                                                        
29 The full text is in Appendix B. 
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examination of the drafting process reveals that a more complex analysis is 
needed.   
When writing this article, the states participating were responding 
particularly to the policies of the Nazis that stripped German citizenship from 
Jews, Gypsies and Slavs within the Reich owing simply to their ethnic heritage, 
judging that such practices left individuals ‘naked in the world of international 
affairs’.30  The clear intention the article was thus to ensure inclusiveness within 
a state’s legal definition of citizenship so as to avoid the creation of 
‘statelessness’, which was recognized as a legitimate problem, but no acceptable 
wording could be hammered out beyond a somewhat vague protection of 
‘nationality’. However, it is clear is that the delegates were really referring to 
‘citizenship’ when they were crafting Article 15 and not nationality as national 
identity.31 
Nonetheless, there was significant pressure to force states to be more 
inclusive or at least non-discriminatory.  As Morsink notes, ‘it is mostly due to 
[the Soviet Union’s] persistence that [non-discrimination] is so prominent a 
feature in the document.  More than any other voting bloc the communists 
pushed from the very start for the inclusion of clear antidiscrimination language 
in the Declaration.’32  A prime (and hugely important) example of this is the 
Soviet amendment to Article 2 to include the term ‘national origin’ into the list 
of categories meriting explicit reference along with ‘race’ and ‘colour’.  The 
linkage of national origin with race and colour was intended to broaden the 
protections to the individual members of ethnic and other minority groups 
within states.33  During the committee debates, there was a lengthy exchange 
about the meaning of the phrase, and the Australian delegate, McNamara, 
argued that it meant nationality (in the sense of citizenship), but that it might 
also have a wider meaning, including ethnicity (though, of course, that term was 
not yet in common parlance).   
Critically, the Soviet delegate made an impassioned statement to clarify 
the suggested link between the terms.  In response to the suggestion by Shafiq, 
the Iranian expert, that the term ‘ethnic’ replace ‘national’, Borisov, the Soviet 
representative, rejected the idea.  While Morsink calls Borisov’s reasons for 
opposing the change ‘unclear’, a closer reading of the debates yields another, 
more plausible interpretation.  Borisov states that ‘within that same nationality 
                                                        
30 Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 80. 
31 See the review of the debates, including the extensive quotations of the delegates in Morsink, 
The Universal Declaration. 
32 Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 93. 
33 This is an opinion that Morsink endorses strongly on 103-104. 
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there could be different origins.’34  Far from being unclear or confusing, this 
response reflects a conceptualisation of nationality that is permeable and not 
defined exclusively by a specific ethnicity even if it is that of the majority of a 
state’s population, which is a central idea within the Soviet understanding of 
nationality.35  
Most representatives agreed that nationality involved more than mere 
legal rights and that it was qualitatively different from citizenship.  To clarify 
this, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the 
Protection of Minorities in its deliberations approved the Soviet amendment to 
Article 2, which stated ‘that “national origin” should be interpreted by taking 
this conception, not in the sense of citizen of a State, but in the sense of 
“national characteristics”, in other words, in the sense of ‘nationality’36.  While 
the Sub-Commission did not elaborate on the matter in the same manner as the 
Soviet delegation, it is clear that they intended Article 2 to protect nationality 
per se, as means of shielding individual members of that nationality from the 
actions of a state.  In so doing, the Sub-Commission forced the debate onto the 
issue of group rights and their relation to human rights.   
These issues were first addressed by the Nuclear Committee as it began 
its work on the text proposed by John D. Humphrey, the Canadian legal expert 
and Director of the Human Rights Division of the UN Secretariat, who 
influenced much of the wording of the Declaration.37  His draft contained the 
following passage: 
 
These rights are limited only by the equal rights of others. Man also 
owes duties to society, through which he is enabled to develop his 
spirit, mind and body in wider freedoms.38  
 
This emphasizes individuals as opposed to collectives (e.g. ‘rights are limited 
only’), yet it clearly states that duties flow from these rights not only to other 
individuals but also to groups (e.g. ‘man also owes duties…’).  However, and this is 
critical, individuals owe duties to groups because such groups ‘enable’ individuals 
to enjoy ‘wider freedoms’ and achieve individual fulfillment.  As this text was 
                                                        
34 The debates are quoted in great detail by Morsink whose comments follow on 104, supra. 
35 See Chapter 3, (iii) and the discussion in the latter part of this Chapter for more on the Soviet 
interpretation of nationality and self-determination. 
36 Quoted in Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 103. 
37 A short but highly effective discussion of Humphrey and the other key figures of the Nuclear 
Committee is found in M. Glen Johnson and Janusz Symonides, eds. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: A History of its Creation and Implementation (Paris: UNESCO, 1998). 
38 Quoted in Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 244. 
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discussed, there was a general belief that ‘society’ was essential to human growth 
and virtually none of the delegates dissented.39   
However, this left unanswered the question of what groups were ‘of 
worth’, what relation they had to individuals, and whether there was a clear 
hierarchy of these rights, like that outlined in Chapter 1.  This was further 
complicated when later amendments changed the wording to what became its 
final form, including a switch from ‘a’ to ‘the community’ and the addition of 
word ‘alone’ to qualify the space in which an individual might develop.40  This 
implies the existence of only one community, and suggested to some delegates 
that this meant only the community fostered by a state, thereby leaving no place 
to reconcile allegiance to a nationality, or any other PIFG other than the one 
that is dominant in a given state.41   
Many delegates and groups expressed problems with the proposed 
wording, including the American Federation of Labor, which stated that ‘[t]he 
State has no good other than the good of its individual members, present and 
prospective – its supreme test is the way in which it provides for the full and free 
development of each individual.’42  Charles Malik, the delegate from Lebanon, 
spoke in a similar vein.  He stated that the state represented the greatest threat 
to an individual in the modern age, and Malik placed the rights of the individual 
above the state as well as above other communities to which he believed a 
person might have duties.  As he argued, ‘[r]eal freedom sprang from the loyalty 
of the individual not to the state but to these intermediate forms’.  Malik 
himself mentioned national and ‘social’ groups as examples of this type of 
community, however, he went on to add that ‘the human person is more 
important than the racial, national or other groups to which he may belong’ and 
that ‘the social groups to which the individual belongs may like the human 
person himself may be wrong or right; the person alone is the judge’.43 
Taken together, these statements reflect the concept of duties owed to a 
PIFG and to a state as well as the hierarchy of rights outlined in Part 1.  While 
these ideas and the theory behind them were not accepted by all in their 
entirety, the desire to support human rights, to acknowledge the worth and 
importance of groups other than a state to individuals, and the strong desire to 
protect the individual from the state resulted in some significant changes in the                                                         
39 A few delegates pointed out that there were other sources that contributed to personal growth 
besides the ‘community’, but this view did not prevail, despite the backing of the United States. 
See Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 246-8. 
40 The various amendments that led to this change are quoted and discussed at length in 
Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 244-248. 
41 Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 269-270. 
42 Quoted on Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 242, emphasis in original. 
43 All quotations are reprinted in Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 242. 
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draft text.  The passage was eventually moved to the end of the document so as 
to use a physical separation of the text to make a theoretical separation of the 
rights held by individuals from their corresponding duties.44  Additionally, the 
text itself was altered, taking its final form as Article 29:   
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and 
full development of his personality is possible. 
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for 
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic 
society. 
The new second paragraph in particular highlights the type of limitations on 
rights that are in keeping with the hierarchy of rights outlined in Chapter I, as 
individual rights are balanced with not only the rights of individuals but also by 
the need to ensure the ‘general welfare’, thereby indicating that individual rights 
are supreme but not un-checked, and that ‘democratic society’ must play a part 
in the determination of these legal limits.  The meaning and implication of 
‘democratic society’ is still contentious today and was hotly debated at the time, 
but to understand this phrase in context, whether it amounted to the 
establishment of hierarchy of rights, and how this affected the ideas behind self-
determination, it is necessary to draw attention to the connected use of the term 
‘democracy’ in Articles 2, 21 and 29.45 
Proposals to introduce the word ‘democracy’ into the Declaration were 
mentioned at a many points, and the original Soviet sponsored phrase was for 
‘democratic State’ in Article 2 (later 29), but many different takes on this were 
floated.  All parties made clear that the idea of democracy was a central and 
necessary element in the struggle for human rights.  Unfortunately, the Cold 
War debates over the meaning of ‘democracy’ and ‘state’ and over who was the 
‘true champion’ of democracy soon developed.  The Soviet Union’s delegate, in 
an attempt to defend his country’s proposed wording, pointed out that: 
 
notions of the State and democratic society were embodied in the 
documents signed during the war. …In modern democracy, the State 
was not a power imposed on society by force.  It was the product of 
the society which had unfortunately in some cases detached itself 
from the society from which it had sprung and had come to 
dominate and oppress that society [a dig at the West]…[Soviet 
                                                        
44 For the debates on how and why the move occurred, see Morsink, 244-246.  
45 See Appendix B for the full text. 
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democracy] was true democracy: the right to participate in 
government.46 
 
Despite the rhetoric, the assertion that human rights, duties to the state and 
self-government were fundamentally connected was universally supported.   
The French representative moved to change the wording to ‘democratic 
government’, and defined such a government as being that which secured human 
rights.47  This wording almost exactly makes the theoretical connections 
discussed in Chapter 2 between state sovereignty, legitimacy, democracy, human 
rights and duties.  The warm reception this interpretation received suggests that 
the international community, though its representatives, might have been 
moving even closer the theoretical framework outlined in Part I, although the 
suggested text was not, ultimately, approved.  ‘Democratic society’ won out in 
the end over the objections of the Soviet delegate and others.  The deciding 
factor seems to have been the desire by the majority of states to place the 
imperatives of individual human rights above the desires and needs of the state.  
As A.M. Newlands of New Zealand put it, to give into the Soviet wording would 
give the state ‘an escape clause’ by which a state could argue that it was only via 
the state that individuals could thrive, which was, in brief, the kernel of the 
communist argument.  Many delegates joined her in this reasoning, agreeing that 
human rights were superior to the duty of the state to maintain order.48 
As a consequence of this, the debate moved on to the question of 
whether such commitments implied or even necessitated representative 
government and how popular sovereignty should be applied in the text. The 
debate centered on the proposed text for Article 21, which confirmed the right 
of participation in the government of the state.49  What is striking is that there 
was essentially no opposition to the article’s inclusion.  The debate turned to 
details such as the frequency of ‘free’ elections and whether secret ballots should 
be required.  The Cuban and Iraqi delegates attempted to include as many 
people in the electorates of states as possible by moving to insert words such as 
‘everyone’ and ‘plebiscite’ into the text.  While the more constrained language 
endured, the intent of the drafters is clear: they sought to endorse and promote 
popular sovereignty as a basis for legitimacy and tried place a commitment to 
the protection and promotion of human rights at the core of any well-
functioning democracy. 
The widespread commitment to such moves even led some to ask 
whether Articles 2 and 21, when taken together, created and necessity for an                                                         
46 Quoted on Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 64. 
47 Quoted on Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 64. 
48 Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 65. 
49 See Appendix B. 
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inclusive, multi-party democracy to ensure rights were protected for all citizens.  
Lord Dukeston, the UK representative posited that this may well be the case 
and that the Soviet insistence that only a one-party, communist government 
could ensure vigorous human rights protection should be rejected.50  Others felt 
that even a multi-party democracy might not be sufficient to reflect the will of 
the governed if neither the rights of petition and rebellion nor the rights of 
minority groups were addressed in the document. 
As for redress and rebellion, these two issues are central to self-
determination and secession and many delegates connected them to human 
rights, seeking to limit state authority to account for this.  The right to petition 
was introduced and heavily supported by many as originally worded: ‘Everyone 
has the right, either individually or in association with others, to petition the 
government of his State or the United Nations for redress of grievances.’51  The 
proposed text recognized that a state had an obligation not only to hear the 
demands of its individual citizens but also of groups of likeminded individuals 
within its borders.  Many, like Carrera Andrade, the delegate from Ecuador, felt 
that since many liberal democracies had such provisions in their constitutions 
that ‘[i]t was essential to raise to the international plane a right which was an 
integral part of the democratic faith…’.52  Interestingly, while this reasoning was 
not denied by any delegates, they expressed worries that were two-fold: that a 
right of rebellion for colonial ‘peoples’ would fragment empires, and that the 
right to petition the United Nations carried with it immense practical 
difficulties.  Before the depths of the first (and more juicy) issue were fully 
explored, the administrative challenges related to appeals to the UN resulted in 
the striking of the whole sentence, despite the widespread belief that such a 
right existed and should be included in the Declaration. 
Perhaps less explicable is how the right of rebellion, which was far more 
controversial, appeared in the final text of the UDHR, albeit in the Preamble 
and only by implication.  Morsink rightly notes that the ‘right to rebellion was 
special because on its surface it does not really seem to be a right an individual 
could have.’  To explain, Morsink usefully draws on Thomas Paine’s comment 
that in a revolt an individual ‘throws into the common stock as a member of 
society.’53  In the debates over Article 21, suggestions were made to include a link 
to rebellion as a means of ensuring the democratic will of the people was the 
basis of government, an ultimate guarantee as it were.  As Alberto Canas, the 
Costa Rican delegate stated ‘that if the right to oppose the government was not                                                         
50 For this quotation and the surrounding debate, see Morsink, 112.  
51 Quoted in Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 303. 
52 Quoted in Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 305. 
53 Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 307-308. 
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added to the right of participation in government “all human rights would be 
lost.  The Nazi and fascist governments – like all tyrannies – had been able to 
deprive the people of all fundamental human rights precisely because they had 
first deprived them of the basic right to oppose the government.”’54   
However, the plan to include an explicit statement of a right to rebellion 
was not widely supported.  Most delegations saw this as too potentially 
destabilizing, as it might give encouragement to any group, national or 
otherwise, that sought to overthrow a legitimate government. The compromise 
that emerged was for a statement in the Preamble, which takes the following 
shape: 
 
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have 
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, 
that human rights should be protected by the rule of law… 
 
While the wording may seem an endorsement of sorts of the right to rebel, the 
placement of the text in the Preamble and not in the text of Article 21 is a 
reflection of the grudging support it received as well as the unease with its 
possible effects that the drafters felt.  Nonetheless, the inclusion of such 
wording is indicative of an acceptance of a key concept related to self-
determination.  The statement at least acknowledges that the likely practical 
outcome of tyrannical oppression is rebellion, and a more accurate assessment 
would be that states have a primary duty to protect human rights and that gross 
failure to do so might lead citizens to make use of the ultimate protection they 
have at their disposal.   
The question of specific protections for minority PIFG rights, which 
many delegates felt was essential, was frequently and passionately taken up, and 
an article was in fact proposed and approved.  Thus it is strange and complicated 
story to relate how the article fell by the wayside and did not appear in the final 
text.  In the draft prepared by Humphrey, an article (mostly formulated by the 
legal scholar Hersh Lauterpacht and approved by the Sub-Commission on 
Minorities), created explicit limitations on a state’s power over its citizens by 
delineating specific duties owed to minorities.  It stated that, in any state with a:  
 
substantial number of persons of race, language or religion other than 
those of the majority of the population, persons belonging to such 
ethnic, linguistic, or religious minorities shall have the right, as far as 
compatible with public order and security to establish and maintain 
schools and cultural or religious institutions and to use their own 
languages in the Press, in public assembly and before the courts and 
other authorities of the State.55                                                          
54 Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 308. 
55 Quoted in Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 272. 
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The only country with strong opposition to its inclusion was the United 
States, though other countries saw that its inclusion might necessitate wider 
discussions about minorities as distinct from sub-state PIFGs.  The Byelorussian 
delegate suggested that the article might need broadening to include matters of 
‘territorial autonomy’ for minority groups.56  In the drafting sessions, the chair, 
Eleanor Roosevelt representing the US, unsuccessfully attempted to delete the 
entire article twice.  However, the ensuing debate became convoluted and the 
French expert, Prof. Cassin, withdrew the article so that it could be ‘held over’ 
for future discussions.  The article disappeared, despite even more dramatic 
discussions before the full ECOSOC session, where again, despite general 
approval of the idea, no acceptable formulation could be brought to a vote for 
inclusion in the Declaration.57  These events illustrate how in the drafting of the 
UDHR the perennial problems associated with self-determination surfaced and 
trumped the vigorous and determined efforts of many states to address fully and 
completely the implications of the concept, particularly with regard to the limits 
of its exercise.  Despite the omission of a specific reference to minority rights, it 
should be noted that many delegates felt that Articles 2, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22 and 2758 
already contained fundamental protections that would apply to all members of a 
society, whether in the majority or minority, and that these articles ensured 
their ability to achieve meaningful participation in the life of the state in which 
they found themselves. 
Looking at the UDHR through its drafting and in its final form, a less 
than clear picture emerges related to self-determination.  Firstly, it has to be 
noted that although self-determination played a crucial role in the drafting 
process, the term never appears in the text.  It could be argued that this is not 
surprising given that self-determination is a right exercised by groups and not 
individuals, who were more properly the subject of the UDHR.  However, parts 
of the International Covenants and later documents crafted by the United 
Nations employ the phrase, and the term’s absence in a document that draws so 
heavily on so many of the conceptual touchstones related to self-determination 
begs the question as to why it was not simply used. 
The best answer is that it was a combination of two factors.  The first is 
that most of the states participating in the creation of the UDHR were deeply 
concerned about the likely practical implications of including self-determination 
as an explicitly stated right in a normative document such as this.  Many of the                                                         
56.Quoted in Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 272. 
57 These sessions are covered in great depth in Morsink, The Universal Declaration, 273-280. 
58 See Appendix B. 
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major powers involved had colonies or were only just beginning to decolonise 
and many states without colonies feared that explicitly conferring rights to 
PIFGs, let alone a right of national self-determination, would lead directly to 
secession and state fragmentation, something from which the implied right of 
rebellion in the Preamble steers very clear.  Regardless of whether a right to 
rebellion implicitly exists in the UDHR, the Preamble was written so as to 
permit only reform or revolution within an existing state and not withdrawal.  
Given the membership of the UN at the time, and particularly given the absence 
of the soon to be independent Asian and African countries, the non-inclusion of 
self-determination in an explicit form that took on fully these issues is not that 
surprising.   
The second factor that might explain self-determination’s explicit 
absence has more to do with contextual understandings of the theory than with 
the more immediate practical outcomes of including it.  As we have seen, the 
UDHR and the travaux préparitoire are littered with commitments and 
references to ‘democracy’, ‘popular sovereignty’, ‘nationality’ and a human rights 
foundation of state legitimacy, all of which are critical to the construction of a 
normative framework for a right of self-determination.  Yet, actually making the 
connections necessary to affect this was not possible at this moment in time, as 
these terms still meant different things to the states involved, especially the 
most powerful ones.  While there was frequently agreement about the 
importance and value of the terms, there was far less about their meaning and 
even less about how they might fit together.  The sharp and often bitter 
exchanges noted above reflect only a taste of the differing understandings 
related to concepts that, the superpower blocs championed.59  Given that the 
international community was still in the midst of a massive contextual shift, 
resulting in a much greater formalization and institutionalization of relations, it 
is not surprising that compromise and consensus, essential for establishing 
norms, eluded the diplomats.  We are thus left with only a crude outline of a 
normative right to self-determination, which is found by piecing together 
conceptual fragments.  Nonetheless, these fragments represent another 
enormous change in the evolution of the concept. 
Following the approval of the UDHR in 1948, the ECOSOC began the 
task of developing a more detailed, legally binding elaboration of the 
Declaration. This soon evolved into two Covenants: The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) which were                                                         
59 These disagreements are taken up in detail in section (ii), below. 
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drafted in the early-1950s, ratified in 1966 and entered into force in 1976.60  As 
with the drafting of the UDHR, the travaux préparitoire for the Covenants reveal 
much about the understanding of self-determination at that time as well as how 
this interpretation shaped the trajectory of the concept. 
 
d) The International Bill of Rights 
 
The first reference to self-determination in the Covenants appeared in a 
draft proposed in 1949 by the Soviet Union.61  This proposal was initially 
dropped but resurfaced later in 1950 at the insistence of a number of states.  
Once self-determination resurfaced, the lines of debate focused around four key 
questions: whether self-determination was a ‘principle’ or a ‘right’; if it was 
properly located within covenants protecting individual human rights; who could 
legitimately exercise self-determination, specifically, whether it was limited to 
non-self-governing ‘peoples’ or whether it also applied to ‘peoples’ within 
existing states; and, lastly, what, if any, legal limits or organisational mechanisms 
could or should be set up to manage and control the application of self-
determination.   
The first of these four questions reflected the sharp and growing division 
between, on the one hand, the communist bloc and the recently independent 
countries, such as India and Pakistan, and, on the other, those states who at the 
time still held colonies (e.g. Belgium, France and the UK) and their allies, most 
notably the United States.  Eleanor Roosevelt, who represented the United 
States on the Third Committee as the Covenants were first drafted, noted that 
the US had no argument against the principle of self-determination or its 
appearance in the text as such.  In fact, she took pains to stress that the US 
supported it greatly in theory and in practice, and the representative from the 
United Kingdom seconded this approach to the concept.62  Although the US 
and the UK pushed for this interpretation, their efforts were somewhat half-
hearted, perhaps because they sensed the changing world-view of the concept.   
Despite the fact that Article 1(2) of the Charter refers to self-
determination of peoples as a ‘principle’ rather than as a ‘right’ and despite the 
fact that the UDHR had not mentioned self-determination explicitly in any 
fashion, the muted support for this interpretation of self-determination shows 
how world opinion had begun to shift.  There was extremely strong support for a 
‘right’ of self-determination, particularly from the Soviet Union and its satellite                                                         
60 These form, respectively, Appendix C and D. 
61 See Antonio Cassese, ‘The Self-determination of Peoples’ in Louis Henkin, ed., The 
International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1981), 92. 
62 UN, A/C.3/SR.310 (1950) and A/C.3/SR.402 (1952). 
  125 
states and, not surprisingly, from the newly independent countries such as India, 
the Philippines and Egypt.  Instead of pursuing what increasingly looked like an 
anachronistic line, the states still holding colonies and the US tended to 
highlight the difficulties that a less measured approach to the concept might 
entail.63  Nonetheless, this small change of wording, the outcome of an 
exceptionally brief debate on what was regarded by most participants as a minor 
point related to self-determination, reflects a singular milestone in the evolution 
of the concept.  This was the first time that self-determination is expressed 
explicitly as a right within a binding treaty governing the action of states that 
were party to it.  It is to this draft article of the ICCPR and to this moment in 
time that one could reasonably point to date the emergence of the right of self-
determination as a peremptory norm of international relations.   
The acceptance of the ‘right’ of self-determination was momentous; 
however, that its acceptance was so matter-of-fact and achieved with minimal 
dissent is also striking.  Perhaps this indicates that world opinion about self-
determination had already shifted, and that the greatest support for the concept 
was now located in states where it had not originated.  Whatever the case, the 
speedily achieved consensus to include a ‘right’ of self-determination in the draft 
Covenant was not matched by a similarly speedy agreement about the meaning 
and implications of the right.  However, the debates that unfolded over the next 
four years as the Covenants took shape provided a heightened degree of mutual 
understanding of the concept. 
How self-determination, which most felt was a collective right, fit 
together with human rights was questioned frequently while drafting the 
Covenants.  This first came up when the US and other countries asked whether 
the Third Committee, which focused on human rights issues, was the 
appropriate body to deal with matters related to self-determination.64  While 
the US and others raised this issue principally to divert discussion away from 
affirming a ‘right’ of self-determination (for reasons discussed above) and while 
the competence of the Third Committee to discuss the matter was never 
seriously challenged, several other delegations sought to clarify the status of 
what they felt was clearly a ‘group’ right within the framework of individual 
rights.   
The representative from Turkey pointed out that there were three types 
of rights: individual rights, ‘rights recognized to groups of individuals and 
exercised by groups of individuals’, and the rights of nations.65  This tripartite                                                         
63 See below. 
64 UN, A/C.3/SR.310, 311 and 312 (1950). 
65 UN, A/C.3/SR.310 (1950). 
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division of rights was at least tacitly accepted by most other states, and many 
saw an interconnectedness of these rights.  For example, the Yugoslavian 
representative noted that the right of people to self-determination was an 
individual right but one that was ‘enjoyed collectively’ much like religion and the 
right to live under a democratic regime, and the Ukrainian representative asked 
how individual rights could be secure if individuals, acting collectively, could not 
determine their own fate in their own form of government.66  The representative 
from Mexico felt ‘the right of peoples to self-determination was certainly the 
attribute of collectivity, but that collectivity was composed of individuals.  To 
make an attempt on their collective rights was the same thing as to violate their 
individual freedoms.’67 In the boldest and most blunt statement on this point, 
the Byelorussian delegate noted that if the right of self-determination was not 
recognized ‘all individual rights would cease to exist’.68   
These comments reflect the view that although self-determination is 
inherently a group right, it is connected fundamentally to all individual rights 
owing to its function as a guarantee of responsive government and democracy.  
This interpretation moves close to the hierarchy of rights as well as towards the 
understanding of the duties of states towards all citizens outlined in Part I, but 
it lacks the kind of definitive statement about the relative moral worth or legal 
standing of group rights and individual rights that would have secured this. 
However, in the preamble to the ICCPR, the second paragraph expresses that 
human rights have their origin in natural laws and not just in international law, 
the result of an insertion made by the Australian government.69  By noting that 
human rights are inherent, and, moreover, by tracing them to the dignity of 
individuals, this insertion locates the origin of the idea of human rights within 
the liberal democratic tradition and it implies a primacy of individual rights over 
and above those exercised by a group, again moving closer to the framework 
suggested in Part I.  
As the drafting process continued, the drive to include the right of self-
determination grew and the efforts to clarify further the holders of and limits to 
the right continued.  In late-1952, the decision was made to split what was 
originally intended to be one Covenant into two70 and what was to become 
Article 1 of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR now included the following 
wording:                                                         
66 UN, A/C.3/SR.399 (1952). 
67 UN, A/C.3/SR.311 (1950). 
68 UN, A/C.3/SR.311 (1950). 
69 Manfred Nowak, The UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kiel, 
Germany: N.P. Engle Publishers, 1993), 2-3. 
70 UN, A/C.3/SR.360, 361(1951) and 371 (1952). 
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1. All peoples and all nations shall have the right of self-
determination, namely, the right freely to determine their 
political, economic, social and cultural status.71 
 
Other references to self-determination were included in other draft proposals 
for the ICCPR and the ICESCR, but despite the agreed changes and shared 
understandings that all this represented, there was deep uncertainty about the 
details entailed within the passages.  Some states pointed out that including the 
right to self-determination prior to its key precepts being clearly defined might 
be detrimental to the overall process of enhancing individual rights, but this 
objection did not carry the day.72   
Once again, the perennial issues associated with self-determination raised 
their heads, and none was bigger than the question of what groups could 
legitimately exercise this right, and, more specifically, what were the 
implications if ‘nations’ (present in the 1952 draft article) as opposed to or in 
addition to other PIFGs within a state were legitimate possessors.  In 1952 
during the Third Committee’s discussions on this question, the Chilean 
representative attempted to provide greater precision, suggesting different cases 
in which the right of self-determination of peoples might apply: states that had 
lost their ability to exercise this right due to aggression, ‘highly developed 
peoples’ who had not yet exercised their right to self-determination (presumably 
colonies), and the like. 73  It was also put forward that the term ‘peoples’ referred 
to those groups that did not yet form independent states and were under 
colonial control.  Others noted that ‘peoples’ should be interpreted to mean 
large national groups and that ‘the right of self-determination should be granted 
only to those who made a conscious demand for it; and that peoples who are 
politically undeveloped should be placed under the protection of the 
international trusteeship system, which would prepare them for the exercise of 
the right to self-determination’.  Still others felt that the reference to ‘nations’ 
was important as this gave greater clarity as to which groups had a legitimate 
claim to the right of self-determination, as only nations had the requisite 
political development to hold the right. 74   
Given this degree of uncertainty, many members of the Human Rights 
Commission concluded that a study should be made to determine exactly the 
content of the right, and they noted that ‘the Commission would be failing in its 
task if it merely kept on repeating, in one way or another, that peoples had the                                                         
71 UN, E/2256 (1952). 
72 UN, E/2256 (1952). 
73 UN, A/C.3/SR.399 (1952). 
74 UN, E/2256 (1952). 
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right to self-determination, and did not study those problems which, once 
elucidated, should make it possible to transfer the whole problem from the 
theoretical stage to that of practical application.’  It was also suggested that the 
Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of 
Minorities should study the relationship between minorities and self-
determination and that UNESCO might study the sociological and 
psychological characteristics involved.75  However, it would not be until 1970s 
that such systematic efforts were made, and it is questionable whether these 
(admittedly excellent) investigations on the subject provided the hoped-for and 
much needed clarity.76  Without the benefit of such studies at the time of 
drafting, the Commission fell squarely into the trap it hoped to avoid.   
In the draft of Article 1 that had been submitted for both Covenants, the 
holders of the right of self-determination were identified as ‘all peoples and all 
nations’, which indicated that the right might still be connected with the idea of 
nationality as well as to less well-defined ‘peoples’.  The inclusion of ‘nations’ 
came about at the request of the communist states and was, at least at first, 
widely supported, as the intention was to provide protection for minority 
nationalities within existing states, a long-standing concern of the Soviet 
Union.77  Raising the issue of national (as well as other PIFG) minorities 
sharpened the debate, especially since the Charter had referred only to ‘self-
determination of peoples’ and used the term ‘nations’ as a synonym for ‘states’.  
On one level, there was concern that this might be expanding the right, in that 
this might require states to recognize in some legal fashion groups already extant 
within their boundaries and that this might ultimately permit other states to 
interfere with what they considered ‘domestic matters’ or even to violate the 
territorial integrity of states.  However, on another level, there was concern that 
limiting the right to ‘nations’ and ‘peoples’ only might narrow the interpretation 
too severely.78  The overwhelming majority felt that ‘nations’ could be deleted 
since ‘all peoples’ was considered to be the more comprehensive phrase, thus 
including ‘all nations’.79   
This more expansive interpretation of ‘peoples’ won out because it 
seemed to pose the fewest barriers to decolonisation, which was, given the 
historical moment in which the debate occurred, increasingly the focus of the                                                         
75 UN, E/2256 (1952). 
76 These attempts are recounted in and advanced by two UN studies: Cristescu, The Right to Self-
determination and Francesco Capotorti, A Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (New York: United Nations, 1979) 
77 The Soviet interpretation of self-determination was outlined briefly in Chapter 3 and will be 
returned to again in section (ii) of this chapter. 
78 UN, A/C.3/SR. 361(1951), 398 and 399 (1952). 
79 Cristescu, The Right to Self-determination, para. 47 and see UN, E/2256 (1952) and E/2731 (1955).  
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right;80 however, this interpretation brought up serious questions about groups 
within states.  It was noted in the travaux that if self-determination was limited 
to non-self-governing territories this might have the effect of giving them ‘more 
effective protection than to peoples living in other territories [within states]’ 
and that this might ‘be giving approval to discrimination’ against such groups.  
For this reason a draft article, separate from Article 1, was proposed for 
inclusion within the ICCPR, which later became Article 27.  This article states 
that:  
 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the 
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use 
their own language.  
 
This insertion was highly controversial both then and now.  At the time, it was 
feared that, owing to the increased obligation imposed on multi-national states, 
many would not ratify the Covenant.  The representative of Belgium, in the 
399th session of the Third Committee, commented that if it applied to all 
peoples, this might encourage interventions or ‘artificial separatist movements’.81 
The fear of secession (in a non-colonial context) was widespread, and 
many countries raised the issue as they attempted to define (and limit) the 
legitimate holders of the right to self-determination.  For example, when the 
representative of New Zealand noted that ‘if self-determination was intended to 
be recognized as a right, the right should be commensurate with the principle 
and should include the right of secession’82, a number of countries that had 
previously supported vigorously the inclusion of a right of self-determination 
now sought to limit its scope to non-self-governing territories.83  The travaux 
show that there was a clear consensus that peoples under colonial administration 
or peoples who were in non-self-governing territories, regardless of the 
conditions of that rule, held the right of self-determination, however there was 
only limited agreement on what characteristics groups within states needed to 
possess to be legitimate holders of the right.  The most common ones 
mentioned were the characteristics associated with PIFGs, namely, ethnic, 
religious, linguistic and cultural factors, and some consideration was given to the 
                                                        
80 See section (iii) below. 
81 UN, A/C.3/SR.399 (1952). 
82 UN, A/C.3/SR.648 (1952). 
83 See, for example, the statements of Greece, Syria and Pakistan in UN, A/C.3/SR.572, 648 and 
652 (1952), respectively.  Given the sizable national minorities within each of these countries, it is 
hardly surprising they adopted this view. 
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idea that such groups needed to differ substantially from the rest of the state’s 
population.84 
The lack of consensus on delineating the legitimate holders of the right 
did not consume all the discussion.  For example, in the 366th meeting of the 
Third Committee, the idea that self-determination had an ‘internal and external 
aspect’, was brought up and widely supported.85  There was broad consensus that 
the external dimension implied that a ‘people’ could achieve independence, 
international recognition and respect for their territorial integrity, and that the 
internal aspect, whereby the same people could govern themselves, had been 
present in the drafting of the Charter and the Covenants.  The deliberations also 
indicate that states considered that the one of the chief internal aspects of self-
determination was the achievement of effective human rights protection.  This 
was certainly the intention behind Article 27.   
However, also in the 366th meeting of the Third Committee, some 
argued that self-determination should not be confused with the rights of 
minorities and that the Charter was not intended to give rights to minorities.86  
Thus, it is hard to draw any firm conclusions from the proceedings of the 
committees that drafted the ICCPR about whether groups, national or 
otherwise, within existing, non-colonial territories are able to exercise the right 
of self-determination in any form beyond the extent guaranteed in Article 27, i.e. 
within their existing borders.  
As noted legal scholar Antonio Cassese concluded in his recent analysis 
these exchanges, the ‘peoples’ entitled to a right to self-determination must 
meet two conditions: first, that they must be a ‘national’ group, i.e. that they 
‘must be a member of a state made up of different national groups of comparable 
dimensions’; and, second, that the national group ‘must be recognized 
constitutionally’.87  Based on the travaux préparitoire, there is some support for 
the idea that the delegates drafting the Covenants reached such a conclusion. If 
accurate, this interpretation limits the right of self-determination rather severely 
and in a manner that is inconsistent with the philosophical foundations from 
which much of the ICCPR emanates.  However, Cassese makes clear he is 
referring to ‘international self-determination’, which indicates that he is 
considering those groups that would have international recognition and, 
presumably, legitimate access to secession, but this seems to read something 
into the deliberations that created the International Bill of Rights.  While some 
of the states present might have concurred, ‘it was also argued, however, that,                                                         
84 Capotorti, A Study on the Rights of Persons, para. 166. 
85 UN, A/C.3/SR.366 (1951).   
86 UN, A/C.3/SR.366 (1951). 
87 Cassese, ‘The Self-determination of Peoples’, 95. 
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under the Charter, all peoples had the right to self-determination, that it 
mentioned no exception, and that hence a people could not be debarred from 
exercising that right on the pretext that it had formed a national minority.’88   
So there appeared to be concern over national minorities but at the same 
time, a belief that their rights were already protected, though not explicitly.  
Thus, despite the lack of precision, a new awareness for nationalities and other 
PIFG within existing states did emerge and, importantly it did so within a 
framework of liberal democratic human rights, with some consideration also 
given to the relative importance of those rights.  An expanding and deepening 
consensus regarding non-self-governing peoples, particularly colonies, had also 
materialized and solidified, to the extent that the few states that attempted to 
raise questions about self-determination’s appearance in the Covenants or about 
the exact contents or meaning of the right were derided for attempting to delay 
an inevitable and just process of human liberation.89 
The final question around which these debates centred was about what, if 
any, mechanisms were needed to manage the application of self-determination.  
This was driven by a push-pull effect, in that, on one hand, there was a powerful, 
widespread desire to apply self-determination to the decolonisation process and 
explicitly to link this with the emerging human rights norms, and, on the other, 
to find a coherent formula by which to prohibit or at least to limit the legitimacy 
of secession for national groups within states.  Controlling this effect would be 
difficult given the long-standing philosophical problems of simultaneously 
endorsing and restricting secession, which were explored in Chapter 2. 
Although the relationship between self-determination and decolonisation 
is explored in greater detail in section (iii) of this chapter, it is impossible to 
avoid the topic now as it was such an important issue during the drafting of the 
Covenants.  As mentioned above, the fear over secession and its obvious 
connection to the right of self-determination was omnipresent in the drafting 
committee, but such was the moral imperative to decolonise that few if any 
ventured to play down or deny the connection between self-determination and 
decolonisation. 
One of the strongest critics of the decolonisation process was Belgium, 
and their opposition (if it can be called that) was more about the timing and 
management of the process than it was about decolonisation’s correctness.  In 
1950, the Belgian representative argued before the Third Committee that if self-
determination were applied quickly within colonial territories such as the Congo 
and led to independence ‘the people would elect chiefs who would deprive [the                                                         
88 UN, E/2256 (1952). 
89 UN, E/CN.4/SR.474 (1954) and UN, A/C.3/SR.668 (1954). 
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inhabitants] of many of the human rights accorded by the authorities 
responsible for their administration’.90  This argument was roundly dismissed as 
were most subsequent attempts to spell out how independence would take place 
or what other options self-determination might imply besides independence.  As 
noted earlier, many countries saw these attempts as obstruction, and, not 
surprisingly given the context, there was no further consideration of the points 
the Belgium raised.91  This is unfortunate, because, despite Belgium’s real 
motives in raising these issues, the concern of human rights is perpetual and is 
meant to run beyond independence and, accordingly, no fully, logically coherent 
normative framework for the right of self-determination could ignore how 
human rights will or will not be enhanced by decolonisation.  Because this 
portion of the equation was intentionally ignored, the framework for the 
application of self-determination created in the ICCPR contains potential 
weaknesses. 
Moreover, the limited agreement reached about the application of self-
determination and the somewhat constricted nature of the debate meant that 
serious questions about secession outside of the decolonisation process were 
explored insufficiently.  For example, when self-determination was removed 
from the draft Covenant in 1950, Noriega, representing Mexico, interjected that 
he would like to see it return, and he expressed his country’s regret at its 
deletion.  Responding to this, Baroodi of Saudi Arabia commented that the 
deletion came about because of the fear that the right of self-determination 
might be employed by minorities within states.  In response, Noriega noted that 
‘human rights should be protected by the rule of law, lest man should be 
compelled to have recourse to rebellion against tyranny and oppression... to 
prevent it, the collective right of self-determination should be guaranteed.’92  
Noriega’s comment linked self-determination and a right of rebellion in an 
interesting fashion, showing that he believed them to be inseparable, but he also 
suggested a means of moving forward that might reconcile the employment of 
both ideas.  In this conception, the collective right of self-determination is best 
seen as an inducement to states to protect human rights and the rule of law so 
that the exercise of the ultimate right of redress, rebellion and/or secession, 
would not become necessary.  However, owing in part to the haste to include a 
reference to self-determination for the purposes of decolonisation and in part to                                                         
90 A/C.3/SR.310 (1950). 
91 Pakistan was one country that used such language frequently in the drafting of the covenants 
and reflected the zeal of many countries for the decolonisation process when the Pakistani 
representative noted that regardless of the final definition of the right, self-determination would 
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92 UN, A/C.3/SR.310 (1950). 
  133 
the reluctance to explore secession for fear of empowering emerging nationalism 
within existing states, Noriega’s fascinating interjection received virtually no 
further consideration and an opportunity to provide clarity and, perhaps, a more 
coherent norm was lost.  Having noted this, the lack of consensus did accurately 
reflect the shifting positions and priorities of the international community at 
this turbulent stage in the evolution of the concept.  
Still, some aspects of this problem were addressed in a way that provided 
greater clarity.  The United States consistently challenged the status of self-
determination during this period, but because of its growing numerical 
inferiority during voting as new states joined the UN, the American objections 
were not normally decisive, yet one consistent interjection that the United 
States made, that independence was not the only legitimate end of self-
determination, was taken up and debated constructively and became a 
commonly accepted point.93  It was agreed repeatedly in the travaux ‘that self-
determination was but one of many operating principles of the international 
system and that its exercise was conditioned on the maintenance of 
international peace and security.’94   
This study has argued that this kind of debate leading to shared 
understanding and the prioritization of values and concerns is fundamental to 
the construction of norms of international behaviour and to understanding the 
nature of international society itself.  Whether international peace and security 
should rank higher than the exercise of self-determination, or whether the 
exercise of self-determination is necessary for the maintenance of international 
order are crucial questions to resolve, as the answer to these questions guides the 
responses to the challenges of self-determination.  It is clear from the evidence 
examined that, when drafting the International Bill of Rights, the international 
community felt that the maintenance of international peace and security was 
mostly a separate and competing norm and that it took precedence, despite the 
fact that self-determination was also seen as a priority both for decolonisation 
and for relations between existing states.  Although more debate would certainly 
have thrown increased light on the thinking behind this, the debates during this 
time pointed toward increased consensus on at least some aspects of the 
challenges.   
 
e) The Declaration on Friendly Relations 
 
 Outside of the context of decolonisation, only few resolutions of the 
General Assembly had any significant impact on the evolution of self-                                                        
93 UN, E/2256 (1952), E/CN.4/SR.474 (1954) and E/2731 (1955). 
94 UN, A/C.3/SR.366 and A/C.3/SR.366 (1951) and 399 (1952). 
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determination at the normative level, but one of those few crucial exceptions 
was the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations (commonly know as the Declaration on Friendly Relations), 
passed in 1970.95  The inclusion of self-determination in the text of this 
resolution was virtually a given as it had appeared in numerous General 
Assembly resolutions related to decolonisation (discussed below) prior to this 
one, but drafting the Declaration offered a fresh opportunity to explore and 
clarify the meaning of the right of self-determination, especially given that the 
last systematic attempt to do so had been nearly a decade before and prior to the 
admission of many new member states as a result of decolonisation.  In the 
travaux préparitoire, many of the positions expressed in the drafting of the 
ICCPR were restated, including the American and the British desire to 
recognize the ‘principle’ of self-determination.  Others felt that the right of self-
determination should be limited to the decolonisation process only, but neither 
of these opinions was widely supported.96  As the records of the special 
committee tasked with drafting the Declaration indicate, ‘[i]t was also recalled 
that the right to self-determination could not be interpreted in such a way that 
it meant that the right could be exercised only once and solely with the view to 
independence’97, suggesting an appreciation of the internal dimensions of the 
right and the view that it extended beyond the decolonisation context.   
As had been the case in the drafting of the ICCPR the question of who 
could hold and exercise the right surfaced, and, as before, many different views 
were expressed.  One delegate felt that it should apply not only to peoples who 
inhabited large or small areas but also those within federal states, autonomous 
regions and non-self-governing areas, and that those who were ‘geographically 
distinct and ethnically and culturally different from the remainder of the state 
should, with adequate safeguards, be able to exercise the right to self-
determination’.98  Other representatives noted that such a wide interpretation of 
‘peoples’ would be ‘an invitation to secession’ and that this would carry the 
principle ‘to an absurd extreme’.99  The consensus that emerged was that 
‘peoples’ needed to be interpreted in a broad sense to increase its applicability, 
that self-determination had both an internal and external component and, very 
importantly, that there were a range of expressions that reflected fulfilment of 
                                                        
95 UN, A/Res. 2625 (1970). 
96 UN, A/7619 (1969), paras.140-154. 
97 UN, A/7619 (1969), para. 153. 
98 UN, A/7619 (1969), para. 156. 
99 UN, A/7619 (1969), para. 157. 
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the right.100  While the committee accepted that self-determination was the 
driving moral force behind the decolonisation process, there was widespread 
support for the United States’ suggestion that fulfilment of self-determination 
could also included free association or integration with an existing state and 
many expressed a fundamental connection between human rights and self-
determination.101   
Importantly, the committee investigated what this interpretation of the 
right implied about the duties states had towards peoples within their 
jurisdictions.102  Specifically, some countries felt that greater, explicit 
clarification related to the internal aspect of self-determination was needed.  
The majority of the committee wanted to include a statement that would 
require states to respect human rights and promote representative, democratic 
institutions that were inclusive of all citizens.  However, some felt that this 
would apply only to states with existing federal arrangements or with 
geographically, ethnically or culturally distinct minorities.  This touched off a 
further debate related to secession, and opinion was sharply divided with some 
states promoting an explicit right of secession as a means to ‘cement...unity’ 
while others felt this would be a corruption of the right.  Some representatives 
felt that ‘it would be an interference in a State’s domestic affairs if the 
Committee were to draw up rules for the secession of peoples within a State’ and 
that ‘if there were genuine discrimination against any ethnic group in an 
independent state that group would have the right to rebel but it would be a 
domestic matter’.103  
Drawing in part on the drafts proposed by the US and the UK and the 
debates mentioned above, the committee created several passages related to 
these points that became part of the Declaration.104  The Declaration makes 
clear that ‘[e]very State has the duty to promote through joint and separate 
action universal respect for and observance of human rights’ and that ‘alien 
subjugation, domination and exploitation’ as well as ‘denial of fundamental 
human rights...constitutes a violation of the principle [of self-determination and] 
is contrary to the Charter’.  The final text also has an inclusive tone, stating that 
‘all peoples have the right freely to determine without external interference, 
their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance 
with the provisions of the Charter’.  The Declaration also makes clear that states                                                         
100 UN, A/7619 (1969), paras. 158-159 and 171-172. 
101 UN, A/7619 (1969), paras. 140, 153, 156, 159, 164, 175 and 176. 
102 UN, A/7619 (1969), paras. 175-177. 
103 UN, A/7619 (1969), para. 179. 
104 For the full text of the Declaration, see Appendix E. 
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must refrain from any action that might deny this right, and although in no case 
does it define ‘peoples’ exactly, the wording and the travaux préperatoire confirm 
that a broad definition was intended and that this certainly included the 
inhabitants of existing states. 
From this, it seems clear that self-determination had evolved 
considerably in major UN instruments by 1970, most of which were not 
specifically connected with decolonisation.  A link between the right of self-
determination and human rights was made, though not fully articulated.  States 
were obliged to promote self-determination and were in no cases to deny it, even 
within their own borders, and the limits of the right and its relationship to 
secession were explored, though, again, without sufficient clarity added owing to 
a lack of consensus.  However, a few other resolutions in the General Assembly 
as well as several resolutions of the Security Council during this time period 
offer more precision, which, while limited in scope and general impact, further 
shaped the trajectory of self-determination within the UN system.  
 
f) General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions 
 
Although self-determination became an established part of the UN 
structure with the Charter, there were few resolutions of the General Assembly 
and even fewer of the Security Council mentioning self-determination in the 
early years of the organisation’s history.  The right of self-determination was first 
used in the text of a General Assembly resolution in the first session in 1946, and 
in this resolution, a pattern that continued for years was set: the right of self-
determination was applied almost exclusively to the issue of non-self-governing 
territories.105  Decolonisation and its relationship to self-determination is the 
subject of section (iii) below and, as will be suggested there, decolonisation was 
the one application of self-determination around which an overwhelming, 
favourable consensus developed.  However, despite the paucity of resolutions 
from the General Assembly and the Security Council that refer either directly or 
indirectly to self-determination outside of decolonisation, there were some 
important documents and discussions that broadened the scope of the right 
beyond this narrower application.   
The situations in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were just such 
cases and were of great concern to the General Assembly and the Security 
Council from the UN’s earliest days until the 1980s.  In both cases the right of 
self-determination of peoples was at the heart of the resolutions passed.  
However, neither of these cases fitted neatly into the decolonisation model that                                                         
105 UN, A/Res.9 (1946).  
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emerged during this period.  In neither case could the ‘non-indigenous’ or ‘non-
African’ populations simply withdraw as they were so large and so entrenched in 
each country, and in the case of South Africa, the matter was all the more 
complicated because the Republic of South Africa was a recognized, sovereign, 
non-colonial state whose internal affairs were meant to be protected by the 
principles of sovereignty and non-interference in ‘essentially domestic matters’.  
Moreover, because the majority of the population of these two countries were 
disenfranchised and had no meaningful part in either the government or the 
public life of those states, their plight could not be construed as a minority rights 
issue in the strict, numerical sense of the term.  Accordingly, they presented 
unique challenges to the norm of self-determination that was taking shape in the 
international community at this time.  
 The primary concern of all the General Assembly resolutions related to 
both South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, beginning with resolutions in the 
General Assembly’s First Session, was the denial of fundamental rights on which 
these ‘illegal racist minority’ regimes were based.106  In the case of Southern 
Rhodesia,107 the situation did involve the transfer of sovereignty away from a 
metropolitan power to local control, but this transfer had been progressively 
hijacked and deliberately controlled so as to limit the participation of virtually 
all the inhabitants who were of ‘African origin’.108  Despite this, the thrust of the 
General Assembly’s reaction was to ensure that an inclusive polity emerged, by 
forging a constitution through ‘the full participation of representatives of all 
political parties’ and by operating the political system based on ‘one-man one-
vote’.109  In resolution 1760, the General Assembly demanded ‘the immediate 
extension to the whole population, without discrimination, of the full and 
unconditional exercise of their basic political rights...and the establishment of 
equality among all inhabitants of the Territory’.110  The tone of this early 
resolution was remedial (rather than chastising) and steeped in the language of 
human rights and the internal exercise of self-determination, understood here as 
genuinely representative government and meaningful participation in the 
society.   
In later resolutions, as the inflexibility of the regime led by Ian Smith 
became increasingly evident, the tone hardened.  For example, in resolution 1889                                                         
106 For example, see UN, A/Res.44 (1946),  
107 The complex history of the creation of Zimbabwe with all its intrigues, power bargaining and 
political machinations are retold well and succinctly in Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics since 
1945 7th ed. (London; Longman, 1996).  
108 Part of the complexity of this situation was that not all ‘white’ inhabitants supported these 
moves and many ‘blacks’ did, usually for personal reasons of conviction and, often, for financial 
self-interest.  
109 UN, A/Res.1747 (1961). 
110 UN, A/Res.1760 (1961). 
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passed in 1962111, while there is an explicit reference to self-determination and 
while it clearly aims to achieve meaningful participation of the whole 
population, the text mentions the denial of the rights of ‘the majority of the 
African population’, which is the first differentiation of inhabitants in the 
territory by identity.  While this may seem a minor semantic change, its 
relevance to the application of self-determination is significant, because the 
differentiation (however correct it may have been in fact) suggests that the only 
rights that concerned the General Assembly were those of the named group.  Of 
course, in the understanding of self-determination outlined in Part I of this 
study, and indeed in the ICCPR, the right to self-determination applies to all 
peoples, PIFGs or otherwise, and the central goal was equality and equal 
representation, not the privileging of one, currently oppressed group over those 
of their oppressor, however ‘just’ doing so might seem at the time.  This 
dangerous interpretation of self-determination became more pronounced in 
resolutions 2138 and 2262, both of which speak of the ‘inalienable rights’ of the 
‘African people of Zimbabwe’. 112  In neither case is it clear who constitutes the 
‘people of Zimbabwe’ or, more importantly, who is excluded from this group and 
its rights. 
Similarly, the General Assembly was clear in its repeated condemnation 
of the ‘racist regime’ in South Africa during the apartheid era.  In the Third 
Session of the General Assembly in 1948, the treatment of South Africans who 
were ethnically Indian was raised by the representatives of India, and it was 
deemed a violation of the principles of the Charter and of the UNDHR.113  In 
subsequent years, the condemnation of the South African government widened 
to encompass the whole apartheid system, by which the vast majority of South 
African citizens were denied a meaningful role in society and the political 
system.  Resolutions 615 and 616, passed in 1952, were fulsome in their rejection 
of the apartheid system at all levels and called for its swift removal, but 616 went 
further and outlined what the future of a multi-racial South Africa (or any other 
similarly diverse state) should look like.114  It noted that harmony in such a 
society is dependent upon ‘respect for human rights and freedoms... equality 
before the law for all persons regardless of race, creed or colour, and when 
economic, social, cultural and political participation of all racial groups is on a 
basis of equality’.  In addition to this, the resolution also makes a general 
statement about the duties of states, affirming ‘that governmental policies of                                                         
111 UN, A/Res.1889 (1962). 
112 UN, A/Res.2138 (1966) and 2262 (1967). 
113 UN, A/Res.265 (1948).  This was reiterated in several subsequent resolutions: A/Res.395 (1950), 
511 (1951) and 615 (1952). 
114 UN, A/Res.615 and 616 (1952). 
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member states which are not directed towards these goals, but which are 
designed to perpetuate or increase discrimination, are inconsistent with the 
pledges of the members under Article 56 of the Charter.’115  As a result, this 
resolution not only recites the specific failings of the South African regime but it 
traces out a norm about states’ responsibilities to all of their inhabitants, thus 
providing further details about internal expressions of the right of self-
determination.  Moreover, unlike the resolutions related to Southern Rhodesia 
discussed above, this resolution, points to an inclusive, democratic future in 
which all South Africans would have equal rights. 
Between 1946 and the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council 
passed roughly 650 resolutions while in just the next ten years, another 650 were 
passed and the annual number of resolutions of the Security Council in the last 
few years has increased above even this high rate.  The dynamics of the Cold 
War that restricted the activity of the Security Council did not apply in the 
same way to matters related to self-determination, particularly to the cases of 
Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.116  The Security Council spent much time 
debating these matters and passed numerous resolutions related to both 
situations.   
When the Smith government in Southern Rhodesia attempted to declare 
independence in 1965, the Security Council responded with a resolution 
rejecting the actions of what it called a ‘racist settler minority’.117  Subsequent 
resolutions brought in economic sanctions and condemned the ‘political 
repression, including arrests, detentions, trials and executions which violate 
fundamental freedoms and rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia’.118  
Resolutions 277 and 328 both recognized the resistance to the Rhodesian 
government as ‘liberation’, called upon all member states to isolate the regime in 
Southern Rhodesia and asserted a vigorously the right of self-determination of 
‘people of Zimbabwe’.119  However, by doing so the Security Council added to 
the level of confusion about whether the ‘people of Zimbabwe’ included anyone, 
black or white, who supported ‘Southern Rhodesia’ or the Smith government or, 
indeed, what ‘Zimbabwe’ meant.  Resolution 328 called on the UK as 
administering power to guarantee the right to self-determination, and                                                         
115 UN, A/Res.616 (1952). 
116 It is interesting to note that the other areas in which the Security Council was extremely 
active were decolonisation and the Israel-Palestine conflict, both of which had multiple 
resolutions and both of which dealt with the right of self-determination to some degree. 
117 UN, S/Res.217 (1965).  It is interesting to note that it passed unanimously with only one 
abstention, that of France, not United Kingdom as might have been expected given that the UK 
nominally exercised sovereign authority for Southern Rhodesia.  The UK’s unwillingness to use 
the veto to stop this process perhaps reflects the fact that by 1965 it had accepted decolonisation 
and distanced itself somewhat from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. 
118 UN, S/Res.232 (1966) and 253 (1968).   
119 UN, S/Res. 277 (1970) and 328 (1973). 
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specifically called on them to ensure the unconditional release of political 
prisoners, the repeal of all racist, discriminatory legislation, the establishment of 
full political rights and equality for all citizens.  While the aim was to create 
‘majority rule’, the emphasis on establishing rights and equality for all suggests 
that a liberal democratic, inclusive solution was desired.  However, in resolution 
411, passed in 1977, there is no mention of political equality or the establishment 
of equal rights within the hoped-for new state of Zimbabwe, thereby weakening 
the idea that national liberation was to be an inclusive activity.   
Even though the situation in South Africa was similar in many ways to 
Southern Rhodesia, the Security Council’s resolutions had a different feel to 
them and took a different positions related to self-determination, which further 
shaped the development of the concept and in a direction that reflected the 
framework outlined in Part I.  From the earliest resolution about South Africa, 
the Security Council made a connection between human rights and the 
obligations of the state to ensure the well-being of all its citizens by suggesting 
that systemic abuse of rights, such as apartheid, was a threat to international 
peace and security.120  Moreover, unlike most of the resolutions about Southern 
Rhodesia, the ones related to South Africa never envisaged any future for the 
country other than a stable, multi-ethnic, democratic and rights-respecting 
government, and this vision was explicitly at the core of almost every resolution. 
Resolution 134 reminded the government of South Africa of its obligations 
towards all of its citizens and that the goal of the state should be ‘racial 
harmony’.121  Resolution 182, passed in 1963, pointed out that the object of South 
African leaders was to ensure ‘basic human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all individuals within the territory of the Republic of South Africa without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion’.122   
Although Resolution 392, passed in the wake of the Soweto riots in 1976, 
‘[r] ecognizes the legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people for the 
elimination of apartheid and racial discrimination’, it fails to define the 
parameters of ‘the South African people’ potentially introducing a less inclusive 
interpretation.123  However, Resolution 417, passed the following year, eliminates 
this confusion while at the same time illustrating how the interpretation of self-
determination was evolving.124  In the text, the Security Council affirmed ‘the 
right to the exercise of self-determination by all the people of South Africa as a 
whole, irrespective of race, colour or creed’.  The Security Council went on to                                                         
120 UN, S/Res. 134 (1960). 
121 UN, S/Res. 134 (1960). 
122 UN, S/Res. 182 (1963). 
123 UN, S/Res. 392 (1976). 
124 UN, S/Res. 417 (1977). 
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express ‘its support for, and solidarity with, all those struggling for the 
elimination of apartheid and racial discrimination and all victims of violence and 
repression by the South African racist regime’.   
By identifying all those struggling against apartheid as the group whose 
right to self-determination was being repressed, the Security Council, perhaps 
unwittingly, interpreted self-determination within the liberal democratic 
tradition and in accordance with the normative framework traced out in Part I.  
As the resolution clearly indicates, it is not specifically the repression of the 
ethnic, racial, national or religious identities of those denied self-determination 
that triggered the Security Council’s ire; instead, it is the persistent and 
pervasive abuse of political rights and fundamental freedoms that condemned 
the South African government, not the fact that the government was ‘alien’ or 
‘colonial’, and as a result, the government had rendered itself fit for removal by 
those who opposed it, who would be acting with international support.  While 
the discrimination of certain PIFGs under the system of apartheid rightly 
received particular condemnation, the Security Council’s upholding of human 
rights generally within the context of the right of self-determination not only 
made for a more philosophically coherent normative response to the particular 
abuse of apartheid but it also enhanced the vision of an inclusive South African 
future, thereby creating incentives for both sides of the conflict to be inclusive 
in the pursuit of a settlement.   
In subsequent resolutions, Security Council pushed for the peaceful 
dismantling of the apartheid system so that all South Africans could be given ‘a 
full and free voice in the determination of their destiny’.125  When the South 
African government attempted to redraw the Constitution, ostensibly to create 
greater inclusion but in fact to perpetuate the apartheid system, the Security 
Council rejected it, particularly its enfranchisement of ‘coloured’ and ‘Asian’ 
South Africans, which the Council saw as an ‘insidious’ attempt to ‘fragment’ the 
population.  The Security Council’s call for a ‘united and unfragmented South 
Africa’ should be seen not only as a rejection of any secessionist activity but also 
as a restatement of the desire for genuine inclusion as an exercise of the internal 
aspect of right of self-determination.126  It could also be argued that the Security 
Council hoped to create a new national identity in South Africa, constructed not 
on ethnic or racial lines, but within the liberal democratic tradition, based 
around inclusion and equality of rights for all the PIFGs within the country. 
What emerges from the study of self-determination in the UN system is 
that by the 1980s, the understanding and, to a lesser extent, the normative                                                         
125 UN, S/Res.473 (1980). 
126 UN, S/Res.554 and 556 (1984). 
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expression and application of the concept evolved dramatically if slowly and 
unevenly, and it was in some important respects similar to the normative 
framework outlined in Part I.  The Charter based the protection of human 
rights and respect for political independence of states on the ‘principle’ of self-
determination, thereby establishing it as one of the UN’s founding ideas.  The 
drafting of the International Bill of Rights and the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations reflected a growing global consensus in favour of linking the ‘right’ of 
self-determination with human rights and political, social and cultural 
inclusiveness.  The General Assembly and Security Council resolutions dealing 
with the illustrative cases of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa reveal that the 
international community was prepared, at least in part, to apply these standards 
to the challenges presented by groups within states who sought to alter the status 
quo.  While these changes played out over half a century and ultimately did not 
to provide quite enough clarity to address all the challenges thrown up by the 
concept, they constituted a more workable structure for addressing the 
perennial questions associated with self-determination and emerging nationalism 
than had ever existed.  
 
(ii) The Cold War and self-determination 
 
The superpower conflict more than any other factor came to shape and 
define the context of post-war international affairs had a distorting effect on the 
interpretation and the application of self-determination by the international 
community that persisted for nearly fifty years.  Both the Soviets and the 
Americans championed self-determination throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century, offering enthusiastic yet often vague endorsements of the 
concept, but, as mentioned before, they interpreted the idea in very different 
ways.  The intermittent presence of self-determination during the discussion 
about international norms from the Atlantic Charter up to the creation of the 
UN was principally the result of two the emerging superpowers differing 
attitudes about the meaning and limits of the concept.  Because the Cold War 
was the defining paradigm in which self-determination was interpreted and 
applied until the 1990s, these early East/West debates over the concept are 
illuminating. 
Shortly following the publication of the Atlantic Charter, the Soviet 
ambassador to the United Kingdom, I. M. Maisky, set out the Soviet Union’s 
position on the document.127  In this speech, Maisky stated that the Soviet                                                         
127 The text of the Soviet statement to the Inter-Allied meeting at St. James’s Palace is contained 
in Holborn, ed., War and Peace Aims, 356-357.  All references are to this text. 
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Union was ‘guided in its foreign policy by the principle of self-determination of 
nations’ and he noted that this was one of the chief ‘pillars’ of the Soviet system.  
Maisky continued by stating that the Soviet Union defended ‘the right of every 
nation to the independence and territorial integrity of its country’ and that it 
‘denounced all violations of sovereign rights of peoples, all aggression and 
aggressors, all and any attempts of aggressive states to impose their will upon 
other peoples and to involve them in war.’  
Given the Soviet Union’s actions before the war towards Finland, Poland 
and the Baltic states, such declarations invited charges of hypocrisy, but, to be 
fair, Maisky’s policy statement can be seen as an attempt to balance the 
application of such principles with practical considerations.  As Maisky noted 
‘the practical application of these principles will necessarily adapt itself to the 
circumstances, needs and historic peculiarities of particular countries…’.  This 
caveat could be interpreted in one of two ways: as an attempt by the Soviets to 
give themselves an ‘out’, thereby allowing them to violate the principle whenever 
it suited them; or as a genuine acknowledgement of the difficulties of applying 
such normative ideas (or any normative ideas for that matter) to actual 
circumstances on the ground.  The evidence in this case is heavily on the side of 
the former explanation, but there are good reasons not to brush aside the later 
interpretation hastily.   
As discussed in Chapter 3, Lenin’s position on self-determination was 
crucial to the principle’s popularity and persistence in the interwar period, and 
the Soviet Union’s official endorsement of self-determination was not novel 
when Maisky spoke in 1941.  Stalin, at Lenin’s behest, wrote at length on the 
subject of nationality and the right of self-determination when he took on the 
Communist Party’s newly created role of Commissar for Nationalities in 1913.  
Later, Stalin formally incorporated the idea of popular sovereignty and self-
determination into Articles 15 to 18 of the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet 
Union, which granted the right of secession to the constituent republics that 
made up the Union.128   
However, Stalin’s view on self-determination was different from Lenin’s, 
or, rather, it was a more circumscribed interpretation of the concept.  Stalin 
held that while self-determination was an indispensable weapon of the 
proletarian revolution, it applied only to ‘fixed’ nationalities, which he 
understood as peoples who had a tradition of national unity and inhabited 
clearly demarcated territories.  More importantly, Stalin felt even more strongly                                                         
128 For Stalin’s statements on nationality and self-determination, see J.V. Stalin, ‘Marxism and 
the National Question’ (1913) [http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03. 
htm#s2] and A.A. Kristian, The Right of Self-determination and the Soviet Union (London: Boreas 
Publishing Co., 1952), 16-17. 
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than Lenin did that the exercise of these rights should be firmly subordinated to 
the goals of socialism. 
Accordingly, while it seems that the Soviets were genuinely keen to 
endorse and even to expand on the Atlantic Charter’s commitments to self-
determination, their understanding of the concept meant that any application of 
the principle would be governed by their competing norm of protecting and 
promoting the world socialist revolution.  While in practical terms this gave 
Stalin immense latitude as to when he could invoke, ignore or overrule the 
concept, thereby opening his actions and statements up to charges of hypocrisy, 
the Soviets ensured that self-determination would figure heavily in the 
discussions of the post-war norms of international behaviour by championing 
nationality, self-determination and popular sovereignty even more forcefully 
than the US and its allies did.  
While these differing interpretations might have led to a major rift, the 
demands of the war and the need for a strategic alliance kept these matters on 
the periphery until such time as victory was within clear sight and the issues 
could no longer be deferred.  In the closing stages of the war, when the uneasy 
allies met at Yalta and Potsdam to discuss their post-war objectives, self-
determination was a critical factor, at once affected by the Cold War tensions 
and serving to increase these divisions.   
 At both Yalta and Potsdam, strategic questions about the distribution of 
power and spheres of influence in Europe and the rest of the world 
predominated over normative issues such as self-determination.  The future of 
Poland and Germany was an obvious as well as vital issue in which self-
determination was germane, but Russian security interests trumped any 
philosophical or normative commitment to self-determination.  Despite the 
inclusion of assurances about democratic choice in the text of the Yalta and 
Potsdam declarations, United States and United Kingdom lacked the ability and 
the will to force the issue.  At Yalta, for example, President Roosevelt (and to a 
lesser extent Churchill) hoped that the soon to be created United Nations 
Organization would provide a more appropriate forum where their approach to 
these critical issues could be pressed.   
Although there were some bona fide democratic procedures and popular 
consent involved in re-establishing governance in Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, 
etc., the Soviet Union used a range of means (some coercive, others less so) to 
ensure Moscow-friendly administrations.  As a result, in the years following the 
end of the war, the US, the UK and their allies concluded that the Soviet 
commitment to self-determination was, at best, perfunctory and, at worst, 
nonexistent.  From their vantage, the Soviets deduced that efforts such as the 
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Marshall Plan were nothing short of American attempts to purchase loyalty, 
which they saw as a corruption of self-determination. 
It is perhaps for this reason that the United States was somewhat 
surprised when the Soviet Union championed so vigorously the right of self-
determination in the drafting of the UN Charter and the International Bill of 
Rights over the course of the next decade.  The travaux préparitoire of the 
Charter, discussed previously, indicate that both sides greatly desired some 
inclusion of the concept as one of the founding principles of the UN, however, 
the Soviets’ insistence that it be regarded as a right and that it should apply to all 
peoples seemed deeply hypocritical to the United States and other liberal 
democracies.  By 1950 the nuclear arms race was at full pace, China had fallen to 
the communists, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were created and Berlin, indeed 
Germany as a whole, had been divided into semi-autonomous ‘sectors’ that 
looked increasingly permanent.  Even more importantly, the conflict over the 
Korean peninsula, a dispute that heavily involved the idea of national self-
determination, became a ‘hot’ war that brought the superpowers into another 
more deadly confrontation.  One of the principal effects of the Korean War and 
these other events was that the Security Council, indeed the whole United 
Nations system, became frozen.  For example, the Security Council passed a 
mere five resolutions a year on average in the early 1950s, representing a sharp 
decline from the years just before and reflecting the inability to develop 
consensus in the very body that was meant facilitate international compromise 
and harmony.  
This freezing of the Security Council and other United Nations bodies as 
well as the constraints that the Cold War placed on international affairs 
generally had a pronounced effect on the evolution of self-determination both 
within the UN system and within international relations as a whole.  For 
example, during the drafting of the International Covenants, Cold War politics 
and antagonism nearly blocked all progress.  In numerous exchanges between 
the representatives of the Soviet Union and the Soviet satellite states and the 
representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom about the 
meaning and application of self-determination, the discourse became heated, 
with each side pointing out the ‘failings’ of the other.129  On one occasion, the 
Soviet Union argued that, if the US was committed to self-determination and 
genuinely wanted it included in the Covenants, then they would have to do 
something about the racial discrimination within their own country.130  In a 
similar vein, the representative of the Soviet Union questioned the commitment                                                         
129 See, for example, UN, A/C.3/SR.402, 649 and 668 (1952). 
130 UN, A/C.3/SR.402 (1952). 
  146 
of the UK to self-determination given its refusal to permit plebiscites within its 
colonies, to which the British representative retorted that the same question 
could be asked of the Soviet Union given the absence of plebiscites in Latvia and 
Poland.131   
Thus, self-determination was increasingly used as a debating point in the 
rhetorical battle of Cold War ideals, or, more frequently, its validity was made 
tangential to the workings of international politics, which were heavily 
dominated by Realpolitik.  In several situations where the emerging norm of self-
determination could have been applied in a way that might have reduced 
tensions, calculations of raw power and self-interest predominated.  One such 
example is Vietnam, particularly the events surrounding and following the 
Geneva summit in 1954. 
The situation in Vietnam in 1954 was one over which the international 
community had tremendous potential to influence events given that the warring 
factions within Vietnam desired a settlement and needed outside help to achieve 
lasting peace, territorial solidarity and economic and cultural cohesion.132  To be 
sure, the divisions (political, ethnic and religious) were intense, but the general 
desire for a settlement made the situation ripe for resolution through 
international mediation.  Tragically, not all sides appreciated this and some did 
not desire it, and because of Cold War wranglings and French interests, the UN, 
in particular the Security Council, was not involved.  As a result, international 
action to use the proposed countrywide elections as a means of establishing a 
representative government together with adequate minority and human rights 
protections, regardless of whether new state was ultimately communist or not, 
was not ever seriously considered.   
The United States, directed principally in this matter by Secretary of 
State, John Foster Dulles, purposely engaged in a limited manner in the 
proceedings and had very little interest in the countywide election method, as 
intelligence revealed that this would most likely result in a victory for the 
communist Vietminh.  On the other side of the Cold War divide, for internal 
and geopolitical reasons far removed from the Vietnamese situation, the 
Chinese communist government and (to a lesser extent) the Russians forced the 
Vietminh, at the very time the Vietminh military strength was at its apogee, to 
agree to a ‘two state’ settlement with the prospect of elections within two years.   
While the communist-proposed elections might at first sound like a plan 
for a plebiscitary expression of self-determination, this was not advanced owing 
to any concerns about human rights but rather as a tactic to decrease regional                                                         
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tensions while still expanding the communist sphere of influence.  The 
possibility of reconciling these two goals does not appear to have been 
considered.  Following the division of the country and the formation of the 
demilitarized zone, the United States assumed a much larger role in the 
direction of internal affairs within the South, but this did not render a more 
democratic or a more rights-oriented, internal expression of self-determination 
and the plans for an election in 1956 were abandoned on American orders as it 
became evident that a genuine expression of public will in the South at this time 
would lead to a communist victory and a single communist state.  Whether a 
communist victory might have enhanced the well-being of the Vietnamese or 
brought more humane governance was simply not a point that was remotely 
considered, as the answer to this was assumed to be negative, given the Cold 
War mentality at the time.  Put simply, for the Americans, self-determination, 
as they understood it, could not take place in a Soviet-style state, rather, self-
determination was a key objective for their involvement.  
Interestingly, as the war dragged on and its costs rose in human, political 
and economic terms, self-determination, which was long seen as a US war aim, 
became the preferred way to de-escalate the conflict for both the Johnson and 
the Nixon administrations.  While the ultimate goal for all American 
administrations from Eisenhower to Ford was to foster a stable and democratic 
(i.e. pro-American) government in the South, Johnson increasingly stated in 
public that the United States merely desired to end to the interference by the 
North in the self-government of the South.  Both Johnson and his Secretary of 
Defence, Robert McNamara noted in explicit terms that the main reason for 
‘Rolling Thunder’, the extensive bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and 
the ground war against the Viet Cong guerrillas, was to defend the self-
determination of the people of South Vietnam.133  In talks with the Russian 
Prime Minister Kosygin in 1967, Johnson stressed that ‘that any stable peace in 
Southeast Asia must give full weight to the wishes of the people concerned, a 
principle which is most often referred to as self-determination’.134 
President Nixon placed self-determination at the heart of his vision of 
the ‘just peace’ that America sought in Southeast Asia.  In a televised interview 
in 1970, Nixon clarified: 
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What I mean is not victory over North Vietnam - we are not asking 
for that - but [a just peace] is simply the right of the people of South 
Vietnam to determine their own future without having us impose our 
will upon them, or the North Vietnamese, or anybody else outside 
impose their will upon them.135 
 
In this light, ‘Vietnamization’, Nixon’s policy for handing over the responsibility 
for conduct of the war and the settlement to the South Vietnamese, could be 
seen as an exercise of self-determination as they interpreted it or at least of the 
US attempting to ensure that self-determination took place while acting as a 
muscular guarantor of democratic values.   
However plausible this reading of policy might be, it is a rather different 
from the understanding of self-determination that was developing in the UN 
system and somewhat distant from the interpretation outlined in this study, as 
both Nixon and Johnson interpreted self-determination as the defeat of 
communism, which is perhaps a plausible interpretation but one that carries 
tremendous difficulties.  For example in the same interview referred to above, 
President Nixon was asked if the administration’s previously stated goal of a 
non-communist Southeast Asia was undermined by this new commitment to 
self-determination.  He was also asked whether the United States would accept 
the results of a communist victory in free elections and what this would mean 
for the long-held American belief in the domino theory.  In his reply, Nixon 
indicated that the US might have to accept a ‘Yugoslav type’ communist 
government in Vietnam if elections went that way, but he cast grave doubts over 
whether genuinely free elections could ever lead to choice for communism over 
democracy.  Moreover, despite Nixon’s stated willingness to accept the outcome 
of elections, it must be remembered that Nixon authorized massive military and 
covert activity to defeat the North Vietnamese and to support the increasingly 
unpopular and unstable government of the Republic of Vietnam, not to mention 
that neither Nixon nor Johnson made significant strides to ensure that human 
rights or democratic processes were at the core of their desired outcome in 
Vietnam.  Both sides were trapped by their conflicting interpretations of what 
‘national liberation’ and self-determination would mean for the people of 
Vietnam.   
The saga of Vietnam, repeated at least in part in many other situations 
such as Afghanistan, Angola, Guatemala and Czechoslovakia, illustrates well how 
self-determination was construed as a result of the Cold War.  It was used as a 
political tool when convenient, ignored when not and applied in ways that hardly                                                         
135 Live television interview with President Nixon, 1 July 1970, in FRUS, Nixon, Vol. 1, Doc. 67, 
[http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/i].   
  149 
reflected the concept’s liberal democratic origins.136  While this was hardly the 
first time in the concept’s history that such things had happened, the greater 
frequency of its use and the intensity of the different understandings of the 
concept meant that self-determination’s overall status during this period is 
harder to gauge.  Moreover, these Cold War applications and interpretations 
skewed the trajectory of the evolution of self-determination that was taking 
place within the UN system during the same time with the effect that the 
international community’s use and understanding of self-determination was 
inconsistent and somewhat incoherent.  While self-determination was 
increasingly recognized as a norm of international relations, owing to the 
contorting and stifling context of the Cold War, there were few situations where 
the interpretation and application of self-determination was relatively 
uncontested and widely supported. The most important of these was 
decolonisation.  
 
(iii) The’ special case’ of decolonisation 
 
At the simplest level, decolonisation was the process by which over two-
thirds of the world’s population moved from a situation in which they were 
governed by ‘others’ to a situation in which they became ‘self-governing’.  Many 
factors, both ideological and mundane, fuelled this process, but perhaps the 
greatest catalyst was the concept of self-determination.  As examples in earlier 
sections of this study indicated, there is a fundamental connection between 
nationalism, self-determination and self-government that propelled numerous 
revolutions and movements going back to at least the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and self-determination was the ideological basis that guided the first 
structured decolonisation in the British colonies in the early nineteenth century, 
the devolution of substantial authority to Canada, discussed below, and it 
continued to be used both by the decolonisers and by those seeking 
independence from that time on.  In short, despite the wide range of factors 
that played into the process, the debates over decolonisation were either 
explicitly or implicitly debates about the norm of self-determination.  However, 
many of those involved on both sides of this debate argued vociferously that there 
could be no active application of self-determination’s external aspect (i.e. 
independence or secession resulting in state fragmentation) outside of the 
context of decolonisation, making decolonisation something of a ‘special case’.                                                         
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Following the First World War, the leaders of the victorious countries, 
who faced seemingly endless emerging nationalist movements as they began to 
embrace the principle of self-determination, established the mandates system in 
Articles 22 and 23 of the League of Nations Covenant, which set out to create ‘a 
half-way house between outright annexation of former enemy colonial territory 
and the grant of immediate independence’.137  This system was deliberately 
paternalistic in its approach to non-self-governing territories, employing phrases 
such as ‘peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world’ when referring to the inhabitants of colonies.138  
The system also categorized colonies according to their ‘fitness for democracy’, 
classifying some colonies (those in category ‘C’ as being unlikely ever to achieve 
independence.  In addition to its paternalism, the mandates system applied only 
to colonies of the defeated powers and not to those administered by victorious 
countries.  It was, thus, always intended to be a ‘top-down’ process of 
decolonisation, however this institutionalized system of decolonisation occurred 
at the same time and both encouraged and was encouraged by the ‘ground-up’ 
movement for decolonisation in British and other European colonies. 
The dramatic change of Britain’s (and other European countries’) 
overseas empires in the mid-twentieth century is an epic topic, but a few details 
are extremely relevant here.  Despite the reluctance of many within Britain to 
grant independence or even greater autonomy to colonies, successive 
governments acknowledged and supported devolution of sovereign powers away 
from Westminster to dependent territories for nearly 100 years.  Since the 
Durham Report of 1839,139 Britain acknowledged that the granting of at least 
some control to colonies was the wisest course to ensure not only continued 
loyalty to the Crown but also stable and secure governance.  Since that time, 
with varying degrees of enthusiasm, the British Crown transferred more of the 
political administration and social control of its colonies to the populations who 
were the permanent inhabitants.140  One consequence of this was that in many 
territories, the permanent and/or indigenous population developed (or 
constructed) a national identity that accompanied the political systems that had 
been instituted.141  The effects of the First World War and the Great 
Depression accelerated both the top-down and the bottom-up motives for                                                         
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greater autonomy.  The mounting inability and the declining desire to govern 
that Britain and the other European colonisers exhibited combined with the 
increased demands and empowerment of the local intelligentsia for greater 
freedom.  However, prior to the Second World War, the transfers of sovereignty 
were modest in comparison with those that occurred during and following the 
conflict. 
During the Second World War, the issue of self-determination and 
decolonisation came up as soon as the war spread to the metropolitan powers.  
As France, Belgium and the Netherlands became occupied countries, the status 
of their overseas territories and populations came into question.  At the Havana 
Conference in 1940, the independent states of the Americas discussed the short-
term future of the European colonial possessions in the Caribbean.  As the 
states that governed these territories came under Nazi control or had no means 
of exercising sovereignty over their dependencies, important issues of succession 
arose.  Namely, the question was whether Germany could mount a justifiable 
claim over these territories, or, put another way, whether the United States and 
other neutral countries in the Western hemisphere could legitimately deny 
Germany access to the much desired assets in these colonies.  The Havana 
Declaration set in place a mechanism to govern these territories under a neutral 
‘trust’ for the duration of the war.  Although the Havana Declaration was not 
intended to bring about decolonisation, several states supported the Argentine 
motion to hold plebiscites to determine the long-term future of these territories 
in accordance with the wishes of the populations concerned, and the Havana 
discussions themselves increased internal agitation for independence and 
ensured decolonisation’s place on the post-war political agenda.142   
Another example of the unintended consequences of events during the 
war relates to the Atlantic Charter and its emphatic commitment to self-
determination.  Shortly after the Charter had been drafted the British Foreign 
Office commented on it, noting the possible practical pitfalls that such 
philosophical commitments might entail.  These remarks highlight a clear 
appreciation of the difficulties of giving self-determination normative status.  
The Foreign Office noted that Point One of the Charter, which denied any 
desire for territorial aggrandisement by the signatories, might prove 
uncomfortable for the United Kingdom in its colonial dealings, particularly if it 
chose to maintain a ‘protectorate’ over less developed territories at the end of 
the war.143  It was also pointed out that the implications of points two and three 
could cause serious problems as it was unlikely that many in the public,                                                         
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particularly in the US, understood the complexity of applying practically what 
had been agreed in principle. 144   
In addition to the concerns over claims within Europe related to self-
determination, there was great unease in many circles that the subject 
populations of Britain’s colonies might see in the Atlantic Charter an official 
endorsement of their aspirations for self-government or even independence.  
One of the most prominent of these voices of concern was Leo Amery, the 
Secretary of State for Colonies.145  These concerns proved well founded and were 
reflected in the popular press and within the House of Commons, where 
Churchill was forced to defend the Charter, noting that its provisions were 
intended to apply only to those countries currently under ‘the Nazi yoke’.146  
Although this answer satisfied some, it proved insufficient if not irritating and 
hypocritical to others, and it certainly failed to take account of the logic implied 
by the strong commitment to self-determination that the Charter represented.  
One of the leading supporters of decolonisation at this time was the 
United States.  The American commitment to self-determination grew as 
Roosevelt increasingly cast the war as a fight for fundamental liberties, and many 
Americans made the link between fighting for liberty in the struggle against the 
fascists and the liberation from colonial rule.  Vice President Wallace wanted 
the immediate granting of independence of the colonial areas held by all 
combatants at the end of the war and urged Roosevelt to press for this.  
Secretary of State Cordell Hull spoke of a ‘palpable surge’ for independence 
amongst colonial nations in Asia, and despite the obvious security dangers of 
endorsing independence in the Asia-Pacific area, the United States had been 
moving towards granting independence in the Philippines and made a formal 
declaration in 1942 that it would do so.147   
Hull concluded that the US should advocate a plan to encourage and 
facilitate decolonisation at the war’s end.  In preparation for the Moscow 
Conference of 1943, the US tabled a draft, joint declaration for the United 
Nations regarding ‘National Independence’.148  This document consciously built 
on the ideas contained in the Atlantic Charter, at first confirming that self-
government would be returned to ‘nations which have been forcibly deprived of 
independence’ following the war and then declaring that the ‘opportunity to 
achieve independence for those peoples who aspire to independence shall be                                                         
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preserved, respected, and made more effective’.  The draft declaration noted 
that this was a ‘particular pledge... of concern to all of the United Nations’ and 
stated that it would be ‘the duty and the purpose of each nation having political 
ties with colonial peoples...to fix, at the earliest practicable moments, dates 
upon which the colonial peoples shall be accorded the status of full 
independence within a system of general security’.  The draft also charged the 
United Nations ‘to assume with respect to all such peoples a special 
responsibility, analogous to that of the trustee or fiduciary’ and advocated the 
creation of a ‘Trusteeship Administration’ to manage this process.  It was Hull 
who seems to have coined the term ‘trusteeship’ and the idea gained much 
support during the conference, especially from the Soviets who, for their own 
reasons, sought to dismantle colonial territories.  However, owing to pressures 
from the UK, the draft declaration did not become a formal part of the 
concluding Protocol, but was instead held over for further discussion at a later 
stage. 
By the time that high-level discussions on colonies were renewed, just 
prior to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, American enthusiasm for extending 
the right of self-determination to decolonisation had cooled somewhat.  Two 
factors account for this: pressure from the United Kingdom and other colonisers 
in Europe and the growth of Cold War tensions between the US and the USSR.  
In a letter dated 3 August 1944, the US military’s Chief of Staff, General George 
C. Marshall wrote to the Secretary of State suggesting that discussion of the 
trusteeship scheme ‘should be postponed as the military situation is too fluid’.149  
Marshall highlighted the growing uncertainties of strategic situation in Asia and 
alluded to the tensions with the Soviet Union, noting that the political and 
military situation of the post-war world might make the granting of immediate 
independence to strategically vital territories unwise.  He also noted the need to 
maintain close ties with European countries, such as Britain and France, who 
held dependent territories and who would be reluctant to relinquish control.  In 
short, the Cold War mentality, which was daily hardening, began to affect policy 
related to self-determination, in this case with regard to colonial issues.  Here 
again, the pressing weight of practical considerations trumped the more 
philosophical force of self-determination, and while this correspondence reveals 
a clear commitment to the concept and its implications for decolonisation, the 
balancing act that was made for understandable political, economic and, above 
all, strategic reasons, looked like it would lead to a rather tightly circumscribed 
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norm.  As a result, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals contained no reference to a 
trusteeship system.   
However, this proved to be merely a delay, for at the San Francisco 
Conference in 1945, a more developed proposal by the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, France, and China (at this time still Nationalist) for a 
trusteeship system garnered widespread support.150  The main sticking points 
had to do with the scope of the trusteeship system, specifically whether existing 
colonies had to be incorporated and whether independence was the only 
outcome envisaged.  Not surprisingly, the existing metropolitan countries 
(France, the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands) argued for voluntary admission 
to the scheme and often pointed out that independence ‘was not the only way of 
promoting the development of dependent peoples’ and that the goal should be 
‘to promote development towards independence or self-government as may be 
appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its people’.151  
However, the shift in the attitude of Britain, France and the others is 
noteworthy, reflecting in part the acceptance of their weakened post-war 
condition and also there acquiescence to the moral arguments by the United 
States, the Soviet Union and a host of others.  The final wording of Chapters XI 
through XIII of the UN Charter reflected the compromise made in San 
Francisco: decolonisation was now an internationally sanctioned and 
institutionalized process, established through the Declaration on Non-Self-
Governing Territories (a euphemism for colonies) and the Trusteeship System, 
but this system was voluntary and employed only moral force to pressure 
colonial powers to achieve its ends.  It also reflected the force of the combined 
support for decolonisation by the Soviet Union and the US, although they did so 
for different ideological and strategic reasons. 
Over the next few years, a number of new states that had formerly been 
colonies (e.g. India, Pakistan, Burma/Myanmar) join the United Nations and 
began to increase the pressure for decolonisation within the General Assembly, 
which was reflected in a growing number of resolutions aimed at speeding the 
process.  General Assembly Resolution 637, passed in 1952 during the drafting of 
the International Bill of Rights, provided the strongest articulation yet of the 
drive for decolonisation, and, notably, it explicitly connected the decolonisation 
process with the right of self-determination.152  This resolution called upon all 
member states to uphold and promote the right of self-determination within 
Trust territories and in non-self-governing territories alike, and it advocated the                                                         
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use of plebiscites, the promotion of indigenous leadership to administrative 
posts and other mechanisms as a means to achieve the desired end of full 
independence. 
By 1960, following the admission of yet more new states to the UN, most 
of which had formerly been colonies, the tone of the General Assembly was 
noticeably more militant.  The alteration to the composition of the General 
Assembly created not only a political and moral force but also numerical one 
that unified to create Resolution 1514, ‘The Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’.153  This strongly worded 
resolution condemned colonialism and alien subjugation as contrary to human 
rights, affirmed that the right of self-determination applied to all peoples 
including those within colonies, called on colonial administrators to take 
‘immediate steps…to transfer all powers to the people of those territories, 
without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed 
will and desire...’.  Thus, by 1960 a connection between self-determination and 
the process of decolonisation was made a formal part of the international system 
and its scope was beginning to extend to territories that were not originally part 
of the Trusteeship system.  
This connection was strengthened and evolved gradually through a string 
of resolutions over the next ten years, during which time the pace of 
decolonisation quickened.  These General Assembly resolutions displayed a 
forceful tone that reflected the frustration of many states that desired a more 
rapidly paced end to colonial rule.  For example, Resolution 1541 sought to 
enlarge the situations in which the Trusteeship system applied and to increase 
the pressure on metropolitan states, and it employed the moral force of self-
determination to accomplish this.154   
Similarly in Resolution 2131, passed in 1965, the General Assembly 
denounced the interference by outside countries in the affairs of newly 
independent countries and called upon all states to recognize and respect the 
right of self-determination for the purpose of achieving independence and ‘the 
complete elimination of discrimination and colonialism in all its forms and 
manifestations’.155 Resolutions 2621 and 2649 of 1970 affirmed the right of 
colonial peoples to struggle to achieve self-determination ‘by all means available’ 
and 2649 called upon all countries to lend assistance to those struggling for 
independence.156  These and other resolutions employed language accepting and 
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promoting ‘national liberation’157 and the ‘crime’ against humanity that 
colonialism reflected.158 
By the mid-1970s, there was virtually no opposition remaining to 
decolonisation in either the UN or in the international community more 
generally, not least because there were so few non-self-governing territories left.  
The right of self-determination championed originally by the US and the USSR 
had seemingly found an acceptable normative outlet, where the difficulties about 
applicability and limits seemed to clash less with the strategic and ideological 
objectives of both superpowers despite the differences between their 
interpretations of the concept.  In addition to this, for a range of political, 
economic, emotional and moral reasons, the states that had been least likely or 
were openly unwilling to extend the right of self-determination to the 
decolonisation process immediately following the Second World War were far 
more inclined to accept it as the middle decades of the twentieth century wore 
on.  By the late 1960s, France, the United Kingdom, and Belgium, for example, 
were either passively accepting or were actively assisting the fragmentation of 
what had previously been their sovereign territory.159  For all these reasons, 
decolonisation appeared to be a very special case indeed. 
However, the application of self-determination for decolonisation was a 
special case for two other reasons beyond this.  Firstly, it was the one area where 
the right of self-determination was accepted as applying in extremis, meaning it 
not only included a right of secession but, in fact, assumed that secession was 
the legitimate and expected outcome of its exercise.  As the foregoing sections 
have tried to reveal, throughout most of the history and the debates about self-
determination within the community of states, the assumption has been that 
secession was either illegitimate or an exception to the exercise of the right.  
Decolonisation seemed to turn this assumption on its head.  
Secondly, and more importantly, the use of self-determination in the 
context of decolonisation seemed at odds with the more human rights oriented 
normative model that had been simultaneously evolving within the UN system.  
The greatest point of difference between this emerging view of self-
determination and decolonisation was decolonisation’s prioritization of ‘national 
liberation’ over the rights of individuals as well as groups within the new states.  
In a way this is surprising because the tone of the arguments against colonial 
empires was overtly moral, presenting decolonisation as bringing to an end to 
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what had been roundly declared a hideous institution and a large-scale violation 
of human rights. 
To be sure, much of the motivation for decolonisation was based around 
human rights oriented arguments and many condemnations of colonialism in 
UN instruments and resolutions indicate this.  The text of Article 73 and 76 of 
the UN Charter, dealing with the Trustee Council and non-self-governing 
territories focuses on the benefits to be gained from democratic institutions and 
protection of fundamental human rights, placing these concerns at the highest 
level.  Moreover, the ethos behind the charge given to the administering powers 
is to act in the best interests of the individuals within non-self-governing 
territories and to promote the ‘political, social, economic and educational 
advancement of the inhabitants’ above all else.  Numerous General Assembly 
resolutions related to self-determination had reiterated this as well, particularly 
Resolution 648, which laid out the standards that would indicate whether 
independence had been achieved.160  In the second part of the annex of this 
resolution, democratic standards of government, including equality of 
citizenship, protections of ethnic and cultural rights of minorities and the 
promotion of social and economic advancement of all inhabitants are listed as 
indicators of and requirements for granting independence.   
Resolution 1514, the landmark ‘Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’,161 also indicated a need to 
establish inclusive, humane governance in the newly established states.  This 
resolution sets out clearly that ‘alien subjugation, domination and exploitation’ 
are the specific wrongs of colonial administration that are to be reversed with 
the establishment of government based on the right of self-determination and 
the ‘free’ institutions and practices that will follow.  Similarly, Resolution 2131 
prohibited outside interference in the affairs of newly established countries, so 
as to protect their ‘national identity’, the inalienable right of peoples within a 
territory to determine their own future and to promote the new state’s social, 
economic and political advancement.162  Likewise, Resolution 2144, while 
specifically condemning the regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, 
sought the broader aim of ending the kind of human rights violations that the 
perpetuation of colonialism engendered.163 
However, the actual process of decolonisation as encouraged, legitimized 
and recognized by the UN and various member states at this time did not 
adhere closely to these contemporaneous understandings and statements about                                                         
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self-determination, or, for that matter, to the one advocated in Part I of this 
analysis, and instead gave priority to other concerns, chiefly to territorial 
integrity.   
In virtually every case of decolonisation, ‘national liberation’ was 
somewhat of a misnomer in that many colonies could not readily claim 
continuity between borders and nationality owing to shifting or arbitrarily 
created boundaries.  While many colonial territories had recognizable, politically 
active and engaged PIFGs, few had developed a coherent and pervasive national 
identity, and of the more developed colonial nationalities, very few were 
sufficiently inclusive or permeable to encompass the often incredibly diverse 
PIFGs that were within the borders they inherited from their colonial past.164  
Again, while circumstances such as these were not totally unprecedented during 
the creation of new states, the scale of decolonisation was so great and the 
failure to address sufficiently the issue of identity and rights was so considerable 
that decolonisation presented unprecedented challenges.  Given this, greater 
attention by the international community to a coherent and consistently applied 
norm of self-determination might have given greater shape and logic to the 
process.   
Instead, territorial integrity, based on the norm of uti possidetis juris, 
played the authoritative role in defining most the territories and, somewhat 
inadvertently, the ‘nations’ to be ‘liberated’.  The principle of uti possidetis juris 
was applied in the decolonisation process in South America during the early 
nineteenth century and stipulated that newly independent countries should 
conform to previously extant borders, even if these territorial boundaries failed 
to account for differences between PIFGs.  This norm almost certainly solved 
many practical difficulties related to decolonisation, but the concept, which is 
fundamentally legal, ignores entirely the essential issues related to identity and 
the ethical basis of government discussed in Part I above by assuming that one, 
unified nationality exists in the territory in question, and that if not, either a 
nationality can be constructed readily or that nationality and identity is or can 
be made irrelevant to the process of state formation.  The net effect of this was 
that many newly created states faced the challenge of building a state without 
any binding national identity, or, worse, with competing identities that could 
not be reconciled easily.   
The troubled and all too often violent post-colonial histories of Nigeria, 
Sudan, Iraq, the Congo and Indonesia, to name but a few, reflect the short-                                                        
164 India was an excellent example of this latter situation, as the was a discernable and growing 
sense of an ‘Indian nationality’ prior to independence but even this (largely) constructed and 
relatively permeable identity was not broad enough to incorporate all PIFGs in the sub-
continent as became painfully clear as independence beckoned. 
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sightedness of granting or recognizing independence in a way that privileged 
territorial considerations while paying scant attention to the complexities of 
national identity and PIFGs that exist on the ground.165  In most of these 
examples, the international community and the administering power made few 
efforts to obtain information related to the PIFGs within each of the countries 
or, when that information was known, they avoided using it to guide the process 
of decolonisation, opting instead to deal with and recognize whatever ‘national’ 
leaders with whom they were confronted.  While these indigenous leaders were 
frequently popular (e.g. Mobuto, Sukarno, Nkruma) and sometimes reflected the 
will of the peoples within their territories, the nationalism they inspired was 
often centred on them and their vision of the country and did not account for 
the diversity of identities and aspirations of individuals within the territories or 
these groups’ aspirations.  
Even where efforts were made in good faith to understand the 
demographic complexities and to blend this with an accounting of the genuinely 
expressed will of the population in question, difficulties persisted.  To take one, 
fairly representative example, in his masterful, contemporaneous study of self-
determination and decolonisation, Rupert Emerson examined the twisted and 
fraught process that eventually led to the creation Togo and Ghana.166  Emerson 
notes how the Trust territories of British Togoland, Gold Coast and French 
Togoland each lacked anything approaching a national identity and how the 
borders of these colonies carved across the increasingly assertive ethnic Ewe 
people.  Despite this and the fact that the British had governed their two Trust 
territories in a manner that frequently ignored the existing colonial boundaries, 
the UN Trusteeship Council pressed heavily to move each colony toward 
independence separately, weakening the viability of each while building in ethnic 
and linguistic minorities without regard to their status.   
In response, the British and the French sought to apply the right of self-
determination actively through the use of plebiscites, but the perennial 
difficulties of assessing ‘the peoples’ wishes’ frustrated these efforts.  Firstly, the 
plebiscites were administered only within the existing territorial boundaries, 
thereby delivering a gerrymandered result by dividing up ethnic enclaves.  In 
short, no one had determined who ‘the people’ were before asking what ‘they’ 
wanted.  Secondly, because two European countries administered these three 
separate colonies, coordination was haphazard at best between the French and 
the British, leading to the rapid, unilateral granting of independence to French                                                         
165 See Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa, and Alexis Heraclides, The Self-determination of 
Minorities in International Politics (London: Frank Cass, 1991) for insight into many such cases.  
166 Emerson, From Empire to Nation, 320-328. 
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Togoland.  This lack of coordination and guidance by the international 
community and the Trusteeship Council’s insistence upon territorial boundaries 
cannot account entirely for the instability Ghana and Togo experienced in their 
first decades of sovereign statehood but it certainly contributed to it.  What is 
certain is that it was, at best, a partial application of the liberal democratic 
components of self-determination. 
More importantly, the decolonisation process deviated most from the 
normative framework of self-determination suggested in Part I by giving limited 
attention to human rights protection in the post-colonial states.  As noted 
before, the UN resolutions and many statements from governments presumed 
that decolonisation per se would advance human rights, but, despite the 
tremendous improvement that self-government promised, many post-colonial 
states failed to improve the human rights of their inhabitants.  This was 
particularly the case in states that contained PIFGs that were either minorities 
or that were majorities but not dominant in the post-colonial state.  In the 
resolutions and actions aimed at ushering in decolonisation, the international 
community neglected to insist upon or even encourage specific protections for 
these groups as a condition for recognition and took few steps if any to ensure 
that decolonisation would enhance the well-being of those groups and 
individuals after sovereignty was transferred.  By failing to connect fully and 
forcefully the right of self-determination to the protection of human rights, the 
international community missed a significant opportunity to shape the future of 
these countries and to strengthen the norm of self-determination that was 
taking shape.  While the failure to seize this chance is explicable given the other 
competing forces and norms affecting this remarkable transformation of the 
geopolitical landscape, this missed opportunity also affected the internal 
development of many newly created countries.  
In Resolution 2131, the General Assembly reiterated the long-standing 
principle of non-intervention, condemned any armed intervention as an act of 
aggression and outlawed all forms of direct and indirect interference in the 
political, economic and social arrangements within newly created (and all other) 
states.167  This prohibition, repeated numerous times, was intended to 
strengthen nascent states, but the assertion of the principle of sovereignty and 
non-interference also had the effect of solidifying these often arbitrary and 
problematic boundaries and strengthening governments that frequently did little 
to protect let alone enhance the rights and well-being of their citizens.   
                                                        
167 UN, A/Res.2131 (1966). 
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Even where the stability of borders was a strategic necessity or a 
practically sound decision, the repeated, vehement assertions of the absolute 
inviolability of domestic affairs weakened the case for legitimate humanitarian 
interventions as well as for less invasive attempts to enforce existing human 
rights mechanisms.  It also reduced the force of normative arguments to support 
and ensure the rights of non-dominant PIFGs and individuals within newly 
independent states.  While many new states strived to be inclusive and to ensure 
meaningful participation in the public life of the state for all citizens while also 
respecting and promoting their rights within the private sphere, the record 
indicates that far too many emerging nationalist movements in the post-colonial 
world did not follow this path and that this was a direct causal factor in 
numerous insurrections and movements for secession in the post-colonial era.168 
This situation is essentially what Nigel Harris defined as ‘perverse 
national liberation’169 and what Michla Pomerance identified as ‘the new UN law 
of self-determination’ in her scathing critique of the management of 
decolonisation170.  Too much of the decolonisation process fits exactly Harris’ 
definition of perverse national liberation in that it imposed ‘subordination on 
the inhabitants of a territory, not emancipation’171.  In Pomerance’s view, the 
national liberations that were deemed acceptable by the UN under the banner of 
self-determination are troubling on many fronts but not least because many of 
them are not democratic.  As she points out: 
 
Not to a disturbing extent, the ‘new UN law’ exploits the democratic 
penumbra and respectability of ‘self-determination’ while scorning the 
essence of the democratic credo...in the ‘new UN law of self-
determination’, however, democratic methods have always been strictly 
subordinate to the attainment of often preconceived ‘non-colonial’ 
results.172   
 
One is tempted to reach the conclusion that the various peoples within 
colonies were accorded better protections of their human rights under colonial 
rule than they were following independence.  Without a doubt, ‘self-rule’ 
sometimes delivered fewer protections of human rights and less beneficial 
outcomes than what was experienced under colonial administration, thereby 
failing the well-being standard on which self-determination’s philosophical core 
rests.  Although there were tremendous benefits that flowed from the numerous                                                         
168 See Ralph Predmas, et al., eds., Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective (London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1990) and Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1985). 
169 Nigel Harris, National Liberation (London: I.B. Taurus, 1990). 
170 Michla Pomerance, Self-determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine in the United Nations 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982). 
171 Harris, National Liberation, 225. 
172 Pomerance, Self-determination, 75. 
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transfers of sovereignty, many of these transfers ought to have been managed 
very differently or, at the extreme, should not have happened at all, if, as Part I 
suggested, the legitimacy of self-determination is based on the improvement of 
human rights, the development of humane governance and the fulfilment of 
individuals within the new state.  While the capacity and the will of the 
international community to effect such a decision were both absent during the 
process, the position merits discussion.  
To be sure, this is an unpopular argument, and it was unpopular during 
the era of decolonisation when it was known as ‘the Belgian thesis’.  This thesis 
was posited during the 1950s by the Belgian government, which argued that, 
while it was not entirely opposed to granting independence to its colonies, it 
remained sceptical of the endeavour, as it was likely to significantly drop the 
quality of government and perhaps even lead to systematic violations of human 
rights.  As one Belgian diplomat put it in 1950, if self-determination were applied 
quickly within territories such as the Congo ‘the people would elect chiefs who 
would deprive them of many of the human rights accorded by the authorities 
responsible for their administration.’173  Although the Belgian thesis has been 
rightly condemned as a desperate defence of a dying system and as an assertion 
that was almost certainly disingenuous,174 it remains true that there were few 
efforts to place human rights standards ahead of the rush to decolonise, thereby 
calling into question the extent to which the concept of self-determination was 
actually employed during decolonisation and what this meant for the evolution 
of the norm.  As Snyder warns, the ‘democratic’ transfer of authority can be 
disastrous in areas where there are multiple PIFGs, uncertain power structures 
and a limited infrastructure for human rights and humane governance, yielding 
results that stand in stark contrast to the intended democratic aims.175 
The international community did not apply the right of self-
determination during decolonisation in a way that ensured ‘national liberation’ 
would lead to clear and discernible improvement in the lives of all inhabitants of 
all of the newly created states.  By not seeking more complex and more dynamic 
solutions to the challenges of emerging nationalism, including the controversial 
possibility of not recognizing or not facilitating independence, the international 
community and the administering powers, at the least, missed an opportunity 
and, at worst, failed to live up to the ‘sacred trust’ they were charged to fulfil.  By 
opting for rapid, territorially delimited transfers of sovereignty, the international 
community and the colonisers built in many problems.                                                            
173 UN, A/C.3/SR.310 (1950). 
174 Emerson, From Empire to Nation, 309-311; UN, A/C.3/SR.402 (1952) and A/Res.1514 (1960).  
175 Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), particularly Chapter 6. 
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On top of this, decolonisation caused the international community to 
focus on the denial of self-determination in just one category of non-self-
governing peoples, namely those ruled from afar, the so-called ‘salt-water’ or 
‘blue-water’ colonies, while losing sight of the denial of self-determination to 
PIFGs within established states.  The was limited international attention 
directed to festering questions about the plight of, for example, the Kurdish 
people, the Basques or the native people in Central America, all of which, in 
addition to damaging human rights standards domestically, threatened the 
stability of international relations in these regions.176  Again, if the great evil of 
colonialism was abuse of rights and a denial of internal self-determination, then 
the physical distances between those suffering and those committing the abuses 
should be irrelevant.   
Decolonisation, like the Cold War and the formation of the United 
Nations system, had a profound impact on the evolution the norm of self-
determination.  Over the course of the late-twentieth century, self-
determination was, at various times, an official war aim, a founding principle of 
United Nations Organization, a peremptory norm of the UN human rights 
regime, a justification for national liberation and for the struggle against racist 
regimes and a major point of division between the superpowers as well as one of 
their most cherished principles.  Also during this time the international 
community’s interpretation and application of the right of self-determination, in 
some important ways at least, moved closer to the model outlined in Part I of 
this study, however, this overall trajectory of its evolution was dominated by the 
ideological and strategic limitations of the Cold War.   
However, the contextual transformations wrought by the end of the Cold 
War, the stuttered search for a ‘New World Order’ and a dramatic upsurge of 
emerging nationalist activity and the fragmentation of states in the early 1990s 
ushered in a new chapter in the history of the right of self-determination.  Once 
again, a change in the context of international affairs led to new approaches to 
self-determination and nationality, but the contextual shift that came at end of 
the Cold War was uniquely transforming.  The expansion of liberal democratic 
ideas and practices, the resurgence of concern for human rights, the elimination 
of many crippling strategic constraints and the growth of identity-based political 
agitation all served as catalysts for a dramatic increase of nationalist challenges 
to existing states.  Within the span of one decade, the concept of self-                                                        
176 The United Nations did investigate many situations like these, but the attention of the 
organisation was limited mostly to studies as opposed to action of a concrete nature.  One study 
that not only reviews the history of some of these problems but also implicitly reveals the limited 
nature of international action during this time is Jose R. Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of 
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations (New York: United Nations, 1987). 
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determination evolved as much as it had in the previous five.  Part III examines 
the contextual shift and selected events that followed the demise of the Cold 
War to discern more clearly the current status of the norm. 
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Part III – Praxis 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Towards coherent normative responses? –Self-determination and 
emerging nationalism in the post-Cold War era 
 
The end of the Cold War was one of the most surprising and 
transforming events of the twentieth century.  It was surprising in the sense that 
it came so soon on the heels of a nearly decade-long escalation of tensions 
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; because it ended so rapidly and in 
no small part owing to genuinely democratic action, and because it involved, 
relatively speaking, extremely limited bloodshed.  It was transforming in that it 
not only led to an immediate redrawing of the map of Central and Eastern 
Europe (and eventually of other parts of the globe) but also because it reshaped 
the theoretical assumptions on which the international community rested, 
altered the economic and social patterns of trade, finance and business and 
changed the strategic priorities of the international agenda. 
The history of these remarkable events will be touched upon but only to 
show how certain events, ideas and forces coalesced to bring about to this 
dramatic contextual shift in international society and how these, in turn, 
affected the evolution of self-determination.  The first section of Part III 
highlights how the sudden demise of the Cold War’s ideological and strategic 
constraints created an environment that cultivated demands for new political 
arrangements within states and challenged global norms about territorial 
boundaries, sovereignty and intervention.  On the theoretical level, liberal 
democratic principles became far more significant, evidenced by a rapidly 
growing global respect for human rights, humane governance and democratic 
practices.  This was accompanied by the spread of economic liberalization and 
an increased faith in international institutions and global approaches to problem 
solving.  The more tangible aspects of this new international environment 
stemmed above all from the near-total alteration of the strategic realities that 
had so tightly bound political and military action during the Cold War.  
Suddenly, institutions that had been sedentary became active, others 
were transformed or disappeared and new ones were created as patterns and 
structures of power shifted, all of which produced a new dialogical space in 
which genuinely collective, international institutions, norms and action could be 
created, but, at the same time, this dialogical space also transformed the situation 
of many of Primary Identity Forming Groups (PIFGs), some of which yearned 
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for the opportunity to promote their cause and found in this new context 
tangible enhancements to help them achieve their aims.  For many leaders 
caught up in this, with the demise of previously existing conditions and loyalties, 
the appeal of ‘identity’, real or imagined, new or ancient, became a magnetic 
force that could be employed to unite and motivate their peoples.  The net 
effect of these forces and the resulting contextual shift was an increase in the 
relevance of self-determination and emerging nationalism in world politics, 
leading to rapid and dramatic evolution in the international community’s 
understanding and application of self-determination as a norm.  While this new 
context presented opportunities to construct a normative framework that 
adhered closely to the more coherent understanding of the concept outlined in 
Part I of this examination, the momentous upheaval of the new paradigm meant 
that the competition with other political realities and norms, many of which 
were newly created or undergoing a similar process of adaptation, was perhaps 
even greater than it had been in the past.  Putting it another way, just as the 
dialogical space was opening up to discussions that might clarify self-
determination in a positive way, the space got a lot more crowded. 
Building on the general contextual observations in section (i), the middle 
sections of the chapter critically review a few aspects of two examples of 
emerging nationalism since the end of the Cold War, both from the region that 
experienced the greatest amount of state creation since 1989, Eastern Europe.  
The aim is not to give a narrative of these events, a comprehensive analysis of 
the international involvement in these movements or to narrow the perspective 
to just one region.  Instead, the aim is to highlight the specific elements within 
these international responses that indicate the general trajectory of the norm of 
self-determination in the post-Cold War era.  The international responses and 
debate surrounding each of them in their own way serve as guideposts marking 
the shape and trajectory of self-determination’s most recent evolution and 
indicating in what ways and how completely the responses conform to the more 
coherent normative framework outlined in Part I.   
The final and longest section of this chapter explores the case of Kosovo 
and the international actions and reactions to the events there.  Over the past 
ten years, these responses have led to a contested, quasi-independence, in which 
state Kosovo currently finds itself.  Without a doubt, Kosovo is the best 
illustration of the current position of the evolution of self-determination, not 
least because it demonstrates well the limits of consensus on the meaning and 
application of the norm but also because the international involvement in 
Kosovo represents, by most any measure, the international community’s most 
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extensive intervention into a case of emerging nationalism, at least, since the ‘fall 
of the Wall’ if not ever.   
 
(i) Theoretical and tangible changes to the context of international relations 
 
The end of the Cold War created a new environment in which 
international relations took place, and the alteration to the established context 
of political, social and economic interactions across defined borders was 
dramatic and transforming.  While not all of these changes are relevant to the 
evolution of self-determination, many are important to note.  Although these 
changes represented a sometimes jarring fusion of high-minded ideas and base 
realities, the transformations can be broken down roughly into those that were 
predominately theoretical and those that were more tangible and concrete. 
One very pronounced theoretical change was an upsurge of liberal 
democratic ideas and practices.  Within just a few years after the Cold War 
ended, public discourse throughout the international community was steeped in 
the vocabulary of liberal democracy if not actually reflective of a genuine, 
growing commitment to its principles.  Even when states such as Myanmar, 
Zimbabwe and Cuba defend illiberal and un-democratic practices today, the 
most common arguments they offer tend to reflect rather and reject the 
language of liberal democracy.1  Although Thomas Franck’s conviction that a 
normative right to liberal democratic governance had emerged by 1992 was 
overstated, the last seventeen years have seen a dramatic, global spread of the 
very liberal democratic ideas and practices that he outlined, at least suggesting 
that his conclusion might have greater credibility now, and however incomplete 
and qualified the growth of liberal democracy, there is no comparable ideological 
alternative to oppose it on the global stage today.2  Thus, while a ‘right of 
democratic governance’ has not fully taken shape either as a norm or in practice 
and while there remains a sizable gap between the rhetoric of democracy and its 
reality since 1989, it is accurate to conclude that an imperative for states to 
                                                        
1 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Government 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 12-14, considers the ‘democratic’ language of such states as 
reflecting what he terms ‘one-party democracy’, which is anything but liberal.  While such states 
in their acts and structure fit his typology, their rhetoric is more aligned to that of liberal 
democracy, which has become the lingua franca of international relations since the end of the 
Cold War.  For example, rarely do states or leaders deny liberal democratic obligations such as 
free elections, human and civil rights protections or press freedom, instead giving the appearance 
of adhering to such standards. 
2 Thomas M. Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, American Journal of 
International Law, 86 (1992). 
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ensure ‘meaningful participation’ has become more pronounced in the post-Cold 
War era.3   
While democracy’s increased global appeal in the post-Cold War era has 
not always brought with it a uniform commitment to all aspects of liberal 
democracy, one facet of liberalism, economic freedom and faith in ‘the market’, 
has experienced undisputed global uptake.  Few transformations in world history 
have been as dramatic or as rapid as the globalization of the world economy 
since the end of the Cold War.  The massive growth of liberal, market-oriented 
policies is not difficult to quantify:  world trade has mushroomed, far more than 
doubling in the 1990s,4 regional trade agreements have spread to literally every 
part of the globe and have increase six fold in the past twenty years,5 capital 
flows freely and in staggering quantities,6 and the absolute number of people 
living on less than one dollar per day has dropped dramatically, in no small part 
owing to the globalization of the free market during this time.7 
Measuring the impact of these changes on self-determination is difficult, 
but they have acted both as a stimulant and a deterrent to emerging nationalism.  
The spread of free-market economics and the resulting boost to the global 
economy has made it easier for nationalities to become economically 
independent, thereby increasing the likelihood of their political independence or 
autonomy.  In brief, it has never been easier ‘to go it alone’.  Of course, 
globalization also dissuades potential secessionists, as there may be little 
economic incentive to separate when economic liberalization has reduced the 
comparative advantage of independence.8  Nonetheless, the growth of free 
markets has probably been more of a spur to demands for self-determination 
than a hurdle.   
Economic liberalism has had an impact on sovereignty as well.  As 
financial and trade integration expanded throughout the 1990s, discussions 
about the erosion of state sovereignty, some of which had been common in                                                         
3 Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder rightly warn that democratization does not necessarily lead 
to either peace or increased respect for human rights and often to the opposite of these.  See 
Mansfield and Snyder, ‘Democratization and War’, Foreign Affairs, 73:4 (1995) and Snyder, From 
Voting to Violence (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000). 
4 WTO, World Merchandise Exports, 1994-2004. [http://www.wto.org/English/res_e/statis_e/its 
2006_e/its06_bysubject_e.htm]; WTO, World Commercial Services Exports, 1995-2005. 
[http://www.wto.org/English/res_e/statis_e/its2006_e/its06_bysubject_e.htm]. 
5 World Bank, Global Economics Prospects 2005: Trade, Regionalism and Development (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2004), xi. 
6 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006, Key Data from Annex; FDI inflows and FDI stock 
outflow. [http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3277&lang=1]. 
7 David Dollar, ‘Globalization, Inequality and Poverty since 1980’, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper, 3333, (2004), 12-14. [http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTD 
EC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTMACROECO/0,,menuPK:477880~pagePK:6421
0511~piPK:64210513~theSitePK:477872,00.html] 
8 To use Viva Ona Bartkus’ language, these shifts have both lowered ‘the costs of membership’ 
and raised ‘the benefits of secession’ for groups. See Bartkus, The Dynamics of Secession 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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Europe for twenty years, also globalized.  Economic liberalization forced states 
to open boundaries and to loosen their grip on economic controls, which are, 
after all, a key element of sovereignty.  While there may be a limited causal link 
between the decline of economic and political sovereignty, there is little room to 
deny that, regardless of the causes, some of the political aspects of sovereignty 
do not appear as ‘rigid’ as they did before 1989 and that this alteration represents 
a shift in the context of international relations that is very relevant to self-
determination.  
In his Agenda for Peace,9 UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
pointed out that ‘[t]he time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty…has passed; 
its theory was never matched by reality.’10  As a UN study on sovereignty 
released shortly after the publication of the Agenda clarified, ‘a shift in 
perceptions seems to be underway, suggesting that there may be limits to 
national sovereignty when human rights are grossly violated.’11  This shift of 
perceptions had been noted by Boutros-Ghali’s predecessor, Javier Pérez de 
Cuellar, who felt that sovereignty and non-interference ‘cannot be regarded as a 
protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or 
systematically violated with impunity.’12  Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the UN 
Charter denies the right of the United Nations to interfere ‘in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’, however, since the end 
of the Cold War, this position seems more assailable, at least when a connection 
to human rights is made, even if the threat to international security is not 
immediately clear.13   
While there is limited evidence of an emerging international duty or 
norm to intervene in the domestic affairs of a state to address human rights 
abuse or to correct the denial of democratic rights, the post-Cold War era has 
seen a vastly elevated concern for human rights abuse within states and a 
connection being made between the failure to protect human rights and 
sovereignty, a connection that should be made, as Chapter 2 of this study 
contended.  The United Nations’ interventions in Rwanda, Iraq (in 1991 to assist 
the Kurds), Haiti, and (to an extent) Darfur, to name but a few, indicate that 
human rights abuse can trigger the intervention of the international community 
within the established borders of a sovereign state even when the case for 
international stability is rather weak and/or when the state’s explicit approval is                                                         
9 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, A/47/277, (New York: United Nations, 1992). 
10 Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, para. 17. 
11 United Nations (UN), ‘The Limits of Sovereignty’, DPI/1178 (February 1992). 
12 Javier Pérez de Cuellar, quoted in UN, ‘Sovereignty’, 1. 
13 Paul Taylor, ‘The United Nations in the 1990s: Proactive Comopolitanism and the Issue of 
Sovereignty’, Political Studies, 47 (1999). 
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not entirely forthcoming.14  This reprioritization of human rights has also been 
accompanied by a shift in attitude amongst humanitarian non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and, more recently, at the governmental level, away from 
neutral, dispassionate, ‘need-based’ intervention that aims to alleviate the effects 
of suffering to targeted, ‘rights-based’ intervention that advocates particular 
outcomes which were deemed to be more humane and aims to correct the 
conditions causing the suffering.15  The renewed concern for human rights and 
the greater willingness to engage in humanitarian interventionism in the post-
Cold War era constitutes an important opportunity for reifying those elements 
of the norm of self-determination that was taking shape within the UN system 
before the end of the Cold War, which were traced out in Chapter 4.  However, 
while there is increased potential for this happening on the normative level in the 
post-Cold War era, as later sections of this chapter attest, not all aspects of this 
potential have been realised. 
Another component of the shifting context of international affairs of the 
post-Cold War period that relates directly to self-determination is the upsurge 
of identity politics.  This shift occurred on both the theoretical and the tangible 
level, and it is one that interlinks with the increased concern for human rights 
that occurred at this time.  The demise of Cold War presented many PIFGs 
with ripe opportunities to assert themselves politically, economically and socially 
within and frequently against the state in which they found themselves.  In the 
early 1990s, this was frequently described as ‘the lid coming off’, suggesting that 
that the Cold War has somehow contained ethnic, religious and cultural hatreds 
that were ‘waiting to boil over’.  Although many rightly suggested this account 
was too simplistic,16 the Cold War not only barred the genuine expression of 
many non- or sub-state PIFGs but the Cold War also created an odd status quo 
that shoved many real issues of identity within established states to the side.  
Not surprisingly, when the conditions that created this status quo came to an end, 
the issues surrounding identity were unlikely to evaporate.  Helped by the 
changed agenda of the international community after 1989, the protection of 
rights of PIFGs emerged as a normative focus of the international community in 
the 1990s, while at the same time, the absence of the Cold War’s strategic, 
political, economic and cultural agenda, identity emerged as a new filter through 
which many peoples surveyed the political and strategic landscape.                                                           
14 For a range of examples, see Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides, eds., United Nations 
Interventionism, 1991-2004 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
15 Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul, Chapter 2. 
16 A good example is Rogers Brubaker, ‘Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism’ 
in Margaret Moore, ed., National Self-determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998). 
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One of the first developments on the normative level came from the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later the OCSE) in 
the concluding document of the Copenhagen meeting in 1990 on the ‘human 
dimensions’ of the CSCE17, which suggested a broad definition of such 
concerned groups along the lines of PIFGs and took the human rights based 
approach to establish rights of national minorities, and, in doing so, outlined the 
very hierarchy of rights advocated in Part I.  This was followed in 1992 by the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities18, which ensures protections of 
PIFGs in a way that had not been fleshed out in Article 27 of the ICCPR.19  
There has also been an expansion of claims from and attentions given to 
‘indigenous’ groups.  Despite the difficulties of differentiating between the 
ethical value of ‘indigenous claims’, as opposed to ‘minority’ and ‘human rights 
claims’, the United Nations has been active on such matter since 1989, declaring 
1993 the ‘International Year of the World’s Indigenous Peoples’, commissioning 
several reports on the subject, declaring 1995-2004 as the ‘International Decade 
of the World’s Indigenous People’, and, most importantly, drafting and recently 
passing the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People.20  As such, issues of 
indigineity are part of the overall increase in identity politics that is a 
distinguishing characteristic of international landscape of the post-Cold War 
era. 
Regardless of the impact of such documents on the normative level, the 
tangible impact of the increased salience of identity politics was palpable and 
immediate as the Cold War drew to a close.  Anthony Smith has speculated that 
nationalism, which in many ways hastened the end of the Cold War and then 
flourished after its demise, was not caused by globalization but, instead, helped 
to give meaning to people’s lives as their identities became assaulted and 
contested in an ever-shrinking world.21  In a similar vein, Lijphart also contends 
that the decreased salience of ideological conflict has led to a re-emergence of 
identity cleavages, which, Lijphart concludes, are less salient than others, but 
more persistent.22  As the Cold War’s strategic and ideological milieu 
disintegrated, the significance of identity politics became more evident, and                                                         
17 CSCE, Document on the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimensions of the CSCE 
29 June 1990 [http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/1990/06/13992_en.pdf] 
18 UN, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, A/Res./47/135 (1992) 
19 See Appendix C. 
20 See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), Fact 
Sheet No. 9, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples [http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs9.htm], which 
outlines all these developments and extracts from the Declaration are in Appendix F. 
21 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism in a Global Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), vii. 
22 Arendt Lijphart, ‘Ethnic Conflict in the West’, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 
eds., Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 258-261. 
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while identity politics is not necessarily violent, it does, orient politics around 
‘relatively non-tradable issues.  Nationality, language, territorial homelands and 
culture are not easily bargained over.  They create zero-sum conflicts, and 
therefore provide ideal materials for political entrepreneurs interested in 
creating or dividing political constituencies.’23  Thus, in the search for new 
sources of political, cultural and ideological capital that the end of the Cold War 
created, identity politics has had a natural and irresistible logic. 
However, such appeals have to be authentic, in the sense that attempts to 
motivate groups have to resonate with individual member’s belief in the shared 
identity.  Again, Smith is instructive: a movement’s success ‘depends on specific 
cultural and historical contexts’.24  In other words, attempts to foster identity 
politics without a believable and/or sufficiently incentivised method to elicit 
support will most likely flounder, but as Part I posited, identity formation can 
and does often rest on myth, distorted history and propagated traditions and 
modalities, and as the chronology of the post-Cold War era indicates, many 
leaders, governmental or otherwise, found ample sources on which to base their 
actions, be it ‘common heritage’, ‘brotherhood’ or ‘homeland’.  Thus, it was not 
so much a case that the collapse of communism opened a lid revealing ‘angry 
nations’, as it was that the removal of the lid permitted and encouraged the 
conditions for the formation and flourishing of identity politics.   
Identity politics needs only a minor nudge to develop into emerging 
nationalism, which creates pressure for self-determination within or apart from 
the existing state, and the instability wrought by the end of the Cold War 
increased the logic of such movements.  Donald Horowitz coined the phrase 
‘the logic of secession’ to analyze the rational incentives that ethnic groups (here 
one could substitute any PIFGs) have before them when determining courses of 
action, and, as the upsurge of identity politics took place in the 1990s, Viva Ona 
Bartkus examined the motivations of such groups afresh.25  While different, 
their analyses show that many factors play a part the decision to oppose a state, 
ranging from emotional anxiety to calculations of economic gain or perceived 
benefits, and that state reactions are crucial in altering these calculations.  Both 
of these studies indicate that group interests are calculated (and recalculated 
frequently) and that the reactions of the international community are critical to 
their decisions.  As Horowitz puts it: 
                                                         
23 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, ‘Eliminating and Managing Ethnic Differences’ in John 
Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., Ethnicity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 337. 
24 Smith, Nationalism in a Global Age, viii. 
25 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1985); 
Viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamics of Secession (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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Whether and when a secessionist movement will emerge is 
determined mainly by domestic politics, by the relations of groups 
and regions within the state.  Whether a secessionist movement 
will achieve its aims, however, is determined largely by 
international politics, by the balance of interests and forces that 
extend beyond the state.26 
 
To paraphrase slightly Steven Van Evera, emerging nationalist groups that 
threaten to fragment states are affected by the ‘plausibility of statehood’,27 and 
given all the other post-Cold War contextual shifts, the ‘plausibility’ of 
statehood has increased dramatically since 1989, which has in turn increased the 
debate over self-determination’s meaning as a norm.  
Another important tangible alteration and perhaps the most obvious of 
them all was the near total demise of East-West military tension following the 
rapid collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.  As James Mayall 
points out, this did not change the fundamentals of the international system of 
states, merely the dominant strategic and security dynamic; however, this change 
‘open[ed] the floodgates’.28  In terms of emerging nationalism, this opening up 
meant there were far fewer strategic barriers to abate ‘active’ applications of the 
right of self-determination.  The rapidity of the strategic shift is easy to chart.  
Taking Gorbachev’s announcement of Soviet troop withdrawals from 
Afghanistan on 8 February 1988 as a starting point, less than three years elapsed 
until the Soviet Union itself ceased to exist (31 December 1990).  Although the 
Cold War was officially declared over by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and 
the American President George H.W. Bush on 1 February 1992, the strategic, 
military and economic rivalry that had gripped the world for over five decades 
was over well before then.   
The protean political events of 1988 to 1990 in Eastern Europe (and 
elsewhere) were all the more dramatic owing to their highly democratic nature.29  
Throughout these three crucial years, the success of popular movements bred 
more movements and more success, indicating in each case both the desire for 
change and the unwillingness and/or inability of the communist governments to 
stand in the way of it.  Given the highly democratic nature of the events, and the 
fact that most movements rapidly led to free elections, free press and                                                         
26 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, 262. 
27 Stephen Van Evera, ‘Hypotheses on Nationalism and War’ in Michael E. Brown, ed., 
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 37. 
28 James Mayall, ‘Sovereignty, Nationalism and Self-determination’, Political Studies, 47 (1999), 
475. 
29 For a general history of these intricate events see Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the 
Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1993), and 
John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005) and the 
Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center 
[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic_id=1409]. 
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movements towards free markets, etc., neither Washington nor other power 
centres sought to or could place significant hurdles in the way.  As American 
Secretary of State James Baker said at the time, ‘[l]egitimacy in 1991 flows not 
from the barrel of a gun but from the will of the people.’30  It seemed as though 
the merger of democratic theory and practice was taking place exactly as many 
hoped as the repressive ‘lid’ was removed from Eastern European and world 
politics. 
Outside of Europe, the end of the Cold War led to greater 
democratization, though the link was not immediately causal.  Despite the 
questionable legitimacy of many processes on the African continent, ‘[a]lmost all 
of the African countries south of the Sahara have held elections since 1989.’31  
One study noted that with ‘the fading of geopolitical rivalries, the United States 
and other Western powers felt freer to urge autocratic regimes to adopt political 
reforms.  But officials and experts agree that the African people themselves are 
the main force behind the movement toward democracy.’32  In Asia and Latin 
America too, the end of the Cold War helped stimulate democratic practices 
including free and fair, multi-party elections, human rights protections and 
increased governmental transparency and responsiveness.33  As the UN 
Development Programme reported, ‘since 1980, eighty-one countries have taken 
significant steps towards democracy, with thirty-three military regimes replaced 
by civilian governments.  140 of the world’s nearly 200 countries now hold multi-
party elections, more than at any time in history.’34  This tangible and rapid 
expansion of democratic governments and practices in the first decade after ‘the 
fall of the Wall’ helped make self-determination more of an evident and 
important (if contested) norm, made it a tangible reality for millions and, 
simultaneously, increased its appeal to those seeking to utilize it.   
However, this rise in the appeal of self-determination was affected greatly 
by the lack of an evident security paradigm, as the fundamental dynamic of 
politics ceased to be East-West or even core and periphery.  While the form and 
substance of the new dynamic was not immediately certain, it was clear that 
military forces of the scale and type needed for superpower conflict and for 
deterrence were unsuitable as well as untenable.  As ‘peace’ flourished between 
the superpowers, massive reductions in nuclear arms and some sizable ones to                                                         
30 Quoted in Franck, 'The Emerging Right', 46. 
31 Kenneth Jost, 'Democracy in Africa' CQ Researcher, 5:11 (1995). 
32 Jost, 'Democracy in Africa'. 
33 See Freedom House indices for regional changes. [www.freedomhouse.org].   It is worth noting 
that the Middle East’s transition to democracy (NB not liberal democracy) as mentioned above, 
seems slower and more of a normative shift as opposed to a tangible one, and it is less directly 
connected with the end of the Cold War than those elsewhere. 
34 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening 
Democracy in a Fragmented World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 10. 
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conventional forces took place in the US and the former Soviet Union, as well as 
in most of Europe.35  However, the larger question of what the new security 
paradigm was remained unanswered.  As the new UN Secretary General, 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, noted in 1992, ‘[t]he concept of peace is easy to grasp; 
that of international security is more complex’.36 
While it is certainly true that during the Cold War, the superpowers 
frequently restrained in their proxies and contained within those countries many 
situations that might have brought instability to international affairs, and that 
the subsequent termination of the Cold War threatened to unleash these forces, 
the ‘seething cauldron’ metaphor that was often used does not entirely hold.  On 
many occasions, the Soviets and the Americans repressed tensions within and 
between states to serve their purposes, but they also stimulated and even created 
conflict when exploitation served their larger strategic agenda.  With the demise 
of this agenda, the warping effect of such policies disappeared, often stimulating 
in new ways previously extant instability within these states and regions.   
The end of the Cold War also transformed the tools available for war.  
‘The end of the Cold War…left a legacy of massive military expenditures and 
arsenals of deadly weapons entirely disproportionate to any rational assessment 
of threats to security.’37  As a result, arms, particularly small arms, were (and 
remain) widely available, as weapons manufacturers and governments that had 
built up defence industries for years sought out new markets.38  The growing 
availability of arms not only increased instability, it offered previously 
unparalleled opportunities to those willing to use armed force to advance 
whatever claims they were making.  There was a painful irony here: at the very 
moment the world was getting safer by eliminating a nuclear arms race, the 
profusion of less advanced, more portable and cheaper weapons systems 
provided the fuel for smaller, potentially less controllable conflicts. 
A final tangible component of the changed context of the post-Cold War 
world is the reinvigoration of the United Nations Organization as well as the 
expanding role other governmental and NGOs at the international level.  The 
potential for genuinely international activity on matters related to emerging 
nationalism was extremely limited during the Cold War, particularly within the 
UN system, as was discussed in Chapter 4, owing to a ‘frozen’ Security Council.                                                          
35 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner 
Publishers, 1995), 106-108; Timothy Kane, ‘Global US Troop Deployment, 1950-2003’, Heritage 
Foundation, 27 October 2004 [http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/cda04-
11.cfm]. 
36 Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, para.12. 
37 Bhaskar Menon, Disarmament: A Basic Guide, United Nations Basic Guide Series, (New York: 
United Nations, 2001), 7. 
38 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), ‘Trends in Arms Production’ 
[http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/aprod/trends.html], and Menon, Disarmament, 7-11. 
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Although there was considerable movement at the normative level related to 
self-determination through General Assembly resolutions and the work of the 
Economic and Social Council, the lack of international ‘weight’ behind such 
measures prior to the end of the Cold War contributed to the lack of a 
discernable connection of norms to responses.  However, with the passing of the 
Cold War and its adversarial security paradigm, and the growth of democracy 
and the emerging consensus about human rights, the UN and particularly the 
Security Council now had an opportunity to address such issues and build 
consensus-based responses to emerging nationalism, making connections to the 
normative framework that had begun to form while perhaps also reshaping these 
norms closer to those outlined in Part I. 
This renewed vigour was exemplified in the expansion of human rights 
activities and the promotion of democracy, some elements of which were 
mentioned before.  There were signs of an expanded role and an attitudinal shift 
in key departments within the UN, especially the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations,39 however, much like the human rights NGOs mentioned above, 
the UN faced a choice between being a neutral, peaceful observer in conflicts, 
patiently waiting for permission to respond; or would it seek a new path, 
involving advocacy of particular ends, the pursuit of which might involve taking 
sides as well as taking forceful actions, including military responses that might 
challenge the position of a sovereign state?  Given the military capability that 
was a left over ‘benefit’ of the Cold War, the reach, technological capacity and 
firepower of the assets that could be made available for such operations was 
astounding.  Could the UN employ what James Mayall has called ‘a Chapter VI 
and 1/2 solution’?40  The turmoil running through the Agenda for Peace over the 
meaning and role of ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘peacemaking’ reflects the desire and 
need for this debate that existed in the early 1990s.   
Unfortunately, United Nations had virtually no time to deliberate such 
weighty matters before it had to respond to provocative challenges such as 
Somalia, Rwanda and the disintegration Yugoslavia and, perhaps not 
surprisingly, these responses were patchy, disjointed and at times reflected both 
the ‘advocacy’ and the ‘neutral’ courses of action.  It is important to note that, 
despite the lack of clarity in these early post-Cold War responses, the UN and 
other international actors developed important infrastructural tools to permit 
greater fusion of practical and normative responses.  The effect of this has been 
the creation of patterns of behaviour at an institutional level, which, over time,                                                         
39 See Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, paras. 42 and 43 and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘The 
Humanitarian Impulse’ in David Malone, The UN Security Council from the Cold War to the Twenty-
first Century (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2004) 
40 James Mayall, ‘Introduction’ in Berdal and Economides, eds., United Nations Interventionism, 8. 
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‘have reflected and promoted moral interdependence.’41  The development of an 
expanding, more interventionist role for the UN and its subsidiary bodies 
provided a new or, perhaps, revived apparatus for responding to and debating 
the challenges thrown up by emerging nationalism and self-determination.  As 
the Cold War came to an end, it became apparent that such issues were 
unavoidable and that such an apparatus was extremely necessary. 
Firstly, the increased willingness of the international community to 
intervene on humanitarian grounds has boosted the likelihood of success of all 
secessionist groups, particularly those who could convincingly claim the abuse of 
human rights.  Additionally, because of the growth of the free market and trade 
penetration, the economic incentives of ‘going it alone’ never looked better.  
The demise of the strategic constraints of the Cold War and the increased 
availability of conventional arms provided secessionists with the means to 
struggle against states.  Finally, the normative acknowledgment and the tangible 
growth of identity based politics ensured that nations as well as the states from 
which they were attempting to secede had less ground to compromise, as the 
stakes in identity politics tend to be non-negotiable.  As Horowitz pointed out 
recently:  
 
All of this surely means that people who were resigned to living 
together, no matter how uncomfortably, may now think they no 
longer need to be so resigned.  Secessionist movements did not 
need much encouragement before, when their prospects for 
success were very slim.  Now they need less.42  
 
Taken together, these normative and tangible changes have resulted in a 
major alteration to the context of international relations that, in turn, had an 
effect on and continues to shape the evolution of self-determination.  Not all of 
these factors have influenced the concept in the same manner, nor have they all 
worked in the same direction or at the same time.  Indeed, most of the 
individual components of the contextual shift are themselves evolving.  
Nonetheless, they have had a powerful impact on both emerging nationalism 
and self-determination.  This has both increased the significance of self-
determination and, importantly, has created a climate in which more consistent 
responses to emerging nationalism and the development a more coherent norm 
of self-determination seem possible. 
What remains is to examine a few cases that highlight the degree to 
which this has come to pass since 1989.  Almost as soon as the ‘Wall’ fell, 
emerging nationalism seemingly burst onto the centre of the international stage                                                         
41 Taylor, ‘The United Nations’, 538. 
42  Horowitz, ‘Self-determination’, 190. 
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in a series of conflicts, some of which were armed and extremely violent, 
necessitating responses by the international community.  Challenges such as 
these have continued unabated since that time, often leaving the international 
community little time for deliberation or reflection on the norm of self-
determination or the wider implications of the precedents their reactions set.  
Any cursory glance at these recent struggles reveals the range and complexity of 
‘internal’ conflict in the post-Cold War world, and although there were many 
that involved the international community to a greater or a lesser extent, a few 
of these particularly impacted the evolution of the right of self-determination.   
 
(ii) The break up of the Soviet Union 
 
The rapidity of the deterioration of the Soviet Union caught almost all 
contemporary observers off guard.  While the world was only just getting its 
head around the tumultuous events in Berlin, Tiananmen Square and in Eastern 
Europe, the disintegration, and then the disappearance, of the Soviet Union 
unfolded.  The chief catalyst of this disintegration was emerging nationalism, 
first in the ‘union’ republics of the Soviet Union, but the assertion of other 
PIFGs within Russia and the other republics soon followed, adding to the 
complexity of the situation.43 
It is important to understand the nature of the Soviet federal structure to 
appreciate the significance of its decomposition to self-determination and to the 
emergence of identity politics and nationalism.  To call the Soviet Union a 
mosaic of PIFGs is an understatement of enormous proportion, and the Soviets 
had been conscious of the potential force of identity since the Bolshevik 
Revolution, both as an asset and as a potential force for the destruction of the 
Union.  While brutal repression and exceptionally heavy-handed manipulation 
of identities were commonplace during the Soviet period, the USSR had long 
acknowledged the power of identity and nationality and decided, consciously, to 
use it to best effect for as long as possible to support the wider state ends.   
The most significant federal layers of the Soviet state (much like that of 
the Russian Federation today) were, from the top down, union republics, 
autonomous republics, and provinces or oblasti, some of which were also 
autonomous.  Many of the boundaries of these units, but particularly the oblasti, 
were consciously associated with a given PIFG, normally an ethnicity or 
                                                        
43 For more detailed accounts of the internal politics and some of the external relations as they 
related to the collapse of the Soviet Union, see David R. Marples, The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 
1985-1991 (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2004); John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the 
Soviet Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995) and John Keep, Last of the Empires 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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nationality, arrangements that would prove significant not only within the USSR 
during the break-up but also in the international responses to it.    
The first formal act of disintegration of the Union came when the three 
Baltic union republics declared their independence from Moscow, starting with 
Lithuania on 11 March 1990, although a few PIFGs within the Soviet Union and 
several republics and oblasti as a whole had asserted claims of self-determination 
prior to this.  Despite General Secretary Gorbachev’s predictably negative 
response to all these moves and his initial decision to use limited force and, 
subsequently, negotiations to try and dissuade the Baltic States from their 
course of action, the tide could not be stemmed.  When Gorbachev proposed a 
new union arrangement and a broad referendum for 17 March 1991, an act 
designed to elicit expressed consent and an internal application of self-
determination in favour of the Soviet Union, his gambit failed.  In six of the 
union republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Moldavia and Armenia), 
the referendum was either voted down, amended to reflect greater autonomy 
than Gorbachev ever intended or boycotted in favour of statements about 
independence.44  Preceding and surrounding all the actions of the union 
republics, emerging nationalism was at fever pitch in some of the oblasti, most 
notably Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as in some autonomous republics, 
particularly Abkhazia, with demonstrations and rival parties pressuring for 
greater recognition of national demands and even independence, adding further 
to the complexity and urgency of the challenges brought by self-determination 
and the concomitant sovereignty crisis.  
The international reactions varied but were generally supportive of the 
democratic nature of the shifts but some were also cautious.45  The position of 
the United States was crucial, owing to its unique and rapidly changing strategic 
relationship with the Soviet Union.  Given that the United States and most 
European countries had never recognized, de jure, the Soviet takeover of the 
Baltic states in 1940, there was no shortage of calls for the US and European 
governments to acknowledge these declarations of independence.  However, 
President George H.W. Bush’s reluctance to do so was roundly attacked and he 
was accused of choosing Moscow over the legitimate, democratic nationalist 
movements.  During his visit to Russia and the Ukraine, he outlined his                                                         
44 Of greatest significance was the addition of a question about the establishment of an 
independently elected Russian president, which passed, leading to the election of Boris Yeltsin 
in June, who worked fervently against the continuation of the Union. 
45 It is worth remembering that these events coincided with the invasion of Iraq and the UN 
sanctioned expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait as well as the humanitarian interventions in 
the Shia populated sectors to the south of Iraq and Kurdish areas of the north, both of which 
increased the complexity of international responses, especially as Soviet approval of actions 
against Iraq in the Security Council was essential.  Additionally, the crisis in Yugoslavia, 
discussed below, was beginning to unfold. 
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administration’s position.46  Bush warned his audience that ‘freedom is not the 
same as independence’ and cautioned them that America ‘will not aid those who 
promote a suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred’.  This led many then and 
even now to dismiss Bush’s commitment to the right of self-determination, 
perhaps the most famous dismissal coming from conservative commentator 
William Safire, who claimed that Bush had sided ‘against self-determination’ and 
whose sobriquet for Bush’s address, ‘the chicken Kiev speech’, persists even to 
the present.47   
However, to do so is to miss the subtlety of the position on self-
determination and emerging nationalism that Bush and many European 
countries were developing.  Despite a preference for the integrity of the Soviet 
Union, Bush’s main objection to secession was his concern for human rights and 
minority protections.  As he noted in the speech, ‘[i]n Ukraine, in Russia, in 
Armenia, and the Baltics, the spirit of liberty thrives.  But freedom cannot 
survive if we let despots flourish or permit seemingly minor restrictions to 
multiply until they form chains, until they form shackles.’  In what even Bush 
feared sounded like a lecture, he rehashed to his audience Acton’s dictum that a 
truly free society should be judged on how well it protects its minorities. 
In a subsequent article, which like Bush’s speech is still widely dismissed 
and ridiculed (not least because of its publication on 18 August 1991, the day 
before the coup that ultimately brought down Gorbachev and the Soviet Union), 
Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Adviser, clarified the administration’s 
position, stating:  
 
...we will build our policy on principles, not around personalities.  
Two corollaries flow from this.  First, we will support leaders in 
the republics and the center who pursue democracy, but we won't 
choose sides between and among them.  Second, democracy 
requires respect for minority rights... the United States will not 
support independence movements per se, anymore than it will 
support the central government per se…The president’s plea for 
tolerance arises from legitimate concerns...Nationalities have been 
scattered throughout the USSR...If they do not develop habits of 
pluralism and respect for individual and minority rights, they will 
face a bleak Hobbesian future.48 
 
It is possible to spot within these statements a belief that, however 
enthusiastically supported, emerging nationalism stripped of the commitment to 
individual and minority rights did not constitute a legitimate exercise of the 
right of self-determination.                                                           
46 President George H.W. Bush, speech in Kiev, Ukraine (1 August 1991).  
[http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Chicken_Kiev_speech] 
47 William Safire, ‘After the Fall’ The New York Times (24 August 1991). 
48 Brent Scowcroft, ‘Bush Got It Right in the Soviet Union’ The New York Times (18 August 1991). 
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It is interesting to note the difference between this qualified and 
cautious endorsement of nationalism inside the Soviet Union and that of 
Woodrow Wilson seventy years before.  Wilson’s hopeful ideological 
commitment to democracy and self-determination had been modified by one of 
his successors to reflect not only strategic limitations but also human rights 
concerns, and as such, it represents a significant transformation of the 
understanding of the concept over time.  Moreover, while it is possible to 
interpret this shift of attitude as indecision or an inflexible commitment to 
borders, the international community’s ‘slowness’ to recognize the ‘breakaway’ 
republics and Bush’s much criticized willingness to work with the Soviet Union 
can also be seen as a recognition that human rights might be best served within 
existing boundaries as opposed to new ones.  Whatever the case, the approach 
adopted by the US and Europe did not take on the view either that secession 
might be recognized only as a last resort and/or only in the face of massive 
suffering (a case that might be made with regard to Abkhazia or Lithuania but 
not very plausibly for Georgia, the Ukraine or Byelorussia). 
Yet before any fuller discussion of principles could take place on the 
international stage, the fast-paced nature of events in the Soviet Union led to 
further disintegration and the recognition of successor states without a clear 
framework laid out in advance.  Following the failed coup of hardliners in 
August, the subsequent unilateral declarations of independence of other union 
republics and the agreement, negotiated without Gorbachev, to form a new 
association of independent states (the Commonwealth of Independent States or 
CIS), the Soviet Union effectively ceased to exist.  In the wake of this and the 
unfolding events in Yugoslavia (discussed below), the European Community 
(EC), hastily, yet still after the fact, established guidelines for the recognition of 
independent states. 
On 16 December 1991, the EC foreign ministers issued what amounted to 
a statement of norms on the conditions necessary for the legitimate exercise of 
the right of self-determination for the purpose of state creation.49  The 
connection with self-determination was overt and bold, appearing in the first 
sentence of the first operative paragraph, tracing the EC’s commitment to the 
idea to the Helsinki Final Act and the EC’s 1990 ‘Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe’, both of which endorsed the right of self-determination and made a 
direct connection to legitimacy and human rights.50  The guidelines then list                                                         
49 European Community (EC), ‘Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States 
in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union’ (1991).  The full text is in Appendix G. 
50 CSCE, ‘Final Act of the Conference’ (1975).  [http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/osce/basic/finact 
75.htm]; and EC, ‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe’ (1990) [http://www.osce.org/item/4047. 
html]. 
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conditions that nationalities are expected to meet to gain recognition.  Above 
all, to gain recognition, these emerging nations must ‘have constituted 
themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the appropriate international 
obligations and have committed themselves in good faith to a peaceful process 
and to negotiations’ and, a second time, the document stresses the need for new 
states to adhere to ‘the rule of law, democracy and human rights’ as well as to 
accept that change must come through peaceful mechanisms and negotiation.  
Moreover, the guidelines stipulate that recognition also requires new states 
make ‘guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in 
accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the 
CSCE’.  
These new guidelines reflect the growth of democratic norms and imply a 
coupling of democratic practices with human rights regimes, including an 
explicit stipulation of a duty to protect the rights of ‘minority’ PIFGs within the 
boundaries of any new states.  As a result, these guidelines go far towards 
conforming with the normative framework that Part I outlined and, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of more coherent response that avoided at least some 
of the perennial problems with applying self-determination.  However, there 
were three significant shortcomings related to this document.  The first is 
theoretical and is caught up in the use of the term ‘minorities’, which, as 
mentioned before, obscures the aim of such protections, namely the promotion 
of all human rights, not just those of designated minorities.  The second 
shortcoming was the lack of any mechanisms for protection of these rights 
within the new states after recognition.  While it is difficult to consider how 
mechanisms could have been constructed to do so, much less constructing them 
on the abbreviated timetable on which events were unfolding, the lack of any 
attempt to do so or to consider how violations could be reported or dealt with 
meant that there would be little opportunity to place pressure on the new states 
to meet any standards once recognition had been granted.  Finally, the 
document failed to address the larger issue of emerging nationalism within the 
autonomous republics and in the autonomous oblasti and whether such areas 
could secede or whether their use of the right would be limited to ‘internal’ self-
determination.   
The implication of not tackling this point suggests that the EC was only 
thinking of recognizing union republics, thereby adhering to the standard of uti 
possidetis juris.  Again, while the practical utility of the norm is unquestionable, 
uti possidetis juris has little theoretical connection to identity or to the emotion of 
nationalism, and while this may not always be a bad thing, it removes critical 
decisions about land and sovereignty from the ethical context of human rights 
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and the well-being of individuals and groups, where issues related to self-
determination are correctly located.  Uti possidetis juris and self-determination 
were clearly in the minds of those drafting the guidelines, as well as a host of 
other strategic and political concerns, but the tensions between the two norms 
were not resolved, nor were many of the issues within self-determination itself, 
as the leaders hammered out an understanding as rapidly as they could. 
However, despite these difficulties, these guidelines helped to clarify the 
normative framework of self-determination in the new context of international 
affairs that was developing.  Within days of the publication of the guidelines, the 
Soviet Union was dissolved and most of the union republics were recognized as 
independent states, but this fact reflected less an adherence to the list and its 
ideas than a recognition de jure of the de facto independence of these territories.  
It is important to note that the de facto independence of these republics adhered 
to the EC guidelines in that they had taken place through peaceful processes (for 
the most part), although not entirely through negotiation with the Soviet 
government, which despite its rapid disintegration at first opposed the unilateral 
nature of the secessions. 
Of perhaps more significance is the fact that recognition was granted 
without any further undertakings related to guaranteeing PIFG rights other 
than taking the word of the seceding republics that the specified commitments 
would be met, raising serious questions about the effectiveness of human rights 
protections, particularly in the case of states such as Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan where emerging nationalism within these new states had already 
resulted in considerable tension and, in some cases, serious violence.  The failure 
to address these issues left not only the normative aspects of self-determination 
in limbo but also the status of the peoples of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, 
Transdniestria and the Crimea, to name but a few.  However, the problems 
related to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, while great, proved to be both 
less challenging and less deadly than those connected to the fragmentation of 
Yugoslavia. 
 
(iii) The collapse of Yugoslavia – Act I: Badinter and recognition 
 
Accepting for a moment that, in the post-Cold War era, self-
determination has an increasingly important role in justifying international 
actions to protect human rights for marginalized or persecuted groups, and that 
the perennial aim of supporting territorial integrity is to achieve stability and 
prevent conflict, then collapse of Yugoslavia serves as an example where both of 
these ends were pursued by the international community and where neither of 
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them were achieved.  Much has been written about the carnage and the failed 
efforts of the international community to preserve peace, to enforce a 
settlement and to prevent human suffering, and the role self-determination and 
emerging nationalism played in creating, sustaining and defining the conflict has 
also been hotly debated.51  Regardless of the many other conclusions that can be 
drawn from all this, it is abundantly clear that the conflict had a massive impact 
on the international understanding and application of the right of self-
determination, and the international responses to the situation greatly shaped 
the trajectory of the norm in the post-Cold War period. 
The outbreak of violence as well as the first formal moves towards and 
subsequent declarations of independence in Yugoslavia predated most similar 
actions in the Soviet Union.  However, the roots of the collapse of Yugoslavia 
ran as deep as those in the USSR, and, as was the case in the Soviet Union, many 
of the components of the new context of international relations stimulated its 
destruction and the responses to it.  The demise of communism and the long-
standing role of identity in the political structure and the history of the Balkans 
were the two most significant factors leading to the destruction of the Yugoslav 
state, but of equal significance were the resonance of identity politics and the 
increased logic of secession that influenced the major parties at the end of the 
Cold War.  The involvement of the international community, particularly the 
United Nations, in the Yugoslav crisis was greater than in the Soviet case 
because the Soviets had fewer reasons to veto UN actions there, because of 
Yugoslavia’s traditional ‘sideline’ role in the power dynamics of the Cold War 
and because the degree of violence and suffering in Yugoslavia was so much 
greater.  As a result, the international community, and specifically the United 
Nations, found itself drawn very deeply into an intense and complex conflict 
involving emerging nationalism and self-determination, and, like the situation in 
the Soviet Union, the rapidity of events left limited scope for the discussion of 
principles prior to the implementation of responses.  Not surprisingly, these 
responses were chaotic and frequently contradictory. 
The initial international reactions to the collapse of Yugoslavia are 
fascinating to review from the standpoint of the development of self-                                                        
51 For a treatment of the international aspects of the Yugoslav crisis, see James Gow, Triumph of 
the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (London: Hurst Publishers, 1997); 
Spyros Economides and Paul Taylor, ‘Former Yugoslavia’ in Berdal and Economides, United 
Nations Interventionism; Stephen L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic 
Conflict and International Intervention (New York: M.E. Sharp, 2000); Marc Weller, ‘The 
International Responses to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, 
American Journal of International Law 86:3 (1992); Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia (London: 
Penguin Books, 1996); Alistair Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia, 1991-1999 and Ivo H. Daalder, 
‘Fear and Loathing in the Former Yugoslavia’, in Michael E. Brown, ed., The International 
Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). 
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determination, especially as the early stages of the country’s destruction 
coincided with the demise of the USSR.  At first, the international community 
was unwilling even to consider the possibility of a divided Yugoslavia, indicating 
a clear preference for a continued federal solution as late as June of 1991.52  
However, as Payam Akhavan speculates, this was unlikely to work as 
negotiations for a restructuring of the constitutional arrangements had already 
floundered in March owing to Serbian intransigence.53  Some member states of 
the European Community, most notably Germany, indicated an early shift in 
opinion regarding rigid adherence to territorial integrity and pressed for greater 
recognition of the rights of the constituent republics.   
Such ideas, while reasonable on one level, presented difficulties in 
Yugoslavia (as in most federal unions) because virtually all the constituent 
republics contained significant levels of interspersed PIFGs, and, by design, the 
federal territorial structures did not accurately conform to internal identity 
demographics.  As Roland Rich points out, the Yugoslav Constitution 
distinguished between ‘republics’ (the six geographically specific federal entities) 
and ‘nations’ (the major identity groups within Yugoslavia) without specific 
reference to their ‘homelands’, granting both the right of self-determination but 
only the former and not specifically the latter, the right of secession.54  However, 
as Rich continues, there was no extension of either the right of self-
determination or secession to ‘nationalities’ (identity groups with close ties to 
other countries), such as the Albanians in Kosovo.  Nor was there any mention 
of the mechanisms by which self-determination or secession could be exercised 
by those to whom such rights had been granted, thereby plunging the whole 
issue into confusion.   
The unity of the EC member states supporting territorial integrity held 
firm for much of the summer of 1991 until the level of violence and splits 
between EC members required a re-evaluation.  The EC governments 
established a peace conference at The Hague, chaired by Lord Carrington, 
which called for the cessation of violence and stressed the need for protection of 
minority rights but which also hinted to the possible alteration of internal 
borders through diplomatic means by creating an Arbitration Committee, more 
commonly known as the Badinter Committee, after its leader, Robert Badinter 
the President of the French Constitutional Council.  The aims of the Badinter                                                         
52 Renaud Dehousse, ‘The International Practice of the European Communities: Current Survey’ 
European Journal of International Law (EJIL), 4 (1993) 
53 Payam Akhavan, ‘Self-determination and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia: What Lessons of 
the International Community?’ in Donald Clark and Robert Williamson, eds., Self-determination: 
International Perspectives (London: Macmillan Press, 1996). 
54 Roland Rich, ‘Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union’, EJIL, 
4 (1993) and Gow, Triumph, 70-74. 
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Committee were somewhat unclear as its mandate was vaguely worded,55 but its 
establishment reflected a desire on the part of the EC to place norms at the 
centre of its approach to creating peace in Yugoslavia.  Its role in shaping the 
responses and interpretation of self-determination would ultimately prove highly 
significant. 
On the ground in Yugoslavia, actions and reactions increasingly centred 
on PIFG cleavages, as political elites drew upon the resonating theme of 
identity.  A new term, ‘ethnic cleansing’, came into being to describe the horrific 
events unfolding.  As numerous cease-fires were organised, broken and then 
renegotiated, the United Nations Security Council passed a string of resolutions, 
including Resolution 713 setting up an arms embargo, which given the recent 
growth of arms trafficking and sales, proved thoroughly ineffective.56  As the 
warfare intensified and declarations of independence were issued first by 
Slovenia and Croatia, the Serbian ‘rump’ of the old Soviet Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) claimed to be the sole legitimate heir of the federal structure 
and mobilized irregular forces as well as the Serbian dominated Yugoslavia 
National Army (JNA) to thwart these ‘secessions’.57  As the bloody summer of 
1991 turned into a bloodier autumn and as more republics edged closer to 
independence, the likelihood and efficacy of maintaining the antebellum 
structure of Yugoslavia declined considerably.  In light of these events, Lord 
Carrington submitted a letter requesting an opinion from the Bandinter 
Committee as to whether Yugoslavia continued to exist and on what basis the 
competing claims of ‘sovereignty’, ‘succession’ and ‘independence’ should be 
judged.58 
 In the first of the opinions it delivered (dated 20 November 1991), the 
Badinter Committee addressed the various declarations and positions of the 
constituent Yugoslav republics and, intriguingly, the existence and effectiveness 
of the federal government within the SFYR, concluding that it was ‘in the 
process of dissolution’, an understated but nonetheless profound conclusion.  In 
this and all of its subsequent opinions, the Committee stressed the need for 
peaceful interactions and the adjustment of borders only through negotiation.                                                          
55 See Alain Pellit, ‘The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee A Second Breath for 
the Self-Determination of Peoples’ EJIL 3 (1992)  
56 For a highly detailed account of UN efforts, see Economides and Taylor, ‘Former Yugoslavia’, 
and Economides and Taylor in James Mayall, ed., The New Interventionism, 1991-1994 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), Appendix B. 
57 It is perhaps significant that Serbia never really tried to restrain either Montenegro, a close, 
ethnic ally, or Slovenia, thereby casting doubt over the seriousness of their claim to desire a 
perpetuation of the SFYR.  In essence, this confirms that the goal of leading Serbian politicians 
with the creation of a ‘Greater Serbia’. 
58 Opinions of the Arbitration Committee of the International Conference on Yugoslavia (Badinter 
Committee), ‘Opinion 1’ (1991) [http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol3/No1/art13.html].  Extracts of 
this and other opinions of the Badinter Committee form Appendix H. 
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However, the process by which this ‘dissolution’ had taken place was anything 
but peaceful and only the most sanguine of observers could conclude that the 
diplomatic squabbling between the republics was anything more than calculated, 
Realpolitik manoeuvrings.  In effect, the Committee had done exactly what the 
EC had explicitly declared earlier that it would not do, viz., ‘accept a policy of 
fait accompli’59 with regard to territorial changes, as the excessive use of force and 
the unwillingness to compromise were exactly what brought about the 
dissolution. 
Nonetheless, as in the first opinion, the issue of self-determination was 
explicitly at the heart of the Committee’s reasoning in their second and third 
opinions, issued on 11 January 1992.60  Despite finding itself overwhelmed and 
overtaken by events on the ground, the Badinter Committee at numerous points 
in Opinions 2 and 3 stressed the centrality of the right of peoples to self-
determination and that fulfilling this right for all persons within a territory 
hinged on the robust protection of ethnic, religious and cultural minorities.  
Paragraph 3 of Opinion 2 makes a direct link between the situation in 
Yugoslavia and the explicit reference to self-determination in Article 1 of the 
ICCPR, noting that self-determination ‘serves to safeguard human rights.  By 
virtue of that right every individual may choose to belong to what ever ethnic, 
religious or language community he or she wishes’61, and according to the 
Opinions, this commitment creates strict obligations on all republics that aspire 
to international recognition.  The text’s direct linkage between self-
determination and the rights of individuals and, from there by extension, to 
PIFGs of which individuals may be a part, reflects a position that is virtually 
identical to the interpretation of self-determination presented in Part I.  In 
other words, the newly emerging political entities in Yugoslavia would have to 
replicate such an understanding of self-determination in their constitutional 
structure and state practices to be considered legitimate, and in an effort to 
cement such commitments, the Committee stressed the ubiquity of self-
determination and the right of every person to exercise it.   
Despite such a bold commitment to self-determination, the Committee 
sought to limit its exercise to internal practices, indicating that ‘the right of self-
determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of 
independence’.  While this limitation had been employed frequently in the past, 
its use here made little sense.  Stressing the importance of self-determination as                                                         
59 EC, ‘Press Release 81/91’, 27 August 1991, quoted in Renaud Dehousse, ‘The International 
Practice of the European Communities: Current Survey, European Political Cooperation 1991’, 
EJIL, 4 (1993), 146. 
60 Badinter Committee, ‘Opinions 2 and 3’, (1992).  Extracts in Appendix H. 
61 Emphasis added. 
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a right, linking it to the protection and enhancement of human rights, but then 
limiting its application to internal affairs within existing boundaries seemed to 
deny implicitly or to ignore the centrality of self-determination and emerging 
nationalism to the fragmentation of Yugoslavia.  The opposing sides’ desire for 
self-determination and nationalism including the protection and advancement of 
their human rights (as they understood it) fuelled the desire for territorial 
change.  By not taking the next step and articulating a link between rights and 
territory, the Committee missed an opportunity to set normative conditions of 
why and when borders should shift and to incentivise the parties and the 
international community to understand and enforce rights based norms ahead of 
territorial demands. 
The Committee’s evident desire to divorce self-determination from 
territorial issues was furthered by their efforts to show the applicability of uti 
possidetis juris in a case that did not specifically involve decolonisation and the 
frequent reminders that any border shifts outside of the standard of uti possidetis 
juris could only come about through mutual consent.  While the norms of 
inviolability of frontiers and of uti possidetis juris do not necessarily conflict with 
self-determination, they were not sufficiently practicable normative responses in 
and of themselves given the circumstances on the ground in Yugoslavia.  Firstly 
the norm for inviolability of frontiers had already been pushed aside, as 
mentioned above, as Yugoslavia was now officially ‘dissolving’, and if borders 
could be altered through force once, their future inviolability was also suspect.  
The emphasis on the norm of uti possidetis juris and the comparison to 
decolonisation had merit but overlooked the massive human rights violations 
already occurring within such internal boundaries, such that, to those on the 
ground, the creation of states along such lines without credible and 
internationally supported protections of human rights could well have meant 
national suicide and it certainly made a willingly negotiated settlement extremely 
unlikely.  The norms of territoriality seemed to outweigh the norm of self-
determination in the Committee’s thinking but, in reality, both norms were 
being applied and ignored to a similar degree and in ways that papered over the 
realities on the ground, as it became clear that internal borders were likely to be 
as violated as the integrity of Yugoslavia had been, given the intensity of 
fighting.  As it happened, it was also too little too late, as some members of the 
EC were already moving towards recognition without regard to the Badinter 
Opinions.   
In December, the EC attempted to draft general ‘guidelines’ on 
recognition for the whole of Eastern Europe in hopes of establishing consistent 
and coherent norms to respond to the simultaneous fragmentation of the Soviet 
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Union and Yugoslavia.  This sensible approach resulted in the general statement 
of principles, discussed in the previous section, plus a supplemental declaration 
specifically relating to the situation in Yugoslavia that went over and above the 
conditions set down relating to the Soviet republics.62  The separate declaration 
on Yugoslavia invited the pre-existing republics (and only these) to indicate 
formally: whether they desired independence and the recognition of the EC, 
their willingness to adhere to the conditions set forth in the general guidelines 
for recognition for new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, their 
agreement to avoid or denounce irredentist activity within or from without their 
territory and, importantly, their acceptance of additional conditions stipulated 
at The Hague Conference to protect the human, national and ethnic rights of 
persons within their territories.   
However, while the Badinter Committee reviewed the correspondence of 
the four republics that had applied for recognition and drafted its opinions on 
this subject63, Germany independently recognized Slovenia and Croatia on 23 
December 1991.  The debate over the effects of the German recognition has 
been intense and remains unresolved, but from the standpoint of the norm of 
self-determination, the impact was as clear as it was destabilizing.  The newly 
unified government in Bonn had been edging towards an ‘unconditional’ 
recognition of Slovenia for some time and had indicated the likelihood of doing 
so for Croatia, particularly in light of the increased Serbian irregular and JNA 
aggression towards Croatia during the summer, thus the announcement before 
Christmas of formal recognition came as no great shock.  It did, however, 
scupper any effort to achieve normative cohesion related to the application of 
self-determination in Yugoslavia, and it suggested that Germany, at least, was 
interpreting self-determination in a manner that was noticeably different from 
the framework of the Badinter Committee as well as Part I of this investigation. 
When the Badinter Committee published its fourth through seventh 
opinions on 11 January 1992,64 it was akin to slamming the barn door closed after 
the horse has bolted.  The separate opinions reflected the Committee’s 
considered statement on how fully each of the republics requesting recognition 
met the criteria outlined in both the general and the specific guidelines 
published earlier, as well as how fully committed the republics were to meeting                                                         
62 EC, ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia’ (16 December 1991) [http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol4/No1/ 
art7.html]. 
63 Serbia stated that it was ‘not interested in secession’ and that its international standing was, in 
effect, unchanged by events, having been part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 
1918 and, subsequently, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  Montenegro responded to 
the invitation but denied the guidelines’ relevance to their declarations of independence.  See 
Badinter Committee, ‘Opinions 4-7 (11 January 1992) [http://ejil.org/journal/Vol4/No1/art8.html].  
64 Badinter Committee, ‘Opinions 4-7’. 
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the obligations related to minority rights protection.  In the case of Bosnia-
Herzegovina65, the Committee was not satisfied that the will of the peoples 
within the republic had been assessed, and the opinion implied that an 
independent Bosnia-Herzegovina could not satisfy the aspirations or guarantee 
the protection of ethnic Serbs, noting the recent (un-monitored) plebiscite for 
independence held by Bosnian Serbs.  With respect to Croatia, Opinion 5 notes 
similar concerns about the constitutional protections for ethnic minorities 
within its borders and indicated that Croatia was in need of supplementing its 
proposed constitution accordingly.  Of the republics requesting recognition 
under the guidelines, only Slovenia and Macedonia were judged to have met fully 
the criteria for recognition in the guidelines, and the Committee was clearly 
impressed by and took pains to highlight the specificity and encyclopaedic 
nature of the minority rights protections promised by these two aspiring states.   
Given this, it is ironic that the EC elected to follow the German lead and 
recognize Croatia and, within a month, Bosnia-Herzegovina as well, while not 
recognizing Macedonia for a few years.66  While the ‘early’ recognition of the 
more ethnically homogenous and virtually conflict-free Slovenia is more 
understandable, especially given that it was a situation in which the norms of uti 
possidetis juris and self-determination could be conjoined, the actions of the EC 
and the host of other states who followed them failed to provide either clarity or 
consistency to the application of the right of self-determination and the 
responses to emerging nationalism.  An opportunity to establish workable and 
coherent norms was pursued and, as the Badinter Opinions indicate, the EC 
came close to producing normative mechanisms and approaches to the conflict 
that include many of the key components outlined in Part I, but the opportunity 
was squandered and the actual responses spoke more of the divisions within and 
between the ‘new Europe’ and the international community than about 
normative cohesion.   
However, an assessment of these responses needs to acknowledge the 
repeated failure of any responses on the ground aimed at stemming the violence 
that took place during the first years of Yugoslavia’s dissolution.  On the one 
hand, the combatants were engaged in what they felt was a mortal struggle based 
on respective identities that deeply resonated and motivated all sides.  As for the 
international dimension, as James Gow notes:                                                          
65 The term ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina’ refers to the pre-dissolution republic within the SFYR.  As 
noted below, following the Dayton Accords, the name is changed to ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’, a 
seemingly small but important shift in the ‘final’ political settlement. 
66 In short, the reluctance to recognize Macedonia was down to the objections of the Greek 
government and did not reflect the general attitude of the other eleven member states.  In time, 
the European Union recognized the cumbersomely, if appropriately, named Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. 
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in the space of the year the EC had moved from the position on the 
maintenance of the Yugoslav state, through growing internal dispute 
in disarray on how to handle the war, to a common but partially 
discordant policy on inviting those republics seeking independence 
to submit applications and undergo the procedure identified.67   
 
These rapidly shifting goalposts were as much the effect of the intransigence of 
the parties within former Yugoslavia as they were the cause.  It should be 
remembered that the theoretical and tangible context of international activity 
reviewed in section (i) was still a work in progress in 1991 and 1992, making the 
coordination of norms and policy doubly difficult.  In short, the lack of a 
coherent response reflected, in no small part, the absence of a cohesive 
international community that understood itself and its priorities.   
Perhaps the most relevant manifestation of this was the perpetually 
‘evolving mandate’ given to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in ‘former’ 
Yugoslavia through successive resolutions of the Security Council, as the 
organisation and its member states struggled to define and shape their 
responses.68  Greater cohesion, increased dialogue and a fulsome backing of the 
Badinter-Carrington process, might have provided the normative basis on which 
robust, concrete enforcement measures could be constructed, but this 
opportunity was not seized and while it probably would not have affected the 
realities on the ground, it might have given better shape to the efforts and 
provided a more reasoned basis for the reactions.  
The absence of an agreed understanding of self-determination, of how it 
might fit together with uti possidetis juris in this circumstance served to fuel 
rather than deter the combatants.  The heavy emphasis that the EC and the UN 
placed on the inviolability frontiers served, at first, to encourage Serbian hopes 
of creating a ‘Greater Serbia’, and, then, when the EC dropped its idea of a 
united Yugoslavia without any concomitant standard of minority protections, it 
increased the efforts of all parties within the newly recognized republics to fight 
ferociously in what warped into a profoundly vicious, ‘winner take all’ land-grab.  
The absence of any mechanisms for enforcing human rights deepened and 
solidified the roots of the conflict, making it even more intractable than it 
already was.  Without any willingness to develop and then to enforce normative 
principles related to self-determination and emerging nationalism, the EC and 
subsequently the United Nations condemned themselves to negotiations 
between parties that routinely used excessive and occasionally genocidal levels of 
force and who became committed to a war of attrition achieve their aims.                                                          
67 Gow, Triumph, 63-64. 
68 See Economides and Taylor, ‘Former Yugoslavia’. 
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Without any guiding, normative standards around which they could construct 
and enforce a settlement, the EC and, in turn, the UN opted to chart a ‘neutral’ 
course, neither condemning nor using force to counter acts of ethnic cleansing 
by Serbs and (to a lesser extent) others.   
Only with the Dayton Accords in 1995 and the introduction of the 
relatively sizable NATO-led international force (IFOR) did a degree of peace 
return to the area, and this agreement was brokered through force as much as it 
was by the weight of ideas.  Nonetheless, the Dayton Accords provide great 
insight into where the norms of self-determination rested at ‘the end’ of the 
conflict and serve as another guidepost outlining the evolution of the right in the 
post-Cold War era. 
 
(iv) The collapse of Yugoslavia – Act II: Dayton 
 
There were numerous diplomatic and military shifts that brought the 
parties to the negotiation tables at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near 
Dayton, Ohio (the location being a reflection of the increased American 
engagement in the search for peace), and the talks were especially intense and 
complex, even by the standards of former Yugoslavia.69  Despite the inherent 
difficulties, the parties concluded the Accords, comprising the ‘General 
Framework’ and twelve supplementary annexes.70  
The most striking characteristic of the General Framework and the 
relevant annexes is the attention given to the practical enforcement of the 
norms set out within the document.  The Accords contain numerous general as 
well as many specific pronouncements related to the rights of individuals and of 
PIFGs, but unlike virtually all of the other documents examined throughout this 
study, they specify elaborate mechanisms for the enforcement of such rights.  
Moreover, enforcement mechanisms are frequently overlapping, and non-Balkan 
individuals or groups are charged with oversight in numerous instances.  The net 
effect of these mechanisms is a transformation in the understanding of 
sovereignty through a dynamic enforcement of the norm of self-determination. 
For example, the General Framework’s Annex 4, which deals with the 
constitutional structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, provides for a 
consociational power sharing arrangement between the three PIFGs71 within the 
                                                        
69 See Gow, Triumph, 276-286 for an effective survey. 
70 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (General Framework), 14 
December 1995 [http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380]. Relevant extracts are in 
Appendix I. 
71 Muslim, Croat and Serb, though unspecified ‘others’ are added as a blanket protection. 
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two constituent ‘entities’72 that make up the, in effect, new state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, but the intervention into ‘domestic’ matters did not stop there.73  
Several key governmental posts including the Supreme Court were to be 
occupied and appointed by the foreigners, and any person convicted of, indicted 
for or evading charges of war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which was beginning its work at The Hague, 
was barred from holding office at any level of government.  A third of the judges 
in the highest court of the land had to be drawn from non-neighbouring 
countries and were appointed by the president of the European Court of Human 
Rights.  The security of the state was, to begin with at least, almost entirely in 
the hands of the international community, with the Implementation Force 
(IFOR) and the International Police Task Force (IPTF) managing security on 
the ground, arrangements that persisted for nearly a decade after the agreement. 
The monitoring and enforcement of human rights and protections of 
PIFGs, covered in Annex 6, provide the most insight into how Dayton reflects 
the further evolution of self-determination, and the first thing that is apparent is 
the invasive and extensive nature of the protections.  As one scholar has noted, 
‘it would be difficult to construct an international treaty in which more human 
rights are guaranteed in more ways.’74  The normative basis of the protections is 
nothing beyond what had been outlined in earlier documents of the UN and the 
EU, but what sets Dayton apart from any previous international response, even 
in the post-Cold War period are the multiple layers of enforcement 
mechanisms, all of which involved not only oversight but the active and ongoing 
involvement of the international community in, literally, the daily life of the 
citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The main organ for the enforcement of 
rights in Annex 6 is the Human Rights Commission, which is itself made up of 
two principle bodies: the Ombudsman and the Human Rights Chamber.  As 
elsewhere in the Accords, the intrusion of the international community is 
institutionalized.  As the Annex indicates, for the first five years of the 
Commission’s operation, the Ombudsman is to be appointed by the OSCE and 
the Chamber is made up of four members from the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, two from the Republika Srpska and eight, the majority, are 
appointed by the Council of Europe.  The involvement of such offices in 
guaranteeing the respect and promotion of rights is, while very bureaucratic,                                                         
72 The Muslim and Croat dominated Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (NB the return of the 
hyphen that had been substituted with ‘and’ in the country’s new name) and the Serb-dominated 
Republika Srpska. 
73 Gow, Triumph, 288-292 and James Sloan, ‘The Dayton Peace Agreement: Human Rights 
Guarantees and Implementation’, EJIL, 7 (1996), provide clear, detailed yet concise reviews of 
the salient details.   
74 Sloan, ‘Dayton’ 207. 
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extensive and open, creating a climate of government and civil society that is 
disposed towards achieving the kind of meaningful exercise of the right that is 
entailed in the concept. 
In addition to establishing and authorizing these formal governmental 
bodies, Annex 6 contains a section encouraging and facilitating the involvement 
of domestic and international NGOs in the affairs of the new political entities.  
While such provisions might be desirable or even expected in any post-conflict 
treaty, the extensive powers granted to NGOs are sweeping and unique.  Under 
the General Framework, NGOs are permitted ‘full and effective facilitation, 
assistance and access’ to the governmental institutions, and the entities are 
bound to ‘refrain from hindering or impeding [NGOs] in the exercise of [their] 
functions.’  
While self-determination is not explicitly mentioned in the General 
Framework or in its annexes,75 the right pervades the documents, above all in the 
Framework’s desire to ensure meaningful participation in the life of the state for 
all individuals and for the PIFGs to which they belong.  Moreover, Dayton goes 
beyond the international community’s other normative responses to emerging 
nationalism, in the Balkan or elsewhere, by stipulating concrete means to achieve 
the ends desired.  For its attempts at establishing enforcement mechanisms 
alone, the Dayton General Framework Agreement represents a significant 
moment in the evolution of self-determination and responses to emerging 
nationalism.  It also reflects a dramatic shift in the understanding of sovereignty 
in the face of state fragmentation, particularly for those cases involving identity.  
The document permits such a large amount of international intrusion into 
affairs of traditionally reserved to sovereign states that it at least confirms a shift 
away from a Westphalian view sovereignty in the post-Cold War context.  
The General Framework could be seen as heralding what might be called 
a ‘return to trusteeship’, for in essence, the Dayton Accords established a quasi-
independent state, created through the managed application of self-
determination in the hope of mitigating the negative effects of emerging 
nationalism.  Space and the nature of this study do not permit a review of the 
effectiveness of the enforcement mechanisms,76 but the absence of armed 
conflict and the (albeit slow) return to peaceful, civil society indicates a tangible                                                         
75 However, Annex 6, Article 1, which serves as a bill of rights, includes as its last point a 
‘condominium’, extending the rights protected to all those mentioned in the list of international 
treaties and covenants listed in the appendix of the Annex.  This list includes agreements that 
explicitly include the right of self-determination, most notably the ICCPR, which, as noted in 
Chapter 4 is a major development in the evolution of the right.  If one were to speculate on 
reasons for its explicit absence, the best conclusion is probably fear of use by secessionists. 
76 Sumantra Bose, in Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), provides an excellent evaluation of the implementation of 
the Dayton Accords.  
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degree of success.  As an indicator of the post-Cold War evolution of self-
determination, the creation of a quasi-sovereign, trusteeship in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is extremely significant as it seems to confirm the intention of the 
international community to place human rights above the standard of non-
interference, particularly in the face of well-documented, widespread and serious 
violations of human rights.  
 
(v) Kosovo’s ‘quasi-independence’ 
 
The case of Kosovo is by far the best indicator of self-determination’s 
current status as in international norm, as it not only reveals much about how 
the international community currently understands and applies the norm, but 
also because the responses to emerging nationalism in Kosovo have involved 
NATO, the OSCE, the EU and the UN in a colossal intervention that has seen a 
massive, intensive and prolonged use of diplomatic, economic and military force 
in a nation-building process.  While Bosnia and Herzegovina involved both a 
large-scale military and diplomatic intervention, the size and duration of this has 
been greater in Kosovo, and the initial use of force in Kosovo and Serbia by 
NATO without UN Security Council authorization added to the complexity 
and the challenges in finding a solution.  The subsequent (and ongoing) 
implementation of the ‘final’ settlement in Kosovo represents a protracted, 
pervasive and complex management process that is unprecedented in the history 
of responses to self-determination.   
 
a) Post-Dayton challenges 
 
Although Kosovo is examined here for the reasons mentioned above, the 
largely coincidental fact that it is another example drawn from Eastern Europe 
and the collapse of Yugoslavia in particular, is also important.  Having both 
deeper historical roots and more recent triggering events than the conflict in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the present situation in Kosovo is a direct consequence 
of the Dayton Accords, specifically the relevant parties’ failure to apply the right 
of self-determination more broadly so as to consider Serbia’s ethnic Albanian 
minority in Kosovo as a part of that settlement.77  In fact, at the negotiations in 
Dayton, there was a conscious decision to limit the scope of the discussions to                                                         
77 While it is generally agreed that the failure to include the issue of self-determination for 
Kosovo (or for other areas and peoples) in the negotiations played at least some part in the 
ensuing violent struggle, the opinion of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
(IICK), that there was only a limited chance of dealing with Kosovo at the time given the 
parties’ positions and focus on Bosnia, seems correct.  See IICK, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, 
International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 58-59.  It is also 
worth noting that the Dayton Accords were also silent regarding Serbia's other highly significant 
minority PIFG, the ethnically Hungarian peoples of the Vojvodina autonomous region. 
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‘Bosnian’ issues and to ignore (at least for the moment) questions related to 
other aspects of the Yugoslav labyrinth.  While there were excellent practical 
reasons for doing so, the effects on the situation in Kosovo were dramatic.   
Since the withdrawal of autonomy in 1990 by the increasingly nationalist 
President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic,78 Kosovo’s political situation had been 
in a troubled limbo.  Following the revocation of autonomy, a rival, parallel 
government emerged, led by the Kosovo Albanian intellectual, Ibrahim Rugova 
of the League for a Democratic Kosovo (LDK), which subscribed to a policy of 
non-violent resistance. 79  In the midst of the conflicts during the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995, the clashes in Kosovo, though frequent, 
remained fairly contained and the violence relatively limited despite the overall 
repressive nature of the actions in the region.  However, almost immediately 
following the conclusion of the Dayton Accords, tensions in Kosovo increased 
significantly, and the already unstable and frequently violent situation between 
Serbs and Kosovars80 took a dangerous turn.  The failure of the LDK to achieve 
significant progress with their non-violent, moderate strategy, the growth of 
repressive actions by the Serbian dominated government of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (FRY)81 and the lack of international attention to Kosovar appeals 
during the Dayton negotiations all contributed to the emergence of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army, a somewhat disorganised but determined, well armed and 
violent force for independence.82   
By 1998, the spiral of tit-for-tat actions by the KLA and the Serbian 
police and occasionally the FRY army, the VJ, had escalated to such a degree 
that the situation prompted an international response.  The international 
community had been concerned with the situation in Kosovo for some time, 
though the responses to violence in the rest of Yugoslavia took precedence.  
This fact, though, made little sense to Kosovars, who considered their right to 
self-determination as equal to that of any other peoples within the Balkans and 
                                                        
78 Milosevic was also the President of the Soviet Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia after the breakup. 
79 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998), Chapter 13; Tim 
Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven, CT: Yale Nota Bene Press, 2002), Chapter 3.  Like 
Kosovo, Vojvodina in northern Serbia also had its autonomous status stripped at this time.  
80 The two main PIFGs in Kosovo are the Serbs (less than 10% of the population today) and the 
Kosovar Albanians, who are referred to as Kosovars or Albanians depending on who is writing or 
speaking, who make up almost 90% of the population at present.  This study tries to use 
‘Kosovar’ to refer to members of this latter group and uses the term ‘Kosovans’ to refer to all 
persons within the territory of Kosovo when a single collective noun is used.  That it is rarely is 
used is telling of the divisions in Kosovo.   
81 The FRY was composed of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro, until 
2003 when it became the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, which lasted until 2006 when 
Montenegro became independent, which Serbia accepted peacefully. 
82 See in particular, Judah, Kosovo, Chapter 4 and Julie A. Mertus Kosovo: How Myths and Truths 
Started a War (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 5-13. 
  197 
those who supported the LDK felt that their movement was superior given its 
peaceful nature.   
By 1998, however, many within Kosovo drew new and important lessons 
from the violence in Croatia and Bosnia and from the international responses to 
emerging nationalism there, the chief lesson being that the international 
community would probably remain on the sidelines until the level of violence 
and the repression of human rights reached a humanitarian tipping point (as it 
did in Bosnia) or if the conflict looked likely to spread outside of the confines of 
the FRY’s boundaries.  As one scholar has noted, ‘[t]he Albanians regarded the 
peace deal as both cynical and promising.  If the Bosnian Serbs could win their 
own republic within Bosnia through war, why were Albanians expected to 
tolerate their status in Kosovo, deprived in even the smallest degree of 
autonomy?’83  The calculation that the deployment of much tougher tactics 
would trigger a ‘helpful’ intervention were premised on there first being a violent 
counter-reaction from Belgrade, a response likely to come given Milosevic’s 
temperament and rhetoric regarding Kosovo and his track record with such 
tactics.84  As a result, not only did the KLA emerge in the late 1990s as a more 
popular force promoting Kosovar nationalism, but it also stepped up its attacks 
on Serbs within Kosovo with the exact intent of provoking a backlash from the 
FRY government. 
The Serbians and Milosevic in particular also drew important conclusions 
from Dayton and the earlier international responses to the fragmentation of 
Yugoslavia.  They concluded that it was possible in negotiations to maintain 
territory acquired through force of arms, that minority rights guarantees tended 
to be enforced better for non-Serbs than for Serbs, and that the UN (and the 
rest of the international community) could be counted on to act slowly if at all.  
It is also clear that Milosevic counted on Russia to preserve Serbia’s territorial 
integrity and to protect Serbian interests, certainly through diplomacy but 
perhaps also through the threat or the use of force.  
In some ways, these lessons were accurately drawn, but whether accurate 
or not they had the effect of emboldening Milosevic in his desire to pursue an 
aggressive nationalist agenda to further his vision for the FRY and, particularly, 
to further his own power.  In the run up to the elections within the FRY in 1997 
in which Milosevic faced serious challenges, he increased his rhetoric against the                                                         
83 Duska Anastasijevic, ‘The Closing of the Kosovo Cycle: Victimization versus Responsibility’ in 
Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, eds., Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention 
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), 54. 
84 In the interest of avoiding the charge of ‘Milosevic bashing’, it should be noted that few 
sovereign states, even pre-9/11, would respond to the kind of terrorist tactics employed by the 
KLA with anything other than force, at least in the first instance.  
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Kosovar Albanians as a means of shifting focus, while, at the same time signing a 
statement of understanding with Rugova to promote identity-sensitive 
education policies for ethnic Albanians, thereby fulfilling the lone requirement 
within the Dayton agreement related to Kosovo.   
Milosevic’s strident rhetoric resonated with most Serbians at the time, 
given the intensification of KLA activity against Serbs as well as the historical 
stereotype of Albanians as ruffians and ‘indoctrinated Serbophobes’.85  Milosevic 
was thus able to denounce credibly the actions of the KLA as terrorism, both to 
domestic and international audiences.  In fact, in February 1998, Robert 
Gelbard, the US Special Representative for the implementation of the Dayton 
Accords, spoke extremely harshly of the KLA’s actions, labelling them terrorists, 
signalling, in the opinion of the Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo (IICK), a clear signal to Belgrade ‘that the FRY could act ruthlessly in 
Kosovo without arousing any strong critical response from the West, so long as 
its primary target appeared to be the KLA challenge rather than the Kosovar 
civilian population.’86  
A Contact Group, consisting of Russia, Italy, Germany, France, the US 
and the UK87 took the lead in addressing the degenerating situation in Kosovo 
and produced a series of memoranda that formed the basis of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1160.88  As Groom and Taylor note, in this initial UN 
resolution and in subsequent resolutions prior to NATO intervention, the 
Security Council spoke even-handedly in its condemnation of the acts of 
violence by the KLA and the Serbian forces, going so far as to use the word 
‘terrorism’ to describe the actions of the KLA and other Kosovar 
paramilitaries.89  This even-handedness extended to the inclusion of an arms 
embargo, which implicitly acknowledged the reality that the both parties to the 
conflict were being supplied with arms from abroad via the ever-increasing free 
market for weapons, which was highlighted in section (i). 
It was only after the Serbian attacks expanded in scope and intensity 
(albeit mostly in response to the KLA’s stepped-up assaults) that the UN and 
the Contact Group began to signal that Serbian supported and perhaps even 
sponsored ethnic cleansing was taking place, leading to a massive displacement 
of Kosovars.  The Contact Group at first adopted a more explicit position on                                                         
85 Anastasijevic, ‘The Closing of the Kosovo Cycle’, 50; and, more generally, Mertus, Kosovo, 
especially 231-234.  
86 IICK, Kosovo Report, 146-147. 
87 Japan and Canada were also involved the Group’s work. 
88 UN, S/Res.1160 (31 March 1998). Extracts in Appendix K. 
89 A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor, ‘The United Nations System and the Kosovo Crisis’ in 
Schnabel and Thakur, eds. Kosovo, 295-297.  For specifics of the resolution, see United Nations 
(UN), S/Res/1160 and 1199 (1998) in Appendix K. 
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the mater than the UN, labelling the actions of FRY forces and Serb police in 
Kosovo as disproportionate to the level of violence inflicted on the Serbs and 
other minorities of the region.90  Based on the Contact Group’s findings and 
opinions and on UN assessments, UN Security Council Resolution 1199 of 
September 1998 stiffened the tone, referring to the ‘impending humanitarian 
catastrophe’ and pointing out that the FRY had the responsibility to facilitate 
the return of refugees and to end attacks by FRY forces.91  It also repeatedly 
calls on the Serb forces to cease all attacks on civilians, facilitate the entry and 
activity of international monitors from the OSCE and the UN and to identify 
and hand over to the ICTY its personnel suspected of mistreatment of civilians 
and private property.  
While both the Contact Group and the Security Council consistently 
affirmed the territorial integrity of the FRY (a point returned to later), their 
respective statements and resolutions rejected any idea of non-intervention and 
asserted a right, and almost suggested a duty, to intervene to ensure the rights of 
the Kosovars.  As British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook bluntly put it, ‘We do 
not accept that this is merely an internal matter.’92  All the UN resolutions on 
the matter placed the response within scope of the Charter’s Chapter 7 
provisions, defining the matter as a ‘threat to international peace and security’.  
Moreover, while both the UN and the Contact Group urged both sides of the 
conflict ‘to enter immediately into a meaningful dialogue without preconditions’, 
the premise that guided the international community’s efforts was that the status 
quo ante was unacceptable.  Negotiations were aimed at ‘an enhanced status for 
Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-
administration’.93 
Accordingly, from the standpoint of the international community, these 
responses reflect the advancement of a human rights oriented understanding of 
self-determination.  While the term ‘self-determination’ does not appear in any 
of the statements of the Contact Group or in the resolutions, the idea suffuses 
and informs the documents.94  Even the Russian government supported the 
expansion of autonomy and relatively strong international actions to curtail 
ethnic cleansing, which is quite surprising considering that Russia was a long-
standing supporter of Milosevic, extremely wary of NATO and very concerned 
about setting a precedent for intervention in cases of emerging nationalism,                                                         
90 IICK, Kosovo Report, 137-142.  
91 UN, S/Res/1199 (1998). 
92 Quoted in IICK, Kosovo Report, 138. 
93 UN, S/Res/1160 and 1199 (1998). 
94 In fact, it is absent in an explicit form from almost all documents related to Kosovo.  The 
simplest explanation for this is the international community’s long running fear of making a 
connection between self-determination and secession. 
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given the situation in Chechnya and elsewhere in the Federation.95  While 
Russia was not supportive of either the threat or the use of military force to 
bring Milosevic to heel, it did not stand in the way to the extent that it could 
have when the US increased the pressure on the FRY and threatened NATO air 
strikes, which is, in itself, highly indicative of the changing context of 
international relations and, perhaps, also of the new understanding of self-
determination that was beginning to take shape.  
 
b) Rambouillet 
 
During the autumn of 1998, following expanded media coverage of the  
frequent atrocities, intense diplomacy by an ever more divided Contact Group, 
and the first of a number of threatened NATO air strikes, Milosevic agreed to a 
ceasefire, a reduction of police and FRY forces in the region and the 
deployment of unarmed international monitors.  These concessions were 
collectively know as the Holbrooke Agreement, after the chief American envoy, 
Richard Holbrooke.  When this agreement failed, owing to violence by both the 
KLA and Serbian forces, the Contact Group tried brinkmanship diplomacy in 
the Parisian suburb of Rambouillet.96  Many things affected the flow of 
discussions at Rambouillet including the spoiling efforts of both the KLA and 
Serbian officials, the half-hearted participation of the Russians and the unstated 
but almost exasperated desire of the American and European negotiators to 
achieve a settlement that would end the ethnic cleansing and, if possible, assert 
the credibility of NATO as a post-Cold War political and security actor.97  The 
talks reveal well how the international community struggled with the perennial 
challenges of self-determination and emerging nationalism as it worked to forge 
share understandings and actions.   
On one level, the Rambouillet conference was perhaps doomed to fail 
given the lack of attention paid to it by the FRY.  Indeed, Milosevic did not 
attend, but there was also a lack of unity amongst the Kosovar representatives 
that confused matters.  More importantly, there were overarching obstacles 
blocking the efforts of the diplomats.  The draft proposals on which the talks                                                         
95 The role of Russia in the diplomacy leading up to the commencement of bombing in March is 
difficult to interpret, but while the Russian Federation was in 1998 and remains today the least 
willing member of the Contact Group to intervene in the affairs of the Serbians, their intense 
involvement in the unfolding crisis in Kosovo indicates a willingness to support diplomatic 
intervention in certain cases involving self-determination even while eschewing the use of the 
term.  For a discussion of the Russian involvement during this period, see Spyros Economides, 
‘Kosovo’ in Berdal and Economides, United Nations Interventionism, 233-234; IICK, Kosovo Report, 
143-151; and Judah, Kosovo, 182-187. 
96 For details of the Rambouillet talks, see Judah, Kosovo, Chapter 7; Marc Weller, ‘The 
Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’ International Affairs, 75:2 (April 1999); IICK, Kosovo Report, 
151-161. 
97 Judah, in Kosovo, 211-220, conveys the sense of desperation very effectively. 
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were based contained a section of ‘non-negotiables’, which reflected the Contact 
Group’s understanding of self-determination, the chief of which was a renewed 
assurance of the territorial integrity of the FRY.98  While the application of uti 
possidetis juris in the former Soviet Union and in former Yugoslavia had, to date, 
indicated a willingness to recognize new states provided their boundaries were 
those of ‘republics’ within a federal structure, there had been no suggestion that 
autonomous territories such as Kosovo or the former Soviet oblasti could be 
recognized as sovereign on this basis.   
The unwillingness of the international community to consider the possible 
legitimate fragmentation of a sovereign state as a premise of discussions 
drastically limited the likelihood of success, and it flew in the face of the lessons 
each community learned from Dayton, where facts on the ground had shown the 
limitation of uti possidetis juris as a tool when boundaries were first shattering and 
then resetting in new position due to fighting.  The guarantee of borders ran 
directly counter the one unshakeable and absolute demand of the Kosovar 
community, which was (eventual) independence.  On the Serbian side, the 
promise of territorial integrity might have incentivised Milosevic to engage in 
the Rambouillet discussion, but it is unlikely he found the Contact Group’s 
assurance entirely convincing given the history of diplomatic intervention in 
former Yugoslavia, where boundaries were asserted, then negotiated away.  Thus 
the talks offered little to Serbia other than the potential to avoid armed 
intervention by the UN or NATO.  However, action sanctioned by the UN 
Security Council was extremely unlikely owing to Russia’s support of Serbia 
(although this proved to be more limited than Milosevic thought it would).   
Milosevic’s unwillingness to negotiate was probably based on a reasonable 
calculation that the Kosovars would not accept any agreement that did not 
promise a clear path to independence, thus limiting the likelihood of an 
agreement regardless of Serbian actions.  Since the primary ‘non-negotiable’ that 
the Contact Group and NATO set out, territorial integrity of the FRY, was not 
at all acceptable to their adversaries, Milosevic and the Serbs had no pressing 
reason to invest in the discussions at Rambouillet.  Milosevic’s fundamental 
miscalculation was his failure to predict that the Contact Group might entertain 
the idea of independence during the discussion, which, in the end, they did.  As 
for the Kosovars, having witnessed the multiple fragmentations of Yugoslavia 
that occurred despite international insistence on territorial integrity, their 
intransigence on the demand for independence was neither unwarranted nor 
unwise.                                                         
98 Weller, ‘Rambouillet’, 225-226 contains the full text of the proposals. 
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This is the critical point about Rambouillet and the self-determination 
challenge in Kosovo: by appearing to prioritize territorial integrity over the goal 
of ensuring human rights, humane governance and meaningful participation of 
all groups in the civic life of Kosovo, the Contact Group boxed itself in with 
both parties and refocused the discussions in a way that had drastic practical 
effects, namely an escalation of the armed conflict and NATO bombing that 
soon, directly and indirectly, led to the death and displacement of thousands.  
There was an opportunity before and at the Rambouillet discussions to 
prioritize a human rights oriented, normative framework of self-determination 
above territorial integrity, while at the same time stressing the importance of 
territory to any settlement, and there is evidence that the Contact Group could 
have made this the focus of the negotiations.   
Most of the conditions needed to formulate such a response were present 
at Rambouillet.  The Contact Group was motivated above all by a genuine desire 
to alleviate human suffering and enhance democratic norms, and the Group was 
constructing a ‘Dayton-like’ plan for the region.  The UN Security Council had 
repeatedly invoked Chapter 7 in its condemnations of atrocities, thereby 
classifying the human rights violations as a ‘threat to international peace and 
security’, and NATO and its political wing, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), 
seemed increasingly willing to bypass the UN Security Council to threaten and, 
if needed, to use force to implement the protection of rights.  Nonetheless, 
despite the heavy emphasis on self-determination running throughout the 
‘Interim Agreement’ produced at the end of the deliberations (discussed below), 
the talks never seriously dealt with these points as core issues but only on the 
periphery of the issue of independence and territorial integrity, which were, and 
remain even today, non-negotiable positions for both Serbs and Kosovars.   
Rethinking the approach to Rambouillet within the human rights 
oriented normative framework for self-determination outlined in Part I serves to 
highlight the differences between this and how self-determination was 
interpreted at the normative level at Rambouillet.  This normative stance would 
have made the issue of Kosovo’s future sovereignty and the FRY’s territorial 
integrity dependent on the willingness or, more accurately, on the tangible results 
of both parties’ protection and promotion of individual and group rights within 
Kosovo.  In other words, had the Contact Group adopted something closer to 
this approach, it would have purposely left the issue of Kosovo’s independence 
in limbo and used the Group’s formidable diplomatic, economic and military 
power to push each of the parties forcefully to put an end to their activities that 
ran so counter to the concept of self-determination.   
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This pressure could have forced the Serbs to restrain and/or withdraw 
their forces and engage in building mechanisms of humane governance or risk 
losing Kosovo once and for all with the blessing and support of the international 
community.  It could have led the KLA to halt their own ethnic cleansing and 
their efforts to destabilize the region and provoke Serb retaliation and, instead 
negotiate with the Serbs to construct meaningful representation and 
participation of their nationality in Kosovo.  Their failure to do so would have 
lead not to independence but would have added weight to legitimate Serbian 
efforts to use their armed forces and police to protect their co-nationals and 
other FRY citizens under their jurisdiction.  This might have slowed or ended 
the ethnic cleansing or at least duplicitous endeavours to draw in the West, 
which was the clear intent of the KLA.99   
While not wishing to engage in too much counterfactual speculation, it is 
fair to point out that Milosevic probably would not have drastically changed his 
policies as a result of such methods.  Milosevic frequently and eloquently spoke 
of a multi-ethnic future for Serbia and Montenegro and his willingness to accept 
outside assistance to achieve these ends,100 but Christopher Hill, the US 
Ambassador to Macedonia and Special Envoy to Kosovo during the talks, called 
this ‘a kind of self-hypnosis’ with ‘a high bullshit quota’.101  Nonetheless, this 
approach would have forced him to live up to his rhetorical commitments to 
multi-ethnic democracy, or, at the very least it would have revealed him more 
overtly to international and domestic audiences as the charlatan that he actually 
was, as it would have stolen his argument that the FRY alone was the legitimate 
protector of non-Albanian PIFGs against the terrorism of the KLA.  As for the 
Kosovars, such an approach might have dissuaded them from their entrenched 
demand for independence, as there is some evidence that many Kosovars and 
even some KLA commanders would have accepted this, if only as an interim 
step towards independence.102 
In reality, rather than appearing even-handed and deeply concerned with 
the protection of all PIFGs, the international community at Rambouillet under-
emphasized, and to Serbian minds effectively ignored the legitimate right of self-
determination of the non-Kosovar peoples of the province, especially the rights 
of the Serbians.  The Contact Group also left virtually untouched the idea of                                                         
99 See, for example, the interview with Hashim Thaci, then the leading KLA negotiator at 
Rambouillet, later the leader of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) in the Provisional 
Government of Kosovo (QPK) and most recently the Prime Minister of Kosovo, on 29 
September 1999, in William Joseph Buckley, ed., Kosovo: Contending Voices of the Balkans 
Intervention (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2000), 282-290.  
100 See Milosevic’s interview of 30 April 1999, in Buckley, Kosovo, 273-281. 
101 Quoted in Judah, Kosovo, 201. 
102 See Judah, Kosovo, 220.  
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intervening to stem the flow of arms across the Albanian and Montenegrin 
borders to the KLA, opening itself to the charge of one-sidedness.   
However, to be fair, the Interim Agreement of 23 February 1999 dealt at 
length with establishing genuinely consociational arrangements within Kosovo, 
including internationally managed systems like those used in Bosnia.103  The 
Agreement includes an ombudsman for human rights protection, externally 
appointed, non-Balkan Supreme Court judges, guaranteed representation of 
Kosovars in the government of Serbia and the FRY and a Presidential-Prime 
Ministerial system that divided executive power in the hope of containing it.  
The most striking feature of the Interim Agreement is the lengthy attention 
given to ‘national communities’, assumed to be the most relevant PIFGs in 
Kosovo.104  While a definition of what constitutes a ‘national community’ and 
how these groups derive their significance are not explicitly given in the text, it 
is obvious that the Contact Group had in mind not only the Serbian and 
Albanian ethnic nationalities but also the Roma, the Montenegrins and other 
numerically smaller PIFGs in the area, and left open the possibility of 
recognizing other PIFGs as such by explicitly mentioning identity-forming 
affinities like religion, language and culture.105   
What is unique is that such groups are given protections for their 
identity though guaranteed participation in the proposed Assembly, the 
Constitutional Court and other inferior courts, and guaranteed representation at 
all levels in the administrative offices and bureaucracy, all this in addition to the 
protections of language, religion, education, public nomenclature and 
(importantly for Serbs) access to and protection of historically significant 
locations for the national communities and for the individual constituent 
members.  As with the Dayton Accords, the entire document is also premised 
on an acceptance of the undertakings of the Helsinki Final Act and its explicit 
commitments to self-determination as an integral part of ensuring human rights.  
As such, the Interim Agreement represents the international community’s 
commitment to ensure self-determination and suggests that their understanding 
of the concept was increasingly linked to human rights and focused on ensuring 
the well-being and meaningful participation of all individuals within a territory. 
However, the Interim Agreement was stillborn, as neither side initially 
signed the document.  Although many accounts at the time and subsequently                                                         
103 Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-government in Kosovo 23 February 1999, [http://jurist.law.pitt. 
edu/ramb.htm#Frame]. 
104 Interim Agreement, Chapter 1, Art. VIII. 
105 Such groups include the Gorani and the Serb Muslims (often called Bosniaks). For more on 
the numerically small PIFGs in Kosovo, see ‘The minorities within the minority’, The Economist 2 
November 2006. 
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indicated that the Kosovar Albanians signed, in fact, they only agreed to the 
Interim Agreement following intense and dramatic negotiations at Rambouillet 
and subsequent talks back in Kosovo.  As it became clear that the Serbians, for 
reasons discussed above, were not likely to engage, the Contact Group 
responded in a fragmented manner, with US Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright taking personal charge of the negotiations with the Albanians, pushing 
them to sign in a direct effort to single out the Serbs as a ‘guilty’ party.106   
The motivation for this seems to have been a desire to have an 
agreement, any agreement that allowed NATO to use force to pressure Serbia to 
accept intervention on the ground in order to protect human rights and 
democratic norms, the Contact Group’s ultimate aims.107  While this might have 
been a just aim, and even one that ultimately might have conformed to a human 
rights based understanding of self-determination, the means proved too 
unseemly and appeared one-sided (as indeed they were) to Milosevic and to 
many in the Group.  Milosevic did not move and the Kosovars held out long 
enough to secure a highly ambiguous text that envisaged a three year period of 
managed government of Kosovo followed by an: 
 
international meeting…to determine a mechanism for the final 
settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, 
opinions of relevant authorities, each Party’s efforts regarding the 
implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and 
to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of 
this Agreement and to consider proposals by any Party for additional 
measures.108  
 
There is language here to suggest that implementation would be fairly and evenly 
adjudicated and that the ultimate test for the future status of Kosovo would be 
dependent on progress made towards improving the respect for human rights 
and the well-being of all individuals and communities.  This would certainly 
constitute an active application of self-determination that would fully conform 
to the human rights oriented normative framework suggested in Part I. 
However, the ambiguous text left all parties unsatisfied, and rather than 
using this ambiguity to bolster rights of all communities and form the basis of 
agreement, Madeline Albright drafted a letter of understanding to the Kosovar 
delegation indicating that this would be interpreted to mean holding a 
plebiscite, a position that was thoroughly unacceptable to both Serbia and 
                                                        
106 Judah, Kosovo, 211-218. 
107 James Rubin, US State Department Spokesperson, officially said as much in the middle of the 
crisis. See Marc Weller, The Crisis in Kosovo, 1989-1999: International Documents and Analysis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 451. 
108 Interim Agreement, Chapter 8, Art. 1, para. 3. 
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Russia.109  While this secured the eventual signature of the Albanian Kosovar 
delegates on 15 March, it guaranteed the non-participation of the Serbs and 
paved the way for NATO’s military action on 24 March 1999.  
Rambouillet thus stands as a tremendous missed opportunity for some of 
the most important voices in the international community to hammer out a 
more coherent normative understanding of self-determination at the very time 
when the international community desperately needed logical and consistent 
principles to guide its actions.  This missed opportunity did not come about 
because the diplomats eschewed the idea of self-determination or had radically 
different interpretations of its meaning and its connection to human rights, for, 
as demonstrated, a human rights oriented understanding is evident in and clearly 
informed much of the thinking behind the document.  Instead, the diplomats 
missed the chance to reconcile successfully this norm with matters of 
territoriality and sovereignty.  The central dialogue in the talks was not located 
sufficiently on the causes of crisis, namely, the human rights catastrophe, which 
was precisely where it needed to be, and instead centred on the political and 
strategic effects. While this pattern was not new to crises involving state 
fragmentation, the initial and sustaining motivations for the intervention were 
the severe violations of human rights and the denial of internal self-
determination for the Kosovars, so the failure to create a response that fused 
together self-determination with territorial and strategic issues was unfortunate 
to say the least.  Doing so probably would not have changed the attitude of the 
combatants or the course of events at this stage of the conflict, for, as noted at 
the start of this subsection, the real opportunity to employ the norm of self-
determination in such a way was probably during the Dayton talks when such 
issues and approaches were discussed regarding Bosnia and before the level of 
violence and agitation in Kosovo had risen to such a level that positions became 
hardened and relatively untradeable.  Notwithstanding this backwards glance, an 
agreement at Rambouillet might have mitigated to some extent the extreme 
brutality, the ethnic cleansing and the humanitarian crises that flowed from the 
NATO bombings that followed the agreement’s collapse.  As Judah puts it, 
‘Rambouillet is now the greatest “What if…?” of modern Balkan history’.110 
 
c) The search for ‘standards’ and ‘status’ 
 
Regardless of the questions about settlements that did not happen and 
other ‘might have beens’, it is clear that the NATO-led military action did not                                                         
109 The text of the Albright letter is in Weller, The Crisis in Kosovo, 452. 
110 Judah, Kosovo, 221. 
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yield a rapid end to the violence or a solution to the sovereignty issue, thus the 
parties had to confront the challenges of self-determination again in the years 
following the cessation of bombing.  The NATO bombing ended on 10 June 
1999 with an agreement that was based on proposals by the Group of Eight 
states (G-8) and negotiated by Viktor Chernomyrdin and Martti Ahtisaari, 
respectively, the Russian and EU envoys.  Seventy-eight days of destruction had 
led to the death of tens of thousands and the displacement of hundreds of 
thousands in addition to the creation of a tremendous amount of, at best, ill-will 
and distrust and, at worst outright hatred, on all sides.  This agreement was 
reached in no small part by an acceptance that while NATO had dropped the 
bombs without UN sanction and without Russia’s expressed approval, the UN 
(including the Russians) would be in control of the post-conflict situation.  This 
was confirmed by the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on the 
day that NATO’s offensive actions came to a halt.  This document and the steps 
it outlined have framed the political, social and economic changes since 1999 in 
Kosovo, and it is a crucial piece of evidence in revealing the current normative 
framework of self-determination today.111  
Not long after the bombing was over and the United Nation’s 
administration of Kosovo was underway, it was said that ‘NATO has won the 
war.  Now the United Nations has to win the peace.’112  While the legality and 
the morality of NATO’s ‘humanitarian intervention’ was, and still is, heavily 
debated, a deliberate decision was made at the end of the NATO bombing to 
place Kosovo under UN auspices (albeit with substantial NATO involvement), 
thereby lending credibility to the claims of the humanitarian nature of the 
intervention and widening the international legitimacy of future actions.  Much 
of this shift was accomplished in resolution 1244, which picked up almost 
exactly where previous resolutions left off prior to the bombings in its equal 
condemnation of ‘terrorists acts by any party’ within Kosovo, its focus on the 
‘humanitarian crisis’ and the right of all refugees to return to their homes 
regardless of their PIFG, the commitment to the principles of the Helsinki 
Final Act and, very importantly, in its repeated affirmation of the territorial 
integrity of the FRY.   
Although the Rambouillet discussions and the Interim Agreement never 
entered into force as such, the persistent reassertion of territorial integrity in 
1244 stood in contrast to the understanding given to the Kosovar Albanians and 
the expressed commitments of the United States, thereby raising the spectre of                                                         
111 UN, S/Res.1244 (10 June 1999), in Appendix K.  This also contains the G-8’s principles, 
mentioned above, in Annex 1 of the resolution. 
112 IICK, Kosovo, 97. 
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renewed conflict over this issue.  A glimmer of hope was perhaps nestled in the 
text as the earlier resolutions had mentioned ‘an enhanced status’ and ‘a 
substantially greater degree of autonomy’ for Kosovo, while 1244’s language 
called for ‘substantial autonomy’, a small but perhaps tangible shift in attitudes. 
The text of 1244 (like the diplomacy that led to it) is confused and at 
times contradictory while at other points there is a high degree of clarity.  Points 
of clarity include the security arrangements, the details and timetables for 
withdrawal of FRY forces and the demilitarisation of the KLA, the emphasis on 
an economic element to the settlement of the crisis and the absolute demand 
that conditions improve to permit the return of refugees.113  The powers given to 
the body coordinating the implementation of 1244, the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), headed by a Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), appear broad, including the 
ability to call upon not only NATO forces but also other member states’ armed 
forces, know as collectively as KFOR, standing for Kosovo International 
Security Force, to demilitarise the KLA and to enforce the pullout of VJ troops 
and Serbian police; to enforce human rights standards; to run local government 
and administration at virtually all levels; to prepare for democratic elections; and 
to deploy police forces from member states to ensure law and order.   
The layers of international cooperation and action are impressive on 
paper (if not always in action).  For most of its operational history, UNMIK has 
been structured around four ‘pillars’ each directed by an organisation under the 
general supervision of the SRSG and UNMIK: Pillar 1 was established as 
humanitarian assistance and refugee returns directed by the UN High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR); Pillar 2 was civil affairs and administration 
headed by UNMIK itself; Pillar 3 was ‘institution building’ and the promotion of 
democracy and human rights directed by the OSCE, an extension of the Kosovo 
Verification Mission or KVM, the OSCE’s monitoring role prior to the NATO 
bombing; and lastly, Pillar 4, directed by the EU was set up to facilitate 
economic development.114  In addition, the SRSG was given the power to issue 
Executive Regulations, which have the force of law, and Administrative 
Directives, which are binding guidelines for actions.  Many have concluded 
accurately that such powers amounted to a return to trusteeship or to something 
like the League of Nations’ mandates system and it is worth noting the human, 
financial and material commitment to the effort, which have made the Kosovo 
                                                        
113 See in particular Art. 10 and Annex 2, in Appendix K. 
114 The Pillars have been altered and some have been removed over the past decade and, where 
relevant, these changes will be discussed. 
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intervention one of, if not the, largest and most extensive peacekeeping missions 
in history on a per capita basis.115 
However Economides suggests there was a remarkable lack of clarity 
about the ultimate objective of the resolution.116  In fact, there is a great deal of 
clarity on the humanitarian goals, the assertion of human rights and an emphatic 
endorsement for democratic modalities, all of which are important elements of 
self-determination, but Economides is correct to indicate that there is no clarity 
in 1244 about the all-important issue of independence, something that still 
bedevils efforts to come to consensus about the ‘final status’ of Kosovo.  In fact, 
the situation in the text is worse than unclear, as the wording lends itself to the 
possibility of both parties seeing and reading into it what they hope for.  On the 
one hand, the territorial integrity of the FRY is either alluded to overtly or 
stated explicitly no fewer than five times (this in a relatively short document).  
Yet, the ideas of ‘substantial autonomy’ and self-government are repeated 
frequently, often within the very paragraphs that contain the statements about 
territorial integrity.   
The impact of this cannot be understated, especially with regard to the 
period immediately after UNMIK’s arrival, for it raised hopes on both sides 
while at that same time indicating (accurately) that the international community 
had not come to a consensus about the future of Kosovo.  As King and Mason 
report, as UNMIK commenced its efforts in Kosovo in 1999 and 2000, it was 
generally greeted with enthusiasm by the Kosovars who took its presence as a 
pro-Albanian humanitarian intervention and as the first step on road to 
independence.117  For the Serbs within Kosovo, the international presence failed 
from the start to protect the population and to dispel the widely held belief that 
Serbs and other minority PIFGs would be threatened and hunted by the KLA 
and the majority Kosovar population, thereby hardening Kosovo Serb attitudes 
and increasing mistrust.  Nonetheless, despite the turmoil that was about to 
unfold within the FRY with the fall of Milosevic, the Serbian government, both 
before and after Milosevic’s removal in 2000, felt the likelihood of retaining 
Kosovo was high, especially given renewed Russian support and the strong 
endorsement of territorial integrity by both Russia and China, who had backed 
1244.                                                          
115 Richard Caplan, A New Trusteeship?: The International Administration of War-torn Territories 
Adelphi Paper 341 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) and International Crisis Group 
(ICG), ‘The New Kosovo Protectorate’, ICG Balkans Report 69, (1999) 
[http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1594&l=1].  Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: 
Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2003), coins the 
interesting term ‘empire lite’ to describe this level of post-conflict control. 
116 Economides, ‘Kosovo’, 240-241. 
117 Iain King and Whit Mason, Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2006), 79-81. 
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During the intensely unstable two and a half year period from 1999 to 
2002 following UNMIK’s and KFOR’s arrival, there were numerous, immediate 
practical challenges related to transferring into action the human rights oriented 
understanding of self-determination that ran through resolution 1244.  These 
tested the resolve and unity of the society of states on their understanding of 
these norms and, perhaps more pressingly, constantly forced the interrelated 
issue of sovereignty towards the surface.  The actions UNMIK and the other 
international bodies took to address these challenges and the debate 
surrounding the intent and ‘success’ of their efforts are revealing.  
The first and foremost challenge was security, but security not merely in 
the military sense but also ‘human security’, an essential prerequisite for the 
protection of the rights of all and the construction of civil society.  Serb and 
other minority PIFG populations, particularly in the north along the border, 
were victimized by extremists Kosovars who now sought revenge for the actions 
of Serb police force and the VJ during the NATO campaign, and the planned 
demilitarisation of the KLA was, even in the often rose-tinted UNMIK reports, 
a limited success at best and failed almost totally to avert massive panic and 
internal displacement.  According to UN High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNMIK 
figures, nearly half of the Kosovo Serb population, along with substantial 
numbers of other PIFGs, namely the Roma and Turkish, fled their homes or 
were forced out and, as a result, became internally displaced persons (IDPs) or 
refugees and, importantly, appeared unwilling to return.118   
Creating the conditions to achieve voluntary return was (and remains) a 
major test of the success of the international intervention and the international 
commitment to the conditions of ‘humane governance’ for which the 
intervention was undertaken.  Complicating this situation was a lack of a neutral 
and credible police force, a problem that took over a year to move from crisis to 
merely problematic, and the lack of an independent judiciary, as most of 
Kosovo’s judges were ethnically Serbian.  Additionally, there was a lack of clarity 
about which laws to apply, those passed by the FRY, those of the unrecognized 
Kosovar ‘government’ (discussed below) or the as yet unpromulgated UN 
regulations.119  Ethnically motivated murders and arson were commonplace in 
1999 and there were many suggestions that these were organised or at least                                                         
118 See BBC News Online, ‘Refugees’, in Kosovo: An Uneasy Peace (April 2000) 
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encouraged by the new security force, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC in 
English or TMK in Albanian), which was in theory multi-ethnic and 
demilitarised but in fact was essentially the demobilised KLA.  Even former 
KLA spokesman Pleurat Sejdiu shared the common Kosovar joke that TMK 
stood for ‘Tomorrow’s Masters of Kosovo’.120  Added to this already complex 
and bleak situation was the need to alleviate the suffering and to meet the needs 
of the whole Kosovo population in what was a war-torn area, tasks that, like 
security, fell under multiple ‘Pillars’ of the UNMIK structure.  There was a 
desperate need for health care, power generation and education, all of which 
influenced the chances for stability. 
The lack of clarity over the issue of sovereignty played into these 
difficulties by creating a governmental vacuum, and it was into this gap that both 
Kosovo Serbs and the pre-existing Kosovar ‘government’ attempted to place 
themselves ahead of UNMIK’s efforts.  Since Milosevic revoked Kosovo’s 
autonomy in 1989, the Kosovars had established a parallel government that not 
only functioned in name but also worked to provide to their co-nationals many 
of the basic services of a state.  Following the hostilities, this entity, under the 
leadership of Rugova, claimed legitimacy for such matters and attempted to take 
charge of many aspects of life in Kosovo, while at the same time, Serbs in the 
north of Kosovo where their numbers were greater, began to form rival 
structures to deal with the lack of services and security while still looking to 
Belgrade for both moral and financial support to preserve these services.121 
Despite these mammoth challenges, UNMIK was able to address many 
of these issues, in part by leaning heavily on and expanding the role of KFOR, 
and it did so in a manner that mostly maintained the careful and somewhat 
ambiguous position established in 1244.  The demilitarisation of the KPC was 
accelerated and a new UN sponsored, multi-ethnic Kosovo Police Service (KPS) 
was launched.  The bulk of the refugee crisis, which was a predominantly 
ethnically Kosovar Albanian issue, was resolved mostly through voluntary 
return122 and the Kosovar parallel assembly was ruled unlawful and replaced with 
a new system of government, the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) 
was put in its place at the start of 2000.  The JIAS was formed around a 
consociational model, with a small, multi-ethnic assembly, the Kosovo                                                         
120 BBC News Online, ‘Demobilisation’ in Kosovo; IICK, Kosovo Report, 117-119. 
121 For more on parallel structures in the Milosevic and UNMIK eras and on the international 
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122 These returns were so successful that Pillar 1, aimed at refugee issues was phased out as of 
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Transition Council (KTC), that included representatives of virtually all PIFGs as 
well as a spectrum of local community leaders to advise on broad policy issues, 
and the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) that developed policy, which was 
composed of four UNMIK representatives, four Kosovar leaders (the heads of 
the main political parties) and one Serb observer, who eventually took his seat in 
April 2000.  The driving idea of the JIAS was that all parties in Kosovo were to 
have a meaningful role in the reconstruction process, regardless of the questions 
related to sovereignty. 123   
Although the lack of progress on some these challenges certainly 
frustrated UNMIK’s early efforts, the tangible successes of establishing at least 
a modicum of law and order and something approaching stable, humane 
governance did crack open a space to focus on ‘standards’ and not just on 
Kosovo’s ‘final status’.  This approach, arising out of the international 
community’s inability to reach agreement on the sovereignty issue, produced an 
opportunity to focus on human rights, democracy and other ‘internal aspects’ of 
self-determination, on which agreement was almost immediate, and to make the 
‘external aspects’ of self-determination (independence, autonomy, etc.) contingent 
upon the outcome of such efforts.  During the UN Security Council’s fact-
finding mission to Kosovo and to neighbouring states in mid-2001, it was clear 
that this approach garnered the support of all parties, even ones with widely 
varying attitudes on the issue of territorial integrity of Kosovo.  Most Kosovo 
Serb leaders were cautiously working with UNMIK, not least because of the 
‘firm’ pressure to do so exerted by the new President of the FRY, Vojislav 
Kostunica.  Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was visiting Kosovo at the 
same time, met with the group and stressed ‘the need to strive towards a multi-
ethnic Kosovo’ and that this ‘was an even more pressing task than the 
establishment of law and order’, lending weight to the idea of finding a way of 
governing over and above a particular structure of government.124  
In fact, elements of this approach became the stated policy for Kosovo in 
2002 when Michael Steiner took the helm at UNMIK as the SRSG and coined 
the slogan ‘standards first, then status’.125  Upon taking office in February 2002, 
Steiner signalled a shift from his predecessors and for UNMIK.  ‘Under 
Kouchner [the first SRSG], Kosovo was in an emergency phase.  Under 
Haekkerup [the second], it was in an administrative and design phase.  Today 
Kosovo is in a transfer phase.’126  At the centre of this shift was a concerted                                                         
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effort to refocus UNMIK’s efforts to build on the tangible but sluggish progress 
towards improving material conditions on the ground, especially for the 
minority PIFGs within Kosovo.  This effort was hinged on the successful 
implementation of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-
government, which outlined the Provisional Institutions for Self-government.127.   
Launched in mid-2001 by UNMIK, having been drafted with substantial 
input from the OSCE, which had responsibility for Pillar 3 (i.e. promoting 
democracy and civil society), the Constitutional Framework and the Provisional 
Institutions had both normative and practical aims.  On the normative level, the 
Framework sought to establish a pattern of governance that was fully 
democratic, rights respecting and rights enhancing, multi-ethnic and 
consociational at all levels.  On the practical level, the Provisional Institutions 
tried to meet the aspirations of Kosovars who were keen to take over governing 
from UNMIK, which, in turn, was overstretched by providing such a broad and 
deep level of administration, and they sought to create a model of government 
that would meet the normative goals while also working within whatever 
sovereign structure Kosovo found itself following the withdrawal of the 
international community.  As for this last point, the fusion of normative and 
practical aspirations was seen as integration within the EU at some future point. 
The normative commitments can be seen clearly in the lengthy, recurring 
and emphatic statements linked to liberal democratic ideas that pervade the 
document.  Chapter 2 highlights that all institutions and all officers within the 
Provisional Institutions must accept the conditions of resolution 1244, with all 
its commitments to human rights; they must ‘[p]romote and fully respect the 
rule of law, human rights and freedoms, democratic principles and 
reconciliation’; and, in case there was any doubt, Chapter 3 explicitly commits 
them to observe and implement all of the major international and European 
human rights agreements and commitments of the past fifty years, making them 
‘directly applicable in Kosovo as part of the Constitutional Framework’.  
Chapter 4, dealing with the ‘Rights of Community Members’, commits the 
Provisional Institutions to support ‘coexistence and support reconciliation 
between Communities and to create appropriate conditions enabling 
Communities to preserve, protect and develop their identities.’  Interestingly, 
regarding identities, the Framework does not name or specify these, merely 
referring to PIFGs generally, and stresses that membership to a ‘community’ is 
determined through an individual’s declaration, or non-declaration, or, to use the                                                         
127 Relevant sections of the Constitutional Framework form Appendix L.  The abbreviation for 
the Provisional Institutions is PISG, but, as this might cause confusion with this study’s frequent 
use of the ‘PIFG’ abbreviation, it will not be employed. 
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language of Part I, through their choice. 
On the practical side, the Framework stipulates that the Assembly of 120 
members is elected through a party list system, with a single, Kosovo-wide 
constituency with no minimum threshold to encourage broad participation and 
ensure proportional representation, but the Framework also includes a minimum 
of ten guaranteed seats for the Kosovo Serbs and ten more for other minority 
PIFGs, which is a slight overrepresentation of minority populations given the 
ethnic composition of the population in 2001.  On the executive side, while the 
Prime Minister is elected by a majority of the Assembly and can appoint 
ministers, at least two ministers must be from minority communities or three if 
the number of ministerial positions rises above 12 (which it did shortly after 
coming into force).  In addition, an Ombudsperson was to be appointed to 
receive complaints from all persons in Kosovo, to investigate and to report to 
the Provisional Institutions and to UNMIK on any violation of human rights or 
of alleged misconduct.  UNMIK retained authority over the area on all foreign 
matters and, ultimately, on most everything else deemed not in keeping with in 
the implementation of resolution 1244. 
The newly established Provisional Institutions came into force late in 
2001 following elections in November; however, the implementation was not 
without measurable difficulties.128  Despite the fact that many Kosovo Serbs 
boycotted the elections in protest against the Provisional Institutions, the 
Serbian ‘Coalition Return’ party (KP) received over eleven percent of the vote, 
but refused to take the allotted Assembly and ministerial seats for almost a year 
to object to the new body’s existence.  Added to this, political divisions within 
the two main Kosovar parties, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the 
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), led to a gridlocked presidential election, 
which, while eventually resolved, weakened the new body in its first critical 
months.  Internationally, the new structures increased anxiety in the FRY 
government, who feared not only that Serbs in Kosovo would be powerless in 
the new institutions but also because this was seen as a first step towards 
independence. Both the FRY and Russia objected to the permanence of these 
bodies and sought to limit their development.129   
Even more troubling was the continued development and strengthening 
of parallel institutions and the related failure to engage the municipal level of                                                         
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documents/mik/2002/05/1110_en.pdf], particularly paras. 130-143; and UNMIK News (13 
December 2001, 21 January, 13 February and 28 February 2002) [http://www.unmikonline.org/ 
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government in the development of a multi-ethnic, liberal democratic form of 
governance.  Although originally large-scale Kosovar mechanisms to deal with 
the injustices of the Milosevic era, parallel institutions were now predominately 
local phenomena employed in an ad hoc manner by various groups but mostly by 
Kosovo Serbs.130  While understandable given the levels of violent ethnic 
cleansing and deep-seated mistrust in Kosovo, these ‘opposition’ arrangements 
were becoming a major obstacle to the international efforts in the area, 
hampering work within all the Pillars.  In some areas, most notably the 
ethnically and geographically divided city of Mitrovice/Mitrovica,131 the parallel 
structures were the only functioning provider of many vital services such as 
security, courts and justice, education and health care for minority PIFGs, and 
some of these services were supported not only through separate, local taxation 
and administration but also through the assistance of Belgrade.  The example of 
healthcare shows well the extent of the difficulties.132  Owing to a potent 
mixture of mistrust and freedom of movement created by fear, many Serbs relied 
only on healthcare provided by fellow Serbs, who were paid by the Serbian 
Ministry of Health (SMH) but offered care in unofficial and often unmanaged 
facilities (sometimes working out of private houses), as neither the SMH nor the 
Provisional Institutions’ Ministry of Health exercised direct control.  The effect 
of such structures cannot be underestimated, as they stood out as mammoth 
obstacles blocking efforts to deliver the meaningful participation in the life of the 
state for all citizens that was outlined in Part I of this study and was an 
expressed end goal of the intervention. 
While not as profound or seemingly intractable, the situation with local 
government was also troubling and was heightened by the slow start to which 
the Provisional Institutions got off in 2002.  Given UNMIK’s understandable 
focus on central government, the activities of local authority were somewhat 
neglected and this accelerated the development and expansion of parallel 
institutions.133  To be fair, UNMIK and the OSCE designed municipal 
government to conform to the European Charter for Local Government, which 
seeks entirely to promote liberal democratic norms, and municipalities were 
permitted to ‘regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs’ in the 
hope that devolution would give a degree of autonomy and protection to ethnic 
enclaves.  Unfortunately, the elections in late-2000 were not very well managed,                                                         
130 OSCE, Parallel Structures, especially Chapters 1 (on security) and 2 (on courts). 
131 Place names in Kosovo vary depending on the language used.  Most maps still use Serbian 
place names yet some use only the Albanian.  Following OSCE practice, both are used herein 
with the Albanian first. 
132 OSCE, Parallel Structures, Chapter 5. 
133 UNMIK Reg/2000/45 (11 August 2000) [http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/re 
2000_45.htm]. 
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the turnout of minority PIFGs was virtually nil, so much so that certain 
municipal areas’ results were not validated,134 and the bodies to which candidates 
were elected had extremely limited powers because the realities on the ground 
did not permit significant devolution.  The situation looked quite different in 
2002 when UNMIK and the OSCE now made a concerted effort to manage the 
electoral process and to encourage participation from all PIFGs.  Much of this 
encouragement came through a concerted, on-the-ground voter and party 
education effort by the OSCE135 as well as through pressure from the 
international community, including the FRY government, to get all parties but 
particularly the Kosovo Serbs to turnout.136  Despite these efforts, few Serbs 
voted, and in areas where elections ran reasonably well, there were numerous 
boycotts, many unrelated to ethnic divisions, that prevented any forward 
progress, which prompted SRSG Steiner to postpone the planned talks for 
decentralization.137  
Acting in part to respond to these challenges, the general desire to build 
on UNMIK’s slow but substantial progress since its arrival and the steadily 
mounting pressure within the international community to develop an exit 
strategy,138 SRSG Steiner defined the standards of performance that had to be 
achieved by the newly-created institutions before any decision on Kosovo’s final 
status could be taken.139  Having held intensive meetings prior to the speech 
with UNMIK staff in Kosovo on how best to spell out the process, Steiner 
produced a list of eight specific standards without which any settlement would 
be unsustainable.  The benchmarks or standards were:  
 
the existence of effective, representative and functioning 
institutions; enforcement of the rule of law; freedom of movement 
for all; respect for the right of all Kosovans to remain and return: 
development of a sound basis for a market economy; clarity of 
property title; normalized dialogue with Belgrade; and reduction 
and transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps in line with 
its mandate. 
 
As Steiner noted, ‘Kosovo can advance towards a fair and just society only when 
these minimum preconditions are met’, and he elevated the standards further by 
describing them as part of ‘an exit strategy which is, in reality, an “entry                                                         
134 OSCE, Municipal Election Results (8 November 2000) [http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/ 
2000/11/20458_en.pdf]. 
135 See OSCE, ‘Permanent Council Decision No. 470’ (18 April 2002) [http://www.osce.org/ 
documents/pc/2002/04/1129_en.pdf]. 
136 UN, S/PV.4605 (5 September 2002). 
137 OSCE, Boycott at the Municipal Level (15 May 2003) [http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2003 
/05/711_en.pdf]; and UNMIK News (30 October 2002) [http://www.unmikonline.org/archives/ 
news10_02full.htm#0210]. 
138 For a sample of these attitudes, see UN, S/PV.4454 (2002). 
139 UN, S/PV.4518 (24 April 2002). 
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strategy” into the European integration process.  The benchmarks complement 
the preconditions that Kosovo needs to meet to qualify for the stabilization and 
association process [i.e. entry to the EU].’  As such, the benchmarks were to 
serve not only as direct evidence of a human rights norm of self-determination 
but also of a ‘carrot and stick’ tactic, dangling the prospect of EU entry to both 
the Serbian Government and the Kosovars.  As such, the shift to the ‘standards 
before status’ approach appeared to be a signal moment in the understanding 
and use of the norm of self-determination, as it not only came extremely close to 
following the normative framework indicated in Part I, but it also reflected a 
willingness in international society to make standards the focus and to draw 
upon a diverse range of tangible forces to ensure that norms are met as a part of 
the sovereignty question.  
However, as close as this formula came to applying these liberal 
democratic understandings of self-determination, it included several critical 
normative limitations and deviations and a range of practical impediments that 
reduced the likelihood that such norms would yield the desired result for the 
peoples in Kosovo.  Most of the limitations stemmed from the aforementioned 
uncertainty within resolution 1244, specifically, how the new ‘standards’ would 
fit into the vague wording of those texts regarding final status.  This uncertainty 
allowed the parties to see both what they wanted and what they feared in the 
standards.  For example, at the same Security Council meeting when the 
benchmarks were announced, Nebojsa Covic, the deputy prime minister of 
Serbia representing the FRY, spoke out against the continuation of ethnically 
targeted violence against Serbs and non-Albanian PIFGs as he accepted the 
vision of a multi-ethnic, democratic and, using the words of 1244, ‘substantially 
autonomous Kosovo’.140  However, he also explicitly argued against the idea of 
an independent Kosovo, called into question the validity of the Provisional 
Institutions and noted how dangerous a precedent independence in such 
circumstances would be.  The Kosovar Albanians perceived the establishment of 
the Provisional Institutions and the talk of ‘final status’ as the international 
community’s decisive move towards independence. 
Of more significance was the apparent division within the international 
community about the meaning and application of the ‘standards before status’ 
doctrine.  Singapore’s representative on the Security Council quoted at some 
length141 a study by the highly influential International Crisis Group (ICG) that 
sought to separate the progress on ‘internal’ aspects of Kosovo’s status from the 
‘external’ ones, arguing that some form of independence is the only viable option                                                         
140 UN, S/PV.4518 (2002). 
141 UN, S/PV.4518 (2002). 
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(an opinion that ICG continues to promote).  As the report posits, ‘[d]emocracy 
in Serbia is incompatible with absorbing a province most of whose 
population…wants nothing to do with a Serbian or Yugoslav state’, a conclusion 
that overlooks the fact that Kosovo was de jure still a part of Serbia and therefore 
could not be ‘absorbed’.142  It was also likely that the Kosovars still believed that 
the US backed the idea of independence, despite official statements in favour of 
the ‘standards before status’ approach in the Security Council and from the State 
Department,143 and it is possible that memories of Germany’s ‘early’ recognition 
of Slovenia and Croatia in 1992 furthered their thoughts in this direction.   
After Michael Steiner’s term as SRSG came to a close in 2003, the 
standards process became more formalized with the launch of the Kosovo 
Standard Implementation Plan (KSIP) which held out the prospect of a line-by-
line review of the benchmarks to then feed into an eventual assessment of 
Kosovo’s readiness for final status talks.144  However, for a range of reasons, 
including Kosovar frustrations with the lack of progress through UNMIK-
sponsored channels, the continuation of political activity in unofficial channels 
and parallel institutions and the lack of sustained economic growth, the 
tinderbox was full, and in March 2004, the most serious violence since 1999 
ignited in Kosovo.  The riots began in response to the drowning of three 
Kosovar Albanian boys and the false but authoritatively reported story that a 
gang of Serbs with dogs had instigated the drowning.  The ensuing violence 
involved some 51,000 people, left nineteen dead and nearly 1,000 wounded, 
included the destruction of hundreds of homes, widespread attacks on Orthodox 
churches and monasteries and led to the displacement of roughly 4,000 
people.145  It also revealed not only the staggering lack of progress at achieving a 
multi-ethnic society and trust in Kosovo, but also revealed UNMIK’s and 
KFOR’s inability to deliver, respectively, protection of basic human rights and 
physical security to non-Albanian PIFGs, and it played a part in the resignation 
of SRSG Harri Holkeri that same year before his term ended.146    
It is perhaps remarkable, given the level and nature of the aggression 
involved in the riots and the aftermath, that this did not lead to a massive shake-                                                        
142 ICG, A Kosovo Roadmap (I): Addressing Final Status Europe Report, 124 (2002) 
[http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1640&CFID=25826980&CFTOKEN=78814220]. 
143 King and Mason, Peace, 83-84. 
144 UNMIK, ‘Standards for Kosovo’ and UNMIK, ‘The Kosovo Standards Process, 2003-2007’ 
[http://www.unmikonline.org/standards/index.html]. 
145 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Not on the Agenda: The Continuing Failure to Address 
Accountability in Kosovo Post-March 2004 (May 2006) 18:4(D) [http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/ 
files/reports/kosovo0506web.pdf]. 
146 It is worth noting that the violence was not limited to Serbians but also directed at the Roma 
and other non-Albanian groups, as well as international workers, and that it also included 
retaliatory actions by Serbians beyond the level of self-defense.  See HRW, Not on the Agenda, 1-2, 
and King and Mason, Peace, 9-16. 
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up of UNMIK’s plans for the area.  To be sure, there were voices in the society 
of states that questioned the entire ‘standards before status’ approach.147  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Serbian government148 took the violence as 
evidence that UNMIK had failed and that Serbia should retake control of the 
area, arguing, interestingly, that it would do a better job at securing the rights of 
all people in Kosovo and ensuring a well-functioning multi-ethnic democracy.  
Some other states questioned the likelihood of UNMIK’s success, but the 
reaction was to reaffirm the goal of a multi-ethnic Kosovo and to achieve the 
‘standards’ but without any new initiatives to make these laudable goals tangible.  
In fact, the UN indicated that it would attempt to move forward rapidly and 
undeterred, appointing a new SRSG (the Dane, Søren Jessen-Petersen) and 
preparing for the scheduled elections for the autumn of 2004 and, subsequently 
in mid-2005, to commencing the formal review of progress on standards and 
assessment leading to a decision about final status.   
While such decisions may at first seem either unwise given the minimal 
improvements in the year following the violence in 2004 or as more of an exit 
strategy than a commitment to delivering self-determination to the peoples of 
Kosovo, the course charted by then Secretary General Kofi Annan and SRSG 
Jessen-Petersen was a sound attempt to place the ball in the court of the parties 
and to increase the pressure to make tangible changes in their behaviour and 
their performance by moving the matter towards some sort of closure.  By 
beginning to link the discussions about final status directly to a concrete process 
of gauging the achievement of standards, the Secretary General and the SRSG 
were signalling an alteration of the ‘standards before status’ doctrine to 
something like ‘standards leading to status’.   
The impetus for such a shift increased in 2005 owing in part to the 
Provisional Institutions elections of 2004, an improving security and 
infrastructure and a simultaneously worsening economic situation, and, finally, a 
transition in the Provisional Institutions when the Prime Minister, Ramush 
Haradinaj stepped aside to face war crimes charges at the ICTY.  The 2004 
elections, in which most Serbs did not vote, paved the way for expanded 
cooperation between the Kosovar parties and led to the election of Haradinaj as 
Prime Minister, who, despite being a former KLA commander, was roundly seen 
as committed to multi-ethnic efforts, winning praise from UNMIK and some 
                                                        
147 The future of the ‘standards before status’ approach was the focus of debate in the Security 
Council on 5 August 2004. UN, S/PV.5017 (5 August 2004).  
148 As noted before, in 2003, the FRY was reconstituted into the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro, and, in 2006, with the dissolution of this union, it became the Republic of Serbia. 
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Kosovo Serbs.149  Following sustained efforts by KFOR and the increasingly 
well-regarded, multi-ethnic Kosovo Police Service (KPS), personal security and 
freedom of movement improved greatly in most of Kosovo, which increased the 
opportunities for meeting the standards.  In the midst of these positive 
developments, the already unhealthy Kosovan economy was weakening, and 
Prime Minister Haradinaj, when indicted for war crimes, resigned his office and 
surrendered himself voluntarily to stand trial.150  These two setbacks, rightly or 
wrongly, seem to have motivated the international community to accelerate, 
rather than slow, the standards process and its linkage to discussions of Kosovo’s 
final status.   
Kai Eide of Norway was appointed Special Envoy by the Secretary 
General to conduct the comprehensive review of the standards and the timing of 
final status discussions, and his report to the Secretary General in October 2005 
and its reception reveal much about the standards process and status as well as 
how the international community interpreted and applied self-determination in 
this situation.151  Eide’s review is far from rosy and is often damning, particularly 
on the progress towards creating a multi-ethnic society.  Like almost every press 
release and report by UNMIK since the violence of 2004, Eide’s report notes 
the impressive progress in meeting the standards and the desire of all parties to 
engage with the issue of final status, but it highlights two prominent sources of 
failure: on the Kosovar side, the lack of progress by the Provisional Institutions 
to create an environment that encourages the return of refugees and to create 
credible human security for the non-Kosovar PIFGs, and, on the Serbian side, 
the persistence of parallel institutions (particularly for health and education) and 
Belgrade’s unwillingness to encourage the dismantling of these institutions and 
Kosovo Serb engagement with the Provisional Institutions.  In Eide’s opinion, 
the root cause for each side’s failure is a lack of will and engagement, but, very 
interestingly, he suggests that this could, perhaps, be corrected by settling the 
final status issue.  Eide’s plea for action on final status is based on a deep 
concern for standards, warning that:  
 
having moved from stagnation to expectation, stagnation cannot 
again be allowed to take hold.  Further progress in standards 
implementation is urgently required.  It is unlikely that 
postponing the future status process will lead to further and 
tangible results.  However, moving into the future status process                                                         
149 UN, S/PV.5130 (24 February 2005) and BBC Albanian, ‘Different Positions for Governance’ (6 
September 2006) [http://www.bbc.co.uk/albanian/news/2006/09/060906_arber.shtml]. 
150 Haradinaj won much praise internationally for doing so and was subsequently released prior to 
standing trial and, in April 2008, acquitted on all counts. 
151 Kai Eide, ‘A Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo’, Annex to S/2005/638 (7 
October 2005). 
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entails a risk that attention will be focused on status to the 
detriment of standards.152 
 
Thus, Eide’s recommendation seems to suggest that although achieving 
the standards, and thereby enhancing internal self-determination, should be the 
top priority, this could happen without a verdict on status, or the external issue 
of self-determination, and it also implies that this prioritization could be 
reversed.  Of course Eide’s report on its own, however well documented and 
inclusive, is not strong evidence of a normative shift, even a slight one.  For that, 
international reactions must be examined.   
What is most striking about the reception of Eide’s report is the 
readiness of the international community to shift the focus on Kosovo back 
onto status.  While this did not move the focus away from standards, the change 
in tone can be spotted easily.  Following the formal presentation of the review, 
the Security Council held informal discussions and then returned to issue a joint 
statement, which began with an emphatic call for ‘undiminished energy and a 
stronger sense of commitment…to ensure the implementation of standards at all 
levels, allowing tangible results to be delivered to all Kosovo’s citizens.’  
However, it also noted, ‘notwithstanding the challenges still facing Kosovo and 
the wider region, the time has come to move to the next phase of the political 
process.’153  Shortly afterwards, the Contact Group, which had largely failed to 
live up overtly to its name after UNMIK’s first year, had clearly been working in 
anticipation of Eide’s report and issued a statement of vigorous support for the 
refocusing of efforts to final status.154  However, the Group’s statement and the 
attached points articulating it both stressed the standards process and the 
specific dimensions of the report that related to self-determination, namely the 
need for responsive, participatory, multi-ethnic government, enhanced action 
for returns of IDPs and improved primary services for all.   
Within days of the publication of Eide’s review, the Secretary General 
appointed former Finnish President and veteran diplomat Martii Ahtisaari to be 
his Special Envoy to Kosovo and to lead the parties towards discussions on final 
status.  Ahtisaari noted on taking office that ‘Status has to go with Standards, 
and more concrete progress is needed in the implementation of the Standards’.155  
During the ensuing sixteen months, most of which involved direct, intense                                                         
152 Eide, ‘Review’, 4.  Eide reiterated the risks of this approach strongly in his briefing to the 
Security Council, UN, S/PV.5289 (24 October 2005). 
153 UN, S/PV.5290 (24 October 2005) 
154 Contact Group, ‘Guiding Principles of the Contact Group for a Settlement of the Status of 
Kosovo’ (11 November 2005) [http://www.unosek.org/docref/Contact%20Group%20%20Ten%2 
0Guiding%20principles%20for%20Ahtisaari.pdf]. 
155 UNMIK News (22 November 2005) [http://www.unmikonline.org/archives/news11_05full.htm 
#0122]. 
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negotiations with all parties in Kosovo, the region and internationally, it became 
clear that standards and status were not only connected but were in fact working 
against each other, despite the clear endorsement in favour of a standards based 
model for solving the problem.  In his final, detailed report, presented to the 
Security Council on 26 March 2007, Ahtisaari’s frustrations are conspicuous.  In 
curt language, he flatly denies any possibilities other than ‘independence, 
supervised by the international community’.156  The assumptions on which he 
based his conclusion and the key intervening events that contributed to their 
formation are interesting and illuminate much about his interpretation of self-
determination, outlining further some of the most recent normative thinking 
about the concept and its limitations.   
In his report, Ahtisaari sees UNMIK’s transfer of authority to the 
Provisional Institutions Kosovo as irreversible (except perhaps through the use 
of arms), owing in large part to the prolonged experience of self-rule, which 
raised the expectations of the Kosovar population.  In this sense, resolution 1244 
and the subsequent actions of UNMIK actually created or at least contributed 
to the situation the UN faced in 2007.  The implicit logic behind Ahtisaari’s 
blunt, final verdict, which he outlines through an historical review of the 
situation, is that the UN had two choices before it following the NATO 
bombings: rule Kosovo directly with little or no local input or engage the local 
population in democratic processes in the hope of imbuing new institutions with 
liberal democratic norms.  While Ahtisaari does not note it explicitly, the UN’s 
decision to try and develop indigenous and rights-respecting institutions rather 
than ‘to impose’ a solution, even a temporary one, reflected something of the 
international community’s normative understanding and interpretation of self-
determination at this time and led rather naturally to the strong commitment in 
favour of the standards approach.  
However, the report concludes (in keeping with virtually every UNMIK 
and independent report on Kosovo) that, despite much genuine progress, the 
fulfilment of the standards is somewhat minimal on the ground, particularly 
those related to multi-ethnic institutions and integration of non-Kosovar PIFGs 
into political, social and economic activities.  Given the long-standing 
commitment to the standards, the Special Envoy’s final recommendation in 
favour of independence seems on first inspection to be a premature step or a last 
desperate act (or both).  However, two factors, both of which are touched on in 
the report, explain this apparently puzzling conclusion: the specific limits to the 
                                                        
156 Martii Ahtisaari, ‘Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General on Kosovo’s future 
status’, in S/2007/168 (27 March 2007), in Appendix M. 
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progress of meeting the standards, and the qualification Ahtisaari made on his 
recommendation for independence.  
As for the first of these, it has to be noted that after Eide’s report and 
before Ahtisaari’s, the international community, UNMIK and the other 
international organisations involved in Kosovo stepped up their efforts to 
implement the standards, meeting with some success.  To tackle the troubling 
issue of returns, new guidelines, agencies and policies for ‘sustainable returns’ 
were launched.157  These efforts included greater coordination between the 
Ministry of Community Returns (headed by one of the two Kosovo Serbs in the 
government), the Municipal Working Groups and the KPS, a newly revised 
manual for ‘sustainable returns’ and the creation of the Kosovo Property 
Agency, which aimed to address minority property claims and needs.  There 
were plans for a new formulation of municipal governments that aimed to 
provide greater accountability, more responsive institutions and greater 
decentralisation.158  There was also a tremendous effort by the Stability Pact for 
South Eastern Europe and the EU to boost the trade and financial situation in 
Kosovo, and, importantly, there was a concerted effort by the entire 
international community to place the status issue within the context of 
European Union enlargement, which, as mentioned earlier, was meant to serve 
as a powerful incentive for all parties to cooperate with the implementation of 
standards regardless of their position on Kosovo’s final status.159 
Unfortunately, progress towards meeting these aspects of the standards 
was limited by the unwillingness of the Serbian government, Kosovo Serbs and 
other minority PIFGs to engage with the Provisional Institutions and to cease 
their support of parallel structures.  As noted before, Kosovo Serbs had 
essentially stopped participating in elections and most other affairs involving the 
Provisional Institutions, a decision that was supported by Belgrade from 2005 
onwards.160  However well founded the Serbian and other communities’ reasons 
were for not engaging with the power structures and processes in Kosovo, the 
effect was that the overarching goal of a sustainable, multi-ethnic democracy was 
not possible, a point that Ahtisaari states forcefully.161  For Ahtisaari, this, 
combined with the fact that the Kosovar-dominated Provisional Institutions 
                                                        
157 See OSCE, Eight Years After: Minority Returns and Housing and Property Restitution in Kosovo 
(June 2007) [http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2007/07/25813_en.pdf]. 
158 UNMIK Reg./2007/27 (29 August 2007) and OSCE, Relationships between Local and Central 
Governments (February 2008) [http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2008/02/29797_en.pdf]. 
159 See the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe [http://www.stabilitypact.org], the Contact 
Group, ‘Guiding Principles’ and UN, S/PV.5588 (13 December 2006). 
160 See for example the report of SRSG Rucker in UN, S/PV.5522 (13 September 2006). 
161 Ahtisaari, ‘Report’, para. 6 in Appendix M.  
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had run Kosovo for several years without Serbian influence, made even a 
nominal return to Serbian sovereignty unworkable.   
The other factor that explains Ahtisaari’s conclusion is the qualification 
that independence ought to be ‘supervised’.  As he notes, ‘Kosovo’s political and 
legal institutions must be further developed, with international assistance and 
under international supervision.  This is especially important to improve the 
protection of Kosovo’s most vulnerable populations and their participation in 
public life.’  To achieve this, Ahtisaari calls upon the international community to 
play a significant role in political and military affairs, particularly in those areas 
related to minority rights protection, confirming Ahtisaari’s conviction that the 
standards process should still be at the core of the international efforts in 
Kosovo.  This view represented another shift of emphasis from ‘standards before 
status’ and from Eide’s ‘standards leading to status’ to something like ‘standards 
within (protected) final status’.   
The Athisaari report’s affirmation of the standards process in the face of 
such obstacles stems from and reflects the international community’s genuine 
commitment to ensure that the norm of self-determination was applied 
internally to achieve meaningful participation and to guarantee the well-being of 
all communities in Kosovo, but the recommendation for independence begs the 
question of how this connects to self-determination’s external aspects, which 
also brings in the perennial question of what limits can be placed on the active 
exercise of the right.  Ahtisaari’s report and subsequent statements make clear 
his conviction that, despite UNMIK’s tireless (if occasionally flawed) pursuit of 
the standards process, virtually all roads in Kosovo lead to the issue of status, 
even if it was not immediately obvious how this could be the case.  Ahtisaari 
notes with some frustration and hints of resignation that ‘[e]ven on practical 
issues such as decentralization, community rights, the protection of cultural and 
religious heritage and economic matters, conceptual differences — almost 
always related to the question of status — persist, and only modest progress 
could be achieved.’162  Ahtisaari’s reluctantly reached prescription for an 
internationally supervised independence appears to elevate and prioritize the 
connection between the internal and external aspects of self-determination.  
Although Ahtisaari makes clear that practical circumstances were a major factor 
in his reasoning, he concludes that a quasi-sovereign statehood for Kosovo, 
premised on substantial, active international supervision, would have the 
greatest chance of achieving the ends for which the international presence had 
                                                        
162 Ahtisaari, ‘Report’, para. 2, in Appendix M.  
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worked for so long.  As such, his recommendations stand out as an intriguing 
fusion of normative aspirations in the midst of tangible constraints.  
Of course, like Eide’s review, Ahtisaari’s report does not, by itself, reflect 
how the international community understood and applied self-determination in 
response to the impasse that seemed to have developed in Kosovo.  Of course, 
unlike Eide’s situation, Ahtisaari had been called on by the Secretary General to 
report on the state of affairs, make a recommendation for action and then 
engage the parties and the international community in the search for a 
resolution.  As a result, the international community immediately engaged with 
the ideas and recommendations in the report, and the responses to its central 
recommendation as well as Kosovo’s subsequent declaration of independence on 
17 February 2008163 illustrate the most recent steps in self-determination’s 
evolution as a norm of international activity. 
 
d) Independence(?) 
 
Even before Ahtisaari submitted his formal proposal in March, and 
perhaps long before that, the likelihood of its acceptance by the Serbs in Kosovo 
and in the Republic of Serbia was nil.  Despite the dramatic changes within 
Serbia that had taken it far away from the Milosevic era towards liberal 
democracy and the beginnings of the integration and accession process to the 
European Union, the Serbian position on Kosovo has remained firm and has 
long been supported by three lines of argument, all of which are interconnected 
with the norm of self-determination.   
Nationalism, the first of these lines, was the vocabulary of choice for 
Kosovo’s defence in the Milosevic era.164  Although the use of the nationalist 
idiom has changed since that time, Serbia still rejects the idea of independence 
on the grounds that Kosovo’s government passively neglects or, at worst, actively 
abuses their co-nationals’ rights as well as the national religious sites, which 
blends nationalism and the liberal democratic ideas behind self-determination.165  
A major plank of the ‘national protection’ argument has been the Kosovo 
Provisional Institutions’ (and UNMIK’s) failure to achieve significant returns of 
IDPs to their former homes and the lack of freedom of movement for non-
                                                        
163 The text of the declaration forms Appendix N. 
164 For the use and abuse of history related to Kosovo in the Milosevic era, see Michael A. Sells, 
‘Vuk’s Knife: Kosovo, the Serbian Golgotha and the Radicalization of Serbian Society’ in 
Buckley, Kosovo and Malcolm, Kosovo, 341-356. 
165 For example, see Serbian President Tadic’s statement on Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence in UN, S/PV.5839 (18 February 2008). 
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Kosovars in Kosovo, two facts that no accurate account could deny.166   
Another long-standing argument on which Serbia rejects Kosovo’s 
independence is that it violates norms of territorial integrity and the concept of 
sovereign statehood, both of which interact directly with the norm of self-
determination.  As Prime Minster Kostunica noted before the Security Council 
in 2005, ‘I believe that we all share the conviction that to dismember a 
democratic State and to change its internationally recognized borders against its 
will are options not to be contemplated.’167  The appeal to the norm of territorial 
integrity appears fairly standard, but the emphasis placed on the democratic 
nature of the Serbian government and likely entry to the EU have been 
highlighted often by Serbia specifically to weaken the Kosovar argument that 
independence is necessary to secure democratic outcomes and rights protection 
for Kosovar Albanians.  In his statement before the Security Council 
immediately following the declaration of Kosovo’s independence, President 
Tadic emphasized Serbia’s standing as a legitimate democracy by reminding the 
members that nearly nine years had passed since the NATO intervention and 
that ‘Milosevic is no longer there’.168   As negotiations on status collapsed in late 
2007, the Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic conceded that, despite the 
firmness of his country’s position, Kosovo would be given ‘the widest possible 
autonomy in the world’ within Serbia.169  Given these statements, the Serbian 
position can be seen as not so much an argument for the norm of territorial 
integrity against self-determination but a defence of Serbian sovereignty that 
folds in many elements of the interpretation of self-determination that were 
outlined in Part I. 
More recently, and especially since Kosovo declared its independence in 
February 2008, the Serbian government has also argued that any international 
acceptance of independence would create a powerful, negative precedent that 
could be used to fragment other sovereign states.  Building on the argument that 
Serbia had become, by 2008, a right-respecting, democratic entity, President 
Tadic powerfully confronted the Security Council: 
 
If a small, peace-loving and democratic country in Europe that is a 
United Nations Member State can be deprived of its territory 
illegally and against its will, a historic injustice will have occurred, 
because a legitimate democracy has never before been punished in 
that way…A large number of countries all over the world are plagued                                                         
166 It has been contended that the failures to return and the lack of free movement is a matter of 
choice, but this does not erase the fact that an integrated, safe, multi-ethnic Kosovo is illusory at 
present.  
167 UN, S/PV.5289 (2005) 
168 UN, S/PV.5839 (2008). 
169 BBC News Online, (1 August 2007) [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6927080.stm]. 
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by problems similar to Serbia’s…Who can guarantee to you that a 
blind eye will not be turned…when your country’s turn comes?170  
 
Raising the perennial concerns about setting a precedent for legitimate state 
fragmentation, this line of argument sought to confront the international 
community with the question of what coherent limits could be constructed 
within the norm of self-determination and whether or how these limits might be 
reconciled with the norms of security and territorial integrity. 
Considering the range of international responses to the Ahtisaari 
recommendations, Kosovo’s declaration of independence and the 
counterarguments made by the Serbian government outlined above, it is 
interesting to note the near universal lack of concern that Kosovo’s 
independence might seriously jeopardize the democratic and human rights 
centred goals that led to the intervention and defined the standards approach.171  
This lack of concern probably extends from the fact that, as Ahtisaari 
recommended, Kosovo’s independence has been heavily supervised, monitored 
and supported by the international community.  UNMIK, KFOR and the 
OSCE still have a very large presence there and have recently been joined by the 
EU’s Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which aims to overhaul 
Kosovo’s police, customs and legal system.172  It is also likely that the lack of 
concern is the result of the efforts by the government of Kosovo to create a 
multi-ethnic society173 and the fact that many countries have accepted that both 
Kosovo and Serbia will eventually join the European Union, which will facilitate 
the achievement of a multi-ethnic and liberal democratic society.174  Whatever 
the case, it appears that independence did not shake the international 
community’s resolve to encourage and affirm the standards process for Kosovo, 
which can be taken as further evidence of a growing consensus that self-
determination has clear links to liberal democratic ideas and practices.  
In contrast to this lack of overt concern for creating a multi-ethnic 
society, most international responses were centred entirely on matters 
connected to the other two arguments raised by the Serbian government.  For 
example, in an editorial in the Daily Telegraph just prior to independence, 
Russia’s Ambassador to the UK, Yury Fedotov, put forward an example of the                                                         
170 UN, S/PV.5839 (2008). 
171 The notable exception is the statement by China, which claimed China is ‘deeply worried’ 
about the security impact to the Balkans and ‘the goal of establishing a multi-ethnic society’.  
Quoted in Nicholas Kulish, et al., ‘US and Much of Europe Recognize Kosovo’, New York Times 
(19 February 2008). 
172 [http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?id=2]. 
173 See the Kosovo’s declaration of independence in Appendix N. 
174 Former SRSG and current French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner suggested as much 
when responding to the declaration. Kulish, et al. ‘US and Much of Europe Recognize Kosovo’. 
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‘official’ Russian position, in which he made almost no mention of the plight of 
the Serbs or the Kosovo standards process and instead argued strongly in favour 
of territorial integrity, warning that independence could set a precedent for 
future secessions in other areas where there are ‘frozen conflicts’.175  However, 
just after Kosovo’s independence was declared, both houses of the Russian 
parliament announced plans to recognize the independence of the breakaway 
provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia,176 which failed to create a 
stir at the time but may have been a factor that contributed to the brief but 
intense armed conflict in the summer of 2008 between Georgia and Russia.  
Despite the resulting appearance of hypocrisy or at least inconsistency given 
these later events, Russia’s position on Kosovo, like that of almost all states that 
have refused to recognize Kosovo’s independence, has more to do with 
dissuading potential secessionists inside their own borders than with the specific 
of the Kosovo situation or with norms.177  Very few countries with a high 
potential for fragmentation have recognized Kosovo,178 and of the sixty-one 
states that have done so to date (early-July 2009), some have followed the 
French lead and added the caveat that Kosovo is a ‘unique situation’ and, 
accordingly, cannot be a precedent for other cases of emerging nationalism.179   
Despite the common themes that run through many these responses, 
drawing firm conclusions about their impact on the current understanding of 
self-determination is very difficult.  Nonetheless, there are some points that 
suggest where the norm of self-determination stands at present and highlight the 
degree to which these responses reflect the normative framework discussed in 
Part I of this investigation.  While the countries that reject Kosovo’s 
independence appear to do so primarily on pragmatic grounds because of 
circumstances within their country and/or because they see the norm of 
territorial integrity as being paramount, their statements and actions before and 
after nonetheless reflect a commitment to the idea of the standards and the 
creation of a stable, rights respecting, multi-ethnic society in Kosovo.180   As a 
result, while there may be no firm consensus in the society of states about the 
relative importance of territorial integrity and self-determination and how they 
fit together on the normative level, the Kosovo case seems confirm that the                                                         
175 Yury Fedotov, ‘We Risk Danger by Granting Kosovo Independence’, Daily Telegraph (19 
December 2007). 
176 Kulish, et al. ‘US and Much of Europe Recognize Kosovo’. 
177 For a collection of official (and some unofficial) statements on the recognition/non-
recognition of Kosovo, see [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Kosovo# 
States_which_formally_recognize_Kosovo_as_independent].  
178 Turkey is an interesting counterexample. 
179 UN, S/PV.5839 (18 February 2008).  The US also made this point.  See Julie Preston, ‘UN 
Report Urges Independence for Kosovo’, New York Times (27 March 2007). 
180 In fact, no country has opposed them, at least not overtly. 
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internal aspects of self-determination are of very great normative significance in 
cases of emerging nationalism today.  Moreover, as already noted, the standards 
process (indeed the entire international intervention after the NATO bombings) 
was and remains closely aligned with the framework.   
The tougher question over Kosovo’s quasi-independence and its impact 
on the concept of self-determination comes when considering what these 
responses suggest about the limits that can be legitimately placed on the exercise 
of the concept.  Some countries, like Algeria, have been blunt and have denied 
that self-determination can be applied to permit Kosovo’s independence,181 
while others, like France, see a connection but not one that could apply to any 
other case.  It is possible that further clarification will come in 2010 when the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) will, most likely, render its advisory opinion 
on the legality of Kosovo’s ‘unilateral’ declaration of independence.182  While the 
impact of the Court’s opinion on the trajectory of self-determination’s evolution 
is unknown at this time, it is extremely unlikely that the ICJ will call into 
question the decision to place the standards process at the heart of the 
intervention in Kosovo, but the Court’s opinion might call into question the 
idea of making human rights and governance standards a litmus test for future 
status.   
In Kosovo, as the Eide and Ahtisaari reports illustrated, the standards 
process, which aimed to ensure the right of self-determination’s internal aspects 
irrespective of status, eventually got caught up on status because of the 
entrenched positions of the Kosovars, the Serbs in Kosovo and the Serbian 
government, which were the direct result of the bloody conflict prior to the 
arrival of UNMIK.  As a result, the viable options regarding external 
applications of self-determination were limited at best, and although one could 
question the exact option that Ahtisaari recommended, it is much harder to 
deny his conviction that progress on standards separate from status was 
becoming increasingly difficult.  Whether the international community can or 
will try to limit self-determination to ‘internal exercises’ of the right, such as the 
standards process, while leaving status to the side when they confront emerging 
nationalism in the future is uncertain.   
It might have been better for the Security Council to insist that the 
standards process in Kosovo was the end and not the means and to stress that                                                         
181 [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Kosovo#States_which_formally_ 
recognize_Kosovo_as_independent]. 
182 UN, A/Res./63/3 and A/PV.22 (8 October 2008). This process began in late-2008 when Serbia 
(with strong support from Russia) approached a divided General Assembly to seek what would 
amount to a legal interpretation of the key normative questions behind the Kosovo case.  The 
vote was 77 in favour, 6 against (including the US) with 74(!) abstentions.   
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the ‘final’ status, whether independence, quasi-independence or autonomy, 
would be selected and remain ‘final’ only if it proved to be the best means of 
achieving self-determination for all citizens, but this was almost definitely not 
possible given the realities on the ground.  Earlier international intervention 
based on such norms prior to the massive escalation of the conflict in 1998 and 
1999, might have diverted the parties from the actions that contributed to the 
hardening of attitudes that resulted in the situation that exists today, but this 
remains merely speculation.  
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Conclusion 
 
It is perhaps both fitting and distressing that this study has commenced 
and ended with examples of the international community’s frustrated attempts 
to come to grips with the challenges of self-determination.  The peacemakers of 
1919 and those who are responding to the situation in Kosovo today are linked 
together in their common struggle to solve the perennial questions that surface 
when confronting self-determination and emerging nationalism.  There has been 
a great desire to find practicable limits to the application of this seemingly 
irrepressible concept since it emerged as a principle of international interactions 
in the eighteenth century, but the search for coherent and consistent limits has 
been fraught with difficulties, many of which have persisted into the post-Cold 
War era.  The challenges and the violence that all too often accompany self-
determination and emerging nationalism could lead to the conclusion that the 
concept should be shunned on all occasions or at least when its application 
proves messy, that it should be limited to a discrete category of cases which, 
preferably, do not appear often, that it should not be connected with desirable 
ideas like democracy and liberalism, or that the correct response is to lament, 
much as Wilson did, that the genie cannot be put back in the bottle. 
  Fortunately or unfortunately, neither self-determination nor emerging 
nationalism is likely to disappear from the face of world politics.  As a 
philosophical concept, self-determination is rooted firmly in the liberal 
democratic tradition of thought and is intimately connected with human rights, 
sovereignty and, above all, to individual and group identity, all of which imbue 
the concept with an undeniable moral significance and value.  As Part I 
explained, the theoretical foundations of self-determination link the autonomy, 
identity, aspirations and well-being of individuals to the identity, actions and 
destiny of the collective bodies they form and of which they are a part, whether 
these groups are Primary Identity Forming Groups (PIFGs), nationalities or 
states.   
Part II highlighted the connection between the context of international 
affairs and the development and evolution of normative responses to emerging 
nationalism and state fragmentation, showing that as new dialogical spaces were 
formed and new forces altered the landscape of international politics and 
society, these ideas were mutually debated and intersubjectively understood in 
different ways, leading to new applications.  As the international society of 
states has increasingly accommodated, adopted and institutionalized liberal and 
democratic principles and practices, including human rights, democratic 
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standards and popular sovereignty, self-determination’s significance has 
increased rather than declined, making it practically unlikely and theoretically 
impossible to escape, despite its associated difficulties.  In the post-Cold War 
era, with the global expansion of liberal democratic values and norms, the only 
realistic approach to meeting the challenges of self-determination is to chart a 
way through rather than around them. 
 Part I argued that international norms related to self-determination 
might come closer to yielding their desired results and have more coherent 
limits if the international community acknowledged and reflected the liberal 
democratic tradition from which the concept extended.  As a result, the 
application of these norms would adhere to this if international responses 
reflected a concern for human rights, humane governance and the value and 
worth of PIFGs, especially nationality, to the individual members of such groups 
when balanced against other norms such as territorial integrity.  Over time, the 
international responses to real and potential fragmentations of states have 
evolved irregularly, but in some ways and at some times they have moved closer 
towards the normative framework of understanding outlined in Part I.  Without 
a doubt, the dramatic alterations to the environment of international relations 
ushered in with the demise of the Cold War have led to the greatest opportunity 
for congruence of concept and context yet seen. 
 Nonetheless, despite these contextual shifts, the development of 
theoretically coherent and consistently applied normative responses has not 
been a given.  The recent cases examined above highlight that the international 
understanding of self-determination has not fully aligned with the theoretical 
framework outlined in Part I.  The challenges of constructing consensus 
between nearly 200 states is great, especially when some have a warranted fear of 
fragmentation along identity lines and many have a lacklustre commitment to 
liberal democratic standards and values.  Competition with other norms and a 
plethora of tangible strategic, political social and economic circumstances have 
also contributed to the failure of consensus building about the limits of self-
determination.   
With that said, since the end of the Cold War, it is clear that a renewed 
and vigorous commitment to self-determination exists, that it is a central idea 
and a valued right in international relations and that it is ethically significant 
owing to its instrumental function as a means of protecting and promoting the 
well-being of those seeking to exercise it.  Its exercise by states and by 
nationalities within states forms the basis of state sovereignty and legitimacy, 
which is in turn is respected and accommodated internationally by other states, 
and, in theory if not in practice, ensures the meaningful participation of all 
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groups, particularly PIFGs, in the public life of the state of which it is a part.  In 
short, the internal aspect of self-determination forms the central core of the 
normative standard today. 
As has always been the case with nationalism and self-determination, 
secession and the active, external aspect of the concept is the tipping-point 
where debates about the limits and validity of self-determination spark divisions 
in the international community, and the post-Cold War era is proving to be no 
exception.  However, although Kosovo still stands in a state of quasi-
independence and is recognized by a (growing) minority of other states, the 
situation below the surface revels much alteration to the norm of self-
determination since the end of the Cold War.  The ‘standards before status’ 
doctrine transmitted important messages about political obligations of states 
and of nationalities and PIFGs hoping to alter their status vis-à-vis the state.  
The other developments covered in Part III revealed a massive refocusing of 
attention closer to where the liberal democratic roots of self-determination 
suggest they should be: on the tangible improvement of the rights and well-being 
of all individual and groups regardless of their political status.  The evolution of 
normative responses to self-determination and emerging nationalism is still 
somewhat distant from this point, and the exact trajectory of this evolution is 
unknown, especially given the constantly shifting nature of international 
relations in the wake of 9/11, the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the growing threats of nuclear proliferation and the most serious global 
economic downturn since the Great Depression.  
However, as these dramatic changes unfold and affect the context of 
international relations in the twenty-first century, if the international 
community continues to turn its attention to the interplay of human rights, 
identity, humane governance and sovereignty, it is entirely possible that the 
understanding and application of the norm of self-determination may 
incorporate and reflect these ideas even more coherently than it does at the 
present. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
 
The Atlantic Charter (1941)1 
 
The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, 
representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it 
right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective 
countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world. 
First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other; 
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely 
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; 
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which 
they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who 
have been forcibly deprived of them; 
Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the 
enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the 
trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity; 
Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the 
economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic 
advancement and social security; 
Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace 
which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and 
which will afford assurance that all the men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from 
fear and want; 
Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without 
hindrance; 
Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual 
reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force.  Since no future peace can be 
maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or 
may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a 
wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is 
essential.  They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measure which will lighten 
for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments. 
 
Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Winston S. Churchill 
 
                                                        
1 ‘Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and Mr. Winston 
Churchill, representing His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom’ [The Atlantic 
Charter], (14 August 1941) [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/atlantic.htm]. 
  244 
Appendix B 
 
Extracts from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)1 
 
Preamble 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts 
which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human 
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been 
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people, 
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to 
rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of 
law, 
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between 
nations, 
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights 
of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life 
in larger freedom, 
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the 
United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, 
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest 
importance for the full realization of this pledge, 
Now, therefore the General Assembly Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights…  
 
Article 1. 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.  They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
Article 2. 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.  Furthermore, no distinction shall be 
made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory 
to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any 
other limitation of sovereignty… 
 
Article 15. 
(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change 
his nationality. 
Article 16. 
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or 
religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to 
marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. 
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending 
spouses. 
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State. 
Article 17. 
(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
Article 18. 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, 
worship and observance… 
 
Article 20. 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 
(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association. 
Article 21. 
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or                                                         
1 UN, A/Res.217 (10 December 1948). 
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through freely chosen representatives. 
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. 
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall 
be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and 
shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
Article 22. 
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to 
realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the 
organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights 
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality… 
 
Article 25. 
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being 
of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. 
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance.  All children, 
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection… 
 
Article 27. 
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to 
enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting 
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. 
Article 28. 
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized. 
Article 29. 
(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development 
of his personality is possible. 
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. 
(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations. 
Article 30. 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any 
of the rights and freedoms set forth herein. 
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Appendix C 
 
Extracts for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)1 
 
Preamble 
The States Parties to the present Covenant, 
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the 
United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, 
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person, 
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want 
can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political 
rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights, 
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to 
promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms, 
Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to 
which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
Agree upon the following articles: 
 
Article 1 
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-
operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a 
people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for 
the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of 
the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of 
the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
Article 2  
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or 
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant. 
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated 
shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other 
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy; 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when 
granted… 
 
Article 5 
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group 
or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any 
of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for in the present Covenant. 
2. There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human 
rights recognized or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, 
conventions, regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize 
such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent. 
                                                         
1 UN, A/Res.2200A (16 December 1966). 
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PART III 
Article 6   
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be 
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the 
commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only 
be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court. 
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that 
nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any 
way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the 
sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases. 
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below 
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women. 
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital 
punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant… 
 
Article 12  
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the 
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. 
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. 
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those 
which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), 
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other 
rights recognized in the present Covenant. 
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.    
Article 13 
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be 
expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, 
except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the 
reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the 
purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the 
competent authority… 
 
Article 18 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, 
either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 4. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to 
ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions. 
Article 19  
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these 
shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public 
health or morals. 
Article 20  
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. 
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law. 
Article 21 
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the 
exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public 
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order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
Article 22 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the 
right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are 
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition 
of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this 
right. 
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour 
Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such 
a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention… 
 
Article 25  
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions 
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: 
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; 
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will 
of the electors; 
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country. 
Article 26 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the 
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and 
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. 
Article 27  
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or 
to use their own language. 
 
PART IV 
Article 28 
1. There shall be established a Human Rights Committee (hereafter referred to in the 
present Covenant as the Committee). It shall consist of eighteen members and shall carry out 
the functions hereinafter provided. 
2. The Committee shall be composed of nationals of the States Parties to the present 
Covenant who shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field 
of human rights, consideration being given to the usefulness of the participation of some persons 
having legal experience. 
3. The members of the Committee shall be elected and shall serve in their personal 
capacity… 
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Appendix D 
 
Extracts from the International Covenant on Economic, Social  
and Cultural Rights (1966)1 
 
Preamble 
The States Parties to the present Covenant, 
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the 
United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, 
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person, 
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if 
conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as 
well as his civil and political rights, 
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to 
promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms, 
Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to 
which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
Agree upon the following articles: 
 
PART I 
Article 1 
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination.  By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-
operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law.  In no case may a 
people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for 
the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of 
the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of 
the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
PART II 
Article 2 
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly 
the adoption of legislative measures. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights 
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status. 
3. Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, 
may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the 
present Covenant to non-nationals… 
 
Article 4 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of those 
rights provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject 
such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be 
compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general 
welfare in a democratic society… 
 
Article 15 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: 
(a) To take part in cultural life; 
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; 
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.                                                         
1 UN, A/Res.2200A (16 December 1966). 
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2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the development and 
the diffusion of science and culture. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom 
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived from 
the encouragement and development of international contacts and co-operation in the scientific 
and cultural fields. 
PART IV 
Article 16 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit in conformity with 
this part of the Covenant reports on the measures which they have adopted and the progress 
made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized herein… 
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Appendix E 
 
The Declaration on Friendly Relations (1970)1 
 
Preamble 
The General Assembly, 
Reaffirming in the terms of the Charter of the United Nations that the maintenance of 
international peace and security and the development of friendly relations and co-operation 
between nations are among the fundamental purposes of the United Nations, 
Recalling that the peoples of the United Nations are determined to practise tolerance 
and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, 
Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening international peace 
founded upon freedom, equality, justice and respect for fundamental human rights and of 
developing friendly relations among nations irrespective of their political, economic and social 
systems or the levels of their development, 
Bearing in mind also the paramount importance of the Charter of the United Nations in 
the promotion of the rule of law among nations, 
Considering that the faithful observance of the principles of international law 
concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States and the fulfillment in good faith of 
the obligations assumed by States, in accordance with the Charter, is of the greatest importance 
for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the implementation of the other 
purposes of the United Nations, 
Noting that the great political, economic and social changes and scientific progress 
which have taken place in the world since the adoption of the Charter give increased importance 
to these principles and to the need for their more effective application in the conduct of States 
wherever carried on, 
Recalling the established principle that outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use 
or occupation, or by any other means, and mindful of the fact that consideration is being given in 
the United Nations to the question of establishing other appropriate provisions similarly 
inspired, 
Convinced that the strict observance by States of the obligation not to intervene in the 
affairs of any other State is an essential condition to ensure that nations live together in peace 
with one another, since the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and 
letter of the Charter, but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international 
peace and security, 
Recalling the duty of States to refrain in their international relations from military, 
political, economic or any other form of coercion aimed against the political independence or 
territorial integrity of any State, 
Considering it essential that all States shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, 
Considering it equally essential that all States shall settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in accordance with the Charter, 
Reaffirming, in accordance with the Charter, the basic importance of sovereign equality 
and stressing that the purposes of the United Nations can be implemented only if States enjoy 
sovereign equality and comply fully with the requirements of this principle in their international 
relations, 
Convinced that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation constitutes a major obstacle to the promotion of international peace and security, 
Convinced that the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples constitutes a 
significant contribution to contemporary international law, and that its effective application is of 
paramount importance for the promotion of friendly relations among States, based on respect 
for the principle of sovereign equality, 
Convinced in consequence that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of 
the national unity and territorial integrity of a State or country or at its political independence is 
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter, 
Considering the provisions of the Charter as a whole and taking into account the role of 
relevant resolutions adopted by the competent organs of the United Nations relating to the 
content of the principles, 
Considering that the progressive development and codification of the following 
principles: 
(a) The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat                                                         
1 UN, Declaration On Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Among States, A/Res.2526 (24 October 1970). 
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or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, 
(b) The principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means 
in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, 
(c) The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in 
accordance with the Charter, 
(d) The duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter, 
(e) The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
(f) The principle of sovereign equality of States, 
(g) The principle that States shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in 
accordance with the Charter, 
so as to secure their more effective application within the international community, 
would promote the realization of the purposes of the United Nations, 
Having considered the principles of international law relating to friendly relations and 
co-operation among States, 
1. Solemnly proclaims the following principles: 
The principle that States shall refrain in their international ~ relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations 
Every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a threat or use of force 
constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and shall 
never be employed as a means of settling international issues. 
A war of aggression constitutes a crime against the peace, for which there is 
responsibility under international law. 
In accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, States have the 
duty to refrain from propaganda for wars of aggression. 
Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the existing 
international boundaries of another State or as a means of solving international disputes, 
including territorial disputes and problems concerning frontiers of States. 
Every State likewise has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate 
international lines of demarcation, such as armistice lines, established by or pursuant to an 
international agreement to which it is a party or which it is otherwise bound to respect. Nothing 
in the foregoing shall be construed as prejudicing the positions of the parties concerned with 
regard to the status and effects of such lines under their special regimes or as affecting their 
temporary character. 
States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force. 
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples 
referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of their right 
to self-determination and freedom and independence. 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of 
irregular forces or armed bands including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another 
State. 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating 
in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within 
its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the 
present paragraph involve a threat or use of force. 
The territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the 
use of force in contravention of the provisions of the Charter. The territory of a State shall not 
be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force. No 
territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal. 
Nothing in the foregoing shall be construed as affecting: 
(a) Provisions of the Charter or any international agreement prior to the Charter regime 
and valid under international law; or 
(b) The powers of the Security Council under the Charter. 
All States shall pursue in good faith negotiations for the early conclusion of a universal 
treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and strive to 
adopt appropriate measures to reduce international tensions and strengthen confidence among 
States. 
All States shall comply in good faith with their obligations under the generally 
recognized principles and rules of international law with respect to the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and shall endeavour to make the United Nations security 
system based on the Charter more effective. 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as enlarging or diminishing in 
any way the scope of the provisions of the Charter concerning cases in which the use of force is 
lawful. 
The principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered 
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Every State shall settle its international disputes with other States by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered. 
States shall accordingly seek early and just settlement of their international disputes by 
negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional 
agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their choice.  In seeking such a settlement 
the parties shall agree upon such peaceful means as may be appropriate to the circumstances and 
nature of the dispute. 
The parties to a dispute have the duty, in the event of failure to reach a solution by any 
one of the above peaceful means, to continue to seek a settlement of the dispute by other 
peaceful means agreed upon by them. 
States parties to an international dispute, as well as other States shall refrain from any 
action which may aggravate the Situation so as to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and shall act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations. 
International disputes shall be settled on the basis of the Sovereign equality of States 
and in accordance with the Principle of free choice of means.  Recourse to, or acceptance of, a 
settlement procedure freely agreed to by States with regard to existing or future disputes to 
which they are parties shall not be regarded as incompatible with sovereign equality. 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs prejudices or derogates from the applicable 
provisions of the Charter, in particular those relating to the pacific settlement of international 
disputes. 
The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter 
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.  Consequently, armed 
intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of 
the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international 
law. 
No State may use or encourage the use of economic political or any other type of 
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of 
its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.  Also, no State shall organize, 
assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed 
towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in 
another State. 
The use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of 
their inalienable rights and of the principle of non-intervention. 
Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural 
systems, without interference in any form by another State. 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as reflecting the relevant 
provisions of the Charter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. 
The duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter 
States have the duty to co-operate with one another, irrespective of the differences in 
their political, economic and social systems, in the various spheres of international relations, in 
order to maintain international peace and security and to promote international economic 
stability and progress, the general welfare of nations and international co-operation free from 
discrimination based on such differences. 
To this end: 
(a) States shall co-operate with other States in the maintenance of international peace 
and security; 
(b) States shall co-operate in the promotion of universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and in the elimination of all forms of racial 
discrimination and all forms of religious intolerance; 
(c) States shall conduct their international relations in the economic, social, cultural, 
technical and trade fields in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality and non-
intervention; 
(d) States Members of the United Nations have the duty to take joint and separate 
action in co-operation with the United Nations in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Charter. 
States should co-operate in the economic, social and cultural fields as well as in the field 
of science and technology and for the promotion of international cultural and educational 
progress. States should co-operate in the promotion of economic growth throughout the world, 
especially that of the developing countries. 
The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in 
the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without 
external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions 
of the Charter. 
Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of 
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the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions 
of the Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the 
responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the implementation of the principle, in 
order: 
(a) To promote friendly relations and co-operation among States; and 
(b) To bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the freely expressed will 
of the peoples concerned; 
and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle, as well as a denial of fundamental human 
rights, and is contrary to the Charter. 
Every State has the duty to promote through joint and separate action universal respect 
for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the Charter. 
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or 
integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely 
determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by 
that people. 
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples 
referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination 
and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action 
in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek 
and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. 
The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Charter, 
a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such separate 
and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-
Governing Territory have exercised their right of self-determination in accordance with the 
Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles. 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or 
political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus 
possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour. 
Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the 
national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country. 
The principle of sovereign equality of States 
All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal 
members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, 
political or other nature. 
In particular, sovereign equality includes the following elements: 
(a) States are judicially equal; 
(b) Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty; 
(c) Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States; 
(d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable; 
(e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic 
and cultural systems; 
(f) Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international 
obligations and to live in peace with other States. 
The principle that States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in 
accordance with the Charter-: 
Every State has the duty to fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by it in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
Every State has the duty to fulfil in good faith its obligations under the generally 
recognized principles and rules of international law. 
Every State has the duty to fulfil in good faith its obligations under international 
agreements valid under the generally recognized principles and rules of international law. 
Where obligations arising under international agreements are in conflict with the 
obligations of Members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations, the 
obligations under the Charter shall prevail. 
GENERAL PART 
2. Declares that: 
In their interpretation and application the above principles are interrelated and each 
principle should be construed in the context of the other principles.  Nothing in this 
Declaration shall be construed as prejudicing in any manner the provisions of the Charter or the 
rights and duties of Member States under the Charter or the rights of peoples under the Charter, 
taking into account the elaboration of these rights in this Declaration. 
3. Declares further that: The principles of the Charter which are embodied in this 
Declaration constitute basic principles of international law, and consequently appeals to all 
States to be guided by these principles in their international conduct and to develop their mutual 
relations on the basis of the strict observance of these principles. 
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Appendix F 
 
Extracts from the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)1 
 
The General Assembly, 
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and good 
faith in the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by States in accordance with the Charter, 
Affirming that indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples, while recognizing the 
right of all peoples to be different, to consider themselves different, and to be respected as such, 
Affirming also that all peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of civilizations and 
cultures, which constitute the common heritage of humankind, 
Affirming further that all doctrines, policies and practices based on or advocating 
superiority of peoples or individuals on the basis of national origin or racial, religious, ethnic or 
cultural differences are racist, scientifically false, legally invalid, morally condemnable and 
socially unjust,… 
Acknowledging that the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights as well as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, affirm the fundamental 
importance of the right to self-determination of all peoples, by virtue of which they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development, 
Bearing in mind that nothing in this Declaration may be used to deny any peoples their 
right to self-determination, exercised in conformity with international law, 
Convinced that the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples in this Declaration 
will enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the State and indigenous peoples, 
based on principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, non-discrimination and good 
faith, 
Encouraging States to comply with and effectively implement all their obligations as they 
apply to indigenous peoples under international instruments, in particular those related to 
human rights, in consultation and cooperation with the peoples concerned, 
Emphasizing that the United Nations has an important and continuing role to play in 
promoting and protecting the rights of indigenous peoples, 
Believing that this Declaration is a further important step forward for the recognition, 
promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms of indigenous peoples and in the 
development of relevant activities of the United Nations system in this field, 
Recognizing and reaffirming that indigenous individuals are entitled without 
discrimination to all human rights recognized in international law, and that indigenous peoples 
possess collective rights which are indispensable for their existence, well-being and integral 
development as peoples,… 
 
Article 1 
Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, 
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights law. 
Article 2 
Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and 
individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the exercise of their 
rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity. 
Article 3 
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination.  By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. 
Article 4 
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to 
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways 
and means for financing their autonomous functions. 
Article 5 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, 
legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if 
they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State. 
Article 6 
Every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality. 
Article 7 
1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty 
and security of person. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as                                                         
1 UN, A/61/L.67 (7 September 2007). 
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distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of violence, 
including forcibly removing children of the group to another group. 
Article 8 
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced 
assimilation or destruction of their culture… 
 
Article 11 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions 
and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and 
future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, 
designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and literature. 
2. States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include 
restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, 
intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and informed consent 
or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs. 
Article 12 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, develop and teach their 
spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and 
have access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and control of their 
ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatriation of their human remains. 
2. States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of ceremonial objects and 
human remains in their possession through fair, transparent and effective mechanisms developed 
in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned. 
Article 13 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future 
generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and 
literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for communities, places and persons.  
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that this right is protected and also to 
ensure that indigenous peoples can understand and be understood in political, legal and 
administrative proceedings, where necessary through the provision of interpretation or by other 
appropriate means. 
Article 14 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their educational systems 
and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate to their 
cultural methods of teaching and learning. 
2. Indigenous individuals, particularly children, have the right to all levels and forms of 
education of the State without discrimination. 
3. States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take effective measures, in order 
for indigenous individuals, particularly children, including those living outside their 
communities, to have access, when possible, to an education in their own culture and provided in 
their own language. 
Article 15 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the dignity and diversity of their cultures, 
traditions, histories and aspirations which shall be appropriately reflected in education and 
public information. 
2. States shall take effective measures, in consultation and cooperation with the 
indigenous peoples concerned, to combat prejudice and eliminate discrimination and to promote 
tolerance, understanding and good relations among indigenous peoples and all other segments of 
society… 
 
Article 18 
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which 
would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their 
own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making 
institutions. 
Article 19 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed 
consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect 
them. 
Article 20 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic 
and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of 
subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic 
activities. 
2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development are 
entitled to just and fair redress. 
Article 21 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of 
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their economic and social conditions… 
 
Article 46 
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter 
of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would 
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States… 
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Appendix G 
 
Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and 
 in the Soviet Union (19911) 
 
In compliance with the European Council's request, Ministers have assessed 
developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union with a view to elaborating an approach 
regarding relations with new states.   
 
In this connection they have adopted the following guidelines on the formal recognition 
of new states in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union: 
 
The Community and its Member States confirm their attachment to the principles of the 
Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, in particular the principle of self-
determination.  They affirm their readiness to recognize, subject to the normal standards of 
international practice and the political realities in each case, those new States which, 
following the historic changes in the region, have constituted themselves on a democratic 
basis, have accepted the appropriate international obligations and have committed 
themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations. 
 
Therefore, they adopt a common position on the process of recognition of these new 
States, which requires: 
 
- respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments 
subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with 
regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights 
- guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance 
with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE 
- respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful 
means and by common agreement 
- acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation as well as to security and regional stability 
- commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by recourse to 
arbitration, all questions concerning State succession and regional disputes. 
 
The Community and its Member States will not recognize entities which are the result of 
aggression. They would take account of the effects of recognition on neighbouring States. 
 
The commitment to these principles opens the way to recognition by the Community and 
its Member States and to the establishment of diplomatic relations.  It could be laid down 
in agreements. 
                                                        
1 [http://207.57.19.226/journal/Vol4/No1/art6.html] 
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Appendix H 
 
Extracts from The Badinter Commission Opinions (1991-1992)1 
 
Opinion No. 1 
The President of the Arbitration Committee received the following letter from Lord 
Carrington, President of the Conference on Yugoslavia, on 20 November 1991: 
We find ourselves with a major legal question.  Serbia considers that those Republics which have 
declared or would declare themselves independent or sovereign have seceded or would secede 
from the SFRY which would otherwise continue to exist. 
Other Republics on the contrary consider that there is no question of secession, but the 
question is one of a disintegration or breaking-up of the SDRY as the result of the concurring 
will of a number of Republics. They consider that the six Republics are to be considered equal 
successors to the SFRY, without any of them or group of them being able to claim to be the 
continuation thereof. 
I should like the Arbitration Committee to consider the matter in order to formulate any 
opinion or recommendation which it might deem useful. 
The Arbitration Committee has been apprised of the memoranda and documents 
communicated respectively by the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Slovenia, Serbia, and by the President of the collegiate Presidency of the SFRY. 
 
1) The Committee considers: 
a) that the answer to the question should be based on the principles of public international law 
which serve to define the conditions on which an entity constitutes a state; that in this respect, 
the existence or disappearance of the state is a question of fact; that the effects of recognition by 
other states are purely declaratory; 
b) that the state is commonly defined as a community which consists of a territory and a 
population subject to an organized political authority; that such a state is characterized by 
sovereignty; 
c) that, for the purpose of applying these criteria, the form of internal political organization and 
the constitutional provisions are mere facts, although it is necessary to take them into 
consideration in order to determine the Government's way over the population and the 
territory; 
d) that in the case of a federal-type state, which embraces communities that possess a degree of 
autonomy and, moreover, participate in the exercise of political power within the framework of 
institutions common to the Federation, the existence of the state implies that the federal organs 
represent the components of the Federation and wield effective power; 
e) that, in compliance with the accepted definition in international law, the expression `state 
succession' means the replacement of one state by another in the responsibility for the 
international relations of territory. This occurs whenever there is a change in the territory of the 
state. The phenomenon of state succession is governed by the principles of international law, 
from which the Vienna Conventions of 23 August 1978 and 8 April 1983 have drawn inspiration. 
In compliance with these principles, the outcome of succession should be equitable, the states 
concerned being free of terms of settlement and conditions by agreement. Moreover, the 
peremptory norms of general international law and, in particular, respect for the fundamental 
rights of the individual and the rights of peoples and minorities, are binding on all the parties to 
the succession. 
 
2) The Arbitration Committee notes that: 
a) - although the SFRY has until now retained its international personality, notably inside 
international organizations, the Republics have expressed their desire for independence; 
- in Slovenia, by a referendum in December 1990, followed by a declaration of independence on 
25 June 1991, which was suspended for three months and confirmed on 8 October 1991; 
- in Croatia, by a referendum held in May 1991, followed by a declaration of independence on 25 
June 1991, which was suspended for three months and confirmed on 8 October 1991; 
- in Macedonia, by a referendum held in September 1991 in favour of a sovereign and 
independent Macedonia within an association of Yugoslav states; 
- in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by a sovereignty resolution adopted by Parliament on 14 October 
1991, whose validity has been contested by the Serbian community of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
b) - The composition and workings of the essential organs of the Federation, be they the Federal 
Presidency, the Federal Council, the Council of the Republics and the Provinces, the Federal 
Executive Council, the Constitutional Court or the Federal Army, no longer meet the criteria of 
participation and representatives inherent in a federal state;                                                         
1 Extracts from Opinions of the Arbitration Committee of the International Conference on Yugoslavia 
(Badinter Committee), (1991-1992) [http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol3/No1/art13.html] and 
[http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol4/No1/art8.html#TopOfPage]. 
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c) - The recourse to force has led to armed conflict between the different elements of the 
Federation which has caused the death of thousands of people and wrought considerable 
destruction within a few months. The authorities of the Federation and the Republics have 
shown themselves to be powerless to enforce respect for the succeeding ceasefire agreements 
concluded under the auspices of the European Communities or the United Nations 
Organization. 
 
3) - Consequently, the Arbitration Committee is of the opinion: 
- that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution; 
- that it is incumbent upon the Republics to settle such problems of state succession as may arise 
from this process in keeping with the principles and rules of international law, with particular 
regard for human rights and the rights of peoples and minorities; 
- that it is up to those Republics that so wish, to work together to form a new association 
endowed with the democratic institutions of their choice. 
 
Opinion No. 2 
On 20 November 1991 the Chairman of the Arbitration Committee received a letter from Lord 
Carrington, Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia, requesting the Committee's opinion on 
the following question put by the Republic of Serbia: 
Does the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as one of the constituent 
peoples of Yugoslavia, have the right to self-determination? 
The Committee took note of the aide-mémoires, observations and other materials submitted by 
the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia, by 
the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and by the `Assembly of 
the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina'. 
1. The Committee considers that, whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination 
must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) 
except where the states concerned agree otherwise. 
2. Where there are one or more groups within a state constituting one or more ethnic, religious 
or language communities, they have the right to recognition of their identity under international 
law. 
As the Committee emphasized in its Opinion No. 1 of 29 November 1991, published on 7 
December, the - now peremptory - norms of international law require states to ensure respect 
for the rights of minorities. This requirement applies to all the Republics vis-à-vis the minorities 
on their territory. 
The Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia must therefore be afforded every 
right accorded to minorities under international convention as well as national and international 
guarantees consistent with the principles of international law and the provisions of Chapter II of 
the draft Convention of 4 November 1991, which has been accepted by these Republics. 
3. Article 1 of the two 1986 International Covenants on human rights establishes that the 
principle of the right to self-determination serves to safeguard human rights. By virtue of that 
right every individual may choose to belong to whatever ethnic, religious or language community 
he or she wishes. 
In the Committee's view one possible consequence of this principle might be for the members 
of the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia to be recognized under agreements 
between the Republics as having the nationality of their choice, with all the rights and 
obligations which that entails with respect to the states concerned. 
4. The Arbitration Committee is therefore of the opinion: 
(i) that the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is entitled to all the rights 
concerned to minorities and ethnic groups under international law and under the provisions of 
the draft Convention of the Conference on Yugoslavia of 4 November 1991, to which the 
Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia have undertaken to give effect; and 
(ii) that the Republics must afford the members of those minorities and ethnic groups all the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized in international law, including, where 
appropriate, the right to choose their nationality… 
 
Opinion No.3 
On 20 November 1991 the Chairman of the Arbitration Committee received a letter from Lord 
Carrington, Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia, requesting the Committee's opinion on 
the following question put by the Republic of Serbia: 
 
Can the internal boundaries between Croatia and Serbia and between Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Serbia be regarded as frontiers in terms of public international law?... 
 
2. The Committee therefore takes the view that once the process in the SFRY leads to the 
creation of one or more independent states, the issue of frontiers, in particular those of the 
Republics referred to in the question before it, must be resolved in accordance with the 
following principles: 
First - All external frontiers must be respected in line with the principles stated in the United 
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Nations Charter, in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
(General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV)) and in the Helsinki Final Act, a principle which also 
underlies Article 11 of the Vienna Convention of 23 August 1978 on the Succession of States in 
Respect of Treaties. 
 
Second - The boundaries between Croatia and Serbia, between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, 
and possibly other adjacent independent states may not be altered except by agreement freely 
arrived at. 
 
Third - Except where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers protected by 
international law. This conclusion follows from the principle of respect for the territorial status 
quo and, in particular, from the principle of uti possidetis.  Uti possidetis, though initially applied in 
settling decolonisation issues in America and Africa, is today recognized as a general principle, as 
stated by the International Court of Justice… 
Nevertheless the principle is not a special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of 
international law. It is a general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of 
the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the 
independence and stability of new states being endangered by fratricidal struggles... 
 
The principle applies all the more readily to the Republic since the second and fourth paragraphs 
of Article 5 of the Constitution of the SFRY stipulated that the Republics' territories and 
boundaries could not be altered without their consent… 
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Appendix I 
 
The Dayton Accords – Extracts from the ‘General Framework’ (1995)1 
 
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (the "Parties"), 
Recognizing the need for a comprehensive settlement to bring an end to the tragic 
conflict in the region, 
Desiring to contribute toward that end and to promote an enduring peace and 
stability… 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
Article I 
The Parties shall conduct their relations in accordance with the principles set forth in 
the United Nations Charter, as well as the Helsinki Final Act and other documents of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In particular, the Parties shall fully 
respect the sovereign equality of one another, shall settle disputes by peaceful means, and shall 
refrain from any action, by threat or use of force or otherwise, against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other State… 
Article III 
The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning 
the boundary demarcation between the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Republika Srpska, as set forth in the Agreement at Annex 2.  The Parties shall fully respect 
and promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein. 
Article IV 
The Parties welcome and endorse the elections program for Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
set forth in Annex 3. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of that program. 
Article V 
The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning 
the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as set forth in Annex 4. The Parties shall fully 
respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein. 
Article VI 
The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning 
the establishment of an arbitration tribunal, a Commission on Human Rights, a Commission on 
Refugees and Displaced Persons, a Commission to Preserve National Monuments, and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Public Corporations, as set forth in the Agreements at Annexes 5-9. The 
Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein. 
Article VII 
Recognizing that the observance of human rights and the protection of refugees and 
displaced persons are of vital importance in achieving a lasting peace, the Parties agree to and 
shall comply fully with the provisions concerning human rights set forth in Chapter One of the 
Agreement at Annex 6, as well as the provisions concerning refugees and displaced persons set 
forth in Chapter One of the Agreement at Annex 7… 
 
Article IX 
The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of this 
peace settlement, as described in the Annexes to this Agreement, or which are otherwise 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to the obligation of all Parties to 
cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of 
international humanitarian law. 
Article X 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
recognize each other as sovereign independent States within their international borders. Further 
aspects of their mutual recognition will be subject to subsequent discussions… 
 
Annex 4 - Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Preamble 
Based on respect for human dignity, liberty, and equality, 
Dedicated to peace, justice, tolerance, and reconciliation, 
Convinced that democratic governmental institutions and fair procedures best produce 
peaceful relations within a pluralist society, 
Desiring to promote the general welfare and economic growth through the protection of 
private property and the promotion of a market economy,                                                         
1 The General Framework Agreement   for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 December 1995 
[http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380]. 
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Guided by the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Committed to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in accordance with international law, 
Determined to ensure full respect for international humanitarian law, 
Inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on 
Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Declaration on 
the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, as 
well as other human rights instruments, 
Recalling the Basic Principles agreed in Geneva on September 8, 1995, and in New York 
on September 26, 1995, 
Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina hereby determine that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is as 
follows: 
Article I: Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Continuation. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the official name of which shall 
henceforth be "Bosnia and Herzegovina," shall continue its legal existence under international 
law as a state, with its internal structure modified as provided herein and with its present 
internationally recognized borders. It shall remain a Member State of the United Nations and 
may as Bosnia and Herzegovina maintain or apply for membership in organizations within the 
United Nations system and other international organizations. 
Democratic Principles. Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a democratic state, which shall 
operate under the rule of law and with free and democratic elections. 
Composition. Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of the two Entities, the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (hereinafter "the Entities")… 
All citizens of either Entity are thereby citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
No person shall be deprived of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Entity citizenship arbitrarily 
or so as to leave him or her stateless. No person shall be deprived of Bosnia and Herzegovina or 
Entity citizenship on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status. 
All persons who were citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately 
prior to the entry into force of this Constitution are citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
citizenship of persons who were naturalized after April 6, 1992 and before the entry into force of 
this Constitution will be regulated by the Parliamentary Assembly. 
Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina may hold the citizenship of another state, provided 
that there is a bilateral agreement, approved by the Parliamentary Assembly in accordance with 
Article IV(4)(d), between Bosnia and Herzegovina and that state governing this matter. Persons 
with dual citizenship may vote in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities only if Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is their country of residence. 
A citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina abroad shall enjoy the protection of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Each Entity may issue passports of Bosnia and Herzegovina to its citizens as 
regulated by the Parliamentary Assembly. Bosnia and Herzegovina may issue passports to 
citizens not issued a passport by an Entity. There shall be a central register of all passports issued 
by the Entities and by Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Article II: Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Human Rights. Bosnia and Herzegovina and both Entities shall ensure the highest level 
of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. To that end, there shall 
be a Human Rights Commission for Bosnia and Herzegovina as provided for in Annex 6 to the 
General Framework Agreement. 
International Standards. The rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply 
directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These shall have priority over all other law. 
Enumeration of Rights. All persons within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall 
enjoy the human rights and fundamental freedoms referred to in paragraph 2 above; these 
include: 
The right to life. 
The right not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
The right not to be held in slavery or servitude or to perform forced or compulsory 
labor. 
The rights to liberty and security of person. 
The right to a fair hearing in civil and criminal matters, and other rights relating to 
criminal proceedings. 
The right to private and family life, home, and correspondence. 
Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. 
Freedom of expression. 
Freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association with others. 
The right to marry and to found a family. 
The right to property. 
  264 
The right to education. 
The right to liberty of movement and residence. 
Non-Discrimination. The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms provided for in this 
Article or in the international agreements listed in Annex I to this Constitution shall be secured 
to all persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status. 
Refugees and Displaced Persons. All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely 
to return to their homes of origin. They have the right, in accordance with Annex 7 to the 
General Framework Agreement, to have restored to them property of which they were deprived 
in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any such property that cannot 
be restored to them. Any commitments or statements relating to such property made under 
duress are null and void. 
Implementation. Bosnia and Herzegovina, and all courts, agencies, governmental organs, 
and instrumentalities operated by or within the Entities, shall apply and conform to the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms referred to in paragraph 2 above. 
International Agreements. Bosnia and Herzegovina shall remain or become party to the 
international agreements listed in Annex I to this Constitution. 
Cooperation. All competent authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall cooperate with 
and provide unrestricted access to: any international human rights monitoring mechanisms 
established for Bosnia and Herzegovina; the supervisory bodies established by any of the 
international agreements listed in Annex I to this Constitution; the International Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (and in particular shall comply with orders issued pursuant to Article 29 
of the Statute of the Tribunal); and any other organization authorized by the United Nations 
Security Council with a mandate concerning human rights or humanitarian law. 
Article III: Responsibilities of and Relations Between the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the Entities 
Responsibilities of the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The following matters are the responsibility of the institutions of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: 
Foreign policy. Foreign trade policy. Customs policy. Monetary policy as provided in 
Article VII. Finances of the institutions and for the international obligations of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Immigration, refugee, and asylum policy and regulation. International and inter-
Entity criminal law enforcement, including relations with Interpol.  Establishment and operation 
of common and international communications facilities. Regulation of inter-Entity 
transportation.  Air traffic control. Responsibilities of the Entities. 
The Entities shall have the right to establish special parallel relationships with 
neighboring states consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
Each Entity shall provide all necessary assistance to the government of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in order to enable it to honor the international obligations of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, provided that financial obligations incurred by one Entity without the consent of 
the other prior to the election of the Parliamentary Assembly and Presidency of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina shall be the responsibility of that Entity, except insofar as the obligation is 
necessary for continuing the membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina in an international 
organization. 
The Entities shall provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in their 
respective jurisdictions, by maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating in 
accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for the internationally 
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms referred to in Article II above, and by 
taking such other measures as appropriate. 
Each Entity may also enter into agreements with states and international organizations 
with the consent of the Parliamentary Assembly. The Parliamentary Assembly may provide by 
law that certain types of agreements do not require such consent. 
Law and Responsibilities of the Entities and the Institutions. 
All governmental functions and powers not expressly assigned in this Constitution to 
the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be those of the Entities. 
The Entities and any subdivisions thereof shall comply fully with this Constitution, 
which supersedes inconsistent provisions of the law of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the 
constitutions and law of the Entities, and with the decisions of the institutions of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The general principles of international law shall be an integral part of the law of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities. 
Coordination.   The Presidency may decide to facilitate inter-Entity coordination on 
matters not within the responsibilities of Bosnia and Herzegovina as provided in this 
Constitution, unless an Entity objects in any particular case. 
Additional Responsibilities. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina shall assume responsibility for such other matters as are agreed 
by the Entities; are provided for in Annexes 5 through 8 to the General Framework Agreement; 
or are necessary to preserve the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and 
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international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with the division of 
responsibilities between the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additional institutions may 
be established as necessary to carry out such responsibilities. 
Within six months of the entry into force of this Constitution, the Entities shall begin 
negotiations with a view to including in the responsibilities of the institutions of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina other matters, including utilization of energy resources and cooperative economic 
projects… 
Article IV: Parliamentary Assembly 
The Parliamentary Assembly shall have two chambers: the House of Peoples and the 
House of Representatives. 
House of Peoples. The House of Peoples shall comprise 15 Delegates, two-thirds from 
the Federation (including five Croats and five Bosniacs) and one-third from the Republika 
Srpska (five Serbs). 
The designated Croat and Bosniac Delegates from the Federation shall be selected, 
respectively, by the Croat and Bosniac Delegates to the House of Peoples of the Federation. 
Delegates from the Republika Srpska shall be selected by the National Assembly of the 
Republika Srpska. 
Nine members of the House of Peoples shall comprise a quorum, provided that at least 
three Bosniac, three Croat, and three Serb Delegates are present. 
House of Representatives. The House of Representatives shall comprise 42 Members, 
two- thirds elected from the territory of the Federation, one-third from the territory of the 
Republika Srpska. 
Members of the House of Representatives shall be directly elected from their Entity in 
accordance with an election law to be adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly. The first 
election, however, shall take place in accordance with Annex 3 to the General Framework 
Agreement… 
Powers. The Parliamentary Assembly shall have responsibility for: 
Enacting legislation as necessary to implement decisions of the Presidency or to carry 
out the responsibilities of the Assembly under this Constitution. 
Deciding upon the sources and amounts of revenues for the operations of the 
institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Approving a budget for the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Deciding whether to consent to the ratification of treaties. 
Such other matters as are necessary to carry out its duties or as are assigned to it by 
mutual agreement of the Entities. 
 
Article V: Presidency 
The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of three Members: one Bosniac 
and one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly 
elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska… 
Procedures. 
The Presidency shall determine its own rules of procedure, which shall provide for 
adequate notice of all meetings of the Presidency. 
The Members of the Presidency shall appoint from their Members a Chair. For the first 
term of the Presidency, the Chair shall be the Member who received the highest number of 
votes. Thereafter, the method of selecting the Chair, by rotation or otherwise, shall be 
determined by the Parliamentary Assembly, subject to Article IV(3). 
The Presidency shall endeavor to adopt all Presidency Decisions (i.e., those concerning 
matters arising under Article V(3)(a) - (e)) by consensus. Such decisions may, subject to paragraph 
(d) below, nevertheless be adopted by two Members when all efforts to reach consensus have 
failed. 
A dissenting Member of the Presidency may declare a Presidency Decision to be 
destructive of a vital interest of the Entity from the territory from which he was elected, 
provided that he does so within three days of its adoption. Such a Decision shall be referred 
immediately to the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska, if the declaration was made by 
the Member from that territory; to the Bosniac Delegates of the House of Peoples of the 
Federation, if the declaration was made by the Bosniac Member; or to the Croat Delegates of 
that body, if the declaration was made by the Croat Member. If the declaration is confirmed by 
a two-thirds vote of those persons within ten days of the referral, the challenged Presidency 
Decision shall not take effect. 
Powers. The Presidency shall have responsibility for: 
Conducting the foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Appointing ambassadors and other international representatives of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, no more than two-thirds of whom may be selected from the territory of the 
Federation. 
Representing Bosnia and Herzegovina in international and European organizations and 
institutions and seeking membership in such organizations and institutions of which Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is not a member. 
Negotiating, denouncing, and, with the consent of the Parliamentary Assembly, 
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ratifying treaties of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Executing decisions of the Parliamentary Assembly. 
Proposing, upon the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, an annual budget to 
the Parliamentary Assembly. 
Reporting as requested, but not less than annually, to the Parliamentary Assembly on 
expenditures by the Presidency. 
Coordinating as necessary with international and nongovernmental organizations in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Performing such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties, as may be 
assigned to it by the Parliamentary Assembly, or as may be agreed by the Entities. 
Council of Ministers. The Presidency shall nominate the Chair of the Council of 
Ministers, who shall take office upon the approval of the House of Representatives. The Chair 
shall nominate a Foreign Minister, a Minister for Foreign Trade, and other Ministers as may be 
appropriate, who shall take office upon the approval of the House of Representatives. 
Together the Chair and the Ministers shall constitute the Council of Ministers, with 
responsibility for carrying out the policies and decisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the fields 
referred to in Article III(1), (4), and (5) and reporting to the Parliamentary Assembly (including, 
at least annually, on expenditures by Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
No more than two-thirds of all Ministers may be appointed from the territory of the 
Federation. The Chair shall also nominate Deputy Ministers (who shall not be of the same 
constituent people as their Ministers), who shall take office upon the approval of the House of 
Representatives. 
The Council of Ministers shall resign if at any time there is a vote of no-confidence by 
the Parliamentary Assembly… 
 
Article VI: Constitutional Court 
Composition. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall have nine 
members. 
Four members shall be selected by the House of Representatives of the Federation, and 
two members by the Assembly of the Republika Srpska. The remaining three members shall be 
selected by the President of the European Court of Human Rights after consultation with the 
Presidency. 
Judges shall be distinguished jurists of high moral standing. Any eligible voter so 
qualified may serve as a judge of the Constitutional Court. The judges selected by the President 
of the European Court of Human Rights shall not be citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina or of 
any neighboring state… 
For appointments made more than five years after the initial appointment of judges, the 
Parliamentary Assembly may provide by law for a different method of selection of the three 
judges selected by the President of the European Court of Human Rights... 
The Constitutional Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide any dispute that 
arises under this Constitution between the Entities or between Bosnia and Herzegovina and an 
Entity or Entities, or between institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including but not limited 
to: 
Whether an Entity's decision to establish a special parallel relationship with a 
neighboring state is consistent with this Constitution, including provisions concerning the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Whether any provision of an Entity's constitution or law is consistent with this 
Constitution… 
 
Article VII: Central Bank 
There shall be a Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which shall be the sole 
authority for issuing currency and for monetary policy throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The Central Bank's responsibilities will be determined by the Parliamentary Assembly. 
For the first six years after the entry into force of this Constitution, however, it may not extend 
credit by creating money, operating in this respect as a currency board; thereafter, the 
Parliamentary Assembly may give it that authority. 
The first Governing Board of the Central Bank shall consist of a Governor appointed by 
the International Monetary Fund, after consultation with the Presidency, and three members 
appointed by the Presidency, two from the Federation (one Bosniac, one Croat, who shall share 
one vote) and one from the Republika Srpska, all of whom shall serve a six-year term. The 
Governor, who shall not be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any neighboring state, may 
cast tie-breaking votes on the Governing Board. 
Thereafter, the Governing Board of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall 
consist of five persons appointed by the Presidency for a term of six years. The Board shall 
appoint, from among its members, a Governor for a term of six years… 
 
Article IX: General Provisions 
No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who has failed 
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to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal, may stand as a candidate or hold any 
appointive, elective, or other public office in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Compensation for persons holding office in the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
may not be diminished during an officeholder's tenure. 
Officials appointed to positions in the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be 
generally representative of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Article X: Amendment 
Amendment Procedure. This Constitution may be amended by a decision of the 
Parliamentary Assembly, including a two-thirds majority of those present and voting in the 
House of Representatives. 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. No amendment to this Constitution may 
eliminate or diminish any of the rights and freedoms referred to in Article II of this 
Constitution or alter the present paragraph. 
 
Annex 6 – Human Rights 
 
Chapter Two: The Commission on Human Rights 
Part A: General 
 
Article II: Establishment of the Commission 
To assist in honoring their obligations under this Agreement, the Parties hereby 
establish a Commission on Human Rights (the "Commission"). The Commission shall consist of 
two parts: the Office of the Ombudsman and the Human Rights Chamber… 
 
Article IV: Human Rights Ombudsman 
The Parties hereby establish the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (the 
"Ombudsman"). 
The Ombudsman shall be appointed for a non-renewable term of five years by the 
Chairman- in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), after 
consultation with the Parties. He or she shall be independently responsible for choosing his or 
her own staff. Until the transfer described in Article XIV below, the Ombudsman may not be a 
citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina or of any neighboring state. The Ombudsman appointed after 
that transfer shall be appointed by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Members of the Office of the Ombudsman must be of recognized high moral standing 
and have competence in the field of international human rights. 
The Office of the Ombudsman shall be an independent agency. In carrying out its 
mandate, no person or organ of the Parties may interfere with its functions… 
 
Article VI: Powers 
The Ombudsman shall have access to and may examine all official documents, including 
classified ones, as well as judicial and administrative files, and can require any person, including a 
government official, to cooperate by providing relevant information, documents and files. The 
Ombudsman may attend administrative hearings and meetings of other organs and may enter 
and inspect any place where persons deprived of their liberty are confined or work. 
The Ombudsman and staff are required to maintain the confidentiality of all 
confidential information obtained, except where required by order of the Chamber, and shall 
treat all documents and files in accordance with applicable rules… 
 
Article VII: Human Rights Chamber 
The Human Rights Chamber shall be composed of fourteen members. 
Within 90 days after this Agreement enters into force, the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina shall appoint four members and the Republika Srpska shall appoint two members. 
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, pursuant to its resolution (93)6, after 
consultation with the Parties, shall appoint the remaining members, who shall not be citizens of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina or any neighboring state, and shall designate one such member as the 
President of the Chamber. 
All members of the Chamber shall possess the qualifications required for appointment 
to high judicial office or be jurists of recognized competence. The members of the Chamber 
shall be appointed for a term of five years and may be reappointed. 
Members appointed after the transfer described in Article XIV below shall be 
appointed by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina… 
 
Article XIII: Organizations Concerned with Human Rights 
The Parties shall promote and encourage the activities of non-governmental and 
international organizations for the protection and promotion of human rights. 
The Parties join in inviting the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the 
OSCE, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and other 
intergovernmental or regional human rights missions or organizations to monitor closely the 
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human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including through the establishment of local 
offices and the assignment of observers, rapporteurs, or other relevant persons on a permanent 
or mission-by- mission basis and to provide them with full and effective facilitation, assistance 
and access. 
The Parties shall allow full and effective access to non-governmental organizations for 
purposes of investigating and monitoring human rights conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and shall refrain from hindering or impeding them in the exercise of these functions. 
All competent authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall cooperate with and provide 
unrestricted access to the organizations established in this Agreement; any international human 
rights monitoring mechanisms established for Bosnia and Herzegovina; the supervisory bodies 
established by any of the international agreements listed in the Appendix to this Annex; the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; and any other organization authorized by the 
U.N. Security Council with a mandate concerning human rights or humanitarian law… 
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Appendix J 
 
Map of Kosovo1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                        
1 [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia08/kosovo_sm_2008.gif] 
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Appendix K 
 
Extracts of UN Security Council Resolutions related to Kosovo (1998-1999)1 
 
Resolution 1160, 31 March 1998 
The Security Council, 
Noting with appreciation the statements of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, 
Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the United States of America (the Contact Group) of 9 and 25 March 1998 (S/1998/223 and 
S/1998/272), including the proposal on a comprehensive arms embargo on the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, 
Welcoming the decision of the Special Session of the Permanent Council of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of 11 March 1998  
Condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and 
peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation 
Army or any other group or individual and all external support for terrorist activity in Kosovo, 
including finance, arms and training, 
Noting the declaration of 18 March 1998 by the President of the Republic of Serbia on 
the political process in Kosovo and Metohija  
Noting also the clear commitment of senior representatives of the Kosovar Albanian 
community to non-violence, 
Noting that there has been some progress in implementing the actions indicated in the 
Contact Group statement of 9 March 1998, but stressing that further progress is required, 
Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,  
1. Calls upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia immediately to take the further 
necessary steps to achieve a political solution to the issue of Kosovo through dialogue and to 
implement the actions indicated in the Contact Group statements of 9 and 25 March 1998; 
2. Calls also upon the Kosovar Albanian leadership to condemn all terrorist action, and 
emphasizes that all elements in the Kosovar Albanian community should pursue their goals by 
peaceful means only; 
3. Underlines that the way to defeat violence and terrorism in Kosovo is for the 
authorities in Belgrade to offer the Kosovar Albanian community a genuine political process; 
4. Calls upon the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the 
Kosovar Albanian community urgently to enter without preconditions into a meaningful 
dialogue on political status issues, and notes the readiness of the Contact Group to facilitate 
such a dialogue; 
5. Agrees, without prejudging the outcome of that dialogue, with the proposal in the 
Contact Group statements of 9 and 25 March 1998 that the principles for a solution of the 
Kosovo problem should be based on the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and should be in accordance with OSCE standards, including those set out in the 
Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1975, and the 
Charter of the United Nations, and that such a solution must also take into account the rights of 
the Kosovar Albanians and all who live in Kosovo, and expresses its support for an enhanced 
status for Kosovo which would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and 
meaningful self-administration;  
6. Welcomes the signature on 23 March 1998 of an agreement on measures to 
implement the 1996 Education Agreement, calls upon all parties to ensure that its 
implementation proceeds smoothly and without delay according to the agreed timetable and 
expresses its readiness to consider measures if either party blocks implementation; 
7. Expresses its support for the efforts of the OSCE for a peaceful resolution of the 
crisis in Kosovo, including through the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who is also the Special Representative of the European 
Union, and the return of the OSCE long-term missions; 
8. Decides that all States shall, for the purposes of fostering peace and stability in 
Kosovo, prevent the sale or supply to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, by 
their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels and aircraft, of arms and related 
matériel of all types, such as weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment and 
spare parts for the aforementioned, and shall prevent arming and training for terrorist activities 
there; 
9. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a 
committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake 
the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and 
recommendations: 
(a) to seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning                                                         
1 UN, S/Res.1160, 31 March 1998; S/Res.1199, 23 September 1998; S/Res.1244, 10 June 1999. 
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the effective implementation of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution; 
(b) to consider any information brought to its attention by any State concerning 
violations of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution and to recommend appropriate 
measures in response thereto; 
(c) to make periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to it 
regarding alleged violations of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution; 
(d) to promulgate such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation 
of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution; 
(e) to examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 below; 
10. Calls upon all States and all international and regional organizations to act strictly in 
conformity with this resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights granted or 
obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or of any contract entered into 
or any license or permit granted prior to the entry into force of the prohibitions imposed by this 
resolution, and stresses in this context the importance of continuing implementation of the 
Agreement on Sub-regional Arms Control signed in Florence on 14 June 1996… 
18. Affirms that concrete progress to resolve the serious political and human rights 
issues in Kosovo will improve the international position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and prospects for normalization of its international relationships and full participation in 
international institutions; 
19. Emphasizes that failure to make constructive progress towards the peaceful 
resolution of the situation in Kosovo will lead to the consideration of additional measures; 
20. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
 
 
Resolution 1199, 31 March 1998 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolution 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998… 
Gravely concerned at the recent intense fighting in Kosovo and in particular the 
excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army 
which have resulted in numerous civilian casualties and, according to the estimate of the 
Secretary-General, the displacement of over 230,000 persons from their homes,   
Deeply concerned by the flow of refugees into northern Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and other European countries as a result of the use of force in Kosovo, as well as by 
the increasing numbers of displaced persons within Kosovo, and other parts of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, up to 50,000 of whom the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees has estimated are without shelter and other basic necessities… 
Condemning all acts of violence by any party, as well as terrorism inpursuit of political 
goals by any group or individual, and all external support for such activities in Kosovo, including 
the supply of arms and training for terrorist activities in Kosovo and expressing concern at the 
reports of continuing violations of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 (1998), 
Deeply concerned by the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation throughout 
Kosovo, alarmed at the impending humanitarian catastrophe as described in the report of the 
Secretary-General, and emphasizing the need to prevent this from happening, 
Deeply concerned also by reports of increasing violations of human rights and of 
international humanitarian law, and emphasizing the need to ensure that the rights of all 
inhabitants of Kosovo are respected, 
Reaffirming the objectives of resolution 1160 (1998), in which the Council expressed 
support for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem which would include an enhanced 
status for Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-
administration, 
Reaffirming also the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Affirming that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region, 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Demands that all parties, groups and individuals immediately cease hostilities and 
maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which would enhance the 
prospects for a meaningful dialogue between the authorities of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership and reduce the risks of a humanitarian 
catastrophe; 
2. Demands also that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Kosovo Albanian leadership take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation and to 
avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe; 
3. Calls upon the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo 
Albanian leadership to enter immediately into a meaningful dialogue without preconditions and 
with international involvement, and to a clear timetable, leading to an end of the crisis and to a 
negotiated political solution to the issue of Kosovo, and welcomes the current efforts aimed at 
facilitating such a dialogue; 
4. Demands further that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in addition to the 
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measures called for under resolution 1160 (1998), implement immediately the following concrete 
measures towards achieving a political solution to the situation in Kosovo as contained in the 
Contact Group statement of 12 June 1998: 
(a) cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population and order the 
withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression; 
(b) enable effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo by the European 
Community Monitoring Mission and diplomatic missions accredited to the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, including access and complete freedom of movement of such monitors to, from and 
within Kosovo unimpeded by government authorities, and expeditious issuance of appropriate 
travel documents to international personnel contributing to the monitoring; 
(c) facilitate, in agreement with the UNHCR and the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes and allow 
free and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies to Kosovo; 
(d) make rapid progress to a clear timetable, in the dialogue referred to in paragraph 3 
with the Kosovo Albanian community called for in resolution 1160 (1998), with the aim of 
agreeing confidence-building measures and finding a political solution to the problems of 
Kosovo; 
5. Notes, in this connection, the commitments of the President of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, in his joint statement with the President of the Russian Federation of 16 June 
1998: 
(a) to resolve existing problems by political means on the basis of equality for all citizens 
and ethnic communities in Kosovo; 
(b) not to carry out any repressive actions against the peaceful population; 
(c) to provide full freedom of movement for and ensure that there will be no restrictions 
on representatives of foreign States and international institutions accredited to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia monitoring the situation in Kosovo; 
(d) to ensure full and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations, the ICRC and 
the UNHCR, and delivery of humanitarian supplies; 
(e) to facilitate the unimpeded return of refugees and displaced persons under 
programmes agreed with the UNHCR and the ICRC, providing State aid for the reconstruction 
of destroyed homes, and calls for the full implementation of these commitments; 
6. Insists that the Kosovo Albanian leadership condemn all terrorist action, and 
emphasizes that all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community should pursue their goals by 
peaceful means only; 
7. Recalls the obligations of all States to implement fully the prohibitions imposed by 
resolution 1160 (1998); 
8. Endorses the steps taken to establish effective international monitoring of the 
situation in Kosovo, and in this connection welcomes the establishment of the Kosovo 
Diplomatic Observer Mission; 
9. Urges States and international organizations represented in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to make available personnel to fulfil the responsibility of carrying out effective and 
continuous international monitoring in Kosovo until the objectives of this resolution and those 
of resolution 1160 (1998) are achieved; 
10. Reminds the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that it has the primary responsibility 
for the security of all diplomatic personnel accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as 
well as the safety and security of all international and non-governmental humanitarian personnel 
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and all others concerned in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to take all appropriate 
steps to ensure that monitoring personnel performing functions under this resolution are not 
subject to the threat or use of force or interference of any kind; 
11. Requests States to pursue all means consistent with their domestic legislation and 
relevant international law to prevent funds collected on their territory being used to contravene 
resolution 1160 (1998); 
12. Calls upon Member States and others concerned to provide adequate resources for 
humanitarian assistance in the region and to respond promptly and generously to the United 
Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance Related to the Kosovo 
Crisis; 
13. Calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the leaders of the 
Kosovo Albanian community and all others concerned to cooperate fully with the Prosecutor of 
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the investigation of possible violations 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; 
14. Underlines also the need for the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to 
bring to justice those members of the security forces who have been involved in the 
mistreatment of civilians and the deliberate destruction of property; 
15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide regular reports to the Council as 
necessary on his assessment of compliance with this resolution by the authorities of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community, including through 
his regular reports on compliance with resolution 1160 (1998); 
16. Decides, should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution and resolution 
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1160 (1998) not be taken, to consider further action and additional measures to maintain or 
restore peace and stability in the region; 
17. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
 
Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999 
…Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in 
the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2, 
Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful 
self-administration for Kosovo, 
Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security, 
Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the 
implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and 
acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general 
principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in 
annex 2; 
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and 
other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation; 
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and 
verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased 
withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid 
timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be 
synchronized; 
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military 
and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in 
accordance with annex 2; 
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of 
international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, 
and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences; 
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, 
a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and 
further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate 
closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards 
the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner; 
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the 
international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary 
means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below; 
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and 
security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment; 
9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed 
and acting in Kosovo will include: 
(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, 
and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic 
military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2; 
(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo 
Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below; 
(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can 
return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration 
can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered; 
(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take 
responsibility for this task; 
(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take 
over responsibility for this task; 
(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the 
international civil presence; 
(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required; 
(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil 
presence, and other international organizations; 
10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international 
organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an 
interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial 
autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional 
administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-
governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of 
Kosovo; 
11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include: 
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(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy 
and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords 
(S/1999/648); 
(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required 
(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for 
democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the 
holding of elections; 
(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities 
while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and 
other peacebuilding activities; 
(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking 
into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); 
(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional 
institutions to institutions established under a political settlement; 
(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic 
reconstruction; 
(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, 
humanitarian and disaster relief aid; 
(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and 
meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo; 
(j) Protecting and promoting human rights; 
(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their 
homes in Kosovo; 
12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid 
organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective 
delivery of international aid; 
13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to 
economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced 
persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors’ 
conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible 
date; 
14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security 
presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; 
15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately 
all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the 
head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General; 
16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall 
not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security 
presences; 
17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international 
organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and 
stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to 
further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation; 
18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all 
aspects of this resolution; 
19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an 
initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise; 
20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the 
implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international 
civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of 
this resolution; 
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
 
Annex 1 
Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign 
Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre, 6 May 1999 
The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political 
solution to the Kosovo crisis: 
- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo; 
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces; 
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed 
and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common 
objectives; 
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security 
Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitants in Kosovo; 
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- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to 
Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations; 
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework 
agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the 
Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the 
KLA; 
- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis 
region… 
 
Annex 2 
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution 
of the Kosovo crisis: 
1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo. 
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces 
according to a rapid timetable. 
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil 
and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of 
guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives. 
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and 
authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe 
return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. 
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international 
civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. 
The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and 
overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure 
conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo. 
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be 
permitted to return to perform the following functions: 
- Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence; 
- Marking/clearing minefields; 
- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites; 
- Maintaining a presence at key border crossings. 
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to 
Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations. 
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework 
agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the 
Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. 
Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment 
of democratic self-governing institutions. 
9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the 
crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe 
with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic 
prosperity, stability and regional cooperation. 
10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth 
above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are 
specified in the footnote below.  A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded 
that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions 
of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo: 
Withdrawal 
- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of 
a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn; 
Returning personnel 
- Equipment associated with returning personnel; 
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities; 
- Timetable for their return; 
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation; 
- Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the 
international civil mission. 
Notes 
Other required elements: 
- A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete 
withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 
48 hours; 
- Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the 
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supervision of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number 
(hundreds, not thousands); 
- Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals; 
- The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the 
previously determined time for completion of withdrawals. 
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Appendix L 
 
The Constitutional Framework for Self-government in Kosovo (2001)1 
 
Regulation No. 2001/9  
The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Pursuant to the authority given to 
him under United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999 
 
Taking into account United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) Regulation No. 1999/1 of 25 July 1999, as amended, on the Authority of the Interim 
Administration in Kosovo, For the purposes of developing meaningful self-government in 
Kosovo pending a final settlement, and establishing provisional institutions of self-government 
in the legislative, executive and judicial fields through the participation of the people of Kosovo 
in free and fair elections, Hereby promulgates the Constitutional Framework for Provisional 
Self-Government in Kosovo which is attached to the present regulation… 
 
Preamble 
The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Pursuant to the authority 
given to him under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244(1999) of 10 June 1999 
(UNSCR 1244(1999));  
Recalling that UNSCR 1244(1999) envisages the setting-up and development of 
meaningful self-government in Kosovo pending a final settlement;  
Acknowledging Kosovo’s historical, legal and constitutional development; and taking 
into consideration the legitimate aspirations of the people of Kosovo to live in freedom, in 
peace, and in friendly relations with other people in the region;  
Emphasizing that, since its establishment, the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has supported and assisted the people of Kosovo and has worked 
towards this aim by enabling them to take responsibility gradually for the administration of 
Kosovo through the establishment of the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS);  
Considering that, building on the efforts undertaken by UNMIK and on the 
achievements of JIAS, including the valuable contribution by the people of Kosovo, and with a 
view to the further development of self-government in Kosovo, Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government in the legislative, executive and judicial fields shall be established through the 
participation of the people of Kosovo in free and fair elections;  
Determining that, within the limits defined by UNSCR 1244 (1999), responsibilities will 
be transferred to Provisional Institutions of Self-Government which shall work constructively 
towards ensuring conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo, with a 
view to facilitating the determination of Kosovo’s future status through a process at an 
appropriate future stage which shall, in accordance with UNSCR 1244(1999), take full account of 
all relevant factors including the will of the people;  
Considering that gradual transfer of responsibilities to Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government will, through parliamentary democracy, enhance democratic governance and 
respect for the rule of law in Kosovo;  
Endeavouring to promote economic prosperity in Kosovo and the welfare of its people 
through the development of a market economy;  
Affirming that the exercise of the responsibilities of the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government in Kosovo shall not in any way affect or diminish the ultimate authority of the 
SRSG for the implementation of UNSCR 1244(1999);  
Taking into account the Charter of the United Nations; the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Protocols 
thereto; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child; the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Protocols thereto; the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages; the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities; and other relevant principles reflected in internationally 
recognized legal instruments;  
Recognizing the need to fully protect and uphold the rights of all Communities of 
Kosovo and their members; 
Reaffirming the commitment to facilitating the safe return of refugees and displaced 
persons to their homes and their exercise of the right to recover their property and possessions, 
and the commitment to creating conditions for freedom of movement for all persons; 
Recognizing the importance of creating a free, open and safe environment which 
facilitates the participation of all persons including all members of Communities in the process 
of establishing democratic institutions of self-government;                                                         
1 [http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/misc/FrameworkPocket_ENG_Dec2002.pdf] 
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Hereby promulgates the following… 
Chapter 1 - Basic Provisions 
1.1 Kosovo is an entity under interim international administration which, with its 
people, has unique historical, legal, cultural and linguistic attributes. 
1.2 Kosovo is an undivided territory throughout which the Provisional Institutions of 
Self-Government established by this Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government 
(Constitutional Framework) shall exercise their responsibilities. 
1.3 Kosovo is composed of municipalities, which are the basic territorial units of local 
self-government with responsibilities as set forth in UNMIK legislation in force on local self-
government and municipalities in Kosovo. 
1.4 Kosovo shall be governed democratically through legislative, executive, 
and judicial bodies and institutions in accordance with this 
Constitutional Framework and UNSCR 1244(1999)… 
Chapter 2 - Principles to be Observed by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and their officials shall… 
(b) Promote and fully respect the rule of law, human rights and freedoms, democratic 
principles and reconciliation… 
Chapter 3 - Human Rights 
3.1 All persons in Kosovo shall enjoy, without discrimination on any ground and in full 
equality, human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
3.2 The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government shall observe and ensure 
internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including those rights and 
freedoms set forth in: 
(a) The Universal Declaration on Human Rights; (b) The European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols; (c) The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Protocols thereto; (d) The 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; (e) The Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; (f) The Convention on the 
Rights of the Child; (g) The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; and(h) The 
Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 
3.3 The provisions on rights and freedoms set forth in these instruments shall be directly 
applicable in Kosovo as part of this Constitutional Framework. 
3.4 All refugees and displaced persons from Kosovo shall have the right to return to 
their homes, and to recover their property and personal possessions. The competent institutions 
and organs in Kosovo shall take all measures necessary to facilitate the safe return of refugees 
and displaced persons to Kosovo, and shall cooperate fully with all efforts by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees and other international and non-governmental organizations 
concerning the return of refugees and displaced persons. 
Chapter 4 - Rights of Communities and Their Members 
General Provisions 
4.1 Communities of inhabitants belonging to the same ethnic or religious or linguistic 
group (Communities) shall have the rights set forth in this Chapter in order to preserve, protect 
and express their ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities. 
4.2 No person shall be obliged to declare to which Community he belongs, or to declare 
himself a member of any Community. No disadvantage shall result from an individual’s exercise 
of the right to declare or not declare himself a member of a Community. 
4.3 The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government shall be guided in their policy and 
practice by the need to promote coexistence and support reconciliation between Communities 
and to create appropriate conditions enabling Communities to preserve, protect and develop 
their identities. The Institutions also shall promote the preservation of Kosovo’s cultural 
heritage of all Communities without discrimination. 
Rights of Communities and Their Members 
4.4 Communities and their members shall have the right to: 
(a) Use their language and alphabets freely, including before the courts, agencies, and 
other public bodies in Kosovo; 
(b) Receive education in their own language; 
(c) Enjoy access to information in their own language; 
(d) Enjoy equal opportunity with respect to employment in public bodies at all levels 
and with respect to access to public services at all levels; 
(e) Enjoy unhindered contacts among themselves and with members of their respective 
Communities within and outside of Kosovo; 
(f) Use and display Community symbols, subject to the law; 
(g) Establish associations to promote the interests of their Community; 
(h) Enjoy unhindered contacts with, and participate in, local, regional and international 
non-governmental organizations in accordance with the procedures of such organizations; 
(i) Provide information in the language and alphabet of their Community, including by 
establishing and maintaining their own media; 
(j) Provide for education and establish educational institutions, in particular for 
schooling in their own language and alphabet and in Community culture and history, for which 
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financial assistance may be provided, including from public funds in accordance with applicable 
law; provided that, curricula shall respect the applicable law and shall reflect a spirit of tolerance 
among Communities and respect for human rights and the cultural traditions of all 
Communities; 
(k) Promote respect for Community traditions; 
(l) Preserve sites of religious, historical, or cultural importance to the Community, in 
cooperation with relevant public authorities; 
(m) Receive and provide public health and social services, on a nondiscriminatory basis, 
in accordance with applicable standards; 
(n) Operate religious institutions; 
(o) Be guaranteed access to, and representation in, public broadcast media, as well as 
programming in relevant languages; and 
(p) Finance their activities by collecting voluntary contributions from their members or 
from organizations outside Kosovo, or by receiving such funding as may be provided by the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government or by local public authorities, so long as such 
financing is conducted in a fully transparent manner. Protection of Rights of Communities and 
Their Members 
4.5 The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government shall ensure that all Communities 
and their members may exercise the rights specified above. The Provisional Institutions also 
shall ensure fair representation of Communities in employment in public bodies at all levels. 
4.6 Based on his direct responsibilities under UNSCR 1244(1999) to protect and promote human 
rights and to support peace-building activities, the SRSG will retain the authority to intervene as 
necessary in the exercise of self-government for the purpose of protecting the rights of 
Communities and their members… 
Chapter 9 – The Assembly  
…9.1.3 Kosovo shall, for the purposes of election of the Assembly, be considered a 
single, multi-member electoral district. 
(a) One hundred (100) of 120 seats of the Assembly shall be distributed amongst all 
parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives, and independent candidates in proportion to the number 
of valid votes received by them in the election to the Assembly. 
(b) Twenty (20) of the 120 seats shall be reserved for the additional representation of 
non-Albanian Kosovo Communities as follows: (i) Ten (10) seats shall be allocated to parties, 
coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and independent candidates having declared themselves 
representing the Kosovo Serb Community. These seats shall be distributed to such parties, 
coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and independent candidates in proportion to the number of valid 
votes received by them in the election to the Assembly; and (ii) Ten (10) seats shall be allocated 
to other Communities as follows: the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities four (4), the 
Bosniak Community three (3), the Turkish Community two (2) and the Gorani Community one 
(1). The seats for each such Community or group of Communities shall be distributed to parties, 
coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and independent candidates having declared themselves 
representing each such Community in proportion to the number of valid votes received by them 
in the election to the Assembly… 
9.1.7 The Assembly shall have a Presidency consisting of eight Assembly members who 
shall be selected as follows: 
(a) Two members shall be appointed by the party or coalition having obtained the 
highest number of votes in the Assembly elections;  
(b) Two members shall be appointed by the party or coalition having obtained the 
second highest number of votes in the Assembly elections;   
(c) One member shall be appointed by the party or coalition having obtained the third 
highest number of votes in the Assembly elections;  
(d) One member shall be appointed by the party or coalition having obtained the fourth 
highest number of votes in the Assembly elections;  
(e) One member shall be appointed from among the members of the Assembly 
belonging to those parties having declared themselves representative of the Kosovo Serb 
Community; and  
(f) One member shall be appointed from among the members of the Assembly belonging 
to parties having declared themselves representative of a non-Kosovo Albanian and non-Kosovo 
Serb Community. The method for appointing this latter member shall be determined by 
members of the Assembly belonging to these same Communities. 
9.1.8 The Assembly shall endorse these appointments by a formal vote…  
Chapter 10 - Ombudsperson 
10.1 Natural and legal persons in Kosovo shall have the right, without threat of reprisal, 
to make complaints to an independent Office concerning human rights violations or actions 
constituting abuse of authority by any public authority in Kosovo. 
10.2 The Office, in accordance with UNMIK legislation in force, shall have jurisdiction 
to receive and investigate complaints, monitor, take preventive steps, make recommendations 
and advise on any such matters. 
10.3 The Ombudsperson shall give particular priority to allegations of especially severe 
or systematic violations, allegations founded on discrimination, including discrimination against 
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Communities and their members, and allegations of violations of rights of Communities and 
their members… 
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Appendix M 
 
The Ahtisaari Report (2007)1 
 
Recommendation: Kosovo’s status should be independence, supervised by the international 
community 
1. In November 2005, the Secretary-General appointed me as his Special Envoy for the 
future status process for Kosovo. According to my terms of reference, this process should 
culminate in a political settlement that determines the future status of Kosovo. To achieve such 
a political settlement, I have held intensive negotiations with the leadership of Serbia and 
Kosovo over the course of the past year. My team and I have made every effort to facilitate an 
outcome that would be acceptable to both sides. But after more than one year of direct talks, 
bilateral negotiations and expert consultations, it has become clear to me that the parties are not 
able to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s future status. 
2. Throughout the process and on numerous occasions, both parties have reaffirmed 
their categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade demands Kosovo’s autonomy within 
Serbia, while Pristina will accept nothing short of independence. Even on practical issues such as 
decentralization, community rights, the protection of cultural and religious heritage and 
economic matters, conceptual differences — almost always related to the question of status — 
persist, and only modest progress could be achieved. 
3. My mandate explicitly provides that I determine the pace and duration of the future 
status process on the basis of consultations with the Secretary-General, taking into account the 
cooperation of the parties and the situation on the ground. It is my firm view that the 
negotiations’ potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo’s status is 
exhausted. No amount of additional talks, whatever the format, will overcome this impasse. 
4. Nevertheless, resolution of this fundamental issue is urgently needed. Almost eight 
years have passed since the Security Council adopted resolution 1244 (1999) and Kosovo’s 
current state of limbo cannot continue. Uncertainty over its future status has become a major 
obstacle to Kosovo’s democratic development, accountability, economic recovery and inter-
ethnic reconciliation. Such uncertainty only leads to further stagnation, polarizing its 
communities and resulting in social and political unrest. Pretending otherwise and denying or 
delaying resolution of Kosovo’s status risks challenging not only its own stability but the peace 
and stability of the region as a whole. 
5. The time has come to resolve Kosovo’s status. Upon careful consideration of 
Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and taking into account the negotiations 
with the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is 
independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community. My 
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which sets forth these international 
supervisory structures, provides the foundations for a future independent Kosovo that is viable, 
sustainable and stable, and in which all communities and their members can live a peaceful and 
dignified existence. 
 
Reintegration into Serbia is not a viable option 
6. A history of enmity and mistrust has long antagonized the relationship between 
Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. This difficult relationship was exacerbated by the actions of the 
Milosevic regime in the 1990s. After years of peaceful resistance to Milosevic’s policies of 
oppression — the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy, the systematic discrimination against the 
vast Albanian majority in Kosovo and their effective elimination from public life — Kosovo 
Albanians eventually responded with armed resistance. Belgrade’s reinforced and brutal 
repression followed, involving the tragic loss of civilian lives and the displacement and expulsion 
on a massive scale of Kosovo Albanians from their homes, and from Kosovo. The dramatic 
deterioration of the situation on the ground prompted the intervention of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), culminating in the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999) on 10 June 
1999. 
7. For the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete 
separation. The establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to 
resolution 1244 (1999), and its assumption of all legislative, executive and judicial authority 
throughout Kosovo, has created a situation in which Serbia has not exercised any governing 
authority over Kosovo. This is a reality one cannot deny; it is irreversible. A return of Serbian 
rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the people of 
Kosovo. Belgrade could not regain its authority without provoking violent opposition. 
Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of Serbia — however notional such autonomy may be 
— is simply not tenable. 
 
Continued international administration is not sustainable 
8. While UNMIK has made considerable achievements in Kosovo, international                                                         
1 UN, S/2007/168, 26 March 2007. 
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administration of Kosovo cannot continue. Under UNMIK authority, Kosovo institutions have 
been created and developed and have increasingly taken on the responsibility of managing 
Kosovo’s affairs. This has set into motion a dynamic political process, which has reinforced the 
legitimate expectations of the Kosovo people for more ownership in, and responsibility for, their 
own affairs. These expectations cannot be realized within the framework of continued 
international administration. 
9. Further, while UNMIK has facilitated local institutions of self-government, it has not 
been able to develop a viable economy. Kosovo’s uncertain political status has left it unable to 
access international financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy or attract the 
foreign capital it needs to invest in basic infrastructure and redress widespread poverty and 
unemployment. Unlike many of its western Balkans neighbours, Kosovo is also unable to 
participate effectively in any meaningful process towards the European Union — an otherwise 
powerful motor for reform and economic development in the region and the most effective way 
to continue the vital standards implementation process. Kosovo’s weak economy is, in short, a 
source of social and political instability, and its recovery cannot be achieved under the status quo 
of international administration. Economic development in Kosovo requires the clarity and 
stability that only independence can provide. 
 
 
Independence with international supervision is the only viable option 
10. Independence is the only option for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo. Only 
in an independent Kosovo will its democratic institutions be fully responsible and accountable 
for their actions. This will be crucial to ensure respect for the rule of law and the effective 
protection of minorities. With continued political ambiguity, the peace and stability of Kosovo 
and the region remains at risk. Independence is the best safeguard against this risk. It is also the 
best chance for a sustainable long-term partnership between Kosovo and Serbia. 
11. While independence for Kosovo is the only realistic option, Kosovo’s capacity to tackle the 
challenges of minority protection, democratic development, economic recovery and social 
reconciliation on its own is still limited. Kosovo’s political and legal institutions must be further 
developed, with international assistance and under international supervision. This is especially 
important to improve the protection of Kosovo’s most vulnerable populations and their 
participation in public life. 
12. Kosovo’s minority communities — in particular the Kosovo Serbs — continue to face 
difficult living conditions. The violence perpetrated against them in summer 1999 and in March 
2004 has left a profound legacy. While Kosovo’s leaders have increased their efforts to reach out 
to Kosovo Serbs and to improve implementation of standards, protecting the rights of minority 
communities requires their even greater commitment. At the same time, Kosovo Serbs need to 
engage actively in Kosovo’s institutions. They must reverse their fundamental position of 
noncooperation; only with an end to their boycott of Kosovo’s institutions will they be able to 
protect effectively their rights and interests. 
13. I therefore propose that the exercise of Kosovo’s independence, and its fulfilment of the 
obligations set forth in my Settlement proposal, be supervised and supported for an initial period 
by international civilian and military presences. Their powers should be strong — but focused — 
in critical areas such as community rights, decentralization, the protection of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church and the rule of law. These powers should be exercised to correct actions that 
would contravene the provisions of the Settlement proposal and the spirit in which they were 
crafted. Recognizing Kosovo’s current weaknesses, the international community’s intensive 
engagement should extend also to institutional capacity-building. I envisage that the supervisory 
role of the international community would come to an end only when Kosovo has implemented 
the measures set forth in the Settlement proposal.  
14. Notwithstanding this strong international involvement, Kosovo’s authorities are ultimately 
responsible and accountable for the implementation of the Settlement proposal. They will 
succeed in this endeavour only with the commitment and active participation of all 
communities, including, in particular, the Kosovo Serbs.  
Conclusion 
15. Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a precedent for 
other unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopting resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council 
responded to Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo by denying Serbia a role in its governance, placing 
Kosovo under temporary United Nations administration and envisaging a political process 
designed to determine Kosovo’s future. The combination of these factors makes Kosovo’s 
circumstances extraordinary. 
16. For over a year, I have led the political process envisaged in resolution 1244 (1999), exhausting 
every possible avenue to achieve a negotiated settlement. The irreconcilable positions of the 
parties have made that goal unattainable. Nevertheless, after almost eight years of United 
Nations administration, Kosovo’s status must be urgently resolved. My recommendation of 
independence, supervised initially by the international community, takes into account Kosovo’s 
recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and the need for political and economic stability in 
Kosovo. My Settlement proposal, upon which such independence will be based, builds upon the 
positions of the parties in the negotiating process and offers compromises on many issues to 
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achieve a durable solution. I urge the Security Council to endorse my Settlement proposal. 
Concluding this last episode in the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia will allow the region to 
begin a new chapter in its history — one that is based upon peace, stability and prosperity for all.  
  284 
Appendix N 
 
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence (2008)1 
 
Convened in an extraordinary meeting on February 17, 2008, in Pristina, the capital of 
Kosovo, 
Answering the call of the people to build a society that honours human dignity and 
affirms the pride and purpose of its citizens, 
Committed to confront the painful legacy of the recent past in a spirit of reconciliation 
and forgiveness, 
Dedicated to protecting, promoting and honouring the diversity of our people, 
Reaffirming our wish to become fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic family of 
democracies, 
Observing that Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia's non-consensual 
breakup and is not a precedent for any other situation, 
Recalling the years of strife and violence in Kosovo, that disturbed the conscience of all 
civilized people, 
Grateful that in 1999 the world intervened, thereby removing Belgrade's governance 
over Kosovo and placing Kosovo under United Nations interim administration, 
Proud that Kosovo has since developed functional, multiethnic institutions of 
democracy that express freely the will of our citizens, 
Recalling the years of internationally sponsored negotiations between Belgrade and 
Pristina over the question of our future political status, 
Regretting that no mutually acceptable status outcome was possible, in spite of the 
good-faith engagement of our leaders, 
Confirming that the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari provide 
Kosovo with a comprehensive framework for its future development and are in line with the 
highest European standards of human rights and good governance, 
Determined to see our status resolved in order to give our people clarity about their 
future, move beyond the conflicts of the past and realize the full democratic potential of our 
society, Honouring all the men and women who made great sacrifices to build a better future for 
Kosovo, 
1. We, the democratically elected leaders of our people, hereby declare Kosovo to be an 
independent and sovereign state. This declaration reflects the will of our people and it is in full 
accordance with the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his 
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. 
2. We declare Kosovo to be a democratic, secular and multiethnic republic, guided by 
the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law. We shall protect and 
promote the rights of all communities in Kosovo and create the conditions necessary for their 
effective participation in political and decision-making processes. 
3. We accept fully the obligations for Kosovo contained in the Ahtisaari Plan, and 
welcome the framework it proposes to guide Kosovo in the years ahead. We shall implement in 
full those obligations including through priority adoption of the legislation included in its Annex 
XII, particularly those that protect and promote the rights of communities and their members. 
4. We shall adopt as soon as possible a Constitution that enshrines our commitment to 
respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all our citizens, particularly as defined by 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The Constitution shall incorporate all relevant 
principles of the Ahtisaari Plan and be adopted through a democratic and deliberative process. 
5. We welcome the international community's continued support of our democratic 
development through international presences established in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 (1999). We invite and welcome an international civilian presence to 
supervise our implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, and a European Union-led rule of law 
mission. We also invite and welcome the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to retain the 
leadership role of the international military presence in Kosovo and to implement 
responsibilities assigned to it under UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the 
Ahtisaari Plan, until such time as Kosovo institutions are capable of assuming these 
responsibilities. We shall cooperate fully with these presences to ensure Kosovo's future peace, 
prosperity and stability. 
6. For reasons of culture, geography and history, we believe our future lies with the 
European family. We therefore declare our intention to take all steps necessary to facilitate full 
membership in the European Union as soon as feasible and implement the reforms required for 
European and Euro-Atlantic integration. 
7. We express our deep gratitude to the United Nations for the work it has done to help 
us recover and rebuild from war and build institutions of democracy. We are committed to 
working constructively with the United Nations as it continues its work in the period ahead. 
8. With independence comes the duty of responsible membership in the international                                                         
1 [http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635] 
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community. We accept fully this duty and shall abide by the principles of the United Nations 
Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, other acts of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, and the international legal obligations and principles of international comity that mark 
the relations among states. Kosovo shall have its international borders as set forth in Annex 
VIII of the Ahtisaari Plan, and shall fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all 
our neighbours. Kosovo shall also refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
9. We hereby undertake the international obligations of Kosovo, including those 
concluded on our behalf by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) and treaty and other obligations of the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to which we are bound as a former constituent part, including the Vienna 
Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations. We shall cooperate fully with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. We intend to seek membership in 
international organizations, in which Kosovo shall seek to contribute to the pursuit of 
international peace and stability. 
10. Kosovo declares its commitment to peace and stability in our region of southeast 
Europe. Our independence brings to an end the process of Yugoslavia's violent dissolution. 
While this process has been a painful one, we shall work tirelessly to contribute to a 
reconciliation that would allow southeast Europe to move beyond the conflicts of our past and 
forge new links of regional cooperation. We shall therefore work together with our neighbours 
to advance a common European future. 
11. We express, in particular, our desire to establish good relations with all our 
neighbours, including the Republic of Serbia with whom we have deep historical, commercial 
and social ties that we seek to develop further in the near future. We shall continue our efforts 
to contribute to relations of friendship and cooperation with the Republic of Serbia, while 
promoting reconciliation among our people. 
12. We hereby affirm, clearly, specifically, and irrevocably, that Kosovo shall be legally 
bound to comply with the provisions contained in this Declaration, including, especially, the 
obligations for it under the Ahtisaari Plan. In all of these matters, we shall act consistent with 
principles of international law and resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, 
including resolution 1244 (1999). We declare publicly that all states are entitled to rely upon this 
declaration, and appeal to them to extend to us their support and friendship. 
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